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  1. AI Responsibility Gap: Not New, Inevitable, Unproblematic.Huzeyfe Demirtas - forthcoming - Ethics and Information Technology.
    Who is responsible for a harm caused by AI, or a machine or system that relies on artificial intelligence? Given that current AI is neither conscious nor sentient, it’s unclear that AI itself is responsible for it. But given that AI acts independently of its developer or user, it’s also unclear that the developer or user is responsible for the harm. This gives rise to the so-called responsibility gap: cases where AI causes a harm, but no one is responsible for (...)
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  2. Enhancement & Desert.Thomas Douglas - forthcoming - Politics, Philosophy and Economics.
    It is sometimes claimed that those who succeed with the aid of enhancement technologies deserve the rewards associated with their success less, other things being equal, than those who succeed without the aid of such technologies. This claim captures some widely held intuitions, has been implicitly endorsed by participants in social-psychological research, and helps to undergird some otherwise puzzling philosophical objections to the use of enhancement technologies. I consider whether it can be provided with a rational basis. I examine three (...)
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  3. Derk Pereboom, Wrongdoing & the Human Emotions. New York: Oxford University Press. 224pp. ISBN: 978-0198903789. US $25.00 (Pbk). [REVIEW]Stephen Kershnar - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry.
    Derk Pereboom’s book, Wrongdoing & the Human Emotions, addresses how we ought to respond to wrongdoing given the lack of basic-desert moral responsibility, falsity of retributivism, and the metaphysical and moral problems with moral anger. The book is outstanding. Pereboom’s arguments are important, interesting, powerful, and very well-written. Despite this, his specific arguments fail because basic-desert responsibility-skepticism makes non-consequentialism is false.
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  4. Gunning for affective realism: Emotion, perception and police shooting errors.Raamy Majeed - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Affective realism, roughly the hypothesis that you “perceive what you feel”, has recently been put forward as a novel, empirically-backed explanation of police shooting errors. The affective states involved in policing in high-pressure situations result in police officers literally seeing guns even when none are present. The aim of this paper is to (i) unpack the implications of this explanation for assessing police culpability and (ii) determine whether we should take these implications at face value. I argue that while affective (...)
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  5. Responsibility voids.Martin Hees Matthew Brahavanm - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    We present evidence for the existence of 'responsibility voids' in committee decision-making, that is, the existence of situations where no member of a committee can individually be held morally responsible for the outcome. We analyse three types of reasons (causal, normative and epistemic) for the emergence of responsibility voids, and show that each of them can occur in committees. But the conditions for these voids are so restrictive as to reduce the philosophical or institutional significance they might be thought to (...)
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  6. Can Ethics Be Taught?Hiran Perera-W. A. - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
  7. The Point of Blaming AI Systems.Hannah Altehenger & Leonhard Menges - 2024 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 27 (2).
    As Christian List (2021) has recently argued, the increasing arrival of powerful AI systems that operate autonomously in high-stakes contexts creates a need for “future-proofing” our regulatory frameworks, i.e., for reassessing them in the face of these developments. One core part of our regulatory frameworks that dominates our everyday moral interactions is blame. Therefore, “future-proofing” our extant regulatory frameworks in the face of the increasing arrival of powerful AI systems requires, among others things, that we ask whether it makes sense (...)
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  8. How AI Systems Can Be Blameworthy.Hannah Altehenger, Leonhard Menges & Peter Schulte - 2024 - Philosophia (4):1-24.
    AI systems, like self-driving cars, healthcare robots, or Autonomous Weapon Systems, already play an increasingly important role in our lives and will do so to an even greater extent in the near future. This raises a fundamental philosophical question: who is morally responsible when such systems cause unjustified harm? In the paper, we argue for the admittedly surprising claim that some of these systems can themselves be morally responsible for their conduct in an important and everyday sense of the term—the (...)
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  9. Understanding Moral Responsibility in Automated Decision-Making: Responsibility Gaps and Strategies to Address Them.Andrea Berber & Jelena Mijić - 2024 - Theoria: Beograd 67 (3):177-192.
    This paper delves into the use of machine learning-based systems in decision-making processes and its implications for moral responsibility as traditionally defined. It focuses on the emergence of responsibility gaps and examines proposed strategies to address them. The paper aims to provide an introductory and comprehensive overview of the ongoing debate surrounding moral responsibility in automated decision-making. By thoroughly examining these issues, we seek to contribute to a deeper understanding of the implications of AI integration in society.
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  10. Letting Animals Off the Hook.Nicolas Delon - 2024 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 28 (1).
    A growing literature argues that animals can act for moral reasons without being responsible. I argue that the literature often fails to maintain a clear distinction between moral behavior and moral agency, and I formulate a dilemma: either animals are less moral or they are more responsible than the literature suggests. If animals can respond to moral reasons, they are responsible according to an influential view of moral responsibility—Quality of Will. But if they are responsible, as some argue, costly implications (...)
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  11. Collective Agents as Moral Actors.Säde Hormio - 2024 - In Säde Hormio & Bill Wringe (eds.), Collective Responsibility: Perspectives on Political Philosophy from Social Ontology. Springer.
    How should we make sense of praise and blame and other such reactions towards collective agents like governments, universities, or corporations? My argument is that collective agents do not have to qualify as moral agents for us to make sense of their responsibility. Collective agents can be appropriate targets for our moral feelings and judgements because they can maintain and express moral positions of their own. Moral agency requires being capable of recognizing moral considerations and reasons. It also necessitates the (...)
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  12. Carbon Offsets and Concerns About Shifting Harms: A Reply to Elson.Kian Mintz-Woo - 2024 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 17 (1):310-317.
    Luke Elson defends carbon offsetting on the basis that it is not morally objectionable to shift harms or risks around. As long as emitting and offsetting does not increase the overall harms or risks—and merely shifts them—compared to refraining from emitting, he suggests there is no injustice involved. I respond in several ways, suggesting that the time delay involved in offsetting can increase these risks but, regardless, there is a defensible default which could justify refraining from emitting, even when planning (...)
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  13. Corporate Moral Credit.Grant J. Rozeboom - 2024 - Business Ethics Quarterly 34 (2):303-330.
    When do companies deserve moral credit for doing what is right? This question concerns the positive side of corporate moral responsibility, the negative side of which is the more commonly discussed issue of when companies are blameworthy for doing what is wrong. I offer a broadly functionalist account of how companies can act from morally creditworthy motives, which defuses the following Strawsonian challenge to the claim that they can: morally creditworthy motivation involves being guided by attitudes of “goodwill” for others, (...)
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  14. When Should the Master Answer? Respondeat Superior and the Criminal Law.Kenneth Silver - 2024 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 18 (1):89-108.
    Respondeat superior is a legal doctrine conferring liability from one party onto another because the latter stands in some relationship of authority over the former. Though originally a doctrine of tort law, for the past century it has been used within the criminal law, especially to the end of securing criminal liability for corporations. Here, I argue that on at least one prominent conception of criminal responsibility, we are not justified in using this doctrine in this way. Firms are not (...)
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  15. The Abolition of Punishment: Is a Non-Punitive Criminal Justice System Ethically Justified?Przemysław Zawadzki - 2024 - Diametros 21 (79):1-9.
    Punishment involves the intentional infliction of harm and suffering. Both of the most prominent families of justifications of punishment – retributivism and consequentialism – face several moral concerns that are hard to overcome. Moreover, the effectiveness of current criminal punishment methods in ensuring society’s safety is seriously undermined by empirical research. Thus, it appears to be a moral imperative for a modern and humane society to seek alternative means of administering justice. The special issue of Diametros “The Abolition of Punishment: (...)
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  16. From experimentation to structural change: fostering institutional entrepreneurship for public engagement in research and innovation.Joshua Cohen & Vincent Blok - 2023 - Public Understanding of Science.
    Many researchers experiment with participatory settings to increase public engagement in research and innovation (R&I). Because of their temporary nature, it often remains unclear how such participatory experiments can contribute to structural change. This paper empirically explores options for bridging this gap. It analyzes how participants can be supported to act as institutional entrepreneurs to actively promote public engagement in R&I. To draw lessons, we analyze empirical material gathered on nineteen Social Labs which were set up to promote the uptake (...)
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  17. Responsibility Internalism and Responsibility for AI.Huzeyfe Demirtas - 2023 - Dissertation, Syracuse University
    I argue for responsibility internalism. That is, moral responsibility (i.e., accountability, or being apt for praise or blame) depends only on factors internal to agents. Employing this view, I also argue that no one is responsible for what AI does but this isn’t morally problematic in a way that counts against developing or using AI. Responsibility is grounded in three potential conditions: the control (or freedom) condition, the epistemic (or awareness) condition, and the causal responsibility condition (or consequences). I argue (...)
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  18. Medien – Ethik – Digitalisierung: Aktuelle Herausforderungen.Petra Grimm, Harald Pechlaner & Oliver Zöllner (eds.) - 2023 - Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.
    Digitality requires new ethical approaches in the context of an all-encompassing mediatization. At the same time, the advance of artificial intelligence (AI) brings forth additional new challenges, as do questions about the ecological responsibility of digital technologies. This edited volume presents a broad range of topics and case studies linked to the sub-discipline of digital ethics. What all contributions in this book have in common, regardless of the their academic or philosophical perspective, is a focus on the question whether human (...)
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  19. Collective responsibility for climate change.Säde Hormio - 2023 - WIREs Climate Change 14 (4).
    Climate change can be construed as a question of collective responsibility from two different viewpoints: climate change being inherently a collective problem, or collective entities bearing responsibility for climate change. When discussing collective responsibility for climate change, “collective” can thus refer to the problem of climate change itself, or to the entity causing the harm and/or bearing responsibility for it. The first viewpoint focuses on how climate change is a harm that has been caused collectively. Collective action problem refers to (...)
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  20. Responsibility collapses: why moral responsibility is impossible.Stephen Kershnar - 2023 - New York, NY: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.
    Our worldview assumes that people are morally responsible. Consider our emotions regarding other people or ourselves. We often feel anger, gratitude, pride, and shame toward them or ourselves. Consider religious beliefs. Jews and Christians believe that God cares whether a person does right by others and freely loves him. Consider moral values. We value dignity, freedom, and rights. The above emotions, beliefs, and values assume that people are responsible. In particular, they assume that a person is responsible for what she (...)
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  21. Blaming.Leonhard Menges - 2023 - In Maximilian Kiener (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Responsibility. Routledge.
    In the last two decades, blame has become a core topic in ethics, philosophical moral psychology and, more recently, epistemology. This chapter aims at clarifying the complex state of the debate and at making a suggestion for how we should proceed from here. The core idea is that accounts of blame are often motivated by very different background goals. One standard goal is to provide a unifying account of our everyday blame practices. The chapter argues that there is reason to (...)
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  22. Jaz u odgovornosti u informatičkoj eri.Jelena Mijić - 2023 - Društvo I Politika 4 (4):25-38.
    Odgovornost pripisujemo sa namerom da postignemo neki cilj. Jedno od opših mesta u filozofskoj literaturi je da osobi možemo pripisati moralnu odgovornost ako su zadovoljena bar dva uslova: da subjekt delanja ima kontrolu nad svojim postupcima i da je u stanju da navede razloge u prilog svog postupka. Međutim, četvrtu industrijsku revoluciju karakterišu sociotehnološke pojave koje nas potencijalno suočavaju sa tzv. problemom jaza u odgovornosti. Rasprave o odgovornosti u kontekstu veštačke inteligencije karakteriše nejasna i neodređena upotreba ovog pojma. Da bismo (...)
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  23. The value of responsibility gaps in algorithmic decision-making.Lauritz Munch, Jakob Mainz & Jens Christian Bjerring - 2023 - Ethics and Information Technology 25 (1):1-11.
    Many seem to think that AI-induced responsibility gaps are morally bad and therefore ought to be avoided. We argue, by contrast, that there is at least a pro tanto reason to welcome responsibility gaps. The central reason is that it can be bad for people to be responsible for wrongdoing. This, we argue, gives us one reason to prefer automated decision-making over human decision-making, especially in contexts where the risks of wrongdoing are high. While we are not the first to (...)
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  24. Schuldhafte Unkenntnis und moralische Überforderung in der Konsumethik.Lukas Naegeli - 2023 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 77 (4):543-567.
    Sind wir für moralisch falsche Kaufentscheidungen verantwortlich zu machen, die wir in Unkenntnis treffen? Einerseits scheint die klassische Annahme einer Wissensbedingung den Raum unserer moralischen Verantwortung einzugrenzen: Wenn uns nicht bewusst ist, dass wir moralisch falsch handeln, dann ist es auch nicht angemessen, uns dafür zu tadeln. Andererseits droht die Wissensbedingung aber dadurch ausgehöhlt zu werden, dass uns schuldhafte Unkenntnis erstens nicht zu entschuldigen scheint und wir zweitens meist darüber informiert sein sollten, was wir tun und ob es moralisch bedeutsam (...)
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  25. Road Safety Policy in Addis Ababa: A Vision Zero Perspective.Henok Girma Abebe - 2022 - Sustainability 14 (9).
    In this article, the Addis Ababa city road safety policies are examined and analysed based on the Vision Zero approach to road safety work. Three major policy documents are explored and assessed in terms of how they compare with Vision Zero policy in Sweden, concerning how road safety problems are conceptualised, the responsibility ascriptions promoted, the nature of goal setting concerning road safety objectives, and the specific road safety interventions promoted. It is concluded that there is a big difference between (...)
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  26. Retributivism, Free Will Skepticism, and the Public Health-Quarantine Model: Replies to Kennedy, Walen, Corrado, Sifferd, Pereboom, and Shaw.Gregg D. Caruso - 2022 - Journal of Legal Philosophy 2 (46):161-216.
  27. The Public Health-Quarantine Model.Gregg D. Caruso - 2022 - In Dana Kay Nelkin & Derk Pereboom (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press.
    One of the most frequently voiced criticisms of free will skepticism is that it is unable to adequately deal with criminal behavior and that the responses it would permit as justified are insufficient for acceptable social policy. This concern is fueled by two factors. The first is that one of the most prominent justifications for punishing criminals, retributivism, is incompatible with free will skepticism. The second concern is that alternative justifications that are not ruled out by the skeptical view per (...)
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  28. Moral Responsibility Reconsidered.Gregg D. Caruso & Derk Pereboom - 2022 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Derk Pereboom.
    This Element examines the concept of moral responsibility as it is used in contemporary philosophical debates and explores the justifiability of the moral practices associated with it, including moral praise/blame, retributive punishment, and the reactive attitudes of resentment and indignation. After identifying and discussing several different varieties of responsibility-including causal responsibility, take-charge responsibility, role responsibility, liability responsibility, and the kinds of responsibility associated with attributability, answerability, and accountability-it distinguishes between basic and non-basic desert conceptions of moral responsibility and considers a (...)
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  29. Moral Responsibility is Not Proportionate to Causal Responsibility.Huzeyfe Demirtas - 2022 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 60 (4):570-591.
    It seems intuitive to think that if you contribute more to an outcome, you should be more morally responsible for it. Some philosophers think this is correct. They accept the thesis that ceteris paribus one's degree of moral responsibility for an outcome is proportionate to one's degree of causal contribution to that outcome. Yet, what the degree of causal contribution amounts to remains unclear in the literature. Hence, the underlying idea in this thesis remains equally unclear. In this article, I (...)
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  30. Responsible AI Through Conceptual Engineering.Johannes Himmelreich & Sebastian Köhler - 2022 - Philosophy and Technology 35 (3):1-30.
    The advent of intelligent artificial systems has sparked a dispute about the question of who is responsible when such a system causes a harmful outcome. This paper champions the idea that this dispute should be approached as a conceptual engineering problem. Towards this claim, the paper first argues that the dispute about the responsibility gap problem is in part a conceptual dispute about the content of responsibility and related concepts. The paper then argues that the way forward is to evaluate (...)
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  31. That only the elite should have children is a worrying argument. [REVIEW]P. M. Msimang - 2022 - South African Journal of Bioethics and Law 15 (1):6-7.
  32. Addressing the Past: Time, Blame and Guilt.Edgar Phillips - 2022 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 30 (3):219-238.
    Time passed after the commission of a wrong can affect how we respond to its agent now. Specifically it can introduce certain forms of complexity or ambivalence into our blaming responses. This paper considers how and why time might matter in this way. I illustrate the phenomenon by looking at a recent real-life example, surveying some responses to the case and identifying the relevant forms of ambivalence. I then consider a recent account of blameworthiness and its development over time that (...)
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  33. Group Action Without Group Minds.Kenneth Silver - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):321-342.
    Groups behave in a variety of ways. To show that this behavior amounts to action, it would be best to fit it into a general account of action. However, nearly every account from the philosophy of action requires the agent to have mental states such as beliefs, desires, and intentions. Unfortunately, theorists are divided over whether groups can instantiate these states—typically depending on whether or not they are willing to accept functionalism about the mind. But we can avoid this debate. (...)
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  34. Blame Without Punishment for Addicts.Prabhpal Singh - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (1):257-267.
    On the moral model of addiction, addicts are morally responsible and blameworthy for their addictive behaviours. The model is sometimes resisted on the grounds that blaming addicts is incompatible with treating addiction in a compassionate and non-punitive way. I argue the moral model is consistent with addressing addiction compassionately and non-punitively and better accounts for both the role of addicts’ agency in the recovery process. If an addict is responsible for their addictive behaviours, and that behaviour is in some way (...)
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  35. Cosmopolitan “No-Harm” Duty in Warfare: Exposing the Utilitarian Pretence of Universalism.Ozlem Ulgen - 2022 - Athena 2 (1):116-151.
    This article demonstrates a priori cosmopolitan values of restraint and harm limitation exist to establish a cosmopolitan “no-harm” duty in warfare, predating utilitarianism and permeating modern international humanitarian law. In doing so, the author exposes the atemporal and ahistorical nature of utilitarianism which introduces chaos and brutality into the international legal system. Part 2 conceptualises the duty as derived from the “no-harm” principle under international environmental law. Part 3 frames the discussion within legal pluralism and cosmopolitan ethics, arguing that divergent (...)
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  36. Responsibility and Situationism.Brandon Warmke - 2022 - In Dana Kay Nelkin & Derk Pereboom (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 468-493.
    This chapter explores the relationship between an agent’s moral responsibility for their actions and the situations in which an agent acts. Decades of research in psychology are sometimes thought to support situationism, the view that features of an agent’s situation greatly influence their behavior in powerful and surprising ways. Such situational fea­tures might therefore be thought to threaten agents’ abilities to act freely and responsi­bly. This chapter begins by discussing some relevant empirical literature on situationism. It then surveys several ways (...)
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  37. What Makes Personal Data Processing by Social Networking Services Permissible?Lichelle Wolmarans & Alex Voorhoeve - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):93-108.
    Social Networking Services provide services in return for rights to commercialize users’ personal data. We argue that what makes this transaction permissible is not users’ autonomous consent but the provision of sufficiently valuable opportunities to exchange data for services. We argue that the value of these opportunities should be assessed for both (a) a range of users with different decision-making abilities and (b) third parties. We conclude that regulation should shift from aiming to ensure autonomous consent towards ensuring that users (...)
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  38. Is punishment backward? On neurointerventions and forward‐looking moral responsibility.Przemysław Zawadzki - 2022 - Bioethics 37 (2):183-191.
    This article focuses on justified responses to “immoral” behavior and crimes committed by patients undergoing neuromodulation therapies. Such patients could be held morally responsible in the basic desert sense—the one that serves as a justification of severe practices such as backward‐looking moral outrage, condemnation, and legal punishment—as long as they possess certain compatibilist capabilities that have traditionally served as the quintessence of free will, that is, reasons‐responsiveness; attributability; answerability; the abilities to act in accordance with moral reasons, second‐order volitions, or (...)
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  39. Being Sympathetic to Bad-History Wrongdoers.Craig K. Agule - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (1):147-169.
    For many philosophers, bad-history wrongdoers are primarily interesting because of what their cases might tell us about the interaction of moral responsibility and history. However, philosophers focusing on blameworthiness have overlooked important questions about blame itself. These bad-history cases are complicated because blame and sympathy are both fitting. When we are careful to consider the rich natures of those two reactions, we see that they conflict in several important ways. We should see bad-history cases as cases about whether and how (...)
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  40. Moral Grounds for Forgiveness.Derek R. Brookes - 2021 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 35 (1):97-108.
    In this paper, I argue that forgiveness is a morally appropriate response only when it is grounded in the wrongdoer’s demonstration of genuine remorse, their offer of a sincere apology, and, where appropriate, acts of recompense and behavioral change. I then respond to John Kleinig’s suggestion (in his paper “Forgiveness and Unconditionality”) that when an apology is not forthcoming, there are at least three additional grounds that, when motivated by virtues such as love and compassion, could nevertheless render “unconditional forgiveness” (...)
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  41. Rejecting Retributivism: Free Will, Punishment, and Criminal Justice.Gregg D. Caruso - 2021 - New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
    Within the criminal justice system, one of the most prominent justifications for legal punishment is retributivism. The retributive justification of legal punishment maintains that wrongdoers are morally responsible for their actions and deserve to be punished in proportion to their wrongdoing. This book argues against retributivism and develops a viable alternative that is both ethically defensible and practical. Introducing six distinct reasons for rejecting retributivism, Gregg D. Caruso contends that it is unclear that agents possess the kind of free will (...)
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  42. The Mandatory Ontology of Robot Responsibility.Marc Champagne - 2021 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 30 (3):448–454.
    Do we suddenly become justified in treating robots like humans by positing new notions like “artificial moral agency” and “artificial moral responsibility”? I answer no. Or, to be more precise, I argue that such notions may become philosophically acceptable only after crucial metaphysical issues have been addressed. My main claim, in sum, is that “artificial moral responsibility” betokens moral responsibility to the same degree that a “fake orgasm” betokens an orgasm.
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  43. ‘Personal Health Surveillance’: The Use of mHealth in Healthcare Responsibilisation.Ben Davies - 2021 - Public Health Ethics 14 (3):268-280.
    There is an ongoing increase in the use of mobile health technologies that patients can use to monitor health-related outcomes and behaviours. While the dominant narrative around mHealth focuses on patient empowerment, there is potential for mHealth to fit into a growing push for patients to take personal responsibility for their health. I call the first of these uses ‘medical monitoring’, and the second ‘personal health surveillance’. After outlining two problems which the use of mHealth might seem to enable us (...)
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  44. Hobbesian causation and personal identity in the history of criminology.Luke William Hunt - 2021 - Intellectual History Review 31 (2):247-266.
    Hobbes is known for bridging natural and political philosophy, but less attention has been given to how this distinguishes the Hobbesian conception of the self from individualist strands of liberalism. First, Hobbes’s determinism suggests a conception of the self in which externalities determine the will and what the self is at every moment. Second, there is no stable conception of the self because externalities keep it in a constant state of flux. The metaphysical underpinnings of his project downplay the notion (...)
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  45. Pursuing Problem Gamblers.Garrett Pendergraft - 2021 - SAGE Business Cases.
    There have been several recent lawsuits in which problem gamblers (or those affected by problem gambling) have sued casinos or other gaming companies for damages relating to bankruptcies, suicides, and other negative consequences of compulsive gambling. Although the legal cases have been decided in favor of the gaming companies, it can seem as though there is a moral residue in some of these cases: perhaps some of the actions of the gaming companies, though legal, have been morally problematic. This case (...)
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  46. Responsibility for Testimonial Injustice.Adam Piovarchy - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):597–615.
    In this paper, I examine whether agents who commit testimonial injustice are morally responsible for their wrongdoing, given that they are ignorant of their wrongdoing. Fricker (2007) argues that agents whose social setting lacks the concepts or reasons necessary for them to correct for testimonial injustice are excused. I argue that agents whose social settings have these concepts or reasons available are also typically excused, because they lack the capacity to recognise those concepts or reasons. Attempts to trace this lack (...)
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  47. General Versus Special Theories of Discrimination.Re’em Segev - 2021 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 18:265-298.
    In this paper, I distinguish between two types of normative accounts of discrimination – general and special – and argue for the former and against the latter. General accounts consider the moral status of discrimination in light of all of the reasons that apply to discrimination, and hold that these reasons are not unique to discrimination (for example, the reasons to bring about the greater benefit or prevent the greater burden, to give priority for people who are worse off, and (...)
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  48. Managing shame and guilt in addiction: A pathway to recovery.Anke Snoek, Victoria McGeer, Daphne Brandenburg & Jeanette Kennett - 2021 - Addictive Behaviors 120.
    A dominant view of guilt and shame is that they have opposing action tendencies: guilt- prone people are more likely to avoid or overcome dysfunctional patterns of behaviour, making amends for past misdoings, whereas shame-prone people are more likely to persist in dysfunctional patterns of behaviour, avoiding responsibility for past misdoings and/or lashing out in defensive aggression. Some have suggested that addiction treatment should make use of these insights, tailoring therapy according to people’s degree of guilt-proneness versus shame-proneness. In this (...)
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  49. Distributed responsibility in human–machine interactions.Anna Strasser - 2021 - AI and Ethics.
    Artificial agents have become increasingly prevalent in human social life. In light of the diversity of new human–machine interactions, we face renewed questions about the distribution of moral responsibility. Besides positions denying the mere possibility of attributing moral responsibility to artificial systems, recent approaches discuss the circumstances under which artificial agents may qualify as moral agents. This paper revisits the discussion of how responsibility might be distributed between artificial agents and human interaction partners (including producers of artificial agents) and raises (...)
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  50. Opioid Treatment Agreements and Patient Accountability.Larisa Svirsky - 2021 - Hastings Center Report 51 (4):46-9.
    Opioid treatment agreements are written agreements between physicians and patients enumerating the risks associated with opioid medications along with the requirements that patients must meet to receive these medications on an ongoing basis. The choice to use such agreements goes beyond the standard informed consent process, and has a distinctive symbolic significance. Specifically, it suggests that physicians regard it as important to hold their patients accountable for adhering to various protocols regarding the use of their opioid medications. After laying out (...)
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