- Inferential Knowledge and the Gettier Conjecture.Rodrigo Borges - forthcoming - In Rodrigo Borges Claudio de Almeida & Peter Klein (eds.), Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem. Oxford University Press.details
- Knowledge First Approaches to Epistemology and Mind.A. Carter, E. Gordon & B. Jarvis (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.details
- Knowledge‐first perceptual epistemology: A comment on Littlejohn and Millar.David de Bruijn - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.details
- Knowledge‐first perceptual epistemology: A comment on Littlejohn and Millar.David de Bruijn - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.details
- Putting Knowledge to Work: New Directions for Knowledge-First Epistemology.Artūrs Logins & Jacques Henri Vollet (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
- Epistemic Territory.Jennifer Nagel - forthcoming - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association:67-86.details
- Where Did It Come From? Where Will It Go?Williamson Timothy - forthcoming - In Artūrs Logins & Jacques Henri Vollet (eds.), Putting Knowledge to Work: New Directions for Knowledge-First Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
- Reductive views of knowledge and the small difference principle.Simon Wimmer - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy.details
- A Knowledge-First Account of Group Knowledge.Domingos Faria - 2022 - Logos and Episteme 13 (1):37-53.details
- Wittgenstein’s Wager: On [Absolute] Certainty.Noah Greenstein - 2022 - Southwest Philosophy Review 38 (1):51-57.details
- Introduction to Knowledge, Number and Reality. Encounters with the Work of Keith Hossack.Nils Kürbis, Jonathan Nassim & Bahram Assadian - 2022 - In Nils Kürbis, Jonathan Nassim & Bahram Assadian (eds.), Knowledge, Number and Reality. Encounters with the Work of Keith Hossack. London: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 1-30.details
- Persistent burglars and knocks on doors: Causal indispensability of knowing vindicated.Artūrs Logins - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):1335-1357.details
- John Cook Wilson on the indefinability of knowledge.Guy Longworth & Simon Wimmer - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):1547–1564.details
- Cook Wilson on knowledge and forms of thinking.Simon Wimmer & Guy Longworth - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-22.details
- Knowledge is a mental state (at least sometimes).Adam Michael Bricker - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1461-1481.details
- Lying: Knowledge or belief?Neri Marsili - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1445-1460.details
- The neural and cognitive mechanisms of knowledge attribution: An EEG study.Adam Michael Bricker - 2020 - Cognition 203 (C):104412.details
- Is Every Theory of Knowledge False?Blake Roeber - 2020 - Noûs 54 (4):839-866.details
- Lying, Belief, and Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2019 - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 120-133.details
- Jessica Brown: Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge.Matthew McGrath - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (11):637-644.details
- Reassessing the Case Against Evidential Externalism.Giada Fratantonio & Aidan McGlynn - 2018 - In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.details
- Against Knowledge-First Epistemology.Mikkel Gerken - 2018 - In Gordon and Jarvis Carter (ed.), Knowledge-First Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 46-71.details
- Good Thinking: A Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology.Christoph Kelp - 2018 - London, UK: Routledge.details
- Epistemology Personalized.Matthew A. Benton - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (269):813-834.details
- Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem.Rodrigo Borges, Claudio de Almeida & Peter D. Klein (eds.) - 2017 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
- Epistemic Conditions on “Ought”: E=K as a Case Study.Cameron Boult - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (2):223-244.details
- Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind.J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin W. Jarvis (eds.) - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
- Basic Knowledge First.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2017 - Episteme 14 (3):343-361.details
- On Putting Knowledge 'First'.Jonathan Ichikawa & C. S. I. Jenkins - 2017 - In Joseph Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press.details
- Inferring as a way of knowing.Nicholas Koziolek - 2017 - Synthese (Suppl 7):1563-1582.details
- How and Why Knowledge is First.Clayton Littlejohn - 2017 - In A. Carter, E. Gordon & B. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First. Oxford University Press. pp. 19-45.details
- Mindreading Knowledge.Aidan McGlynn - 2017 - In Joseph Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin W. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 72-94.details
- In support of the Knowledge-First conception of the normativity of justification.Anne Meylan - 2017 - In Joseph Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. pp. 246-258.details
- No Need for Excuses: Against Knowledge-First Epistemology and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion.Joshua Schechter - 2017 - In J. Adam Carter, Emma Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge-First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 132-159.details
- The Cost of Treating Knowledge as a Mental State.Martin Smith - 2017 - In A. Carter, E. Gordon & B. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First, Approaches to Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 95-112.details
- Acting on Knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 2017 - In J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin W. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 163-181.details
- Gricean Quality.Matthew A. Benton - 2016 - Noûs 50 (4):689-703.details
- Evil and Evidence.Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Yoaav Isaacs - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 7:1-31.details
- Bad Luck for the Anti‐Luck Epistemologist.Rodrigo Borges - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (4):463-479.details
- Justified Belief: Knowledge First‐Style.Christoph Kelp - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):79-100.details
- Epistemic Frankfurt Cases Revisited.Christoph9 Kelp - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (1):27-37.details
- Perceptual Justification: Factive Reasons and Fallible Virtues.Christoph9 Kelp & Harmen8 Ghijsen - 2016 - In C. Mi, M. Slote & E. Sosa (eds.), Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy. Routledge.details
- Knowledge and Reliability.Jennifer Nagel - 2016 - In Hilary Kornblith & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Alvin Goldman and his Critics. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 237-256.details
- Ways and Means: When Sometimes “Knowledge-First” Epistemology Is Not Epistemology.Brian New - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (3):827-834.details
- Norms of Belief.Mona Simion, Christoph Kelp & Harmen Ghijsen - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):374-392.details
- Defeatism Defeated.Max Baker-Hytch & Matthew A. Benton - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):40-66.details
- The Roles of Knowledge Ascriptions in Epistemic Assessment.Mikkel Gerken - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):141-161.details
- Belief is prior to knowledge.David Rose - 2015 - Episteme 12 (3):385-399.details
- A note on Gettier cases in epistemic logic.Timothy Williamson - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):129-140.details
- Knowledge Norms.Matthew A. Benton - 2014 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:nn-nn.details
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