Søren Kierkegaard

The Book of Job is often read as the Bible's response to theodicy's 'problem of evil.' As a resolution to the logical difficulties of this problem, however, it is singularly unsatisfying. Job's ethical protest against God is never addressed at the level of the ethical. But suggested in Job's final encounter with God is the possibility of a spiritual resolution beyond the ethical. In this paper I examine the Book of Job as a response to the spiritual problem of despair; (...) despair engendered by the ethical problem of evil. My reading is informed by Kierkegaard's analysis of despair in The Sickness unto Death, and Stephen Mitchell's extraordinary translation of the Book of Job, as well as his insightful commentary. (shrink)

Søren Kierkegaard’s influence on the thought of Mikhail Bakhtin has received relatively little attention from Bakhtin scholars (and hardly any attention from Bakhtin scholars in the English-speaking world). Yet, as I argue in this paper, Kierkegaard was among the most important formative influences on Bakhtin's work. This influence is most evident in Bakhtin's early ethical philosophy, but remains highly relevant in later periods. Reading Bakhtin as a follower and developer of Kierkegaard's fundamental philosophical insights provides us with a key to (...) the unity of Bakhtin's thought. (shrink)

There is a tension for those who want to simultaneously hold that Abraham’s disposition to sacrifice Isaac is epistemically justified and yet hold that a contemporary father would not be justified in believing that God is commanding him to sacrifice his son. This paper attempts to resolve that tension. While some commentators have correctly pointed out that one must take Abraham’s long relationship with God into account when considering Abraham’s readiness to sacrifice his son, they do not entertain the possibility (...) that his hearing this commandment is evidence against the hypothesis that Abraham is speaking to God. I grant this possibility. But I argue that when God commands Abraham to do the unthinkable, Abraham’s previously acquired evidence could still be sufficient to justify his belief that he is speaking with God. And in making this argument, I attempt to show what differentiates Abraham from the contemporary father who thinks that God is commanding him to sacrifice his son. (shrink)

Kierkegaard's Either-Or is a book about the choice between aesthetic, ethical, and religious approaches to life. I show that Either-Or also contains a proposal for philosophy of science, and in particular, about the ideal epistemic state for human beings. Whereas the Cartesian-Hegelian tradition conceived of the ideal state as one of detached deliberation -- i.e. "seeing the world as it is in itself" -- Kierkegaard envisions the ideal state as the achievement of equilibrium between the "spectator" and "actor" aspects of (...) the human being. Kierkegaard's proposal thus sets the stage for Niels Bohr's "epistemological lesson of quantum mechanics". (shrink)

I object to Merold Westphal’s characterization in Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith (2014) of faith as “against reason.” I argue that Kierkegaard scholars emphasize the tension between faith and reason more than Kierkegaard does, affirming and perpetuating a broader antagonism in our own cultural climate. I suggest that the view of faith as transforming vision” developed by M. Jamie Ferreira and others makes better sense of the different facets of faith in Kierkegaard and the strengths of Westphal's account (especially faith as (...) a passion) while avoiding conceptual and practical problems with the "faith vs. reason" model. (shrink)

This paper puts forward a new interpretation of the “Exordium” and “Eulogy for Abraham” sections in Fear and Trembling that reads them in tension, as mutually incompatible approaches to the biblical narrative of Abraham. I argue this tension is productive insofar as it reveals and critiques the failure of each section to respond to Abraham as a religious exemplar of faith. Drawing on the work of Paul Ricoeur, I argue that this failure consists in the absence of the hermeneutical moment (...) of refiguration, which takes up what is understood in the narrative in the lived experience of the reader. (shrink)

This article engages the considerations of imagination in Kierkegaard and Ricoeur to argue for a moral dimension of the imagination and its objects. Imaginary objects are taken to be mental representations in images and narratives of people or courses of action that are not real in the sense that they are not actual, or have not yet happened. Three claims are made in the article. First, by drawing on the category of possibility, a conceptual distinction is established between imagination and (...) fantasy, I claim that imagination has a moral dimension because it is engaged in considering real-life possibilities. Second, drawing on Kierkegaard and Ricoeur, it is argued that mental representations of selfhood in imagination have a moral dimension because they essentially allow people to understand the development of agency in human selfhood by means of representations of would-be selves and narrative figurations of the self. Third, mental representations of human selves have a moral dimension because they form important points of reference for moral orientations in the field of human praxis. (shrink)

I argue that in Sheridan Hough's book Kierkegaard's Dancing Tax Collector, the distinctive and novelistic literary form is not a playful, whimsical, or otherwise contingent feature, but a structure that's needed to convey the account of Kierkegaardian faith as practical in nature.

In this chapter, I argue that the loss of loved ones requires a revised vision of our relationship to past persons. In particular, I argue that relating to deceased loved ones as points on an ordered, forward-moving timeline—on which they grow more distant from us by the moment—has a distorting and damaging effect on our own identity. If we detach ourselves completely from those who sustain important aspects of our identity, this will cause a jagged break in our narrative where (...) a new self must be constructed (whether by us or our circumstances) ex nihilo. On the other hand, if we allow ourselves to drift into the past with the dead—resigning ourselves to existence as an historical object—we will find that we begin to fade away ourselves. Either way, both the self and the beloved are ultimately lost, since both depend on the lost union. To reject both options is a tremendously difficult task that will require rethinking time and our relationship to the past. I argue that we can look to Kierkegaard’s work on maintaining contemporaneity with the historical past, particularly his warnings about how we must not respond to the loss of a beloved. In the last section of the paper, I offer some suggestions for how we might, in a Kierkegaardian spirit, strive to maintain real union with deceased loved ones, thereby rising above the destructive current of time. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: Table of ContentsIntroduction -- 1. Kierkegaard's Audience and Approach -- 2. Against Hegelianism: Kierkegaard on Creation and Christology -- 3. Karl Barth and the Legacy of the Enlightenment: Cultural Religion, Nationalism, and Idealism -- 4. God's Relationship with Us in Time: The Kierkegaard-Barth Trajectory -- 5. Barth's Appropriation of Kierkegaard -- 6. The Kierkegaard-Barth Trajectory and the Challenge of the "Socratic": What Should Christian Engagement with Secular Society Presuppose? -- 7. Beyond Immanence -- Conclusion -- Bibliography (...) . (shrink)

Soren Kirkegaard and Maurice Blondel are positioned together in a dialogue regarding the vision of the supernatural. Maurice Ashley Agbaw-Ebai draws from this a sharper image of the preeminent place religious experience possesses in human life and thought. Kirkegaard's lament of Christian lack of fervor and Blondel's concern that religion and philosophy no longer interact are both examined and Agbaw-Ebai concludes that they both indicate the same outcome: a "dominant leveling of society" that robs religion of its particularity. This devastates (...) the individual because he is no longer challenged to seek a relationship with God and expose himself to the supernatural. The boundlessness of man must be acknowledged or else his actions will never be understood, and religious experience and philosophy must coexist with mutual reference or self-knowledge will never amount to the discovery of supernatural destiny. And this, asserts Agbaw-Ebai, is the shared urgency of both Kirkegaard and Blondel. Like these philosophers who have preceded him, Agbaw-Ebai exhorts us to never allow the sense of our relation to the supernatural as a settled matter. The philosophy of religion we have inherited does not protect us from having to confront our own subjectivity with autonomy: to be God without God and against God, or to be God with and through God. (shrink)

Kierkegaard, like Plato, though using different methods and conclusions, sought to ground knowledge in the ineffability of subjectivity. For Plato, knowledge comes subjectively (internally); for Kierkegaard, it comes by God's grace through faith. Socrates becomes the facilitator for the slave in the /Meno/, as does God for the man of faith. Again, Kierkegaard is also concerned with passion. "...the paradox is the passion of thought, and the thinker without the paradox is like the lover without passion; a mediocre fellow" (p. (...) 37). The paradox is necessitated by the metaphysical nature of the inquiry. Only knowledge through faith can approach the paradox since it is by definition beyond our knowledge. Passion must accompany the leap of faith, since knowledge acquisition for the man of faith is guided by God. (shrink)

The right to revolt is a central concept in political philosophy, denoting when it is justified to replace a corrupt government with a new one. As such, it is a normative concept that would-be revolutionaries should consult in order to determine the justness of a possible revolution. However, this article argues that within Kierkegaard’s thought lies a wholly new conception of revolution that does not look to describe when it might be just to revolt but that instead sees revolution as (...) an act we are sometimes obligated to enact. Consequently, revolt transforms from a right to a responsibility, with important ethical and political consequences. (shrink)

Recent debates over the role of recognition by the community for one’s development and flourishing generally discuss community in a univocal sense: the way that recognition functions in particular communities is not fundamentally different from the way it functions in the larger community. They also tend to logically prioritize a fundamental human identity over particular religious, ethnic, or societal identities, which are understood to be secondary to, and derivative of, this basic identity. In his depiction of how communal recognition contributes (...) to individual selfhood, Søren Kierkegaard challenges these accounts by (1) differentiating between how communal recognition occurs in society in general and in one particular community, the Christian church and (2) questioning the idea that the self created in the former is more fundamental than that created in the latter. For Kierkegaard, one’s identities as both a Christian and a fully-developed self depend essentially on recognition by the Other: initially and fundamentally on recognition by God alone, and secondarily and derivatively on recognition by the human Other. (shrink)

Historical Dictionary of Kierkegaard's Philosophy, Second Edition chronicles the life and thoughts of the great Danish thinker Søren Kierkegaard. What makes this volume essential is its extensive scope: it provides a glossary of concepts, persons, and places related to Kierkegaard’s authorship, from “Absolute” to “Hans Christian Ørsted.”.

Kierkegaard's writings contain seemingly divergent pictures of the relation of God's grace and human works. The differences are evident in the ways that he portrays the connection of human beings’ natural loving capacities to God's gracious enabling of love. What is the relation of human affiliative dispositions, such as attachment to family and friends, to the more extraordinary forms of Christian love, such as loving strangers, enemies, and God? Kierkegaard sometimes stressed the continuity of natural loves and God's grace and (...) sometimes their discontinuity because in different contexts he was pursuing different edifying purposes. On the one hand, he emphasized the continuity of the two when he was attempting to stimulate the appropriate yearning that is a precondition for welcoming God's grace. On the other hand, elsewhere he stressed the difference of the natural loves and Christian love in order to foster an appreciation for the uniqueness and gratuity of God's self-giving. (shrink)

Kierkegaard’s attitude toward the family of issues usually associated with the rubric ‘nature and grace’ has long been disputed by his interpreters. Some of have seen him as a proponent of the ‘grace perfects nature’ position while others have viewed him as a radical bifurcator of nature and grace. Actually, Kierkegaard’s treatment of these issues is more nuanced. He does propose that human nature intrinsically possesses a yearning that can only be satisfied by God’s grace (and therefore nature is oriented (...) toward grace), but he suggests that the grace that God offers is utterly unanticipated, counter-intuitive, and potentially offensive (and therefore grace disrupts nature). The prospect of God’s self-emptying love is something that nature did not know would fulfill its deepest longings, and which excites both attraction and repulsion. (shrink)

The issue of anxiety has been thoroughly debated in Kierkegaardian scholarship from multiple standpoints and traditions, but not so much when it comes to the hermeneutic undertone. This article is primarily concerned with tackling the concept of anxiety as a hermeneutical concept, or working with it through hermeneutical lenses; nevertheless, the implications go deeper—making a case for an original hermeneutic anxiety, an agonistic trait of hermeneutics. By exploring the hermeneutical dimensions of the Kierkegaardian anxiety we unravel a whole genealogy of (...) the agonistic phenomena—a hermeneutical way that thrives in the paradox. The scope of it all is to break with the conciliatory ways of an epistemic hermeneutics, by regaining the Kierkegaardian hermeneutics of anxiety: preferring the fertile struggle over the passionless synthesis, paradox over soundness and agony over apathy. (shrink)

To counteract the antinomian tendencies of nineteenth-century secular Protestantism, Søren Kierkegaard turns to Johannes Tauler's sermons, which vividly express a dialectics of works and grace, attacking an inflated asceticism as much as idleness. For reasons of reception history and because of the similarity of the images Kierkegaard and Tauler use, particularly servitude as expressed in Luke 17:10, this article proposes to understand Kierkegaard's account of grace as ‘Taulerian’ rather than ‘Arminian’. To show the intertwined agency of the human and the (...) divine, the article offers a comparative reading of Tauler's two sermons on Cantate Sunday, Kierkegaard's Upbuilding Discourse ‘The Expectancy of an Eternal Salvation’ and the second part of Judge for Yourself. Both Kierkegaard and Tauler design definitory ambiguities for a performative purpose: to help their readers and, respectively, listeners to become receptive to grace by humbling themselves and refraining from fathoming ‘what is not given to be understood’. (shrink)

We can address the issue of epistemic luck, the possibility that the world interferes with the activity of believing so as to keep that activity from achieving its aim, by rethinking the aim of that activity. So, if we give up truth, for example, as the aim of belief, and if we embrace a different aim—the aim of believing as my ideal self would have me believe—we can eliminate the possibility of luck and leave the world no room to interfere (...) in the affairs of the activity of believing. All this while at the same time preserving the epistemic’s responsiveness to the world. This way of seeing the epistemic is culled from the work of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms. (shrink)

Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche were two seminal 19th century thinkers, each of whom presented dramatically different theological and philosophical conceptions of Christianity and truth. Prior historical investigations into the relationship between these two individuals have problematised what was once a truism in Nietzsche studies whereby the younger Nietzsche was considered to have nil knowledge of the older Kierkegaard insofar as the former did not read the latter’s writings. Focusing on the topic of truth, this study canvasses the historical literature (...) on Nietzsche’s reception of Kierkegaard to evidence the various ways in which Nietzsche indeed may be said to have ‘known’ Kierkegaard, or at least to have become conversant with Kierkegaard’s thought at some level of awareness. However, despite evidence of Nietzsche having encountered the thought of Kierkegaard in general and Kierkegaard’s theory of truth in particular, this study will contend that such evidence for Nietzsche’s knowledge of Kierkegaard generates as many questions as answers for the historical inquirer. Of note, as Nietzsche inauspiciously did not, in unequivocal writing, address Kierkegaard, this study concludes by illustrating a central challenge confronting historians and historiographers intent on tracking these thinkers’ influence on theological truth claims without recourse to a primary literature. That is, without recourse to a literature in which Nietzsche autonomously responded to Kierkegaard regarding the topic of truth. (shrink)

Nineteenth-century Lutheran giants C.F.W. Walther and Søren Kierkegaard both stressed over the application of Martin Luther’s doctrine of Law and Gospel. Both viewed Law and Gospel as concepts to be distinguished and as concepts that dialectically belong together. To his Pelagian audience tempted to abuse the Law and abolish the Gospel, Walther stressed the distinction of Law and Gospel. To his Antinomian audience tempted to abuse the Gospel and abolish the Law, Kierkegaard stressed the dialectic of Law and Gospel. Walther (...) and Kierkegaard’s contrasting Law and Gospel emphases are clearly seen in their contrasting accounts of the Rich Young Ruler in the Synoptic Gospels. (shrink)

I argue that Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks deserve to be read as works of philosophy and not just used as supplements to bring order and respectability to Kierkegaard’s other writings. There are at least three specific philosophical values in Kierkegaard’s journals – three ways in which the journals create philosophy within their own pages and therefore deserve to be read as independent works of philosophy and not just as supplements to Kierkegaard’s other writing: The journals demonstrate what a true work (...) of existential philosophy looks like. The journals contribute to Kierkegaard’s theory of indirect communication. The journals create new philosophical concepts. All three of these are best understood as philosophical performances or a kind of philosophical theatre. The idea that philosophy can be a kind of theatre is inspired by the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, particularly their book What is Philosophy? I draw from Deleuze and Guattari especially in section to argue that Kierkegaard’s Journals create new philosophical concepts. (shrink)

In a now classic paper, Karen Carr argues that Kierkegaard is a religious “anti-rationalist”: He holds that reason and religious truth exist in necessary tension with one another. Carr maintains that this antagonism is not a matter of the logical incoherence of Christianity, but rather the fact that genuine submission to Christ precludes approaching him through demonstration. In this essay, we argue that while Kierkegaard is in fact an anti-rationalist, the literature has failed to appreciate the full strength of his (...) position. It is not just that reason and obedience are in tension; rather, Kierkegaard holds the stronger view that reason is actively offended by Christianity’s primary claims. Not only is reason incapable of generating any positive evidence for the truth of Christianity, more radically, it provides evidence against it. In order to make this case, we offer a close reading of Practice in Christianity, developing a typology of Kierkegaard’s account of Christ’s “offense.” Finally, having motivated Kierkegaard’s strong anti-rationalism, we consider why, on his account, anyone would want to be a Christian. (shrink)

Este trabajo tiene por finalidad distinguir el fenómeno de la experiencia religiosa en el contexto de la filosofía de Søren Kierkegaard. Para ello se repasará la estructura del pensamiento kierkegaardiano y se analizará cómo su marco teórico hace de la experiencia religiosa un fenómeno altamente perturbador para aquella persona que lo vive. Se observará que este fenómeno, bajo las coordenadas teóricas del danés, se convierte en un suceso sumamente problemático en la medida en que se contrapone necesariamente a lo considerado (...) estético y ético. La experiencia religiosa es concebida aquí no como una vivencia recibida pasivamente, sino como una interpelación desgarradoramente exigente y angustiosa que exige acción. (shrink)