Philosophy of Neuroscience

This paper engages in what might be called anticipatory virtue epistemology, as it anticipates some virtue epistemological risks related to a near-future version of brain-computer interface technology called neuromedia (Lynch 2014, 2016, Carter 2017, Pritchard 2018b). I analyze how neuromedia is poised to negatively affect the intellectual character of agents, focusing specifically on the virtue of intellectual perseverance, which involves a disposition to mentally persist in the face of challenges towards the realization of one’s intellectual goals (King 2014, Battaly 2017). (...) First, I present and motivate what I call ‘the cognitive offloading argument’, which holds that excessive cognitive offloading of the sort incentivized by a device like neuromedia threatens to undermine intellectual virtue development from the standpoint of the theory of virtue responsibilism. Then, I examine the cognitive offloading argument as it applies to the virtue of intellectual perseverance, arguing that neuromedia may increase cognitive efficiency at the cost of intellectual perseverance. If used in an epistemically responsible manner, however, cognitive offloading devices may not undermine intellectual perseverance but instead allow us to persevere with respect to intellectual goals that we find more valuable by freeing us from different kinds of menial intellectual labor. (shrink)

This paper shows the relevance of Zubirian noology for metaphysics in the 21st century, which is marked by the rise of neurosciences and artificial intelligence. Zubiri’s noological analysis, which is closely linked to neurobiology, contributes to offering a new conception of human reality and intelligence.

This art-science interaction evokes two ‘neuroimages’. However, the term ‘neuroimage’ does not refer, as usual, to images that emerge from scientific practices that seek to gain insight into the structural and functional properties of brains. Rather, it is meant that the images considered have as their theme neurotechnologies: specifically, those that concern the control of neuroprostheses, and neuroprostheses themselves. The first neuroimage appears in a biosignal sensing cap catalogue, and the second appears in the science fiction film Blade Runner 2049. (...) While neither neuroimage is actually included in the piece, each is described to the reader before being speculatively analysed, and therefore becomes a ‘mental’ image in the mind’s eye, calling upon the ancient art of ekphrasis. (shrink)

A necessary first step in collaboration between hypnosis research and meditation research is clarification of key concepts. The authors propose that such clarification is best advanced by neurophenomenological investigations that integrate neuroscience methods with phenomenological models based on first-person reports of hypnotic versus meditative experiences. Focusing on absorption, the authors argue that previous treatments of hypnosis and meditation as equivalent are incorrect, but that they can be fruitfully compared when characteristic features of the states described by these concepts are examined. (...) To this end, the authors use the “phenomenological and neurocognitive matrix of mindfulness” (PNM), a multidimensional model recently proposed by Lutz and colleagues. The authors compare focused attention meditation and open monitoring meditation with hypnosis across the dimensions of the PNM, using it to interpret empirical research on hypnosis, and to shed light on debates about the role of meta-awareness in hypnosis and the role of suggestion in meditation. (shrink)

Medical kinds often have an interesting metaphysical structure: they constitute natural kinds but are in part explained or impacted upon by our practices of classification. This prompts the question: when is a natural disease kind truly reactive in response to our practice of classification, and when is it merely associated with or intersecting with a social kind? This paper proposes an answer. I begin with a permissive account of ‘real’ kinds and their structure, distinguishing natural kinds, indifferent kinds and reactive (...) kinds as varieties of real kinds characterised by super-explanatory properties. I proceed to situate disease kinds within this framework, arguing that many disease kinds prima facie satisfy the conditions for being natural as well as reactive. I distinguish ‘simple dependence’, ‘secondary dependence’ and ‘essential dependence’, and argue that a disease kind is only truly reactive under conditions of essential dependence. Finally, I offer a principled hypothesis indicating that neuropsychiatric kinds truly are more ‘on the move’ than paradigm biomedical kinds. (shrink)

Disagreement about how best to think of the relation between theories and the realities they represent has a longstanding and venerable history. We take up this debate in relation to the free energy principle (FEP) - a contemporary framework in computational neuroscience, theoretical biology and the philosophy of cognitive science. The FEP is very ambitious, extending from the brain sciences to the biology of self-organisation. In this context, some find apparent discrepancies between the map (the FEP) and the territory (target (...) systems) a compelling reason to defend instrumentalism about the FEP. We take this to be misguided. We identify an important fallacy made by those defending instrumentalism about the FEP. We call it the literalist fallacy: this is the fallacy of inferring the truth of instrumentalism based on the claim that the properties of FEP models do not literally map onto real-world, target systems. We conclude that scientific realism about the FEP is a live and tenable option. (shrink)

I focus on the concept of the receptive field of a sensory neuron, taking it as a prominent case to address conceptual change in the history of neuroscience. I argue for an interpretation of its ro...

Dubljević and company’s proposed approach for incorporating a socio-political perspective into neuroethics has clear potential to help mitigate the effects of research ‘hype’ relating to neuroethics. Their approach serves as a social regulation meant to improve the realizability of neuroethics research. Drawing on Dubljević et al. s suggestion, we consider how incorporating a socio-political perspective in other scientific disciplines could help the scientific community as a whole move beyond the infamous ‘reproducibility crisis’ in science. The reproducibility crisis is a concern (...) in science stemming from the revelation that most scientific results are difficult, or impossible, to replicate (Frias-Navarro et al., 2020). By applying the four principles proposed by Dubljević et al., the scientific community can avoid many of the pitfalls that have led to the reproducibility crisis, such as the file drawer effect, a publication bias preventing negative results from being published, or the publish-or-perish culture - the pressure for scientists to publish highly influential papers in high impact journals in order to keep their funding (Rosenthal, 1979; Begley & Ioannidis, 2015). As such, we argue that, in its final form, this socio-political framework begs for true open science, wherein systematically sharing data would enable enlightened policymaking by showing a picture closer to the ground-level realities of scientific research. (shrink)

Neuroscience is undergoing faster changes than ever before. Over 100 years our field qualitatively described and invasively manipulated single or few organisms to gain anatomical, physiological, and pharmacological insights. In the last 10 years neuroscience spawned quantitative big-sample datasets on microanatomy, synaptic connections, optogenetic brain-behavior assays, and high-level cognition. While growing data availability and information granularity have been amply discussed, we direct attention to a routinely neglected question: How will the unprecedented data richness shape data analysis practices? Statistical reasoning is (...) becoming more central to distill neurobiological knowledge from healthy and pathological brain recordings. We believe that large-scale data analysis will use more models that are non-parametric, generative, mixing frequentist and Bayesian aspects, and grounded in different statistical inferences. (shrink)

Perceptual filling-in for vision is the insertion of visual properties (e.g., color, contour, luminance, or motion) into one’s visual field, when those properties have no corresponding retinal input. This paper introduces and provides preliminary empirical support for filled/non-filled pairs, pairs of images that appear identical, yet differ by amount of filling-in. It is argued that such image pairs are important to the experimental testing of theories of consciousness. We review recent experimental research and conclude that filling-in involves brain activity with (...) relatively high integrated information (Phi) compared to veridical visual perceptions. We then present filled/non-filled pairs as an empirical challenge to the integrated information theory of consciousness, which predicts that phenomenologically identical experiences depend on brain processes with identical Phi. (shrink)

Moral agential neuroenhancement (MANE) can transform us into better people. However, critics of MB raise four central objections to MANEs use: (1) It destroys moral freedom; (2) it kills one moral agent and replaces them with another, better agent; (3) it carries significant risk of infection and illness; (4) it benefits society but not the enhanced person; and (5) it’s wrong to experiment on nonconsenting persons. Herein, I defend MANE’s use for prisoners of war (POWs) fighting unjustly. First, the permissibility (...) of killing unjust combatants entails that, in cases where MANE is equally or more likely as termination to reduce moral recidivism in unjust combatants, then MANE is morally justified. Second, the relevant infections and illnesses caused by MANE are less bad than death, so MANE leaves unjust POWs better off than the alternative. Third, just as incarceration is often permissible despite benefitting society but not the incarcerated, the same holds for unjust POWs. Fourth, we should accept a broader construal of “benefit” that includes moral benefits. Thus, 3 and 4 are false when applied to unjust POWs. Fifth, medical experimentation likely to help nonconsenting persons is sometimes permissible. Because MANE is likely to help unjust POWs irrespective of their consent or lack thereof, its use is permissible. Sixth, basic principles of proper medical care support the use of MANE on unjust POWs as pro tanto morally obligatory. I conclude that militaries should therefore begin to employ MANE for unjust POWs. (shrink)

Many argue that psychopaths suffer from a stable pattern of neurobiological dysfunctions that should be taken into account in sentencing and treatment decisions. These arguments are compelling only if the neuroimaging data are consistent. It is possible that such consistency is created by reviewers who ignore contradictory findings. To evaluate this, we examined how accurately forensic literature reported neuroimaging findings on psychopaths in a theoretically central structure – the amygdala. We found that forensic commentators consistently under-reported null-findings, creating a misleading (...) impression of the data’s consistency. We discuss this misrepresentation from the perspectives of spin and neurohype, and examine their causes and consequences. (shrink)

ماذا يحدث إذا أبصر الأعمى فجأة، هل سيتخلص فورًا من «عُكازه»؟ أو بعبارة أخرى، هل سيُدرك بالرؤية ما كان يدركه باللمس (عُكازه) بحيث يستطيع تمييزه من بين كافة الأشياء، وتحديد هويته، وبناء خبرة حسية تُطابق بين الجسم الملموس والجسم المرئي؟ تلك هي المشكلة التي حيرت الفكر الفلسفي لبضعة قرون، وشغلت – وما زالت تشغل – حيزًا هامًا من مناقشات علماء النفس وطب العيون والفسيولوجيا العصبية في عالمنا المعاصر.

Objective: Cognitive impairment is a common neurological complication in patients with end-stage renal disease undergoing maintenance hemodialysis. Brain network analysis based on graph theory is a promising tool for studying CI. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to analyze the changes of functional brain networks in patients on MHD with and without CI by using graph theory and further explore the underlying neuropathological mechanism of CI in these patients.Methods: A total of 39 patients on MHD and 25 healthy controls (...) matched for age, sex, and years of education were enrolled in the study. Resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging and T1-weighted high-resolution anatomical data were obtained, and functional brain networks for each subject were constructed. The brain network parameters at the global and regional levels were calculated, and a one-way analysis of covariance was used to compare the differences across the three groups. The associations between the changed graph-theory parameters and cognitive function scores in patients on MHD were evaluated using Spearman correlation analysis.Results: Compared with HCs, the global parameters [sigma, gamma, and local efficiency ] in both patient groups decreased significantly. The clustering coefficient in patients with CI was significantly lower than that in the other two groups. The regional parameters were significantly lower in the right superior frontal gyrus, dorsolateral and gyrus rectus of patients with CI than those of patients without CI; however the nodal local efficiency in the left amygdala was significantly increased. The global Cp and regional parameters in the three brain regions were significantly correlated with the cognitive function scores.Conclusion: This study confirmed that the topology of the functional brain network was disrupted in patients on MHD with and without CI and the disruption of brain network was more severe in patients with CI. The abnormal brain network parameters are closely related to cognitive function in patients on MHD. (shrink)

Parenting books and early childhood policy documents increasingly refer to neuroscience to support their parenting advice. This trend, called ‘neuroparenting’ has been subject to a growing body of sociological and ethical critical examination. The aim of this paper is to review this critical literature on neuroparenting. We identify three main arguments: that there is a gap between neuroscientific findings and neuroparenting advice, that there is an implicit normativity in the translation from neuroscience to practice, and that neuroparenting is a form (...) of neoliberal self-management. We will critically discuss these arguments and make suggestions for ethically responsible forms of neuroparenting that can foster child development but avoid pitfalls. (shrink)

This article explores the use of model organisms in studying the cognitive phenomenon of decision-making. Drawing on the framework of biological control to develop a skeletal conception of decision-making, we show that two core features of decision-making mechanisms can be identified by studying model organisms, such as E. coli, jellyfish, C. elegans, lamprey, and so on. First, decision mechanisms are distributed and heterarchically structured. Second, they depend heavily on chemical information processing, such as that involving neuromodulators. We end by discussing (...) the implications for studying distinctively human decision-making. (shrink)

The possibility of AI consciousness depends much on the correct answer to the mind–body problem: how our materialistic brain generates subjective consciousness? If a materialistic answer is valid, machine consciousness must be possible, at least in principle, though the actual instantiation of consciousness may still take a very long time. If a non-materialistic one is valid, machine consciousness is much less likely, perhaps impossible, as some mental element may also be required. Some recent advances in neurology and many results of (...) parapsychology suggestive of survival after our biological death, strongly support the non-materialistic position and hence the much lower likelihood of AI consciousness. Instead of being concern about AI turning conscious and machine ethics, and trying to instantiate AI consciousness soon, we should perhaps focus more on making AI less costly and more useful to society. (shrink)

Book review of William Bechtel's book Mental Mechanist. The book outlines a new and original program for the philosophy of cognitive science using an original concept of mechanism as its core idea. Bechtel’s concept of mechanism is intended to allow for a naturalized science of the mind that is continuous with the other sciences. The review goes through all the claims made in the book.

Anthropology of Consciousness, EarlyView.

Assume that neuro-doping is safe and efficient. This means that the use of it, and similar future safe methods of enhancement in sport, may help those who are naturally weak to catch up with those who are naturally strong and sometimes even defeat them. The rationale behind anti-doping measures seem to presuppose that this is unfair. But the idea that those who are naturally strong should defeat those who are naturally weak rests on a fascistoid ideology that sport had better (...) leave behind. Neuro-doping may be seen as a means to undermine the fascistoid notion of fairness. The conjecture is that, given that society adopts what will be characterized as a policy of biological egalitarianism, this will happen. Then people will compete in society in general and in sport in particular on more equal biological terms. The fascination with natural strength, and the cheering for the winners, can then go away. Instead we see a liberated sport where we take part in it for the sheer fun of doing so. Neuro-doping, and similar techniques, may be a means that helps to liberate elite sport from its perverse view of fairness. (shrink)

(October 2021 to 2014) The UNBELIEVABLE similarities between the ideas of some people (2011-2016) and my ideas (2002-2008) in physics (quantum mechanics, cosmology), cognitive neuroscience, philosophy of mind, and philosophy (this manuscript would require a REVOLUTION in international academy environment!).

One of the most conspicuous features of contemporary modeling practices is the dissemination of mathematical and computational methods across disciplinary boundaries. We study this process through two applications of the Ising model: the Sherrington-Kirkpatrick model of spin glasses and the Hopfield model of associative memory. The Hopfield model successfully transferred some basic ideas and mathematical methods originally developed within the study of magnetic systems to the field of neuroscience. As an analytical resource we use Paul Humphreys's discussion of computational and (...) theoretical templates. We argue that model templates are crucial for the intra- and interdisciplinary theoretical transfer. A model template is an abstract conceptual idea associated with particular mathematical forms and computational methods. (shrink)

Nudges are often defended on the basis that they merely substitute existing influences on choice with other influences that are similar in kind; they introduce no new kind of influence into the choice situation. I motivate the view that, if this defence succeeds in establishing the moral innocuousness of typical nudges, it also establishes the moral innocuousness of an intuitively wrongful neurochemical intervention. I then consider two attempts to rebut this view and argue that both fail. I end by spelling (...) out four stances that the proponent of the defence might adopt in response to my argument. (shrink)

This Element provides a comprehensive introduction to philosophy of neuroscience. It covers such topics as how neuroscientists procure knowledge, including not just research techniques but the use of various model organisms. It presents examples of knowledge acquired in neuroscience that are then employed to discuss more philosophical topics such as the nature of explanations developed in neuroscience, the different conception of levels employed in discussions of neuroscience, and the invocation of representations in neuroscience explanations. The text emphasizes the importance of (...) brain processes beyond those in the neocortex and then explores what makes processing in neocortex different. It consider the view that the nervous system consists of control mechanisms and considers arguments for hierarchical vs. heterarchical organization of control mechanisms. It concludes by considering implications of findings in neuroscience for how humans conceive of themselves and practices such as embracing norms. (shrink)

Children surviving neural injuries face challenges not seen by their adult counterparts, namely that they experience neural injury before reaching neurodevelopmental maturity. Neural prostheses offer one possible path to recovery, along with the potential for functional outcomes that could exceed expectations. Although the first cochlear implant was placed more than fifty years ago, the field of neuroprosthetics is still relatively young. Several types of neural prostheses are in development stages ranging from animal models to human trials. In this paper, I (...) discuss how neural prostheses may assist recovery for children surviving neural injury. I argue that approaching the use of neural prosthetics in children with considerations derived from transhumanism alongside traditional bioethics can provide an opportunity to reframe adult-focused ethics toward a child/family focus and to strip away the prejudicial metaphor of cyborgization. (shrink)

Gabriel Vacariu, (October 2021 to 2014) The UNBELIEVABLE SIMILARITIES between the ideas of some people (2011-2021) and my ideas (2002-2008) in physics (quantum mechanics, cosmology), cognitive neuroscience, philosophy of mind, and philosophy (this manuscript would produce a REVOLUTION in right international academic environment!) here (the LIST is BELOW) .

There are some distinct methodological challenges, and possible pitfalls, for neuroethics when it evaluates neuroscientific results and links them to issues such as moral or legal responsibility. Some problems emerge in determining the requirements for responsibility. We will show how philosophical proposals in this area need to interact with legal doctrine and practice. Problems can occur when inferring normative implications from neuroscientific results. Other problems arise when it is not recognized that data about brain anatomy or physiology are relevant to (...) the ascription of responsibility only when they are significantly correlated with the psychological capacities contemplated by the legal formulations of responsibility. We will demonstrate this by considering two significant cases concerning psychopathy. Some paradigms that aim at measuring higher-order capacities, such as moral understanding, have limited validity. More robust paradigms for the study of learning in restricted controlled conditions, on the other hand, have limited ecological validity across individuals and context to be of any use for the law. (shrink)

Anthropology of Consciousness, EarlyView.

The article deals with the problem of cognition in the framework of the biogenetic structuralist neurophenomenology of Charles Laughlin. The aim of the article is to study the possibilities of applying the biogenetic structuralist theory as a theoretical and methodological basis for the study of consciousness in Laughlin’s theory. A feature of biogenetic structuralism is the interdisciplinary fusion of anthropology, psychology, and neuroscience. The methodology of biogenetic structuralism allows exploring universal structures of consciousness, which are caused by the genetically predisposed (...) organization of the human nervous system. Universal structures of consciousness include structures that mediate human language, knowledge of time and space. It is shown that the problem of cognition is realized in neurognostic models, which are compared with the operational environment. Neurognostic models include both the real nature of man as an organism and the external environment of the organism. Laughlin introduces the concept of a cognitive environment to designate a set of neurognostic models that can potentially be captured by the area of consciousness. He relies on the idea of a cognitive environment, which is essentially intentional in its organization. The polar interaction between the prefrontal cortex and the sensory cortex of the human brain gives rise to the intentionality of consciousness. Laughlin explains the work of the human cerebral cortex neurognostically as omnipresent for human consciousness, and independent of the cultural background. The cerebral cortex is a field of neural activity that arises and dissolves in temporal sequences and coordinates with cognitive processes that connect meaning and form into a single structure in consciousness. The experience of consciousness suggests a sensitive sphere of the cerebral cortex ascertains the meaningful, phenomenal world. The biogenetic structuralist methodology allows to development of an idea of the intentional structure and uniqueness of consciousness. The biogenetic structuralist approach is heuristic for modern science because, firstly, this approach creates the maximum opportunity to include data obtained from naturalistic, ethnographic, anatomical, clinical, and experimental sources; secondly, biogenetic data have the widest empirical and phenomenological rationale; thirdly, biogenetic concepts are defined in the context of a holistic understanding of the phenomenon through the uniqueness of consciousness. (shrink)

Changes that occurred in science in the second half of the twentieth century, led to the emergence of a number of Sciences, the subject of study of which requires the involvement of interdisciplinary methodology and theory of neuroscience, for example, neurobiology, neurolinguistics, neuroanthropology, neurophilosophy, neurophenomenology, etc. One of the features of modern anthropology is that the subject of its research involves an interdisciplinary dialogue, the involvement of methods and theories of socio-human and natural Sciences, which led to the formation of (...) neuroanthropology as a science. One of the trends in the development of neuroanthropological theory is the introduction of biogenetic structuralism in the field of research. The article is devoted to the analysis of the biogenetic structuralism as an example of an interdisciplinary dialogue in which transpersonal and phenomenological approaches are integrated in neuroanthropology. Appeal to the main areas ofneuroanthropologic research allows going beyond the framework of Cartesian dualism and considering issues of the relationship between body and mind in terms of an integrative approach. The biogenetic structuralist neurophenomenological theory is of great importance as a theoretical and methodological basis for cross-cultural studies of consciousness. (shrink)

In this chapter, I aim to examine the two central properties that are said to underlie the theory of mirror neurons, namely action execution and action observation. I shall call these the functional properties of mirror neurons. I will argue that attributing the functional properties of mirror cognition, as many neuroscientists do, to the so-called ‘mirror neurons’ suffers from the problem of misidentification. This is the problem of incorrectly identifying an object or a property of one sort with some other (...) object or property. In light of this, I will propose that the most promising solution for the problem of misidentification is to ground the functional properties of mirror neurons squarely in consciousness and its bearer. (shrink)

Culpability lies at the heart of our moral and legal practices of blaming, censuring, and punishing. Put simply, an agent is culpable for an action if the action is wrongful and the agent is responsible for that action. This seemingly straightforward concept remains contested within philosophy and legal theory, however, especially in the relatively new fields of neuroethics and neurolaw. How to understand responsible agency, which agents are potential bearers of culpability in general—and for which actions—and the possible evidentiary relevance (...) of neuroscientific findings to these topics are all subjects of active debate. (shrink)

The goal of this work is to compile the basic components for the construction of an electromagnetic field theory of consciousness that meets the standards of a fundamental theory. An essential cornerstone of the conceptual framework is the vacuum state of quantum electrodynamics which, contrary to the classical notion of the vacuum, can be viewed as a vibrant ocean of energy, termed zero-point field (ZPF). Being the fundamental substrate mediating the electromagnetic force, the ubiquitous ZPF constitutes the ultimate bedrock of (...) all electromagnetic phenomena. In particular, resonant interaction with the ZPF is critical for understanding rapidly forming, long-range coherent activity patterns that are characteristic of brain dynamics. Assuming that the entire phenomenal color palette is rooted in the vibrational spectrum of the ZPF and that each normal mode of the ZPF is associated with an elementary shade of consciousness, it stands to reason that conscious states are caused by the coupling of the brain to a particular set of normal modes selectively filtered from the full frequency spectrum of the ZPF. From this perspective, the brain is postulated to function as a resonant oscillator that couples to a specific range of ZPF modes, using these modes as a keyboard for the composition of an enormous variety of phenomenal states. Theoretical considerations suggest that the brain-ZPF interface is controlled by altering the concentrations of neurotransmitters, placing the detailed study of the neurotransmitter-ZPF interaction at the center of future research activities. (shrink)

One way to determine whether a mental condition should be considered a disorder is to first give necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be a disorder and then see if it meets these conditions. But this approach has been criticized for begging normative questions. Concerning autism, a neurodiversity movement has arisen with essentially two aims: advocate for the rights and interests of individuals with autism, and de-pathologize autism. We argue that denying autism’s disorder status could undermine autism’s exculpatory role (...) in cases where individuals with autism are charged with a crime. Our argument raises a dilemma for the neurodiversity movement: advocating for the rights and interests of individuals with autism may require viewing autism as a condition that can be inherently disabling. If this is right, autism’s disorder status might be maintained without deriving this result from any general account of disorder. (shrink)

As neuroscience progresses, we will not only gain a better understanding of how our brains work, but also a better understanding of how to modify them, and as a result, our mental states. An important question we are faced with is whether the state could be justified in implementing such methods on criminal offenders, without their consent, for the purposes of rehabilitation and reduction of recidivism; a practice that is already legal in some jurisdictions. By focusing on a prominent type (...) of view of free action, which I call bypassing views, this paper evaluates how such interventions may negatively impact the freedom of their subjects. The paper concludes that there will be a tension between the goals of rehabilitation and reduction of recidivism, on the one hand, and the negative impact such interventions may have on free action, on the other. Other things equal, the better that a particular intervention is at achieving the former, the more likely it is to result in the latter. (shrink)