About this topic
Summary Evidentialism in its broadest construal is the thesis that only evidential concerns are relevant to whether belief is epistemically appropriate (as opposed to, say, morally appropriate).  A common objection is that this counts as epistemically justified the beliefs of those who are, say, slothful in their evidence gathering or who ignore evidence because, say, they are racists of some sort.  Evidentialists reply that this confuses moral and prudential evaluations with epistemic evaluations. Since evidentialism is an account of the epistemic "ought", some object to limiting epistemic normatively in this way. Some will hold to value monism, arguing that there is only one epistemic norm but that it is some other desideratum like truth or knowledge, others will suggest value pluralism, saying at least that epistemic normatively is not limited to evidential considerations. Another objection to evidentialism is that it is a mere platitude.  Evidentialists reply by trying to flesh out the platitude with an account of evidence.  Many evidentialists prefer a traditional broadly empiricist notion of evidence as consisting in experiences or perhaps the propositional contents of experiences.  Others argue for more stringent restriction of evidence to facts or known facts.  
Key works Feldman & Conee 1985 began the contemporary discussion, with Conee & Feldman 2004 being the locus classicus.  Dougherty 2011 expands the conversation.  As defended in Conee & Feldman 2004, evidentialism is a supervenience thesis: any two possible individuals alike in respect of evidence are alike in respects of what they ought to believe.  Feldman 2000 argues that this epistemic use of "ought" is exhausted by reference to evidence.  DeRose, in Derose 2000, argues against this. Following most traditional epistemologists, Conee & Feldman 2004 take basic evidence to consist in experiences.  Williamson 2000, argues that evidence is all and only one's knowledge.  Conee & Feldman 2008 reply briefly.  Dougherty 2011 puts pressure on Conee & Feldman 2008 to engage more with Williamson.  Dougherty & Rysiew 2013 engages multi-exchange debate with Williamson. A common objection to evidentialism comes from connections between epistemic justification and epistemic responsibility are logically related (identical, even). Feldman & Conee 1985 reply that this objection confuses moral and prudential considerations with epistemic considerations.  Still, Baehr 2009 (anthologized in Dougherty 2011 along with replies by Conee and Feldman) presses the point.  Dougherty 2012 defends the confusion reply. 
Introductions Both Conee & Feldman 2004 and Dougherty 2011 have helpful introductions.  
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334 found
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  1. Risk-Limited Indulgent Permissivism.Guy Axtell - manuscript
    This paper argues for a view described as risk-limited indulgent permissivism. This term may be new to the epistemology of disagreement literature, but the general position denoted has many examples. The paper argues for the need for an epistemology for domains of controversial views (morals, philosophy, politics, and religion), and for the advantages of endorsing a risk-limited indulgent permissivism across these domains. It takes a double-edge approach in articulating for the advantages of interpersonal belief permissivism that is yet risk-limited: Advantages (...)
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  2. Any Dispute May Be Resolved By Argument But Rational People May Disagree About Anything.Danny Frederick - manuscript
    Two common claims in philosophy are that deep disagreements cannot, in principle, be resolved by argument and that normal disagreements will be resolved by argument. In each claim it is assumed that the parties to the disagreement are rational. I argue that both claims are false. The first fails to take account of refutations. The second fails to recognise the role of conjectures in the dynamics of the growth of knowledge. There is no disagreement such that it is impossible for (...)
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  3. Evidence and Virtue (and Beyond) [Long Version, Draft].Kurt Sylvan - manuscript
  4. Plausible Permissivism.Michael G. Titelbaum & Matthew Kopec - manuscript
    Abstract. Richard Feldman’s Uniqueness Thesis holds that “a body of evidence justifies at most one proposition out of a competing set of proposi- tions”. The opposing position, permissivism, allows distinct rational agents to adopt differing attitudes towards a proposition given the same body of evidence. We assess various motivations that have been offered for Uniqueness, including: concerns about achieving consensus, a strong form of evidentialism, worries about epistemically arbitrary influences on belief, a focus on truth-conduciveness, and consequences for peer disagreement. (...)
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  5. Prospects for Evidentialism.Bob Beddor - forthcoming - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge.
    One leading account of justification comes from the evidentialist tradition. According to evidentialists, whether a doxastic attitude is justified depends on whether that attitude is supported by the believer’s evidence. This chapter assesses the prospects for evidentialism, focusing on the question of whether evidentialists can provide a satisfactory account of their key notions – evidence possession and evidential support – without helping themselves to the notion of justification.
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  6. Gettier and Externalism.Rodrigo Borges - forthcoming - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), The Gettier Problem.
  7. Epistemic Paradise Lost: Saving What We Can with Stable Support.Anna-Maria A. Eder - forthcoming - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.
    I focus on the No-Paradise Dilemma, which results from some initially plausible epistemic ideals, coupled with an assumption concerning our evidence. Our evidence indicates that we are not in an epistemic paradise, in which we do not experience cognitive failures. I opt for a resolution of the dilemma that is based on an evidentialist position that can be motivated independently of the dilemma. According to this position, it is rational for an agent to believe a proposition on the agent’s total (...)
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  8. When in Doubt, Withhold: A Defense of Two Rational Grounds for Withholding.A. K. Flowerree - forthcoming - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Angles, New Arguments. Routledge.
    Recent work has argued that there may be cases where no attitude – including withholding – is rationally permissible. In this paper, I consider two such epistemic dilemmas, John Turri’s Dilemma from Testimony and David Alexander’s Dilemma from Doubt. Turri presents a case where one’s only evidence rules out withholding (without warranting belief or disbelief). Alexander presents a case where higher order doubt means one must withhold judgment over whether withholding judgment is rational. In both cases, the authors conclude that (...)
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  9. Wittgenstein and the ABC's of Religious Epistemics.Axtell Guy - forthcoming - In Pritchard Duncan & Venturinha Nuno (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Epistemology of Religion. Oxford University Press.
    This paper continues my development of philosophy of religion as multi-disciplinary comparative research. An earlier paper, “Wittgenstein and Contemporary Belief-Credence Dualism” compared Wittgensteinian reflections on religious discourse and praxis with B-C dualism as articulated by its leading proponents. While some strong commonalities were elaborated that might help to bridge Continental and Analytic approaches in philosophy of religion, Wittgenstein was found to be a corrective to B-C dualism especially as regards how the psychology and philosophy of epistemic luck/risk applies to doxastic (...)
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  10. The evidence in perception.Ali Hasan - forthcoming - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence.
    It is commonly thought that we depend fundamentally on the “evidence of the senses” for our empicial beliefs, including and most directly, our beliefs about our local environment, the spatial world around us. The ultimate evidence we have for our perceptual beliefs is provided in some way by perception or perceptual experience. But what is this evidence? There seem to be three main options: external factualism allows that the evidence include facts about the external world; internal factualism takes facts that (...)
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  11. Positive illusion and the normativity of substantive and structural rationality.Tsung-Hsing Ho - forthcoming - Philosophical Explorations.
    To explain why we should be structurally rational? or mentally coherent? is notoriously difficult. Some philosophers argue that the normativity of structural rationality can be explained in terms of substantive rationality, which is a matter of correct response to reason. I argue that the psychological phenomena? positive illusions? are counterexamples to the substantivist approach. Substantivists dismiss the relevance of positive illusions because they accept evidentialism that reason for belief must be evidence. I argue that their evidentialist stance would imply that (...)
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  12. Evidence and Bias.Nick Hughes - forthcoming - In Clayton Littlejohn & Maria Lasonen Aarnio (eds.), Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence.
    I argue that evidentialism should be rejected because it cannot be reconciled with empirical work on bias in cognitive and social psychology.
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  13. Against the Phenomenal View of Evidence: Disagreement and Shared Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles. New York: Routledge.
    On the phenomenal view of evidence, seemings are evidence. More precisely, if it seems to S that p, S has evidence for p. Here, I raise a worry for this view of evidence; namely, that it has the counterintuitive consequence that two people who disagree would rarely, if ever, share evidence. This is because almost all differences in beliefs would involve differences in seemings: if S believes p, it seems to S that p; if S believes not-p, it seems to (...)
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  14. Faith.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Faith is a trusting commitment to someone or something. Faith helps us meet our goals, keeps our relationships secure, and enables us to retain our commitments over time. Faith is thus a central part of a flourishing life. -/- This article is about the philosophy of faith. There are many philosophical questions about faith, such as: What is faith, and what are its main components or features? What are the different kinds of faith? What’s the relationship between faith and other (...)
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  15. Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson & Margaret Greta Turnbull - forthcoming - In Clayton Littlejohn & Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York: Routledge. pp. 1-13.
    Permissivism is the thesis that, for some body of evidence and a proposition p, there is more than one rational doxastic attitude any agent with that evidence can take toward p. Proponents of uniqueness deny permissivism, maintaining that every body of evidence always determines a single rational doxastic attitude. In this paper, we explore the debate between permissivism and uniqueness about evidence, outlining some of the major arguments on each side. We then consider how permissivism can be understood as an (...)
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  16. Evidentialism and the Problem of Basic Competence.Tim Kearl - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    According to evidentialists about inferential justification, an agent’s evidence—and only her evidence—determines which inferences she would be justified in making, whether or not she in fact makes them. But there seem to be cases in which two agents would be justified in making different inferences from a shared body of evidence, merely in virtue of the different competences those agents possess. These sorts of cases suggest that evidence does not have the pride of place afforded to it by evidentialists; competence (...)
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  17. Permissiveness in morality and epistemology.Han Li & Bradford Saad - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Morality is intrapersonally permissive: cases abound in which an agent has more than one morally permitted option. In contrast, there is a dearth of cases in which an agent has more than one epistemically permitted response to her evidence. Given the structural parallels between morality and epistemology, why do sources of moral permissiveness fail to have parallel permissive effects in the epistemic domain? This asymmetry between morality and epistemology cries out for explanation. The paper's task is to offer an answer (...)
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  18. The Right in the Good: A Defense of Teleological Non-Consequentialism in Epistemology.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij Jeff Dunn (ed.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford University Press.
    There has been considerable discussion recently of consequentialist justifications of epistemic norms. In this paper, I shall argue that these justifications are not justifications. The consequentialist needs a value theory, a theory of the epistemic good. The standard theory treats accuracy as the fundamental epistemic good and assumes that it is a good that calls for promotion. Both claims are mistaken. The fundamental epistemic good involves accuracy, but it involves more than just that. The fundamental epistemic good is knowledge, not (...)
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  19. Reasons and Theoretical Rationality.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Daniel Star (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.
    A discussion of epistemic reasons, theoretical rationality, and the relationship between them. Discusses the ontology of reasons and evidence, the relationship between reasons (motivating, normative, possessed, apparent, genuine, etc.) and rationality, the relationship between epistemic reasons and evidence, the relationship between rationality, justification, and knowledge, and many other related topics.
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  20. The unity of reason.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. Oxford University Press.
    Cases of reasonable, mistaken belief figure prominently in discussions of the knowledge norm of assertion and practical reason as putative counterexamples to these norms. These cases are supposed to show that the knowledge norm is too demanding and that some weaker norm ought to put in its place. These cases don't show what they're intended to. When you assert something false or treat some falsehood as if it's a reason for action, you might deserve an excuse. You often don't deserve (...)
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  21. Knowledge and Prizes.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - In Artūrs Logins & Jacques-Henri Vollet (eds.), Putting Knowledge to Work: New Directions for Knowledge-First Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    We examine two leading theories of rational belief, the Lockean view and the explanationist view. The first is appealing because it fits with some independently plausible claims about the ways that rational persons pursue their aims. The second is appealing because it seems to account for intuitions that cause trouble for the Lockean view. While fitting the intuitive data is desirable, we are troubled that the explanationist view seems to clash with our theoretical beliefs about what rationality must be like. (...)
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  22. God and the Bayesian Conception of Evidence.David Manley - forthcoming - Religious Studies.
    Contemporary arguments for and against the existence of God are often formulated within a broadly Bayesian framework. Arguments of this sort focus on a specific feature of the world that is taken to provide probabilistic evidence for or against the existence of God: the existence of life in a ‘fine-tuned’ universe, the magnitude of suffering, divine hiddenness, etc. In each case, the idea is that things were more likely to be this way if God existed than if God did not (...)
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  23. On the epistemic rationality and significance of self-fulfilling beliefs.Chad Marxen - forthcoming - Synthese 199 (1):4243-4260.
    Some propositions are not likely to be true overall, but are likely to be true if you believe them. Appealing to the platitude that belief aims at truth, it has become increasingly popular to defend the view that such propositions are epistemically rational to believe. However, I argue that this view runs into trouble when we consider the connection between what’s epistemically rational to believe and what’s practically rational to do. I conclude by discussing how rejecting the view bears on (...)
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  24. The Normative Ground of the Evidential Ought.Anne Meylan - forthcoming - In Kevin McCain & S. Stapleford (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, État de New York, États-Unis:
    Many philosophers have defended the view that we are subject to the following evidential ought: “One ought to believe in accordance with one's evidence.” Although they agree on this, a more fundamental question keeps dividing them: from where does the evidential ought derive its normative force? The instrinsicalist answer to this question is sometimes described as the claim that "there is a brute epistemic value in believing in accordance with one's evidence" (Cowie, 2014, 4005). But what does this really mean? (...)
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  25. Why Evidentialists Shouldn't Make Evidential Fit Dispositional.Andrew Moon & Pamela Robinson - forthcoming - Syndicate Philosophy.
    Kevin McCain’s Evidentialism and Epistemic Justification is the most thorough defense of evidentialism to date. In this work, McCain proposes insightful new theses to fill in underdeveloped parts of evidentialism. One of these new theses is an explanationist account of evidential fit that appeals to dispositional properties. We argue that this explanationist account faces counterexamples, and that, more generally, explanationists should not understand evidential fit in terms of dispositional properties.
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  26. Evidentialism, Inertia, and Imprecise Probability.William Peden - forthcoming - The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:1-23.
    Evidentialists say that a necessary condition of sound epistemic reasoning is that our beliefs reflect only our evidence. This thesis arguably conflicts with standard Bayesianism, due to the importance of prior probabilities in the latter. Some evidentialists have responded by modelling belief-states using imprecise probabilities (Joyce 2005). However, Roger White (2010) and Aron Vallinder (2018) argue that this Imprecise Bayesianism is incompatible with evidentialism due to “inertia”, where Imprecise Bayesian agents become stuck in a state of ambivalence towards hypotheses. Additionally, (...)
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  27. Weak Non-Evidentialism.Tommaso Piazza - forthcoming - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Luca Moretti (eds.), Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Brill.
    First aim of this paper is to show that Evidentialism, when paired with a Psychologistic ontology of evidence, is unable to account for ordinary cases of inferential justification. As many epistemologists have maintained, however, when it is paired with a Propositionalist ontology of evidence, Evidentialism is unable to explain in a satisfactory way ordinary cases of perceptual justification. So, the Evidentialist is faced with a dilemma. Second aim of this paper is to give an argument in favour of Propositionalism about (...)
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  28. Self-Fulfilling Beliefs: A Defense.Paul Silva Jr - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    Self-fulfilling beliefs are, in at least some cases, a kind of belief that is rational to form and hold in the absence of evidence. The rationality of such beliefs have significant implications for a range of debates in epistemology. Most startlingly, it undermines the idea that having sufficient evidence for the truth of p is necessary for it to be rational to believe p. The rationality of self-fulfilling beliefs is here defended against the idea that their rationality is incompatible with (...)
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  29. Higher-Order Defeat and the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence.Mattias Skipper - forthcoming - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Evidentialism is the thesis, roughly, that one’s beliefs should fit one’s evidence. The enkratic principle is the thesis, roughly, that one’s beliefs should "line up" with one’s beliefs about which beliefs one ought to have. While both theses have seemed attractive to many, they jointly entail the controversial thesis that self-misleading evidence is impossible. That is to say, if evidentialism and the enkratic principle are both true, one’s evidence cannot support certain false beliefs about which beliefs one’s evidence supports. Recently, (...)
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  30. Unifying Epistemic and Practical Rationality.Mattias Skipper - forthcoming - Mind.
    Many theories of rational action are predicated on the idea that what it is rational to do in a given situation depends, in part, on what it is rational to believe in that situation. In short: they treat epistemic rationality as explanatorily prior to practical rationality. If they are right in doing so, it follows, on pain of explanatory circularity, that epistemic rationality cannot itself be a form of practical rationality. Yet, many epistemologists have defended just such a view of (...)
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  31. Evidence and Virtue (and Beyond).Kurt Sylvan - forthcoming - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Evidence.
  32. On Suspending Properly.Kurt Sylvan & Errol Lord - forthcoming - In Luis Oliveria & Paul Silva (eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification. Routledge.
    We argue for a novel view of suspending judgment properly--i.e., suspending judgment in an ex post justified way. In so doing we argue for a Kantian virtue-theoretic view of epistemic normativity and against teleological virtue-theoretic accounts.
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  33. Whither Higher-Order Evidence?Daniel Whiting - forthcoming - In Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Mattias Skipper (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    First-order evidence is evidence which bears on whether a proposition is true. Higher-order evidence is evidence which bears on whether a person is able to assess her evidence for or against a proposition. A widespread view is that higher-order evidence makes a difference to whether it is rational for a person to believe a proposition. In this paper, I consider in what way higher-order evidence might do this. More specifically, I consider whether and how higher-order evidence plays a role in (...)
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  34. The Pragmatic Hypothesis Testing Theory of Self-Deception and the Belief/Acceptance Distinction.Kevin Lynch - 2023 - Philosophy 98 (1):29-53.
    According to the pragmatic hypothesis testing theory, how much evidence we require before we believe something varies depending on the expected costs of falsely believing and disbelieving it. This theory has been used in the self-deception debate to explain our tendencies towards self-deceptive belief formation. This article argues that the application of this theory in the self-deception debate has overlooked the distinction between belief and acceptance, and that the theory in all likelihood models acceptance rather than belief, in which case (...)
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  35. Ética da Crença.Eros Carvalho - 2022 - In Rogel Esteves de Oliveira, Kátia Martins Etcheverry, Thiege Vieira Rodrigues & Carlos Augusto Sartori (eds.), Compêndio de Epistemologia. Porto Alegre: Editora Fi. pp. 467-493.
    Há pelo menos três modos pelos quais o debate sobre a conduta doxástica se relaciona com a ética. O primeiro e menos contencioso assinala que o ato de crer, analogamente às ações morais, responde a um tipo de normatividade, não necessariamente moral. Por exemplo, as normas para o ato de crer podem ser puramente epistêmicas. Nesse caso, essas normas diriam respeito a como o agente deve visar ou buscar a verdade. O segundo modo como o debate da ética da crença (...)
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  36. SUBDETERMINAÇÃO E FECHO EPISTÊMICO: UM ENSAIO EM BUSCA DO ARGUMENTO CÉTICO FUNDAMENTAL.Samuel Cibils - 2022 - DISSERTATIO Revista de Filosofia 55:201 - 216.
    Abstract: The contemporary discussion of radical skepticism – the category of skepticism that defends the thesis that knowledge is impossible – is presented in two different arguments: skeptical arguments of epistemic closure (AFE) and epistemic underdetermination (ASE). We intend to describe how the skeptical paradox is constructed. Then, how the two classes of argument are related to the principles of underdetermination and epistemic closure. Finally, we will present the logical argument which shows that AFE implies ASE and not the opposite; (...)
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  37. Externalism and exploitability.Nilanjan Das - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):101-128.
    According to Bayesian orthodoxy, an agent should update---or at least should plan to update---her credences by conditionalization. Some have defended this claim by means of a diachronic Dutch book argument. They say: an agent who does not plan to update her credences by conditionalization is vulnerable (by her own lights) to a diachronic Dutch book, i.e., a sequence of bets which, when accepted, guarantee loss of utility. Here, I show that this argument is in tension with evidence externalism, i.e., the (...)
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  38. Is Jamesian Evidentialism a Coherent Position?Robert A. Elisher - 2022 - Southwest Philosophy Review 38 (2):21-24.
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  39. Appearance and Explanation: Phenomenal Explanationism in Epistemology by Kevin McCain and Luca Moretti. [REVIEW]Caleb Estep - 2022 - Review of Metaphysics 76 (2):354-356.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Appearance and Explanation: Phenomenal Explanationism in Epistemology by Kevin McCain and Luca MorettiCaleb EstepMcCAIN, Kevin and Luca Moretti. Appearance and Explanation: Phenomenal Explanationism in Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. iv + 195 pp. Cloth, $70.00Since its beginning, phenomenal conservatism (PC) has grown rapidly in popularity as a theory of epistemic justification. In Appearance and Explanation, McCain and Moretti develop out of PC a new theory of justification (...)
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  40. Evidentialism about Faith and the Justification Encroachment Dilemma.Alex R. Gillham - 2022 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):62-66.
    In this paper, I develop what I call the Justification Encroachment (JE) Dilemma for Dormandy’s Evidentialism about Faith (EaF). The dilemma is this. If JE is true, then belief about objects of faith will be very difficult to justify, perhaps even impossible. If JE is false, then beliefs about objects of faith require no greater justification than any other belief, so that faith requires no more respect for evidence than anything else. After developing each horn, I consider very briefly how (...)
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  41. Was William James an Evidentialist?Henry Jackman - 2022 - Southwest Philosophy Review 38 (1):81-90.
    William James has traditionally been seen as a critic of evidentialism, with his claim that “Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds” being understood as saying that in certain cases we have the right to believe beyond what is certified by the evidence. However, there is an alternate, “expansive”, reading of James (defended most recently by Cheryl Misak, (...)
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  42. The Material Theory of Induction, by John Norton. [REVIEW]William Peden - 2022 - BJPS Review of Books.
    Even prior to its publication, John Norton’s book has stimulated debates about induction. Its publication will galvanize these discussions. Does it merit all this attention? Yes, and not just from philosophers of science. Practically all philosophers will find novel and thought-provoking ideas, with implications for their research.
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  43. Radical epistemology, structural explanations, and epistemic weaponry.Richard Pettigrew - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):289-304.
    When is a belief justified? There are three families of arguments we typically use to support different accounts of justification: arguments from our intuitive responses to vignettes that involve the concept; arguments from the theoretical role we would like the concept to play in epistemology; and arguments from the practical, moral, and political uses to which we wish to put the concept. I focus particularly on the third sort, and specifically on arguments of this sort offered by Clayton Littlejohn in (...)
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  44. On believing indirectly for practical reasons.Sebastian Schmidt - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1795-1819.
    It is often argued that there are no practical reasons for belief because we could not believe for such reasons. A recent reply by pragmatists is that we can often believe for practical reasons because we can often cause our beliefs for practical reasons. This paper reveals the limits of this recently popular strategy for defending pragmatism, and thereby reshapes the dialectical options for pragmatism. I argue that the strategy presupposes that reasons for being in non-intentional states are not reducible (...)
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  45. No Justification for Smith’s Incidentally True Beliefs.Alfred Schramm - 2022 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 99 (2):273–292.
    Edmund Gettier (1963) argued that there can be justified true belief (JTB) that is not knowledge. I question the correctness of his argument by showing that Smith of Gettier’s famous examples does not earn justification for his incidentally true beliefs, while a doxastically more conscientious person S would come to hold justified but false beliefs. So, Gettier’s (and analogous) cases do not result in justified _and_ true belief. This is due to a tension between deductive closure of justification and evidential (...)
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  46. Reason and Religion between " Evidentialism " and "Fideism".Mustafa Azizi - 2021 - Al-Daleel 3 (12):148-164.
    There is a serious conflict between reason and faith since the Age of Enlightenment until present era. In order to show the relation between reason and religion, British mathematician "William Clifford" proposed the theory of "Evidentialism". Based on this theory, religious beliefs cannot be accepted unless sufficient evidences and indications are established to support and confirm them; otherwise, they are rejected. The belief in anything is false if it is not based on sufficient evidences, arguments and indications. Evidentialism rejects the (...)
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  47. Reasons for Reliabilism.Bob Beddor - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 146-176.
    One leading approach to justification comes from the reliabilist tradition, which maintains that a belief is justified provided that it is reliably formed. Another comes from the ‘Reasons First’ tradition, which claims that a belief is justified provided that it is based on reasons that support it. These two approaches are typically developed in isolation from each other; this essay motivates and defends a synthesis. On the view proposed here, justification is understood in terms of an agent’s reasons for belief, (...)
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  48. Prejudiced beliefs based on the evidence: responding to a challenge for evidentialism.Anna Brinkerhoff - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14317-14331.
    According to evidentialism, what is epistemically rational to believe is determined by evidence alone. So, assuming that prejudiced beliefs are irrational, evidentialism entails that they must not be properly based on the evidence. Recently, philosophers have been interested in cases of beliefs that seem to undermine evidentialism: these are beliefs that seem both prejudiced and properly based on the evidence. In these cases, a believer has strong statistical evidence that most members of a social group have some property and then (...)
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  49. The normality of error.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2509-2533.
    Formal models of appearance and reality have proved fruitful for investigating structural properties of perceptual knowledge. This paper applies the same approach to epistemic justification. Our central goal is to give a simple account of The Preface, in which justified belief fails to agglomerate. Following recent work by a number of authors, we understand knowledge in terms of normality. An agent knows p iff p is true throughout all relevant normal worlds. To model The Preface, we appeal to the normality (...)
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  50. Akratic (epistemic) modesty.David Christensen - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (7):2191-2214.
    Abstract: Theories of epistemic rationality that take disagreement (or other higher-order evidence) seriously tend to be “modest” in a certain sense: they say that there are circumstances in which it is rational to doubt their correctness. Modest views have been criticized on the grounds that they undermine themselves—they’re self-defeating. The standard Self-Defeat Objections depend on principles forbidding epistemically akratic beliefs; but there are good reasons to doubt these principles—even New Rational Reflection, which was designed to allow for certain special cases (...)
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