Logic and Philosophy of Logic > Logic and Philosophy of Logic, Miscellaneous > Epistemology of Logic
Epistemology of Logic
Edited by Joshua Schechter (Brown University)
About this topic
Summary | The epistemology of logic focuses on issues concerning the normative status of our beliefs about logical truth and logical validity. It seems that we know that certain claims are logically true and that certain arguments are logically valid. What explains this knowledge? This question is an instance of a more general question about what explains our knowledge of (apparent) a priori truths. It is also closely connected to issues in the epistemology of modality, since logical truths are necessarily true. A long tradition in the epistemology of logic has it that logical truths are analytic -- that is, "true in virtue of meaning". In the middle of the twentieth century, Quine challenged this view. He argued that logical and mathematical claims are empirical claims that can in principle be revised on empirical grounds. In recent years, there have been a number of different proposals put forward about our knowledge of logic. Some philosophers follow Quine in viewing logic as empirical. Other philosophers have tried to rehabilitate the analytic theory of our knowledge of logic. Still other philosophers have appealed to intuitions or rational seemings to explain our knowledge of logic. |
Key works | For Quine's critique of the analytic theory of logical knowledge, see Quine 1936 and Quine 1960. Putnam 1968 argues that logic is empirically reviseable. Haack 1974 discusses Quine's views, in the context of a discussion of alternative logics. BonJour 1998 presents a theory of a priori knowledge based on rational insight. Boghossian 2000 and Boghossian 2001 are part of a sequence of papers trying to rehabilitate the analytic theory of logical knowledge. See Wright 2001 and Wright 2004 for a discussion of the role of intuitions in logical knowledge. Also see the key works for "Deductive Reasoning". |
Introductions | Boghossian 2000 provides an opinionated introduction to views in the epistemology of logic. BonJour 1998 provides an in depth discussion of theories of the apriori that is highly relevant to the case of logical knowledge. Field 2005 discusses some recent debates concerning the a priori in general and logical and mathematical knowledge in particular. |
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- Logical Pluralism (193)
- Logic and Information (229)
- Logic in Philosophy (204)
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- Logic and Philosophy of Logic, Misc (1,059)
- Deductive Reasoning (244)
- The A Priori (1,028 | 363)
- Modal Epistemology (771 | 27)
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