If citizens are to make enlightened collective decisions, they need to rely on true factual beliefs, but misinformation impairs their ability to do so. Although some cases of misinformation are deliberate and amount to propaganda, cases of inadvertent misinformation are just as problematic in affecting the beliefs and behavior of democratic citizens. A review of empirical evidence suggests that this is a serious problem that cannot entirely be corrected by means of deliberation.

Western European liberal democracies have recently enacted laws that prohibit the diffusion of fake news on social media. Yet, many consider that such laws are incompatible with freedom of expression. In this paper, I argue that democratic governments have strong pro tanto reasons to prohibit fake news, and that doing so is compatible with free speech. First, I show that fake news disrupts a mutually beneficial form of epistemic dependence in which members of the public are engaged with journalists. Second, (...) I contend that laws against fake news enhance rather than thwart personal autonomy. If these suggestions are plausible, then the same considerations about truth and autonomy that underpin the value of free speech give us reasons to prohibit fake news. (shrink)

Kant’s discussion of the highest good is subject to continuous disagreement between the proponents of two interpretations of this concept. According to the secular interpretation, Kant conceived of the highest good as a political ideal which can be realized through human agency alone, albeit only from the Critique of the Power of Judgement onwards. By way of contrast, proponents of the theological interpretation find Kant’s treatment of the highest good in his later works to be wholly coherent with the discussions (...) of this concept found in the second Critique. In their view, however, Kant never conceived of the highest good as a political ideal, and some go as far as to argue that it is the work of God alone. In this article, I defend a theologico-political account of the highest good that avoids the pitfalls of both readings. (shrink)

In a recent contribution to conceptual ethics, Joshua Habgood-Coote argues that philosophers should refrain from using the term “fake news,” which is commonly employed in public discussions focusing on the epistemic health of democracies. In this short discussion note, I take issue with this claim, discussing each of the three arguments advanced by Coote to support the conclusion that we should abandon this concept. First, I contend that although “fake news” is a contested concept, there is significant agreement among contemporary (...) philosophers about its key feature. Second, I argue against the claim that “fake news” is an unnecessary concept by underlying that it is not reducible to other terms we customarily use to describe the epistemic dysfunctions of democracies. Lastly, I suggest that using the term “fake news” need not serve propagandistic aims, and that philosophers can use this concept without engaging in epistemic policing, that is, commanding their interlocutors not to believe specific news stories or sources. (shrink)

Many neo-Aristotelians argue that practical identities are normative, that is, they provide us with reasons for action and create binding obligations. Kantian constructivists agree with this insight but argue that contemporary Aristotelians fail to fully justify it. Practical identities are normative, Kantian constructivists contend, but their normativity necessarily derives from the normativity of humanity. In this paper, I shed light on this underexplored similarity between neo-Aristotelian and Kantian constructivist accounts of the normativity of practical identities, and argue that both ultimately (...) fail. I end by suggesting an alternative justification of the claim that practical identities are normative. (shrink)

Aristotelian virtue theorists are currently engaged in a discussion with philosophers who use psychological findings to question some of their main assumptions. In this article, I present and argue against one of these psychological challenges—Jesse Prinz’s Normativity Challenge—which rests on the claim that findings in cultural psychology contradict the Aristotelian thesis that the normativity of virtues derives from nature. First, I demonstrate that the Normativity Challenge is based on three problematic assumptions about contemporary Aristotelianism. Second, I argue that it presupposes (...) the truth of a metaethical framework that Aristotelians reject: moral relativism. (shrink)

One central objection to philosophical defences of liberal neutrality is that many neutrally justified laws and policies are nonetheless discriminatory as they unilaterally impose costs or confer unearned privileges on the bearers of a particular conception of the good. Call this the false neutrality objection. While liberal neutralists seldom consider this objection to be a serious allegation, and often claim that it rests on a misunderstanding, I argue that it is a serious challenge for proponents of justificatory neutrality. Indeed, a (...) careful examination of recent French and Canadian laws which impede the members of cultural minorities from freely practising their religion reveals that the state can hide its discriminatory aims by cloaking the policies it enacts in neutral language. In order to avoid the problem of false neutrality, I contend, liberal neutralists should defend a combination of neutrality of justification and neutrality of aim and operationalize neutrality of aim through a practical test that has been a defining feature of American jurisprudence on religious freedom in the last thirty years: the general applicability requirement. (shrink)

Jeffrey Friedman convincingly argues that technocrats may often lack the knowledge required to enact public policies that will effectively promote their consequentialist goals. Friedman’s argument is strong enough to produce technocratic paralysis, in many cases, but “epistemic gambles” may present a way out of this problem. His discussion of exitocracy also raises the question of how to square his internal form of technocratic critique with the question of democratic legitimacy.

Summary This paper examines the entomological investigations carried out by the French naturalist Henri-Louis Duhamel du Monceau during a series of insect epidemics that ravaged France in the second half of the eighteenth century.1 This article began as a paper for Pamela H. Smith's ?Knowledge in Transit? graduate seminar. I would like to thank the participants of that seminar for comments and feedback. I would also like to thank Pamela Smith, Carl Wennerlind, Anya Zilberstein, Christopher L. Brown, Charly Coleman, (...) Matthew Jones, Peter Walker and Melissa Morris for their suggestions and comments on this paper. Finally, thanks to Vanessa Copeland for invaluable assistance in the archives in Paris. The author acknowledges support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Columbia University. It shows how a particularly fierce invasion of caterpillars in the Angoumois region in the 1760s sparked theoretical debates about the nature of animal generation between academic naturalists, farmers, provincial officials and amateur naturalists. As part of a wider effort to reform agricultural production in France, Duhamel du Monceau sought to eliminate vernacular understandings of insect generation and to reform local pest control techniques. In his attempt to develop a body of pest-control knowledge grounded in the systematic observation of insect generation, however, Duhamel du Monceau relied heavily on the efforts of amateur naturalists. The paper shows how he mobilized a nation-wide network of entomological observers, and collected specimens and observational reports from farmers, improving landlords and local officials throughout France. Some informants did not only act as ?mere? observers, but formulated their own causal claims about insect generation that sometimes contradicted those of their metropolitan counterpart. Finally, it demonstrates that a ?patriotic? discourse that joined agricultural improvement and civic virtue provided a powerful impetus for the formation of collaborative relationships between academic naturalists, state officials and enlightened agricultural improvers. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In Habgood-Coote : 1033–1065) I argued that we should abandon ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’, on the grounds that these terms do not have stable public meanings, are unnecessary, and function as vehicles for propaganda. Jessica Pepp, Eliot Michaelson, and Rachel Sterken and Étienne Brown : 144–154) have raised worries about my case for abandonment, recommending that we continue using ‘fake news’. In this paper, I respond to these worries. I distinguish more clearly between theoretical and political reasons (...) for abandoning a term, assemble more evidence that ‘fake news’ is a nonsense term, and respond to the worries raised by Pepp, Michaelson and Sterken, and Brown. I close by considering the prospects for anti-fascist and anti-authoritarian conceptual engineering. (shrink)

It describes and explains the patient-centered model examining and evaluating qualitative and quantitative research. It comprehensively covers the evolution and the six interactive components of the patient-centered clinical method, taking the reader through the relationships between the patient and doctor and the patient and clinician. All the editors are professors in the Department of Family Medicine at the University of Western Ontario, London, Canada.

Si l'histoire de la pensee medievale inclut celle de ses influences, comme l'histoire de la pensee moderne celle de ses sources, il est alors doublement legitime de se demander ce que peut nous apprendre sur la pensee cartesienne sa confrontation historique avec la pensee medievale, au contact de laquelle elle s'est formee, et a l'encontre de laquelle elle s'est developpee. Prenant la suite de travaux anterieurs, cet ouvrage d'Etienne Gilson envisage tout d'abord la confrontation dans une perspective genetique (en cherchant (...) dans certaines doctrines medievales les sources de theses cartesiennes comme l'inneisme, l'etude des meteores ou de la circulation sanguine), avant de considerer plus precisement le rapport de la metaphysique cartesienne et de la metaphysique medievale a travers l'examen de certains points de doctrine particulierement delicats. C'est ici notamment que sont rencontres et eclaircis les problemes de la critique cartesienne des formes substantielles, du dialogue de Descartes avec saint Augustin a l'occasion du cogito, avec saint Thomas dans la preuve de l'existence de Dieu par la causalite de l'idee, et avec saint Anselme dans la preuve dite ontologique. Le caractere novateur de la pensee cartesienne se trouve ainsi etabli avec une acuite inedite. (shrink)

In an influential essay entitled Why abortion is wrong, Donald Marquis argues that killing actual persons is wrong because it unjustly deprives victims of their future; that the fetus has a future similar in morally relevant respects to the future lost by competent adult homicide victims, and that, as consequence, abortion is justifiable only in the same circumstances in which killing competent adult human beings is justifiable.1 The metaphysical claim implicit in the first premise, that actual persons have a future (...) of value, is ambiguous. The Future Like Ours argument (FLO) would be valid if “future of value” were used consistently to mean either “potential future of value” or “self-represented future of value”, and FLO would be sound if one or the other interpretation supported both the moral claim and the metaphysical claim, but if, as I argue, any interpretation which makes the argument valid renders it unsound, then FLO must be rejected. Its apparent strength derives from equivocation on the concept of “a future of value”. (shrink)

Ethical descriptivism is the view that all ethical properties are descriptive properties. Frank Jackson has proposed an argument for this view which begins with the premise that the ethical supervenes on the descriptive, any worlds that differ ethically must differ also descriptively. This paper observes that Jackson's argument has a curious structure, taking a linguistic detour between metaphysical starting and ending points, and raises some worries stemming from this. It then proposes an improved version of the argument, which avoids these (...) worries, and responds to some potential objections to this version of the argument. (shrink)

Major difficulties for readers of Foucault’s The Order of Things concern the historical function and the logical construction of the episteme. Our proposal is to link it with another notion, the ‘point of heresy’, less frequently addressed. This leads to asserting that irreconcilable dilemmas are in fact determined by the type of rationality governing the emergence of common objects of knowledge. It also introduces a possibility of ‘walking on two roads’: a dialogical adventure within rationality. Foucault is not content with (...) either accepting or rejecting the ‘transcendental’ question ‘What is Man?’: with the help of quasi-transcendental categories performing a ‘transdisciplinary’ function, he wants to reach the ‘heretical’ point where anthropology becomes historicity within the horizon of finitude. (shrink)

This paper investigates the semantic treatment of conditional obligation, explicit permission (often called positive permission), and prohibition based on models with agents and branched time. In such models branches (rather than moments) are taken as basic, and the branching provides a way to represent the indeterminism which is normally presupposed by talk of free will, responsibility, action and ability. Careful treatment of the relation between ability and responsibility avoids many common problems with accounts of conditional obligation. Recognition of the generality (...) often involved in conditional obligations makes possible a sensitive way of expressing some kinds of general prohibitions, which in turn makes it possible to account for the special role of explicit permission. (shrink)

Dans sa these de 1913, La liberte chez Descartes et la theologie, Etienne Gilson inaugure le geste qu'il prolongera dans l'Index scolastico-cartesien et les Etudes sur le role de la pensee medievale dans la formation du systeme cartesien: situer l'oeuvre de Descartes dans le contexte intellectuel de son epoque. S'il est certain qu'avec Descartes la philosophie tout entiere semble prendre un nouveau depart, il n'en est pas moins sur que cette pensee s'est formee sous l'influence de la theologie scolastique a (...) laquelle Descartes fut initie lors de ses etudes chez les Jesuites. Etienne Gilson se propose ainsi d'eclairer de cette influence les definitions cartesiennes de la liberte. Notion cardinale de sa philosophie, la liberte fut en effet, avant Descartes, l'objet de nombreuses reflexions theologiques: elle se presente donc comme le point de rencontre privilegie de ces deux systemes de pensee. Par cette entree dans l'oeuvre de Descartes, Etienne Gilson nous invite a la lire d'un oeil neuf: c'est ainsi qu'il nous permet, par exemple, de deplacer le coeur de l'apport cartesien de la definition de la liberte humaine (pour laquelle il emprunte beaucoup aux grands penseurs scolastiques) a celle de la liberte divine. Des lors, Descartes se revele plus fidele a la tradition scolastique qu'il ne l'affirme: n'en transformant les cadres que lorsqu'il s'y trouve contraint par les exigences de sa physique, il s'efforce de minimiser autant que possible les modifications qu'il y applique. (shrink)

L'introduction proposee par Etienne Gilson a l'etude de saint Augustin a pour vocation de cerner l'esprit meme de l'augustinisme en relevant ce qui, dans la doctrine, a imprime a la pensee medievale l'impulsion dont tant d'oeuvres profondes sont les temoins. Cette etude se propose ainsi de degager les quelques theses essentielles qui, commandant l'ensemble de la doctrine, permettent d'en interpreter le detail. La table systematique des matieres annexee a ce volume permettra d'ailleurs au lecteur de l'utiliser a la maniere d'un (...) inventaire; la bibliographie raisonnee competant cette table l'aidera en outre a s'orienter dans une vaste litterature historique. Cependant, a la place de l'ordre synthetique et lineaire des doctrines qui suivent la norme de l'intellect, nous trouvons dans l'augustinisme un mode d'exposition necessairement autre, approprie a une doctrine dont le centre est dans la grace et dans la charite. La methode est digressive: l'ordre naturel de la doctrine augustinienne est ce rayonnement autour d'un centre, qui est l'ordre meme de la charite. Et s'il s'agit la moins de savoir que d'aimer, la tache propre du philosophe est moins de fiare connaitre que de faire desirer... On concoit alors que cet ouvrage, publie pour la premiere fois en 1929, promette aujourd'hui encore une decouverte originale de saint Augustin. (shrink)

The great philosopher and historian of philosophy, Etienne Gilson, sets out to show that final causality or purposiveness and formal causality are principles for those who think hard and carefully about the world, including the world of biology. Gilson insists that a completely rational understanding of organisms and biological systems requires the philosophical notion of teleology, the idea that certain kinds of things exist and have ends or purposes the fulfillment of which are linked to their natures-in other words, formal (...) and final causes. His approach relies on philosophical reflection on the facts of science, not upon theology or an appeal to religious authorities such as the Church or the Bible. (shrink)

L'Index scolastico-cartesien elabore par Etienne Gilson se concoit avant tout comme un instrument de travail apportant des materiaux pour l'application d'une these audacieuse qui sera plus tard developpee dans les Etudes sur le role de la pensee medievale dans la formation du systeme cartesien, et que Gilson inaugure en ces termes : On a longtemps considere que le principal titre de gloire de Bacon et Descartes avait ete de constituer une philosophie radicalement detachee de toutes les philosophies anterieures, et d'en (...) construire l'edifice entier a nouveaux frais. [...] Une pareille conception du cartesianisme peut a la limite se soutenir en ce qui concerne la physique, mais la psychologie, la doctrine de la connaissance, la morale et la metaphysique de Descartes sont remplies d'elements empruntes a la scolastique. La doctrine du temps, des elements et qualites des corps, de Dieu et de ses attributs, des preuves de son existence, de la creation et conservation du monde, de la substance et de son rapport aux accidents, des idees innees et de notre mode de connaissance, des etats actifs et passifs de l'ame, du rapport de la volonte a l'entendement, enfin les vues de Descartes sur la religion et ses rapports avec la philosophie temoignent que sa pensee n'est pas sans devoir quelque chose a la philosophie de l'Ecole. (shrink)

The Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 represents a significant development in UK law. It extends the offence of incitement to racial hatred set out in the Public Order Act 1986 to make it also an offence to stir up hatred against persons on religious grounds. As the most celebrated liberal thinker of the nineteenth century, J.S. Mill might be expected to offer some lessons about the possible dangers of this sort of legislation. A Millian response to the 2006 Act (...) is developed here by first applying Mill’s famous defence of free speech to the Lords amendments to the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill 2005 and then by looking at potential cases in which even freedom of expression loses its immunity when this is necessary to prevent harm to others. Three versions of the harm‐prevention justification for liberty‐limiting restrictions are assessed and it is argued that the most promising version is the claim that it may be permissible to punish incitement to racial and religious hatred not so much because it is itself a kind of harm but by virtue of the acts of discrimination, violence and injustice that are more likely to occur within a climate of hatred. Ultimately, however, this rationale must be weighed against what is, for Mill, the special value of free speech and may in the end justify intervention in only the most acute cases. (shrink)

I was dreaming about Delores when the phone interrupted us. It was the Chief, or ‘Stress,’ as we liked to call him, telling me to get part of my anatomy down to Shakey’s Funeral Parlor. My head ached. I thought I must be the only sucker who gets a hangover from being drunk on life. I got up, put two eggs, a spoonful of wheatgerm, the remains of the scotch, and the phonebill into the blender and fed the whole lot (...) to the cat. It helped, but not as much as Delores would have. I should have married her even if she was a Hubot. At least she could play chess. I was still Rumanating over Delores as I hit the curb outside Shakey’s.I had the notion that Shakey’s was once a pizza joint but I could have been wrong. I found Stress, disheveled as usual, in the lobby.‘You’re late,’ he said. I wasn’t, but he’s thatkinda guy. He says ‘Jump!’ and you say ‘With or without my legs?’ We got our free Cokes from Shakey himself, who led us down the hall. (shrink)

I was dreaming about Delores when the phone interrupted us. It was the Chief, or ‘Stress,’ as we liked to call him, telling me to get part of my anatomy down to Shakey’s Funeral Parlor. My head ached. I thought I must be the only sucker who gets a hangover from being drunk on life. I got up, put two eggs, a spoonful of wheatgerm, the remains of the scotch, and the phonebill into the blender and fed the whole lot (...) to the cat. It helped, but not as much as Delores would have. I should have married her even if she was a Hubot. At least she could play chess. I was still Rumanating over Delores as I hit the curb outside Shakey’s.I had the notion that Shakey’s was once a pizza joint but I could have been wrong. I found Stress, disheveled as usual, in the lobby.‘You’re late,’ he said. I wasn’t, but he’s thatkinda guy. He says ‘Jump!’ and you say ‘With or without my legs?’ We got our free Cokes from Shakey himself, who led us down the hall. (shrink)

Nombreuse, infiniment ondoyante et diverse, cette pensee n'est qu'une charite toujours active dont le mouvement incessant tend vers des objets qui nous echappent ou vers les aspects inconnus de ceux que nous percevions deja. Comment suivre une telle pensee sans etre cette pensee meme (...)?. Le present ouvrage tente une reponse en meme temps qu'il pose la question. Considerant que les ecrits de Bonaventure dessinent moins une progression lineaire qu'ils ne suivent un ordre du coeur, Etienne Gilson propose ici, apres (...) un chapitre introductif de nature biographique qui cherche l'homme derriere l'oeuvre, un parcours circulaire autour du centre de la synthese bonaventurienne, le Verbe, incarne en la personne du Christ. C'est ainsi que se trouvent abordes les themes fondamentaux que sont la critique de la philosophie naturelle, l'evidence de l'existence de Dieu et le probleme de la science et de la volonte divines, mais aussi la creation, les corps inanimes, les animaux, l'ame humaine, les anges, ou encore l'illumination, la grace et la beatitude. Ces etudes convergent et culminent tout a la fois dans un dernier chapitre qui s'attache a saisir l'esprit de ce penseur. A l'encontre de l'argument qui consiste a qualifier Bonaventure de mystique pour le releguer hors de l'histoire de la philosophie, Etienne Gilson se propose de recourir precisement a cet argument pour l'y reintegrer: le sentiment mystique, penetrant en effet toutes les couches de l'edifice, est ce qui lui confere sa systematicite, et une systematicite telle que cette mystique speculative bonaventurienne partage seule avec la doctrine thomiste le titre de synthese de la pensee scolastique tout entiere. Tendant toujours vers une metaphysique de la mystique chretienne comme vers son terme ultime, cette pensee temoigne simultanement de la necessite de la science et de sa subordination aux ravissements mystiques, et se situe a la rencontre des influences de saint Francois, de saint Augustin et des exigences systematiques des Sommes de Thomas d'Aquin. L'oeuvre de Bonaventure marque ainsi un moment capital dans le long progres par lequel la theologie scolastique parvint a l'unite d'un systeme. (shrink)

Many feminist and queer scholars believe that one way to fight racism, sexism and homophobia is to challenge identity labels---ideas of what it means to be “black,” “gay,” “white,” “woman,” “lesbian.” Biology, however, continues to thwart this political agenda; the Body---the biological reality of skin color and sex chromosomes---makes it difficult to propose the idea that identity labels are merely social constructs, not natural facts. Female bodybuilding is a performance that literalizes the body as a site of artificial construction, of (...) intervention, modification. Furthermore, female bodybuilding is a performance of gender bending---women who construct hypermuscular bodies disrupt social norms of gender, performing a kind of self-styled hermaphroditism that begs the question, “why?” This essay explores how female body builders challenge identity labels of sex and gender because of the fact that their gender transgressions occur at the physiological level of the body. I argue that female bodybuilders parody dominant labeling philosophies of sex, gender, and sexual orientation, challenging our sex/gender paradigm in very unique ways. (shrink)

The paper, which retains a hypothetical character, argues that Spinoza's propositions referring to God (or involving the use of the name ‘God’, essentially in the Ethics), can be read in a fruitful manner apart from any pre-established hypothesis concerning his own ‘theological preferences’, as definite descriptions of three ‘ideas of God’ which have the same logical status: one (akin to Jewish Monotheism) which identifies the idea of God with the idea of the Law, one (akin to a heretic ‘Socinian’ version (...) of Christianity) which identifies it with the idea of Human Love, and one (akin to a form of Cosmotheism, rather than ‘Pantheism’) which identifies it with Nature. Evidence of this analytic tripartition can be found in the letter of the texts themselves. If accepted (at least as a thought experiment), it would carry three interesting consequences: 1) to renew our understanding of the theory of the ‘three kinds of knowledge’, which have obvious affinities with the three possible ways of understanding the idea of God; 2) to emphasize the critical move associated by Spinoza with each of the three ideas of God (passing from an anthropomorphic legislator to an impersonal command, passing from an imaginary community of similarities to a practical community of singularities, and passing from a teleological and harmonious idea of nature to a causal, even conflictual, idea of its infinite power); 3) to locate the essential ethical and political questions associated with religion on the ‘vectors’ which lead from one idea to another, and represent themselves practical conatus: obedience, utility, order. It is also assumed that such a reading enhances the relevance of Spinoza's philosophy with respect to contemporary debates about religion and secularism. (shrink)

On emploie ici le terme « structuralisme » dans un sens large, incluant les œuvres de Lévi-Strauss et Barthes aussi bien que celles d'Althusser, de Lacan, de Foucault. J'y vois non pas un système ou une école de pensée, mais un mouvement, et j'y inclus également le « post-structuralisme » de Derrida et de Deleuze, en tant que « négation déterminée » de certains présupposés. Je soutiens que le structuralisme ne se caractérise pas par une position objectiviste, mais par la (...) relance de la tentative pour produire une « genèse » ou une « construction » du sujet au sein de structures transindividuelles, et donc pour y voir un système d'effets au lieu d'une cause originaire. Cette conversion d'un point de vue du sujet constituant au point de vue du sujet constitué explique l'importance des modèles linguistique, psychanalytique et anthropologique, ainsi que d'une certaine interprétation du marxisme comme théorie de l'imaginaire social chez les structuralistes. Quant au post-structuralisme, il déploie un mouvement de rectification, en présentant les limites de la subjectivité, qui impliquent la dissolution de la « normalité » et la mise à jour de la violence inhérente au processus de constitution, comme des « différences » pures qui engendrent l'activité et la passivité. Ce second mouvement contribue de façon décisive à conférer au structuralisme, non seulement une portée épistémologique, mais aussi une orientation éthique. (shrink)

La raison interpretant l'experience sensible peut-elle conclure qu'il existe de la finalite dans la nature? A defaut d'etre reconnue comme une notion scientifique, la notion de finalite apparait comme une constante de la philosophie de la vie, ou biophilosophie. L'idee d'une direction finaliste de la nature a beau etre incomprehensible et indemontrable, elle est necessaire. Et si la science est revolutionnaire, Etienne Gilson est convaincu que la philosophie ne l'est pas. De la philosophie naturelle d'Aristote jusqu'aux theories de l'evolution de (...) Lamarck, Darwin et Malthus, Etienne Gilson retrace le parcours sinueux de la notion de finalite et, a rebours du scientisme de son temps, prefere continuer de croire que l'oeil est fait pour voir. (shrink)

La donnée initiale de La Promesse est directement empruntée à Maigret tend un piège de Simenon. Mais cette histoire de piège cache une idée de sacrifice, chez Simenon lui-même, et bien plus encore chez Dürrenmatt. La Promesse apparaît alors comme une variation sur le récit du sacrifice d’Isaac tel que l’interprète Kierkegaard dans Crainte et tremblement. Le cœur de la méditation du philosophe danois, comme de la fiction de l’écrivain suisse, c’est l’absurde, qui pour Kierkegaard est salvateur, et donne son (...) sens suprême au geste d’Abraham, alors qu’il est pour Dürrenmatt le non-sens même, vouant l’homme à craindre et trembler sans espoir d’apaisement. (shrink)

With his usual lucidity, Etienne Gilson addresses the idea that "art is the making of beauty for beauty's own sake." By distinguishing between aesthetics, which promotes art as a form of knowledge, and philosophy, which focuses on the presence of the artist's own talent or genius, Gilson maintains that art belongs to a different category entirely, the category of "making." Gilson's intellectually stimulating meditation on the relation of beauty and art is indispensable to philosophers and artists alike.

In the 1960s and 70s, first Lacan and then Althusser invoked the category of instance, in a way which would mark what is today called the «structuralist moment» of French philosophy, profoundly influencing the discourse of those who were the disciples of both. The complex system of references to action, demand, insistence, effectivity, decision, hierarchy, which found themselves combined in the notion, proves difficult to translate into other languages, and in particular into English (which has today become the paramount language (...) of critical theory). In order to achieve a syncretism of three heritages (Marx, Freud, Saussure), the French theorists drew on the polysemic extension of the word «instance», which while it does exist in English, operates differently. Hence the interest in examining the divergent choices made by the English and American translators, reading them as symptoms of certain tensions and of a logical instability which affect, from within, the «structuralist» paradigm à la française. (shrink)

Les archives, bien que fondamentales dans la pratique des historiens, tiennent une faible place dans leur réflexion épistémologique, alors que la notion, employée le plus souvent au singulier, a été davantage analysée par certains philosophes, dont en dernier lieu Paul Ricoeur. Il s'agira donc de comprendre l'usage que ce dernier fait du concept d'archive dans son dernier ouvrage, La Mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli, puis de montrer sa filiation avec les travaux de Michel Foucault et de Michel de Certeau. Enfin, on voudrait (...) montrer en quoi cette« archive», liée intimement à la notion de témoignage, peut conduire à des difficultés du point de vue de l'épistémologie historique, et qu'il semble possible de lui opposer un autre usage de la notion, soucieux d'en souligner l'historicité et la matérialité face à une interprétation plus textuelle et herméneutique. (shrink)