About this topic
Summary The moral status of artificial systems is an increasingly open discussion due to the increasing ubiquity of increasingly intelligent machine systems. Questions range from those about the "smart" systems controlling traffic lights to those controlling missile systems to those counting votes, to questions about degrees of responsibility due semi-autonomous drones and their pilots given operating conditions at either end of the joystick, and finally to questions about the relative moral status of "fully autonomous" artificial agents, "Terminator"s and "Wall-E"s. Prior to the rise of intelligent machines, the issue may have seemed moot. Kant had made the status of anything that is not an end in itself very clear - it had a price, and you could buy and sell it. If its manufacture runs contrary to the categorical imperative, then it is immoral, e.g. there are no semi-autonomous flying missile launchers in the kingdom of ends, so no Kantan moral agent could ever will their creation. Even earlier, after using a number of physical models to describe the dynamics of cognition in the Thaetatus, Socrates tells us that some things "have infinity within them" - i.e. can't be ascribed a limited value - and others not. As machines exemplifying and then embodying such capacities typically reserved to human beings (Kant, famously for example, writes that we know only human beings to be able to answer to moral responsibility) are trained and learn, questions of robot psychology and motivation, autonomy as a capacity for self-determination, and so political and moral status under conventional law become important. To date, established conventions are typically taken as a given, as engineers have focused mainly on delivering non-autonomous machines and other artificial systems as tools for industry. However, even with limited applications in for example artificial companions, pets, interesting new issues have emerged. For example, can a human being fall in love with a computer program of adequate complexity? What about a robot sex industry? Artificial nurses? If an artificial nurse refuses a human doctor's order to remove life support from a child because his parents cannot pay the medical bills, is the nurse a hero, or is it malfunctioning? Closer to the moment, questions about expert systems and automation of transport, manufacturing and logistics raise important moral questions about the role of artificial systems in the displacement of human workers, public safety, as well as questions concerning the redirection of crucial natural resources to the maintenance of centrally controlled artificial systems at the expense of local human systems. Issues such as these make the relative status of widely distributed artificial systems an important area of discourse. This is especially true with intelligent machine technologies - AI. Recent use of drones in surveillance and wars of aggression, and the relationship of the research community to these end-user activities of course raise the same ethical questions which faced scientists developing the nuclear bomb in the middle 20th century. Thus, we can see that questions about the moral status of artificial systems - especially "intelligent" and "intelligence" systems - arise from the perspectives of the potential product, the engineer ultimately responsible (c.f. IEEE ethics for engineers), and the "end-user" left to live in terms of the artificial systems so established. Finally, given the diverse fields confronting similar issues as increasingly intelligent machines are integrated into various aspects of daily life, discourse on the relative moral status of artificial systems promises to be an increasingly integrative one, as well. 
Related categories

435 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 435
  1. The Moral Addressor Account of Moral Agency.Dorna Behdadi - manuscript
    According to the practice-focused approach to moral agency, a participant stance towards an entity is warranted by the extent to which this entity qualifies as an apt target of ascriptions of moral responsibility, such as blame. Entities who are not eligible for such reactions are exempted from moral responsibility practices, and thus denied moral agency. I claim that many typically exempted cases may qualify as moral agents by being eligible for a distinct participant stance. When we participate in moral responsibility (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Is Simulation a Substitute for Experimentation?Isabelle Peschard - manuscript
    It is sometimes said that simulation can serve as epistemic substitute for experimentation. Such a claim might be suggested by the fast-spreading use of computer simulation to investigate phenomena not accessible to experimentation (in astrophysics, ecology, economics, climatology, etc.). But what does that mean? The paper starts with a clarification of the terms of the issue and then focuses on two powerful arguments for the view that simulation and experimentation are ‘epistemically on a par’. One is based on the claim (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3. Anthropomorphism and the Impact on the Perception and Implementation of AI Systems.Marie Oldfield -
    Anthropomorphism has long been used as a way for humans to make sense of their surroundings. By converting abstract concepts into objects or concepts that we can relate to we discover a common language with which we can communicate i.e "by which one thing is described in terms of another" ?. Anthropomorphism is based in multiple fields such as, sociology, psychology, neurology philosophy etc. This technique has been seen across history in such fields as religion, fables and folk takes where (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. From Responsibility to Reason-Giving Explainable Artificial Intelligence.Kevin Baum, Susanne Mantel, Timo Speith & Eva Schmidt - forthcoming - Philosophy and Technology.
    We argue that explainable artificial intelligence (XAI), specifically reason-giving XAI, often constitutes the most suitable way of ensuring that someone can properly be held responsible for decisions that are based on the outputs of artificial intelligent (AI) systems. We first show that, to close moral responsibility gaps (Matthias 2004), often a human in the loop is needed who is directly responsible for particular AI-supported decisions. Second, we appeal to the epistemic condition on moral responsibility to argue that, in order to (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Supporting Human Autonomy in AI Systems.Rafael Calvo, Dorian Peters, Karina Vold & Richard M. Ryan - forthcoming - In Christopher Burr & Luciano Floridi (eds.), Ethics of Digital Well-being: A Multidisciplinary Approach.
    Autonomy has been central to moral and political philosophy for millenia, and has been positioned as a critical aspect of both justice and wellbeing. Research in psychology supports this position, providing empirical evidence that autonomy is critical to motivation, personal growth and psychological wellness. Responsible AI will require an understanding of, and ability to effectively design for, human autonomy (rather than just machine autonomy) if it is to genuinely benefit humanity. Yet the effects on human autonomy of digital experiences are (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6. Anti-Natalism and the Creation of Artificial Minds.Bartek Chomanski - forthcoming - Journal of Applied Philosophy.
    Must opponents of creating conscious artificial agents embrace anti-natalism? Must anti-natalists be against the creation of conscious artificial agents? This article examines three attempts to argue against the creation of potentially conscious artificial intelligence (AI) in the context of these questions. The examination reveals that the argumentative strategy each author pursues commits them to the anti-natalist position with respect to procreation; that is to say, each author's argument, if applied consistently, should lead them to embrace the conclusion that procreation is, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. If Robots Are People, Can They Be Made for Profit? Commercial Implications of Robot Personhood.Bartek Chomanski - forthcoming - AI and Ethics.
    It could become technologically possible to build artificial agents instantiating whatever properties are sufficient for personhood. It is also possible, if not likely, that such beings could be built for commercial purposes. This paper asks whether such commercialization can be handled in a way that is not morally reprehensible, and answers in the affirmative. There exists a morally acceptable institutional framework that could allow for building artificial persons for commercial gain. The paper first considers the minimal ethical requirements that any (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. Liability for Robots: Sidestepping the Gaps.Bartek Chomanski - forthcoming - Philosophy and Technology:1-20.
    In this paper, I outline a proposal for assigning liability for autonomous machines modeled on the doctrine of respondeat superior. I argue that the machines’ users’ or designers’ liability should be determined by the manner in which the machines are created, which, in turn, should be responsive to considerations of the machines’ welfare interests. This approach has the twin virtues of promoting socially beneficial design of machines, and of taking their potential moral patiency seriously. I then argue for abandoning the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. The Philosophical Case for Robot Friendship.John Danaher - forthcoming - Journal of Posthuman Studies.
    Friendship is an important part of the good life. While many roboticists are eager to create friend-like robots, many philosophers and ethicists are concerned. They argue that robots cannot really be our friends. Robots can only fake the emotional and behavioural cues we associate with friendship. Consequently, we should resist the drive to create robot friends. In this article, I argue that the philosophical critics are wrong. Using the classic virtue-ideal of friendship, I argue that robots can plausibly be considered (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  10. What Matters for Moral Status: Behavioral or Cognitive Equivalence?John Danaher - forthcoming - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics.
    Henry Shevlin’s paper—“How could we know when a robot was a moral patient?” – argues that we should recognize robots and artificial intelligence (AI) as psychological moral patients if they are cognitively equivalent to other beings that we already recognize as psychological moral patients (i.e., humans and, at least some, animals). In defending this cognitive equivalence strategy, Shevlin draws inspiration from the “behavioral equivalence” strategy that I have defended in previous work but argues that it is flawed in crucial respects. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Freedom in an Age of Algocracy.John Danaher - forthcoming - In Shannon Vallor (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Technology. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    There is a growing sense of unease around algorithmic modes of governance ('algocracies') and their impact on freedom. Contrary to the emancipatory utopianism of digital enthusiasts, many now fear that the rise of algocracies will undermine our freedom. Nevertheless, there has been some struggle to explain exactly how this will happen. This chapter tries to address the shortcomings in the existing discussion by arguing for a broader conception/understanding of freedom as well as a broader conception/understanding of algocracy. Broadening the focus (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Walking Through the Turing Wall.Albert Efimov - forthcoming - In Teces.
    Can the machines that play board games or recognize images only in the comfort of the virtual world be intelligent? To become reliable and convenient assistants to humans, machines need to learn how to act and communicate in the physical reality, just like people do. The authors propose two novel ways of designing and building Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). The first one seeks to unify all participants at any instance of the Turing test – the judge, the machine, the human (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Ethics for Artificial Intellects.John Storrs Hall - forthcoming - Nanoethics: The Ethical and Social Implications of Nanotechnology.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. A Dilemma for Moral Deliberation in AI in Advance.Ryan Jenkins & Duncan Purves - forthcoming - International Journal of Applied Philosophy.
    Many social trends are conspiring to drive the adoption of greater automation in society, and we will certainly see a greater offloading of human decisionmaking to robots in the future. Many of these decisions are morally salient, including decisions about how benefits and burdens are distributed. Roboticists and ethicists have begun to think carefully about the moral decision making apparatus for machines. Their concerns often center around the plausible claim that robots will lack many of the mental capacities that are (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Safety Requirements Vs. Crashing Ethically: What Matters Most for Policies on Autonomous Vehicles.Björn Lundgren - forthcoming - AI and Society:1-11.
    The philosophical–ethical literature and the public debate on autonomous vehicles have been obsessed with ethical issues related to crashing. In this article, these discussions, including more empirical investigations, will be critically assessed. It is argued that a related and more pressing issue is questions concerning safety. For example, what should we require from autonomous vehicles when it comes to safety? What do we mean by ‘safety’? How do we measure it? In response to these questions, the article will present a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16. Ethics of Artificial Intelligence.Vincent C. Müller - forthcoming - In Anthony Elliott (ed.), The Routledge social science handbook of AI. London: Routledge. pp. 1-20.
    Artificial intelligence (AI) is a digital technology that will be of major importance for the development of humanity in the near future. AI has raised fundamental questions about what we should do with such systems, what the systems themselves should do, what risks they involve and how we can control these. - After the background to the field (1), this article introduces the main debates (2), first on ethical issues that arise with AI systems as objects, i.e. tools made and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Human Goals Are Constitutive of Agency in Artificial Intelligence.Elena Popa - forthcoming - Philosophy and Technology:1-20.
    The question whether AI systems have agency is gaining increasing importance in discussions of responsibility for AI behavior. This paper argues that an approach to artificial agency needs to be teleological, and consider the role of human goals in particular if it is to adequately address the issue of responsibility. I will defend the view that while AI systems can be viewed as autonomous in the sense of identifying or pursuing goals, they rely on human goals and other values incorporated (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Mapping the Stony Road Toward Trustworthy AI: Expectations, Problems, Conundrums.Gernot Rieder, Judith Simon & Pak-Hang Wong - forthcoming - In Marcello Pelillo & Teresa Scantamburlo (eds.), Machines We Trust: Perspectives on Dependable AI. Cambridge, Mass.:
    The notion of trustworthy AI has been proposed in response to mounting public criticism of AI systems, in particular with regard to the proliferation of such systems into ever more sensitive areas of human life without proper checks and balances. In Europe, the High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence has recently presented its Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI. To some, the guidelines are an important step for the governance of AI. To others, the guidelines distract effort from genuine AI regulation. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. Do Automated Vehicles Face Moral Dilemmas? A Plea for a Political Approach.Javier Rodríguez-Alcázar, Lilian Bermejo-Luque & Alberto Molina-Pérez - forthcoming - Philosophy and Technology:1-22.
    How should automated vehicles react in emergency circumstances? Most research projects and scientific literature deal with this question from a moral perspective. In particular, it is customary to treat emergencies involving AVs as instances of moral dilemmas and to use the trolley problem as a framework to address such alleged dilemmas. Some critics have pointed out some shortcomings of this strategy and have urged to focus on mundane traffic situations instead of trolley cases involving AVs. Besides, these authors rightly point (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  20. On and Beyond Artifacts in Moral Relations: Accounting for Power and Violence in Coeckelbergh’s Social Relationism.Fabio Tollon & Kiasha Naidoo - forthcoming - AI and Society:1-10.
    The ubiquity of technology in our lives and its culmination in artificial intelligence raises questions about its role in our moral considerations. In this paper, we address a moral concern in relation to technological systems given their deep integration in our lives. Coeckelbergh develops a social-relational account, suggesting that it can point us toward a dynamic, historicised evaluation of moral concern. While agreeing with Coeckelbergh’s move away from grounding moral concern in the ontological properties of entities, we suggest that it (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Moral Zombies: Why Algorithms Are Not Moral Agents.Carissa Véliz - forthcoming - AI and Society:1-11.
    In philosophy of mind, zombies are imaginary creatures that are exact physical duplicates of conscious subjects but for whom there is no first-personal experience. Zombies are meant to show that physicalism—the theory that the universe is made up entirely out of physical components—is false. In this paper, I apply the zombie thought experiment to the realm of morality to assess whether moral agency is something independent from sentience. Algorithms, I argue, are a kind of functional moral zombie, such that thinking (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22. AI Extenders and the Ethics of Mental Health.Karina Vold & Jose Hernandez-Orallo - forthcoming - In Marcello Ienca & Fabrice Jotterand (eds.), Artificial Intelligence in Brain and Mental Health: Philosophical, Ethical & Policy Issues. Springer International Publishing.
    The extended mind thesis maintains that the functional contributions of tools and artefacts can become so essential for our cognition that they can be constitutive parts of our minds. In other words, our tools can be on a par with our brains: our minds and cognitive processes can literally ‘extend’ into the tools. Several extended mind theorists have argued that this ‘extended’ view of the mind offers unique insights into how we understand, assess, and treat certain cognitive conditions. In this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Sustainability of Artificial Intelligence: Reconciling Human Rights with Legal Rights of Robots.Ammar Younas & Rehan Younas - forthcoming - In Zhyldyzbek Zhakshylykov & Aizhan Baibolot (eds.), Quality Time 18. Bishkek: International Alatoo University Kyrgyzstan. pp. 25-28.
    With the advancement of artificial intelligence and humanoid robotics and an ongoing debate between human rights and rule of law, moral philosophers, legal and political scientists are facing difficulties to answer the questions like, “Do humanoid robots have same rights as of humans and if these rights are superior to human rights or not and why?” This paper argues that the sustainability of human rights will be under question because, in near future the scientists (considerably the most rational people) will (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. The Ethics of Generating Posthumans: Philosophical and Theological Reflections on Bringing New Persons Into Existence.Trevor Stammers - 2022 - London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic.
    Is it possible, ethically speaking, to create posthuman and transhuman persons from a religious perspective? Who is responsible for post and transhuman creation? Can post and transhuman persons be morally accountable? Addressing such pressing ethical questions around post and transhuman creation, this volume considers the philosophical and theological arguments that define and stimulate contemporary debate. Contributors consider the full implications of creating post and transhuman beings by highlighting the role of new technologies in shaping new forms of consciousness, as well (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. The Hard Problem of AI Rights.Adam J. Andreotta - 2021 - AI and Society 36 (1):19-32.
    In the past few years, the subject of AI rights—the thesis that AIs, robots, and other artefacts (hereafter, simply ‘AIs’) ought to be included in the sphere of moral concern—has started to receive serious attention from scholars. In this paper, I argue that the AI rights research program is beset by an epistemic problem that threatens to impede its progress—namely, a lack of a solution to the ‘Hard Problem’ of consciousness: the problem of explaining why certain brain states give rise (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  26. Prolegómenos a una ética para la robótica social.Júlia Pareto Boada - 2021 - Dilemata 34:71-87.
    Social robotics has a high disruptive potential, for it expands the field of application of intelligent technology to practical contexts of a relational nature. Due to their capacity to “intersubjectively” interact with people, social robots can take over new roles in our daily activities, multiplying the ethical implications of intelligent robotics. In this paper, we offer some preliminary considerations for the ethical reflection on social robotics, so that to clarify how to correctly orient the critical-normative thinking in this arduous task. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. Lethal Autonomous Weapons: Re-Examining the Law and Ethics of Robotic Warfare.Jai Galliott, Duncan MacIntosh & Jens David Ohlin (eds.) - 2021 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    The question of whether new rules or regulations are required to govern, restrict, or even prohibit the use of autonomous weapon systems has been the subject of debate for the better part of a decade. Despite the claims of advocacy groups, the way ahead remains unclear since the international community has yet to agree on a specific definition of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems and the great powers have largely refused to support an effective ban. In this vacuum, the public has (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. In search of the moral status of AI: why sentience is a strong argument.Martin Gibert & Dominic Martin - 2021 - AI and Society 1:1-12.
    Is it OK to lie to Siri? Is it bad to mistreat a robot for our own pleasure? Under what condition should we grant a moral status to an artificial intelligence system? This paper looks at different arguments for granting moral status to an AI system: the idea of indirect duties, the relational argument, the argument from intelligence, the arguments from life and information, and the argument from sentience. In each but the last case, we find unresolved issues with the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  29. Moral Control and Ownership in AI Systems.Raul Gonzalez Fabre, Javier Camacho Ibáñez & Pedro Tejedor Escobar - 2021 - AI and Society 36 (1):289-303.
    AI systems are bringing an augmentation of human capabilities to shape the world. They may also drag a replacement of human conscience in large chunks of life. AI systems can be designed to leave moral control in human hands, to obstruct or diminish that moral control, or even to prevent it, replacing human morality with pre-packaged or developed ‘solutions’ by the ‘intelligent’ machine itself. Artificial Intelligent systems are increasingly being used in multiple applications and receiving more attention from the public (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  30. Debate: What is Personhood in the Age of AI?David J. Gunkel & Jordan Joseph Wales - 2021 - AI and Society 36:473–486.
    In a friendly interdisciplinary debate, we interrogate from several vantage points the question of “personhood” in light of contemporary and near-future forms of social AI. David J. Gunkel approaches the matter from a philosophical and legal standpoint, while Jordan Wales offers reflections theological and psychological. Attending to metaphysical, moral, social, and legal understandings of personhood, we ask about the position of apparently personal artificial intelligences in our society and individual lives. Re-examining the “person” and questioning prominent construals of that category, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. The Moral Consideration of Artificial Entities: A Literature Review.Jamie Harris & Jacy Reese Anthis - 2021 - Science and Engineering Ethics 27 (4):1-95.
    Ethicists, policy-makers, and the general public have questioned whether artificial entities such as robots warrant rights or other forms of moral consideration. There is little synthesis of the research on this topic so far. We identify 294 relevant research or discussion items in our literature review of this topic. There is widespread agreement among scholars that some artificial entities could warrant moral consideration in the future, if not also the present. The reasoning varies, such as concern for the effects on (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Operations of power in autonomous weapon systems: ethical conditions and socio-political prospects.Nik Hynek & Anzhelika Solovyeva - 2021 - AI and Society 36 (1):79-99.
    The purpose of this article is to provide a multi-perspective examination of one of the most important contemporary security issues: weaponized, and especially lethal, artificial intelligence. This technology is increasingly associated with the approaching dramatic change in the nature of warfare. What becomes particularly important and evermore intensely contested is how it becomes embedded with and concurrently impacts two social structures: ethics and law. While there has not been a global regime banning this technology, regulatory attempts at establishing a ban (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. The Question of Algorithmic Personhood and Being (Or: On the Tenuous Nature of Human Status and Humanity Tests in Virtual Spaces—Why All Souls Are ‘Necessarily’ Equal When Considered as Energy).Tyler Jaynes - 2021 - J (2571-8800) 3 (4):452-475.
    What separates the unique nature of human consciousness and that of an entity that can only perceive the world via strict logic-based structures? Rather than assume that there is some potential way in which logic-only existence is non-feasible, our species would be better served by assuming that such sentient existence is feasible. Under this assumption, artificial intelligence systems (AIS), which are creations that run solely upon logic to process data, even with self-learning architectures, should therefore not face the opposition they (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. On Human Genome Manipulation and Homo Technicus: The Legal Treatment of Non-Natural Human Subjects.Tyler L. Jaynes - 2021 - AI and Ethics 1 (3):331-345.
    Although legal personality has slowly begun to be granted to non-human entities that have a direct impact on the natural functioning of human societies (given their cultural significance), the same cannot be said for computer-based intelligence systems. While this notion has not had a significantly negative impact on humanity to this point in time that only remains the case because advanced computerised intelligence systems (ACIS) have not been acknowledged as reaching human-like levels. With the integration of ACIS in medical assistive (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  35. Tecno-especies: la humanidad que se hace a sí misma y los desechables.Mateja Kovacic & María G. Navarro - 2021 - Bajo Palabra. Revista de Filosofía 27 (II Epoca):45-62.
    Popular culture continues fuelling public imagination with things, human and non-human, that we might beco-me or confront. Besides robots, other significant tropes in popular fiction that generated images include non-human humans and cyborgs, wired into his-torically varying sociocultural realities. Robots and artificial intelligence are re-defining the natural order and its hierar-chical structure. This is not surprising, as natural order is always in flux, shaped by new scientific discoveries, especially the reading of the genetic code, that reveal and redefine relationships between (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Group Agency and Artificial Intelligence.Christian List - 2021 - Philosophy and Technology:1-30.
    The aim of this exploratory paper is to review an under-appreciated parallel between group agency and artificial intelligence. As both phenomena involve non-human goal-directed agents that can make a difference to the social world, they raise some similar moral and regulatory challenges, which require us to rethink some of our anthropocentric moral assumptions. Are humans always responsible for those entities’ actions, or could the entities bear responsibility themselves? Could the entities engage in normative reasoning? Could they even have rights and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  37. Rights for Robots: Artificial Intelligence, Animal and Environmental Law (2020) by Joshua Gellers. [REVIEW]Kamil Mamak - 2021 - Science and Engineering Ethics 27 (3):1-4.
  38. Artificial intelligence and moral rights.Martin Miernicki & Irene Ng - 2021 - AI and Society 36 (1):319-329.
    Whether copyrights should exist in content generated by an artificial intelligence is a frequently discussed issue in the legal literature. Most of the discussion focuses on economic rights, whereas the relationship of artificial intelligence and moral rights remains relatively obscure. However, as moral rights traditionally aim at protecting the author’s “personal sphere”, the question whether the law should recognize such protection in the content produced by machines is pressing; this is especially true considering that artificial intelligence is continuously further developed (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Is It Time for Robot Rights? Moral Status in Artificial Entities.Vincent C. Müller - 2021 - Ethics and Information Technology:1-9.
    Some authors have recently suggested that it is time to consider rights for robots. These suggestions are based on the claim that the question of robot rights should not depend on a standard set of conditions for ‘moral status’; but instead, the question is to be framed in a new way, by rejecting the is/ought distinction, making a relational turn, or assuming a methodological behaviourism. We try to clarify these suggestions and to show their highly problematic consequences. While we find (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. Existential Risk From AI and Orthogonality: Can We Have It Both Ways?Vincent C. Müller & Michael Cannon - 2021 - Ratio:1-12.
    The standard argument to the conclusion that artificial intelligence (AI) constitutes an existential risk for the human species uses two premises: (1) AI may reach superintelligent levels, at which point we humans lose control (the ‘singularity claim’); (2) Any level of intelligence can go along with any goal (the ‘orthogonality thesis’). We find that the singularity claim requires a notion of ‘general intelligence’, while the orthogonality thesis requires a notion of ‘instrumental intelligence’. If this interpretation is correct, they cannot be (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Artificial Moral Patients: Mentality, Intentionality, and Systematicity.Howard Nye & Tugba Yoldas - 2021 - International Review of Information Ethics 29:1-10.
    In this paper, we defend three claims about what it will take for an AI system to be a basic moral patient to whom we can owe duties of non-maleficence not to harm her and duties of beneficence to benefit her: (1) Moral patients are mental patients; (2) Mental patients are true intentional systems; and (3) True intentional systems are systematically flexible. We suggest that we should be particularly alert to the possibility of such systematically flexible true intentional systems developing (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Pragmatism for a Digital Society: The (In)Significance of Artificial Intelligence and Neural Technology.Matthew Sample & Eric Racine - 2021 - In Orsolya Friedrich, Andreas Wolkenstein, Christoph Bublitz, Ralf J. Jox & Eric Racine (eds.), Clinical Neurotechnology meets Artificial Intelligence. Springer. pp. 81-100.
    Headlines in 2019 are inundated with claims about the “digital society,” making sweeping assertions of societal benefits and dangers caused by a range of technologies. This situation would seem an ideal motivation for ethics research, and indeed much research on this topic is published, with more every day. However, ethics researchers may feel a sense of déjà vu, as they recall decades of other heavily promoted technological platforms, from genomics and nanotechnology to machine learning. How should ethics researchers respond to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Who Is Responsible for Killer Robots? Autonomous Weapons, Group Agency, and the Military‐Industrial Complex.Isaac Taylor - 2021 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 38 (2):320-334.
  44. Do Others Mind? Moral Agents Without Mental States.Fabio Tollon - 2021 - South African Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):182-194.
    As technology advances and artificial agents (AAs) become increasingly autonomous, start to embody morally relevant values and act on those values, there arises the issue of whether these entities should be considered artificial moral agents (AMAs). There are two main ways in which one could argue for AMA: using intentional criteria or using functional criteria. In this article, I provide an exposition and critique of “intentional” accounts of AMA. These accounts claim that moral agency should only be accorded to entities (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. Value Sensitive Design to Achieve the UN SDGs with AI: A Case of Elderly Care Robots.Steven Umbrello, Marianna Capasso, Maurizio Balistreri, Alberto Pirni & Federica Merenda - 2021 - Minds and Machines 31 (3):395-419.
    Healthcare is becoming increasingly automated with the development and deployment of care robots. There are many benefits to care robots but they also pose many challenging ethical issues. This paper takes care robots for the elderly as the subject of analysis, building on previous literature in the domain of the ethics and design of care robots. Using the value sensitive design approach to technology design, this paper extends its application to care robots by integrating the values of care, values that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  46. AI Assistants and the Paradox of Internal Automaticity.William A. Bauer & Veljko Dubljević - 2020 - Neuroethics 13 (3):303-310.
    What is the ethical impact of artificial intelligence assistants on human lives, and specifically how much do they threaten our individual autonomy? Recently, as part of forming an ethical framework for thinking about the impact of AI assistants on our lives, John Danaher claims that if the external automaticity generated by the use of AI assistants threatens our autonomy and is therefore ethically problematic, then the internal automaticity we already live with should be viewed in the same way. He takes (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  47. AI As a Moral Right-Holder.Joseph Bowen & John Basl - 2020 - In Markus Dubber, Frank Pasquale & Sunit Das (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethics of AI. New York: Oxford University Press.
    This chapter evaluates whether AI systems are or will be rights-holders, explaining the conditions under which people should recognize AI systems as rights-holders. It develops a skeptical stance toward the idea that current forms of artificial intelligence are holders of moral rights, beginning with an articulation of one of the most prominent and most plausible theories of moral rights: the Interest Theory of rights. On the Interest Theory, AI systems will be rights-holders only if they have interests or a well-being. (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  48. Why Friendly AIs Won’T Be That Friendly: A Friendly Reply to Muehlhauser and Bostrom.Robert James M. Boyles & Jeremiah Joven Joaquin - 2020 - AI and Society 35:505–507.
    In “Why We Need Friendly AI”, Luke Muehlhauser and Nick Bostrom propose that for our species to survive the impending rise of superintelligent AIs, we need to ensure that they would be human-friendly. This discussion note offers a more natural but bleaker outlook: that in the end, if these AIs do arise, they won’t be that friendly.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  49. Applying a Principle of Explicability to AI Research in Africa: Should We Do It?Mary Carman & Benjamin Rosman - 2020 - Ethics and Information Technology 23 (2):107-117.
    Developing and implementing artificial intelligence (AI) systems in an ethical manner faces several challenges specific to the kind of technology at hand, including ensuring that decision-making systems making use of machine learning are just, fair, and intelligible, and are aligned with our human values. Given that values vary across cultures, an additional ethical challenge is to ensure that these AI systems are not developed according to some unquestioned but questionable assumption of universal norms but are in fact compatible with the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  50. An Ethical Framework for the Design, Development, Implementation, and Assessment of Drones Used in Public Healthcare.Dylan Cawthorne & Aimee Robbins-van Wynsberghe - 2020 - Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (5):2867-2891.
    The use of drones in public healthcare is suggested as a means to improve efficiency under constrained resources and personnel. This paper begins by framing drones in healthcare as a social experiment where ethical guidelines are needed to protect those impacted while fully realizing the benefits the technology offers. Then we propose an ethical framework to facilitate the design, development, implementation, and assessment of drones used in public healthcare. Given the healthcare context, we structure the framework according to the four (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 435