ResumenEste artículo propone una idea de intervención e institución que se entrelace en lo social a través del concepto de contagio como elemento filosófico articulador. En primer lugar, se establece un marco teórico-filosófico para pensar la vida como una ontología social del contagio, que permita habitar un pensar relacional etológico que se abra a otros modos de existencia. Desde este marco, los hallazgos perfilan la relación intervención-institución desde la sensibilidad que evoca esta forma distinta de intervención en lo social, disponiendo (...) de otros modos las variaciones de la institución y sus procesos de instituir el campo social. Se concluye discutiendo la relación entre intervención y sus capacidades transformativas como componente metódico y epistemológico distinto que trae consigo un fuerte potencial político y ético. Al multiplicar los modos de ser y los procesos de subjetivación se abren prácticas humanas y más-que-humanas, instituyendo otros modos de hacer-y-pensar toda intervención del presente.Palabras clave: institución; intervención; contagio; formas de vida; cartografías. (shrink)

The application of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in healthcare and epidemiology undoubtedly has many benefits for the population. However, due to its environmental impact, the use of AI can produce social inequalities and long-term environmental damages that may not be thoroughly contemplated. In this paper, we propose to consider the impacts of AI applications in medical care from the One Health paradigm and long-term global health. From health and environmental justice, rather than settling for a short and fleeting green honeymoon between (...) health and sustainability caused by AI, it should aim for a lasting marriage. To this end, we conclude by proposing that, in the upcoming years, it could be valuable and necessary to promote more interconnected health, call for environmental cost transparency, and increase green responsibility. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence (AI) developments are proliferating at an astonishing rate. Unsurprisingly, the number of meaningful studies addressing the social impacts of AI applications in several fields has been remarkable. More recently, several contributions have started exploring the ecological impacts of AI. Machine learning systems do not have a neutral environmental cost, so it is important to unravel the ecological footprint of these techno-scientific developments. In this chapter, we discuss the sustainability of AI from environmental ethics approaches. We examine the moral (...) trade-offs that AI may cause in different moral dimensions and analyse prominent conflicts that may arise from human and more-than-human-centred concerns. (shrink)

Solidarity within bioethics is increasingly being recognized as an important means of improving health for all. Its contribution seems particularly relevant when there are injustices or inequalities in health and different individuals or groups are disadvantaged. But the current context of ecological collapse, characterized mainly by a loss of biodiversity and ecosystem decline, affects global health in a different way to other factors. This scenario creates new challenges, risks and problems that require new insights from a bioethical perspective. I, therefore, (...) propose an argument in favor of ecological solidarity. The aim of this article is to re-define this concept, outlining which causes should incite action through ecological solidarity and who should be the main recipient of it. To this end, I discuss what the background for practicing ecological solidarity might be: an intrinsically altruistic motivation to attempt to be a better person or a forced response to a political obligation. Finally, by way of example, I argue for rewilding as an effective, practical strategy through which ecological solidarity can be applied in the belief that building ecological solidarity supports a number of key interdependencies and ensures ethical care for the health of the planet. (shrink)

Gómez Franco, Irene (2021)Deudas pendientes: La justicia entre generacionesMadrid: CSIC / Plaza y Valdés Editores, 384 p.ISBN CSIC: 978-84-00-10728-4ISBN Plaza y Valdés: 978-84-17121-32-7.

En este artículo se ofrecerán tres razones a fin de defender una fraternidad política con los animales. La primera comprenderá a los animales como miembros de la misma clase social oprimida que los humanos durante el desarrollo capitalista. La segunda analizará el concepto de ciudadanía matizando su rasgo de participación política y resaltando el rasgo de compartir un espacio común. La tercera introducirá el dinamismo orgánico y ecológico en el espacio de convivencia. Finalmente, mediante una relativización del concepto de vulnerabilidad, (...) se concluirá que nuestra relación política con los animales no ha de ser siempre paternalista, hospitalaria o solidaria, sino también fraternal. (shrink)

Tafalla, Marta.Ecoanimal: Una estética plurisensorial ecologista y animalistaMadrid: Plaza y Valdés Editores. Dilemata, 362 p.ISBN 978-84-17121-20-4.

The context of accelerated climate change, environmental pollution, ecosystems depletion, loss of biodiversity and growing undernutrition has led human societies to a crossroads where food systems require transformation. New agricultural practices are being advocated in order to achieve food security and face environmental challenges. Cultivated meat has recently been considered one of the most desired alternatives by animal rights advocates because it promises to ensure nutrition for all people while dramatically reducing ecological impacts and animal suffering. It is therefore presented (...) as one of the fairest means of food production for the coming decades, according to utilitarian arguments. However, food security, environmental concerns and animal welfarism guided by a short-term utilitarianism could have techno-optimism bias and could result in some forms of oppression such as anthropocentrism. I argue that there are still deep-rooted moral issues in food systems that are not addressed primarily by lab-grown meat, mainly derived from a loss of sovereignty. Food practices developed in high-tech labs with artificial interventionism constrain the ability of living entities (that are used as food) to flourish on their own terms. This paper aims to explore how sovereignty entitlements for humans and nonhumans are often overlooked by advocates of cultivated meat and the moral challenges it may pose. Accordingly, a more than utilitarian approach framed by ecological and republican justice is proposed here to shed light on some pitfalls of food chains based on cellular agriculture. (shrink)

El objetivo del estudio fue examinar las prácticas pedagógicas mediadas por TIC, integradas por los docentes de la Facultad de educación de la Universidad de Las Américas ˗en tiempos de pandemia. El trabajo es una investigación de nivel exploratorio, no experimental, con una metodología mixta. Los datos se recogieron a través de una entrevista semiestructurada de 82 preguntas, abiertas y cerradas. Los resultados más importantes muestran tendencias a la integración de metodologías activas, principalmente aula invertida y uso de cápsulas digitales. (...) Finalmente, predomina la integración de herramientas de evaluación y colaboración. (shrink)

La discusión sobre el �orgullo gordo� y la supuesta pandemia de la obesidad han encontrado un espacio político y comercial receptivo en nuestras sociedades occidentales, y poco a poco amenaza con extenderse por todo el mundo. Siguiendo con anteriores trabajos, interpretamos y comentamos aquí los envíos remitidos por un grupo de lectores en respuesta a un artículo polémico publicado en las páginas de un periódico digital de difusión nacional. Más que intentar descifrar las supuestas motivaciones o intenciones de los lectores, (...) nuestro objetivo es desarrollar algunas ideas sobre el modo en que las personas obesas resultan posicionadas o caracterizadas a través de los mensajes al foro del periódico: como personas enfermas, anormales, asociados con otros grupos socialmente mal considerados, discriminados, perjudiciales para la sociedad y condenados a resignarse con su estado obeso. Nuestro trabajo persigue poner de manifiesto el trato desconsiderado y estigmatizador que nuestra sociedad depara a las personas gordas, así como explorar algunas claves de actuación que sirvan para reducir el estigma. (shrink)

Given the pervasiveness of AI systems and their potential negative effects on people’s lives (especially among already marginalised groups), it becomes imperative to comprehend what goes on when an AI system generates a result, and based on what reasons, it is achieved. There are consistent technical efforts for making systems more “explainable” by reducing their opaqueness and increasing their interpretability and explainability. In this paper, we explore an alternative non-technical approach towards explainability that complement existing ones. Leaving aside technical, statistical, (...) or data-related issues, we focus on the very conceptual underpinnings of the design decisions made by developers and other stakeholders during the lifecycle of a machine learning project. For instance, the design and development of an app to track snoring to detect possible health risks presuppose some picture or another of “health”, which is a key notion that conceptually underpins the project. We take it as a premise that these key concepts are necessarily present during design and development, albeit perhaps tacitly. We argue that by providing “justificatory explanations” about how the team understands the relevant key concepts behind its design decisions, interested parties could gain valuable insights and make better sense of the workings and outcomes of systems. Using the concept of “health”, we illustrate how a particular understanding of it might influence decisions during the design and development stages of a machine learning project, and how making this explicit by incorporating it into ex-post explanations might increase the explanatory and justificatory power of these explanations. We posit that a greater conceptual awareness of the key concepts that underpin design and development decisions may be beneficial to any attempt to develop explainability methods. We recommend that “justificatory explanations” are provided as technical documentation. These are declarative statements that contain at its simplest: (1) a high-level account of the understanding of the relevant key concepts a team possess related to a project’s main domain, (2) how these understandings drive decision-making during the life-cycle stages, and (3) it gives reasons (which could be implicit in the account) that the person or persons doing the explanation consider to have plausible justificatory power for the decisions that were made during the project. (shrink)

The Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) is a multilateral, multisectoral partnership comprised of more than 70 countries, international organizations, foundations, and businesses to strengthen global health security.

BackgroundFor a long time, in sports, researchers have tried to understand an expert by comparing them with novices, raising the doubts if the visual search characteristics distinguish experts from novices. Therefore, the aim of the present study was to review and conduct a meta-analysis to evaluate the differences in visual search behavior between experts and novices in team sports athletes.MethodsThis systematic review with meta-analysis followed the PRISMA 2020 and Cochrane's guidelines. Healthy team athletes were included, which engaged in regular practice, (...) from any sex or competitive level, specifically classified a priori as expert or novice in the original research. We considered only research published in peer-reviewed journals, with no limitations regarding date or language. It was considered healthy team sport athletes engaged in regular practice. The scenarios could be in situ or film-based. The databases of EBSCO, PubMed, Scopus, SPORTDiscus, and Web of Science were used to perform the searches. The risk of bias was calculated through the RoBANS tool.ResultsFrom a total of 6,257 records, of which 985 were duplicates, titles and abstracts of 5,272 were screened, and 45 required full-text analysis. Of those, 23 were excluded due to not fulfilling the eligibility criteria regarding participants. In the end, 22 studies were selected, however, as two studies were part of the same trial and were analyzed conjointly.DiscussionExperts showed to be older and with more years of practice. The ability to distinguish experts from novices was not so clear regarding the variables analyzed. This could be due to the strategies chosen in each study, which were specific to each scenario, and when grouping all together, it was lost information within non-representative averages. The distinction between experts and novices was not clear, showing a lot of heterogeneity in the included studies. The expert classification itself may have been the conditioning aspect for these results, retaining the doubt and the need for more studies in the field.Systematic review registrationThe protocol was pre-registered in OSF. (shrink)

In this paper, we raise two points. First, any rights‐based theory should provide a method by which to guide reasoning in addressing conflicts of rights. The reason, we argue, is that these theories must provide guidance on what should be done. Second, this method must contain two key recommendations: (1) We should try to find a deliberative mechanism through which none of the rights is simply eliminated from the scene; (2) these rights may be balanced against each other to define (...) which right should prevail, but without considering non‐rights‐interests as if they were rights in the process. These recommendations instantiate two crucial principles that underlie our common intuitions on rights, namely, the principle that rights deserve equal respect and the principle that rights should be taken seriously. (shrink)

In this article, we apply the literature on the ethics of choice-architecture (nudges) to the realm of virtual reality (VR) to point out ethical problems with using VR for empathy-based nudging. Specifically, we argue that VR simulations aiming to enhance empathic understanding of others via perspective-taking will almost always be unethical to develop or deploy. We argue that VR-based empathy enhancement not only faces traditional ethical concerns about nudge (autonomy, welfare, transparency), but also a variant of the semantic variance problem (...) that arises for intersectional perspective-taking. VR empathy simulations deceive and manipulate their users about their experiences. Despite their often laudable goals, such simulations confront significant ethical challenges. In light of these goals and challenges, we conclude by proposing that VR designers shift from designing simulations aimed at producing empathic perspective-taking to designing simulations aimed at generating sympathy. These simulations, we claim, can avoid the most serious ethical issues associated with VR nudges, semantic variance, and intersectionality. (shrink)

Our memories elicit, in us, both beliefs about what the external world was like in the past, and beliefs about what our own past experience of it was like in the past. What explains the power of memories to do that? I tackle this question by offering an account of the content of our memories. According to this account, our memories are ‘token-reflexives’, in that they represent their own causal origin. My main contention will be that our memories are able (...) to provide us with evidence for the two types of beliefs due to the self-referential nature of their content. First, I will put forward a series of thought-experiments intended to raise several intuitions about the veridicality of memories. Next, I will introduce the view that memories are token-reflexives, and I will motivate it by pointing out that the view accommodates the relevant intuitions. And, then, I will return to the two types of beliefs prompted by our memories, and argue that conceiving memories as token-reflexives allows us to explain why memory has the power to elicit the two types of beliefs in us. (shrink)

Memories are mental states with a number of interesting features. One of those features seems to be their having an intentional object. After all, we commonly say that memories are about things, and that a subject represents the world in a certain way by virtue of remembering something. It is unclear, however, what sorts of entities constitute the intentional objects of memory. In particular, it is not clear whether those are mind-independent entities in the world or whether they are mental (...) entities of some kind. The purpose of this chapter is to map the different positions on this issue, and to highlight the virtues and difficulties for each of the options. In Section 2, I will specify the question of what the intentional objects of memory are by clarifying the relevant notions of memory and intentional object. In Section 3, I will motivate the significance of identifying the intentional objects of memory by exploring the relations between, on the one hand, the intentionality of memory and, on the other hand, the phenomenology and the epistemology of memory. In Section 4, I will consider two natural candidates for being the intentional objects of memory, namely, worldly entities and mental entities, and I will raise some concerns for each of the two candidates. A promising alternative will emerge, in Section 5, as preserving the virtues of the two original candidates while avoiding their difficulties. The alternative will concern a certain combination of worldly and mental entities; a combination that involves both causal and truth-making relations. I will conclude by sketching how the alternative candidate can shed some light on the phenomenological and epistemological issues raised in the third section. (shrink)

This chapter provides an overview of how existential phenomenology has influenced qualitative research methods across a range of disciplines across the social, health, educational, and psychological sciences. It focuses specifically on how the concepts of “existential structures,” or “existentials”—such as selfhood, temporality, spatiality, affectivity, and embodiment—have been used in qualitative research. After providing a brief introduction to what qualitative research is and why philosophers should be interested in it, the chapter provides clear, straightforward examples of how qualitative researchers have used (...) existentials to analyze qualitative data and design qualitative studies. The chapter is intended to introduce philosophers to existential approaches to phenomenological qualitative research, with the aim of facilitating interdisciplinary dialogue and collaboration. (shrink)

The present paper deals with the ontological status of numbers and considers Frege ́s proposal in Grundlagen upon the background of the Post-Kantian semantic turn in analytical philosophy. Through a more systematic study of his philosophical premises, it comes to unearth a first level paradox that would unset earlier still than it was exposed by Russell. It then studies an alternative path, that departin1g from Frege’s initial premises, drives to a conception of numbers as synthetic a priori in a more (...) Kantian sense. On this basis, it tentatively explores a possible derivation of basic logical rules on their behalf, suggesting a more rudimentary basis to inferential thinking, which supports reconsidering the difference between logical thinking and AI. Finally, it reflects upon the contributions of this approach to the problem of the a priori. (shrink)

Kitcher has proposed an ideal-theory account—well-ordered science (WOS)— of the collective good that science’s research agenda should promote. Against criticism regarding WOS’s action-guidance, Kitcher has advised critics not to confuse substantive ideals and the ways to arrive at them, and he has defended WOS as a necessary and useful ideal for science policy. I provide a distinction between two types of ideal-theories that helps clarifying WOS’s elusive nature. I use this distinction to argue that the action-guidance problem that WOS faces (...) remains even under the aims/means distinction, because the WOS’s failure is more basic than critics have suggested. (shrink)

Um marco sobre a questão do tempo na História da Filosofia, o livro XI das Confissões de Agostinho de Hipona (354–430) ainda hoje recebe interpretações. O presente artigo menciona pontos que já apresentei noutro texto sobre o tempo como espelho da alma, no entanto ele recebe o acréscimo de dois pontos que mudam a ênfase de minha interpretação prévia: (1) a citação a Josué e (2) a escolha de Deus creator ominum para exemplificar a relação, via tempo, entre ser humano, (...) Deus e o mundo. Mediante a análise textual do livro XI, a seguinte conclusão será encaminhada: embora Agostinho não recuse a existência do tempo como uma realidade independente das vivências humanas, ele privilegia outro aspecto do tempo, medular nas Confissões, a saber, a relação humana com o tempo em correspondência com a intenção da vontade pela qual a vida humana é governada. Em Agostinho, o tempo da vida se compromete com a ética, e reflete o modo como a vontade habita a vida. Tempo e alma, nas Confissões, são interdependentes a ponto de a experiência humana do tempo ser um espelhamento da vontade. (shrink)

En este artículo se busca comprender las epistemologías de la manigua, entendidas como, un complejo sistema de conocimientos y vida, en diálogo con el monte y el agua en el Departamento de Chocó, Colombia. Las categorías de ‘conocimiento ancestral’ y ‘tradicional’ le asignan un carácter involutivo al ribereño; lo anclan al pasado. Las epistemologías de la manigua como metodología implican un diálogo interepistémico entre el método genealógico y las mañas de Tío Conejo, Ananse, Miguel Caicedo, Jaime Arocha, Sergio Mosquera, Lydia (...) Cabrera, en especial, Rogerio Velásquez. La oralidad representa potentes guayacanes3. Los ribereños son portadores de conocimientos propios: espiritualidad, ombligamiento, partería, etc. Esta racionalidad se encuentra amenazada por el colonialismo. (shrink)

Is it justified to hold that an agent S has a (moral) right to P if the duty-bearer is not specified? There is an intense ongoing debate on this question. There are two positions in the literature. On the one hand, O´Neill´s much-discussed account of rights holds that it is justified to say that an agent S has a right to P if and only if the duty-bearer is sufficiently determined – i.e. if and only if it is clear against (...) whom S may claim her right to P (O’Neill 1986, 1988, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2016). Call this, the ‘claimability condition’. On the other hand, interest-based theorists argue that it can be justified to say that an agent S has a right to P even if the duty-bearer is not sufficiently determined (Caney 2007; Griffin, 2008; Raz 1988; Tasioulas 2007; see also: Etinson, 2013; Ypi 2010). Who (if anyone) is correct in this fundamental discussion about the very nature of rights? In this paper, I provide an answer to this crucial question. Neither O´Neill nor interest-based theorists provide good reasons to justify their positions. However, I argue, the claimability condition is an existence condition of rights justified on the basis of their action-guiding character. The reason is that if the duty-bearer is not specified, the content of the right (its correlative obligation) does not sufficiently guide what the agent should do because it is indeterminate who is required to act (or refrain from acting). (shrink)

Intellectual property regimes necessarily create artificial scarcity leading to wastage, both by blocking follow-up research and hindering access to those who are only able to pay less then the actual retail price. After revising the traditional arguments to hinder access to people’s intellectual labour we will examine why we should be more open to allow free-riding of inventive efforts, especially in cases where innovators have not secured the widest access to the fruits of their research and failed to cooperate with (...) follow-up innovators. We will do so by questioning the voluntariness involved in consumption of objects of innovation, restating the positive social externalities that arise when wider access to the fruits of innovation is assured, and examining the eventual harms innovators face. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to introduce a new concept of “pain-related bodily doubt,” which complements current concepts currently in use, such as pain-related fear, pain catastrophizing, and pain self-efficacy. This new concept, adapted from recent philosophical work on illness experience, has the potential to positively contribute to pain research and clinical practice by providing a vocabulary for clinicians and patients to discuss implicit or tacit dimensions of pain-related experiences.

Food security brings a number of benefits to humanity from which nobody can be excluded and which can be simultaneously enjoyed by all. An economic understanding of the concept sees food security qualify as a global public good. However, there are four other ways of understanding a public good which are worthy of attention. A normative public good is a good from which nobody ought to be excluded. Alternatively, one might acknowledge the benevolent character of a public good. Others have (...) argued that public goods demand being public in the sense of being visible to all. Finally, it has also been argued that public goods are those goods which need joint action to be produced and maintained. This chapter discusses these five understandings of the public good in relation to food security and highlights the advantage of assessing policies from each of these perspectives. (shrink)

The debate about how neurotechnologies impact authenticity has focused on two inter-related dimensions: self-discovery and self-creation. In this paper, we develop a broader framework that includes the experimental and relational dimensions of authenticity, both understood as decisive for shaping one’s narrative identity. In our view, neurointerventions that alter someone’s personality traits will also impact her very own self-understanding across time. We argue that experimental authenticity only needs a minimum conception of narrative coherence of the self and that reversibility should remain (...) a key feature in the ethical assessment of neurotechnologies. The relational dimension of authenticity derives from the fact that a process of self-constitution is never a solitary business. The significant others act not just as subsequent judges of one’s life decisions, but as real co-authors of one’s self. We discuss relevant cases in which others are actively contributing to the meaning-making process, as to the direction one’s life is taking. We also claim that the experimental and the relational dimensions of authenticity should aim to correct each other. The relational dimension introduces socially approved standards as well as limitations to the array of available possibilities of self-fashioning or human enhancement. The experimental side enables us to avoid confusing one’s personal identity with a social and narrative construct that only bears the mark of social pressure and conformism. (shrink)

The mixture of political, social, cultural and economic environments in Latin America, together with the enormous diversity in climates, natural habitats and biological resources the continent offers, make the ethical assessment of agricultural policies extremely difficult. Yet the experience gained while addressing the contemporary challenges the region faces, such as rapid urbanization, loss of culinary and crop diversity, extreme inequality, disappearing farming styles, water and land grabs, malnutrition and the restoration of the rule of law and social peace, can be (...) of great value to other regions in similar latitudes, development processes and social problems. This chapter will provide a brief overview of these challenges from the perspective of a continent that is exposed to the consequences of extreme inequality in multiple dimensions and conclude by arguing for the need to have a continuous South-South dialogue on the challenges of establishing socially and environmentally sustainable food systems. (shrink)

This paper aspires to meet a philosophical challenge posed to the author to give treatment to what was seen as a particularly nice Meinongian case1; namely the case of Galician Meigas. However, through the playful footpaths of enchanted Galician Meigas, I rehabilitate some relevant discussion on the justification of belief formation and come to some poignant philosophical insights regarding the understanding of possibilities. I hope both the leading promoter of the challenge and, of course, other philosophical readers are satisfied with (...) the outcome. (shrink)

The much-discussed “claimability objection” holds that it is unjustified to believe that all individuals have a human right to subsistence because the bearers of the correlative duties are not sufficiently determined. This argument is based on the so-called “claimability-condition”: S has a right to P if and only if the duty-bearer is sufficiently determined. Practice-based theorists defend the human right to subsistence by arguing that if we take the existing human rights practice seriously, there is no indeterminacy about the allocation (...) of duties. In this paper, I challenge this (apparently compelling) defense of the human right to subsistence with a dilemma. If the claimability condition is true, the practice-based defense fails to undermine the claimability objection because the duty-bearer is determined in some, but not all, cases. If practice-based theorists reject the claimability condition, they generate an account of human rights that is problematic from the practical perspective because it may contain duties that are unable to guide action. (shrink)

Boghossian’s (2003) proposal to conditionalize concepts as a way to secure their legitimacy in disputable cases applies well, not just to pejoratives – on whose account Boghossian first proposed it – but also to thick ethical concepts. It actually has important advantages when dealing with some worries raised by the application of thick ethical terms, and the truth and facticity of corresponding statements. In this paper, I will try to show, however, that thick ethical concepts present a specific case, whose (...) analysis requires a somewhat different reconstruction from that which Boghossian offers. A proper account of thick ethical concepts should be able to explain how ‘evaluated’ and ‘evaluation’ are connected. (shrink)

The forfeiture thesis is posed as an independent thesis in moral philosophy according to which agents forfeit (or lose) rights if they perform certain act-types. According to many, this thesis plays a crucial role in the justification of (legal) punishment. In this paper, I argue that the forfeiture thesis is unnecessary – we can simply dismiss it without any substantive loss. Echoing an aspect of the specificationist approach to rights, the reason is that we may replace the forfeiture thesis with (...) an exception clause in the very content of the right not to be subjected to hard treatment: P has no right not to be subjected to hard treatment simpliciter, but a right not to be subjected to hard treatment unless P performs an act-type φ – e.g., murdering an innocent person. This alternative has substantive advantages over the forfeiture thesis, which, in turn, shows that the former cannot be reduced to the latter. (shrink)

The organizational account of biological functions interprets functions as contributions of a trait to the maintenance of the organization that, in turn, maintains the trait. As has been recently argued, however, the account seems unable to provide a unified grounding for both intra- and cross-generation functions, since the latter do not contribute to the maintenance of the same organization which produces them. To face this ‘ontological problem’, a splitting account has been proposed, according to which the two kinds of functions (...) require distinct organizational definitions. In this article, we propose a solution for the ontological problem, by arguing that intra- and cross-generation functions can be said to contribute in the same way to the maintenance of the biological organization, characterized in terms of organizational self-maintenance. As a consequence, we suggest maintaining a unified organizational account of biological functions. (shrink)

Entre 1843 y 1844, uno de los conceptos centrales del pensamiento de Karl Marx es el de ser genérico. Es indudable en este concepto la herencia terminológica feuerbachiana, cuya principal referencia es el concepto de género. Sin embargo, este trabajo muestra que en su funcionamiento el ser genérico, lejos prolongar el concepto feuerbachiano, implica su refutación. Esto permite comprenderlo en una problemática más amplia de la obra de Marx: el proceso histórico de sustitución de las interrelaciones fundantes de los cuerpos (...) por su forma representada. (shrink)