Spinoza: Natural Law

In this paper I make four claims. First, there is an apparent contradiction in Spinoza’s theory of justice. On the one hand, in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (1670), he argues that justice is entirely conventional and depends on the ruler’s decision. On the other hand, in the later and unpublished Tractatus Politicus (1677), he claims that man really is a social animal and that we can articulate ideal forms of justice on that basis. Second, to address this apparent inconsistency, we need (...) to look at Spinoza’s use of early modern scholastic metaphysics. Although he rejects scholastic natural law theory, he has adopted another concept from the scholastics that is crucial for his theory: the notion of a ‘being of reason’ (ens rationis). Third, if we consider justice as a kind of being of reason, then we can resolve the apparent contradiction in Spinoza’s approach. I shall argue that concepts of justice are imaginative ‘beings of reason.’ They are products of convention that are not derived from general features of the world but from a particular set of circumstances. Fourth, Spinoza’s social ontology of political concepts like justice has some distinct advantages for contemporary theory. This approach shows how we might be able to provide a framework to integrate politics and natural science without reducing one to the other. (shrink)

In the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (TTP), Spinoza argues that an individual’s natural right extends as far as their power. Subsequently, in the Tractatus Politicus (TP), he offers a revised argument for the same conclusion. Here I offer an account of the reasons for the revision. In both arguments, an individual’s natural right derives from God’s natural right. However, the TTP argument hinges on the claim that each individual is part of the whole of nature (totius naturae), and for this reason inherits (...) part of the natural right of that whole. Using several analogous cases from the Ethics, I show that this form of argument from division is not compatible with Spinoza’s considered metaphysical views. The revised argument, by contrast, avoids the pitfalls of his earlier efforts. It also better reveals the deep roots by which the monistic metaphysics of the Ethics feeds into Spinoza’s conception of natural right. (shrink)

In the first few pages of chapter 4 of his Theological Political Treatise (1670), Spinoza defines his conception of the law. In fact, he defines the law twice, first in terms of compulsion or necessity and then in terms of use. I would like to investigate here these definitions, in particular the second one, as it is Spinoza’s preferred one. The difficulty with understanding this definition is that it contains an expression, ratio vivendi, that is repeated several times in the (...) first few pages of chapter 4, but, unless it is taken as a technical term referring to law as use, it is easy to mistake it as a casual expression that might mean different things each time. As a result, it is indispensable to turn to the Latin text to unlock the technical meaning of ratio vivendi. The result will be that Spinoza's conception of the law aligns with the epicurean conception of the law understood in terms of use. (shrink)

The chapter introduces the function of authority in Spinoza's Theological Political Treatise and Political Treatise.

Vardoulakis argues that the notion of law as developed in chapter 4 of Spinoza's Theological Political Treatise does not rely on a notion of legitimacy but rather on how authority justifies itself. To demonstrate this point, Vardoulakis analyzes closely the example of Adam and the Fall used by Spinoza in that chapter of the Treatise.

Baruch Spinoza is one of the most influential and controversial political philosophers of the early modern period. Though best-known for his contributions to metaphysics, Spinoza’s _Theological-Political Treatise_ and his unfinished _Political Treatise_ were widely debated and helped to shape the political writings of philosophers as diverse as Rousseau, Kant, Marx, Nietzsche, and even Locke. In addition to its enormous historical importance, Spinoza’s political philosophy is also strikingly contemporary in its advocacy of toleration of unpopular religious and political views and his (...) concern with stabilizing religiously diverse democratic societies. The first Guidebook to Spinoza’s political writings, _The Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Spinoza on Politics_ covers the following key points: Spinoza’s life and the background to his philosophy the key themes and arguments of the _Theological-Political-Treatis_e and _Political Treatise _ the continuing importance of Spinoza’s work to philosophy. This book is an ideal starting point for anyone new to Spinoza and essential reading for students of political philosophy and seventeenth-century philosophy. (shrink)

Spinoza avait un trou à son manteau. On avait tenté de le poignarder et son manteau en portrait la trace. La haine dont Spinoza fut l'objet est originaire. Dès la parution du Traité théologico-politique, une sainte alliance est scellée, garante d'un ordre moral menacé par la philosophie d'un homme libre. Dans ce livre, Ivan Segré s'intéresse aux derniers avatars de la réaction idéologique qui a pris Spinoza pour cible, et singulièrement aux penseurs juifs qui ont reconnu en lui un "traître". (...) Est-ce à dire qu'une vie sous la conduite de la raison est une trahison de la cause des Juifs? Philosophe et talmudiste, Segré examine l'acte d'accusation qu'on a dressé contre le philosophe d'Amsterdam et il conclut que la fidélité à l'antique tradition hébraïque exige, aujourd'hui, d'arborer le manteau troué de Spinoza. A ceux qu'il appelle les théoriciens bourgeois du nom "juif", il oppose l'intelligence des textes hébraïques, dont il nous dit qu'ils sont solidaires du nom "ouvrier", solidaires de son devenir révolutionnaire. (shrink)

Through an analysis of Kafka's "Before the Law," Vardoulakis considers both various philosophical responses to Kafka's story and philosophical conceptions of the law. In particular, Vardoulakis suggests an affinity between Kafka and Spinoza's conceptions of the law.

The paper, which retains a hypothetical character, argues that Spinoza's propositions referring to God (or involving the use of the name ‘God’, essentially in the Ethics), can be read in a fruitful manner apart from any pre-established hypothesis concerning his own ‘theological preferences’, as definite descriptions of three ‘ideas of God’ which have the same logical status: one (akin to Jewish Monotheism) which identifies the idea of God with the idea of the Law, one (akin to a heretic ‘Socinian’ version (...) of Christianity) which identifies it with the idea of Human Love, and one (akin to a form of Cosmotheism, rather than ‘Pantheism’) which identifies it with Nature. Evidence of this analytic tripartition can be found in the letter of the texts themselves. If accepted (at least as a thought experiment), it would carry three interesting consequences: 1) to renew our understanding of the theory of the ‘three kinds of knowledge’, which have obvious affinities with the three possible ways of understanding the idea of God; 2) to emphasize the critical move associated by Spinoza with each of the three ideas of God (passing from an anthropomorphic legislator to an impersonal command, passing from an imaginary community of similarities to a practical community of singularities, and passing from a teleological and harmonious idea of nature to a causal, even conflictual, idea of its infinite power); 3) to locate the essential ethical and political questions associated with religion on the ‘vectors’ which lead from one idea to another, and represent themselves practical conatus: obedience, utility, order. It is also assumed that such a reading enhances the relevance of Spinoza's philosophy with respect to contemporary debates about religion and secularism. (shrink)

The book forms a balanced structure in which the three conceptual pillars of Spinoza's natural law theory (individuality, natural laws, and power) are first analyzed from the viewpoint of his ontology and then from the viewpoint of his ...

We sometimes imagine that diversity of religion, culture and ethnicity is a problem of the present, one that sets our time apart. However in the 17th century at the end of the Reformation and the wars of religion that divided Europe, overthrowing medieval institutions, social, political and religious hierarchies that had dominated for centuries, the question of how to govern a diverse multitude of individuals was a pressing practical and theoretical question. By taking human diversity as primary, Baruch Spinoza proposed (...) a theory of the state that does not require pre-existing unity among individuals and so provides a theory of justice, which can be scaled to the global. Further, Spinoza’s theory of political and individual power offers positive reasons why we may want to build global democratic institutions to solve the problems of global justice. (shrink)

Spinoza's Theological-Political Treatise was published anonymously in 1670 and immediately provoked huge debate. Its main goal was to claim that the freedom of philosophizing can be allowed in a free republic and that it cannot be abolished without also destroying the peace and piety of that republic. Spinoza criticizes the traditional claims of revelation and offers a social contract theory in which he praises democracy as the most natural form of government. This Critical Guide presents essays by well-known scholars in (...) the field and covers a broad range of topics, including the political theory and the metaphysics of the work, religious toleration, the reception of the text by other early modern philosophers and the relation of the text to Jewish thought. It offers valuable perspectives on this important and influential work. (shrink)

Studies the books of Spinoza to clarify some of his central ideas on man, society, and government.

Spinoza's contributions to a theory of global justice.