Alexius Meinong

According to what has long been the dominant school of thought in analytic meta-ontology––defended not only by W. V. O. Quine, but also by Bertrand Russell, Alvin Plantinga, Peter van Inwagen, and many others––the meaning of ‘there is’ is identical to the meaning of ‘there exists.’ The most (in)famous aberration from this view is advanced by Alexius Meinong, whose ontological picture has endured extensive criticism (and borderline abuse) from several subscribers to the majority view. Meinong denies the identity of being (...) and existence. That is, he denies that ‘there is’ and ‘there exists’ are semantically equivalent, and espouses a theory according to which there are things that do not exist. Here I defend a revised version of this view, which I call “Noncontradictory Neo-Meinongianism.” Focusing primarily on van Inwagen’s arguments in “Meta-Ontology” (1998), I argue that Noncontradictory Neo-Meinongianism is, on commonsensical grounds, preferable to the meta-ontological theories of van Inwagen and Meinong. (shrink)

This sketch of a perhaps future 'Elementary Theory of the Category of Mereological Sums (including Mereological Wholes and Parts)' relates to my previous papers "The Topos of Emergence" and "Intelligible Gunk". I assert that for successfully categorizing Mereology one has to start with a specific setting of gunk. In this paper we will give a sketch of a categorically version of particular mereological structures. I.e. we will follow the example of F.W.Lawvere’s “An elementary theory of the category of sets” -/- (...) where he introduced a categorised version of set theory. We refer to sirenians mainly for the reason that they are the closest living relatives of elephants. -/- But they are also rather underestimated creatures - at the first moment rather dull and clumsy, but moving gracefully and elegant in their natural habitat.And some sailors already reckognized their bewitching attraction before we did.Yet we still think this sirenia is a modest creature compared with the elephant in the room. (shrink)

This study purports a unifying view of the ontology of mathematics and fiction presented in Husserl’s 1894 manuscript “Intentional Objects” [Intentionale Gegenstände] in relation to his theory of manifolds. In particular, I clarify that Husserl’s argument supposes deductive systems of mathematical theories and fictional work as well as their “correlates,” which are mathematical manifolds in the former cases. This unifying view concretizes the concept of manifolds as an ontological concept that is not bound to mathematics. Although mathematical and fictional objects (...) differ in whether they are purely formal or materially filled, the concept of manifolds can be extended to admit materially filled objects, thus encompassing the two into the unitary theory of manifolds. By contrast, reviewing the subsequent developments of Husserl’s theory of manifolds naturally leads to restricting its concept to be strictly formal. This notion is consistent with the view that describes manifolds as forms of worlds and states of affairs; however, I suggest that the concept of the manifold is more fundamental than the concept of the world and state of affairs. (shrink)

_Nicolai Hartmann and Alexius Meinong on Apriority and Causality. Notes on the Correspondence_ The article offers a critical reading of the nine letters composing the correspondence exchanged by Alexius Meinong (1853-1920) and Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950) in 1915 and 1918-1920. The author explores the main contents of the correspondence, through a chronological-thematic analysis. The letters of 1915 are eminently dedicated to a discussion of the gnoseology-ontology relationship. Here, the author focuses (1.1) on the relationship between reality and knowledge and (1.2) on (...) that between a priori and cognitive principles. The analysis (2) of the 1918-1920 correspondence concludes the article, engaging in the theme of the law of causality. Different in the philosophical background and argumentative style, the late Meinong and the young Hartmann find a field of dialogue that appears not lacking in consequences on the philosophical evolution of the latter. (shrink)

Metametaphysics is the study regarding the foundations and the methodology of Metaphysics. We’ll analyze in this paper three methodologies that established the origins of Metametaphysics in the Analytic Tradition: that of Alexius Meinong, Rudolf Carnap and Willard van Orman Quine. According to Meinong, there is a distinction between ‘to exist’ and ‘there is’ and, in order to preserve the intuition that every intentional act is directed towards an object, there are things that do not exist. According to Carnap, the questions (...) in Metaphysics can be easily answered by empirical or inferential means once we adopt a linguistic framework and answer these questions internally to this framework. Quine argued that to take an entity as existing is to take it as the value of a bound variable. Metametaphysics is relevant because it disambiguates our vocabulary and makes the philosophers avoid verbal disputes. Our objective in this paper was not to show our preferences to one of these methodologies but to provide a starting point for those who are not familiar with these matters — just so other researchers may engage with the issues that belong to Metametaphysics. (shrink)

The notion of Ausersein/outbeing, proposed by Alexius Meinong, was for a long time in the shadow of the principle of the Ausersein of a pure object, which made it possible to make non-existent objects part of a judgment. This principle was adopted by many followers of Meinong within the framework of analytical philosophy, but the very concept of Ausersein was almost totally ignored. When it’s become an object of research, there appeared several interpretations of it. It was interpreted either as (...) a way of describing the ontological status of non-existent objects, or as a basic property of all objects without exception. Dale Jacquette suggests interpreting Ausersein as extraontology, i.e. a metasemantic category that includes all items. In this article, we will analyse the arguments of modern interpreters of this notion and try to find out which interpretation is most correct. (shrink)

This paper aspires to meet a philosophical challenge posed to the author to give treatment to what was seen as a particularly nice Meinongian case1; namely the case of Galician Meigas. However, through the playful footpaths of enchanted Galician Meigas, I rehabilitate some relevant discussion on the justification of belief formation and come to some poignant philosophical insights regarding the understanding of possibilities. I hope both the leading promoter of the challenge and, of course, other philosophical readers are satisfied with (...) the outcome. (shrink)

This article argues that Meinong’s analysis of assumption, while exploring the variety of phenomenological primitives in a more promising way than Brentano did, nevertheless fails to adequately account for the noncommittal character of assumptive attitudes and the difference between assumptive and other neighbouring attitudes. Section 1 outlines an overall framework for the philosophical analysis of assumptions and cognitive attitudes. Section 2 gives an overview of Brentano’s analysis of cognitive attitudes and some difficulties thereof. Section 3 offers a critical examination of (...) Meinong’s rival analysis. Eventually, Section 4 suggests an alternative route, according to which assumptive attitudes are best analysed in taking as a phenomenological primitive besides. (shrink)

Among historians of philosophy it is often taken for granted that the “Brentano school” was one of the influential philosophical movements at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century – but Brentano’s own contributions are often eclipsed by that of his direct students. This invites to reflect on the nature of and the unity within the school. Since Brentano’s conception of a rigorous, scientific philosophy had a strong impact on his students, it has been argued (...) that this conception constitutes a unifying element in an otherwise heterogeneous group. The scope of this article is to shed light on this thesis and to show its limits. I argue for a differentiated view: the Brentano school is best seen not as a compact movement, but as a heterogeneous group of scholars who approached, in a given historical and geographical period, similar topics in very similar ways. (shrink)

In this article I connect two concepts that played central roles in the School of Meinong: the notion of impossible objects and that of Gestalt. Ehrenfels claims that Widerspruch or incompatibility would be a temporal Gestalt quality, specifically the trying and failing to build an intuitive presentation. Where, when, and how does this process break down exactly? Meinong’s Graz students developed a more detailed production theory for the presentation of Gestalten (Vorstellungsproduktion) which can help to determine how the failure to (...) produce one Gestalt can generate another, which moreover is typical of impossible objects. There are three contributions to Meinong’s 1904 volume Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie, the ones by Mally, Benussi, and Ameseder, that provide helpful analyses to clarify the incompatibility Gestalt. These suggest three options to refine the analysis of the Gestalt of impossible objects. The conclusion is that the failure of the Vorstellungsproduktion itself is not enough, the incompatibility relation between the foundations must also play a role. (shrink)

In the genealogy of logical empiricism, the so-called “First Vienna Circle” (Neurath, Frank, Hahn) has been considered an essential episode, connecting the philosophy of Mach and the French conventionalists with the later logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle around Schlick. The present paper makes three claims: (1) We make the historical claim that the lack of archival sources on the “First Vienna Circle” does not allow a reliable reconstruction of such a discussion group, and even allows some doubts about its (...) existence, at least as a regular discussion group. (2) We emphasize the interaction of the young Neurath, Hahn and Frank, in Vienna around 1910, with a group of philosophers strongly influenced by Meinong and claim that this interaction was very advantageous for a reception of the new symbolic logic and especially of Russell´s philosophy of logic and mathematics. New archival sources permit us to reconstruct such an interaction. (3) We claim that this Meinongian context in Vienna shaped some philosophical positionss of Neurath and Hahn, especially their view of the nature of logic and mathematics. We claim that at least Neurath, but probably also Hahn, endorsed a logical realism similar to that of Russell and Meinong. It was only after the reception of the Tractatus in the Vienna Circle that such a logical realism was unanimously rejected by the logical empiricists. Besides the obvious influence of Mach and the French conventionalists on the young Neurath, Hahn and Frank, this heritage from the Meinong school should be taken into account in an evaluation of the early philosophies of our mentioned trio. (shrink)

In this first volume of The Sylvan Jungle, the editors present a scholarly edition of the first chapter, "Exploring Meinong's Jungle," of Richard Routley's 1000-plus page book, Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond. Going against the Quinean orthodoxy, Routley’s aim was to support Meinong’s idea that we can truthfully refer to non-existent and even impossible objects, like Superman, unicorns and the round-square cupola on Berkeley College. The tools of non-classical logic at Routley’s disposal enabled him to update Meinong’s project for a (...) new generation. This volume begins with an Introduction from Dominic Hyde, “The ‘Jungle Book’ in Context,” an essay that situates Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond historically. We provide the original Preface by Routley, followed by Chapter 1: “Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond.” In Chapter 2, Nicholas Griffin argues that Sylvan’s project was insufficiently radical with his essay, “Why the Original Theory of Items Didn’t Go Far Enough.” Sylvan revisits his position from this time in Chapter 3, with his article, “Re-Exploring Item-Theory.” Filippo Casati, who has worked in the Routley Archives then takes up the question of the future of Sylvan’s research program in his essay, “The Future Perfect of Exploring Meinong’s Jungle.” Iconic and iconoclastic Australian philosopher Richard Routley published Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond in 1980. This work has fallen out of print, yet without great fanfare it has influenced two generations of philosophers and logicians. (shrink)

In this paper, I analyse and compare Anton Marty’s and Alexius Meinong’s theories of judgement. There are at least two reasons speaking in favour of such a comparison. First, both philosophers were influenced by Franz Brentano’s approach to consciousness, in general, and by his theory of judgement, in particular: in differing degrees, Marty and Meinong may be considered pupils of Brentano. Second, the two philosophers introduced similar amendments to Brentano’s approach. According to Brentanian orthodoxy, we do not have access to (...) any entity that objectively grounds the truth of our judgements, whilst Marty and Meinong both commit themselves to the view that we do. This paper reconstructs the specific ontological characteristics of these entities and the kind of epistemological access we have to them. Finally, a crucial but problematic component of Marty’s and Meinong’s theories is addressed, i.e., the introduction of negative entities to ground the truth of negative judgements. (shrink)

Yablo suggests a ‘hostage crisis’ occurs when an unproblematic statement ϕ entails, and is therefore hostage to, a problematic statement ψ. Yablo proposes a technical solution to this kind of problem by diminishing ϕ to ϕ*, where ϕ* does not entail ψ and thus is not hostage to it. I argue that Yablo’s proposal is unnecessary because the original, undiminished ϕ does not in fact entail ψ. This is what Yablo calls a ‘defiant’ position. I defend defiance by arguing that (...) ϕ and ψ are of different metaphysical weights, which I show through an analysis of their use of quantification. (shrink)

The present article provides a critical analysis of Christian von Ehrenfels’ dissertation Über Grössenrelationen und Zahlen. Eine psychologische Studie. As many other students of Brentano, Ehrenfels engaged repeatedly with the philosophy of mathematics, but until now his dissertation remained nearly completely unknown. Ehrenfels’ dissertation, however, fits perfectly within the Brentanist philosophy of mathematics and actually occupies an important place therein, precisely because it occurs outside of the vertical master - student lineage that goes from Brentano via Stumpf to Husserl. Indeed, (...) Ehrenfels dissertation shows many parallels and anticipations to Husserl’s early works in the philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

These five letters from Christian von Ehrenfels to Alexius Meinong contain a written record of how Ehrenfels' dissertation plans came about, based on his reading and commenting on Meinong's work.

The thesis defended, the “guise of the ought”, is that the formal objects of desires are norms (oughts to be or oughts to do) rather than values (as the “guise of the good” thesis has it). It is impossible, in virtue of the nature of desire, to desire something without it being presented as something that ought to be or that one ought to do. This view is defended by pointing to a key distinction between values and norms: positive and (...) negative norms (obligation and interdiction) are interdefinable through negation; positive and negative values aren’t. This contrast between the norms and values, it is argued, is mirrored, within the psychological realm, by the contrast between the desires and emotions. Positive and negative desires are interdefinable through negation, but positive and negative emotions aren’t. The overall, Meinongian picture suggested is that norms are to desires what values are to emotions. (shrink)

Which entities should be accepted as part of the furniture of the world, and which not? What are pseudo-objects, if they are not properly objects? This collection explores the answers given to these questions by some key philosophers throughout the 20th century. It brings together essays by leading scholars on a subject of central importance to both metaphysics and the history of philosophy.".

Ontological reism remains a defensible metaphysical position, and Kotarbiński’s unwillingness to propose a more robust defence of his views has some identifiable historical causes, i.e. his post-war engagement in practical philosophy (both praxeology and ethics), more relevant in the context of a war-ravaged country. There is however one more reason why it remains difficult to justify the ontological part of the doctrine. Kotarbiński assumes indeed that “the fundamental justification of concretism is both naively intuitive and ordinarily inductive” (Kotarbiński 1958, 402). (...) Does this mean that no decent philosophical discussion can be proposed in defence of intuitively grasped ideas? Certainly not, as, once again, is shown by the contemporary works on qualia. Ontological reism should be pursued as a negative theory though, not as a positive one. This question of the burden of the proof was raised by Kotarbiński in 1966, surprised by the fact that it is the reist, the one who rejects imaginary entities, who is supposed to bring new evidence in favour of his positions, whereas those who assume their existence do not feel compelled to go beyond intuitive claims. It cannot rely on analysis of language alone, but has to engage in the investigation of the world. This idea is coherent with the naturalistic tendencies of Kotarbiński’s approach, even if they did not yield any substantial results on their own. (shrink)

The essay gives an account of the aesthetics of the Graz school, focusing on the standpoint of the object as well as on that of emotions. Meinong’s reflection on aesthetics stems from a psychological background and comes subsequently to an ontological grounding. After examining the notions of imagination, phantasy-representation, relation and complexion, I show how the theory of production of representations, as well as that of higher-order objects, develops under the impulse of Ehrenfels’ concept of Gestalt qualities; both these theories (...) may be applied to aesthetics in the explanation of artistic creation and of aesthetic objects. Meinong identifies the specific object of aesthetics with the “objective” and distinguishes aesthetic feelings, which are true feelings, from imaginary ones. Witasek develops a psychological aesthetics built on the conceptual framework of Meinongian philosophy: aesthetic properties are ideal and extra-objective, they connect the aesthetic object to the subject’s mental attitude; an aesthetic object is an object endowed with aesthetic properties, such as beauty, which depends on the degree of pleasure or displeasure the object may induce in the subject. Witasek, though, parts from Meinong on both the conception of aesthetic objects and of imaginary feelings. In the last sections, I review the reactions to Witasek’s aesthetics, both positive and negative, within the Graz school itself (in particular Schwarz’ and Saxinger’s ideas on phantasy-feelings, and Ameseder’s on value beauty), and I sketch Ehrenfels’ and Veber’s aesthetic views. (shrink)

In this paper I want to examine Meinong’s account of what it is to think about a particular object in the context of issues that have preoccupied twentieth-century philosophy of language. The central interpretive task is to determine what Meinong might have said about cases of intending where the object is referred to by means of a proper name. The two theoretical notions at the heart of Meinong’s account of intending, intending by way of being and intending by way of (...) being-so, are a species of singling an object out by means of an associated description. Since Kripke’s landmark discussion, it is widely denied that descriptive accounts furnish an adequate account of intending. I will consider whether Meinong’s account has the resources to provide reassurance on this matter and whether the descriptive nature of his account raises other difficulties. (shrink)

In this paper I trace a theoretical path along Meinong’s works, by means of which the notion of aesthetic object as well as the changes this notion undergoes along Meinong’s output will be highlighted. Focusing especially on "Über emotionale Präsentation", I examine, on the one hand, the cognitive function of emotions, on the other hand, the objects apprehended by aesthetic emotions, i.e. aesthetic objects. These are ideal objects of higher order, which have, even though not primarily, the capacity to attract (...) aesthetic experiences to themselves. Hence, they are connected to emotions, being what is presented by them. These results are achieved on the basis of a fundamental analogy between the domain of value and the aesthetic domain. Finally, the notion of an absolute beauty is discussed. (shrink)

If everything exists, then it looks, prima facie, as if talking about nothing is equivalent to not talking about anything. However, we appear as talking or thinking about particular nothings, that is, about particular items that are not among the existents. How to explain this phenomenon? One way is to deny that everything exists, and consequently to be ontologically committed to nonexistent “objects”. Another way is to deny that the process of thinking about such nonexistents is a genuine singular thought. (...) The first strategy we may call “the Meinongian tradition” (championed by authors like Alexius Meinong, Ernst Mally, Terence Parsons, Richard Routley, and Ed Zalta), while the second could be dubbed “the de re tradition” (connected to work by Gareth Evans, John McDowell, and Tyler Burge). Finally, the third way to solve the above puzzle, and probably the majority view in contemporary philosophy, is due to Bertrand Russell and W.V.O. Quine, who deny the particularity of the apparent nonexistent object and the singularity of the corresponding thought via the view that any statement about apparently particular nonexistents can be paraphrased into a quantified expression containing no genuinely referring terms. Jody Azzouni’s book is an attempt to argue for and develop a fourth view, based on the hitherto unrecognised notion of an “empty singular thought”, which Azzouni takes to have a place in logical space. Concomitant to developing the view, Azzouni applies it to three typical cases of talk about nonexistents: numbers, hallucinations, and fictions. As the name suggests, empty singular thought is devised as having three essential characteristics: (1) it is genuine thought, no different from any other, (2) it is singular, that is, its content is partly determined by particular non-conceptualised states of affairs, and (3) nevertheless it is genuinely empty, unlike Meinongian thought, that is, its object “does not exist in any sense”, to use Azzouni’s own formulation. Azzouni undertakes some challenging acrobatics when trying to persuade the reader that his view is substantive and it does not end up being the same as any of the previous three views about apparent talk about nonexistents.. (shrink)

Alexius Meinong claimed to uncover a brave new world of nonexistent objects. He contended that unreal objects, such as the golden mountain and the round square, genuinely had properties and therefore, deserved a place in an all-inclusive science. Meinong’s notion of nonexistents was initially not well-received, largely due to the influence and criticisms of Bertrand Russell. However, it has gained considerable popularity in more recent years as academics have uncovered shortfalls in Russell’s philosophy and strived to explain apparent “facts” about (...) the beingless. Some philosophers have continued Meinong’s project, further explaining nonexistent objects or formulating logic systems that incorporate them. The more recent developments beg for a re-examination of Meinongianism. This book does just that, putting the theory on trial. Part One considers if Russell truly defeated Meinongianism. It addresses Meinongian rejoinders in response to Russell’s main criticisms and further defends Russell’s alternative solution, his Theory of Descriptions. Part Two explores the rationale for nonexistents and their use in interpreting three types of statements: characterization, negative existential, and intentional. The book argues that, despite appearances, Meinongianism cannot plausibly account for its own paradigm claims, whereas Russell’s framework, with some further elucidation, can explain these statements quite well. Part Three primarily addresses claims about fiction, exploring the short-comings of Meinongian and Russellian frameworks in interpreting them. The book introduces a contextualization solution and symbolic method for capturing the logical form of such claims – one with the complexity to handle cross-contextual statements, including negative existential and intentional ones. It finally considers where that leaves nonexistent objects, ultimately rejecting such so-called entities. (shrink)