||Ontological realism is a term best applied to theories that are realist regarding what there is, where ‘what there is’ (or the relevant ontology) is usually specified previous to or in conjunction with the realism regarding it. Realism, very simply put, is the notion that something is real. Ideas as to what there is can range from numbers to tables, so realism regarding a given ontology may seem more or less appealing or acceptable depending on the intuitions and beliefs one might already have about the reality of the sorts of things in that ontology. A commitment to there being a fact of the matter might reasonably be expected to accompany accounts that go to the trouble of laying down what there is. Thus, if I say tables are real, as an ontological realist, I might reasonably be interpreted as claiming that this is an objective fact. Things, of course, are not this simple. There are ontological realists who don’t care to claim there’s any fact of the matter; there are those who dispute exactly which bits of a given ontology exist; there are those who argues that it all depends on exactly what you mean by ‘exist’ and/or ‘real’, which can vary according to context. On top of that, there endless nuance in the term ‘realism’. Philosophers identifying as realists can take a startling array of positions: ranging from relativism to determinism, and involving commitment to the existence from everything through to nothing at all (although those committed to the latter usually argue that we can feel free to speak as though some things are real). Nonetheless, if you begin with the supposition that ontological realism is about what there is being real, you’ve enough to be going on with.