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  1. Morality as Both Objective and Subjective: 
Baumgarten’s Way to Moral Realism and Its Impact on Kant.Stefano Bacin - 2024 - In Courtney D. Fugate & John Hymers (eds.), Baumgarten and Kant on the Foundations of Practical Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 90-105.
    In § 37 of his "Elements of First Practical Philosophy", Baumgarten provides important qualifications to the controversial notion of ‘objective morality’, which had long been at the centre of the dispute between realists like Wolff and his adversaries. The chapter shall examine how he construes his view of morality in §§ 36-38 with a specific focus on the central § 37. I shall analyse that section, first considering how Baumgarten understands the key notion of ‘objective morality’ and how he argues (...)
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  2. (1 other version)Kant on Method.Karl Schafer - 2024 - In Andrew Stephenson & Anil Gomes (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Kant. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    In this article I offer an opinionated overview of the central elements of Kant’s philosophical methodology during the critical period. I begin with a brief characterization of how Kant conceives of the aims of human inquiry – focusing on the idea that inquiry ideally aims at not just cognition (Erkenntnis), but also the more demanding cognitive achievements that Kant labels insight (Einsehen) and comprehension (Begreifen). Then I explore the implications of this picture for philosophy — emphasizing Kant’s distinction between critical (...)
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  3. Kant's Formula of Universal Law as a Test of Causality.W. Clark Wolf - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (3):459-90.
    Kant’s formula of universal law (FUL) is standardly understood as a test of the moral permissibility of an agent’s maxim: maxims which pass the test are morally neutral, and so permissible, while those which do not are morally impermissible. In contrast, I argue that the FUL tests whether a maxim is the cause or determining ground of an action at all. According to Kant’s general account of causality, nothing can be a cause of some effect unless there is a law-like (...)
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  4. Three Rival Versions of Kantian Constructivism.Garcia Ernesto V. - 2022 - Kant Yearbook 14 (1):23-43.
    In order to make some headway on the debate about whether Kant was a constructivist, nonconstructivist, or instead defends a hybrid view that somehow entirely sidesteps these categories, I attempt to clarify the terms of the debate more carefully than is usually done. First, I discuss the overall relationship between realism and constructivism. Second, I identify four main features of Kantian constructivism in general. Third, I examine three rival versions of metanormative Kantian constructivism, what I’ll call axiological, constitutivist, and rationalist (...)
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  5. Kantian Constructivism and the Sources of Normativity.Janis David Schaab - 2022 - Kant Yearbook 14 (1):97-120.
    While it is uncontroversial that Kantian constructivism has implications for normative ethics, its status as a metaethical view has been contested. In this article, I provide a characterisation of metaethical Kantian constructivism that withstands these criticisms. I start by offering a partial defence of Sharon Street’s practical standpoint characterisation. However, I argue that this characterisation, as presented by Street, is ultimately incomplete because it fails to demonstrate that the claims of Kantian constructivism constitute a distinctive contribution to metaethics. I then (...)
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  6. Kant on Autonomy of the Will.Janis David Schaab - 2022 - In Ben Colburn (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Autonomy. New York, NY: Routledge.
    Kant takes the idea of autonomy of the will to be his distinctive contribution to moral philosophy. However, this idea is more nuanced and complicated than one might think. In this chapter, I sketch the rough outlines of Kant’s idea of autonomy of the will while also highlighting contentious exegetical issues that give rise to various possible interpretations. I tentatively defend four basic claims. First, autonomy primarily features in Kant’s account of moral agency, as the condition of the possibility of (...)
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  7. Kant e l'autonomia della volontà. Una tesi filosofica e il suo contesto.Stefano Bacin - 2021 - Bologna BO, Italia: il Mulino.
  8. On Korsgaard’s argument for Kant’s moral law.Amir Saemi - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (8):773-787.
    Kant’s formula of universal law says that it is morally impermissible to act on maxims which lead to a contradiction, when universalized. Korsgaard famously argues that we should understand the contradiction involved in Kant’s formula of universal law test as practical contradiction. In her later works, Korsgaard provides an argument for the truth of Kant’s moral law from the principles that are, on her view, constitutive of human agency, including the principle of publicity, the principle of universality and the hypothetical (...)
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  9. Kant and the Second Person.Janis David Schaab - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (4):494-513.
    According to Darwall’s Second-Personal Account, moral obligations constitutively involve relations of authority and accountability between persons. Darwall takes this account to lend support to Kant’s moral theory. Critics object that the Second-Personal Account abandons central tenets of Kant’s system. I respond to these critics’ three main challenges by showing that they rest on misunderstandings of the Second-Personal Account. Properly understood, this account is not only congenial to Kant’s moral theory, but also illuminates aspects of that theory which have hitherto received (...)
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  10. Transcendental Philosophy As Capacities‐First Philosophy.Karl Schafer - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):661-686.
    In this essay, I propose a novel way of thinking about Kant’s philosophical methodology during the critical period. According to this interpretation, the critical Kant can generally be understood as operating within a “capacities‐first” philosophical framework – that is, within a framework in which our basic rational or cognitive capacities play both an explanatorily and epistemically fundamental role in philosophy – or, at least, in the sort of philosophy that limited creatures like us are capable of. In discussing this idea, (...)
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  11. Kantian Cognitivism.E. Sonny Elizondo - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (4):711-725.
    According to many of its advocates, one of the main attractions of Kantian moral philosophy is its metaethical innocence. The most interesting argument for such innocence appeals to Kantians' rationalism. Roughly, if moral action is simply rational action, then we do not need to appeal to anything beyond rationality to certify moral judgment. I assess this argument by reflecting on (dis)analogies between moral and logical forms of rationalism. I conclude that the Kantian claim to metaethical innocence is overstated. Kantians cannot (...)
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  12. Kantian constructivism.Julia Markovits & Kenneth Walden - 2020 - In Ruth Chang & Kurt Sylvan (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason. New York, NY: Routledge.
    Theories of reasons and other normativia can seem to lead ineluctably to a tragic dilemma. They can be personal but parochial if they locate reasons in features of the point of view of actual people. Or they can be objective but alien if they take reasons to be mind-independent fixtures of the universe. Kantian constructivism tries to offer the best of both worlds: an account of normative authority anchored in the evaluative perspectives of actual agents but refined by a procedure (...)
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  13. Christine M. Korsgaard, Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals, Oxford University Press, 2018, 252pp., $24.95 (hbk), ISBN 9780198753858. [REVIEW]Joe Saunders - 2020 - Philosophy 95 (1):141-147.
  14. Kantian constructivism and the Reinhold–Sidgwick objection.Matthé Scholten - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (2):364-379.
    In this paper, I give a reconstruction of the so‐called Reinhold–Sidgwick objection and show that Korsgaard‐style Kantian constructivists are committed to two key premises of the underlying argument. According to the Reinhold–Sidgwick objection, the Kantian conception of autonomy entails the absurd conclusion that no one is ever morally responsible for a morally wrong action. My reconstruction of the underlying argument reveals that the objection depends on a third premise, which says that freedom is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. After (...)
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  15. Commitment and the Second-Person Standpoint.Janis Schaab - 2019 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 73 (4):511-532.
    On Chang's voluntarist account of commitments, when we commit to φ, we employ the 'normative powers' of our will to give ourselves a reason to φ that we would otherwise not have had. I argue that Chang's account, by itself, does not have sufficient conceptual resources to reconcile the normative significance of commitments with their alleged fundamentally volitional character. I suggest an alternative, second-personal account of commitment, which avoids this problem. On this account, the volitional act involved in committing is (...)
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  16. Kantian Constructivism : A Restatement.Janis David Schaab - 2019 - Dissertation, St. Andrews
    This thesis provides a restatement of Kantian constructivism, with the aim of avoiding some of the objections and clearing up some of the ambiguities that have haunted previous versions of the view. I restate Kantian constructivism as the view that morality’s normativity has its source in the form of second-personal reasoning, a mode of practical reasoning in which we engage when we address demands person-to-person. By advancing a position about the source of moral normativity, Kantian constructivism addresses a metaethical question, (...)
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  17. What’s wrong with Constructivist Readings of Kant?Lucas Thorpe - 2019 - In Ricardo Gutierrez Aguilar (ed.), The Philosophy of Kant. pp. 165-186.
    Kantian ethics today is dominated followers of Rawls, many of them his former students. Following Rawls they interpret Kant as a moral constructivist who defines the good in terms of the reasonable. Such readings give priority to the first formulation of the categorical imperative and argue that the other two formulations are (ontologically or definitionally) dependent upon it. In contrast the aim of my paper will be to show that Kant should be interpreted firstly as a moral idealist and secondly (...)
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  18. Autonomy and Moral Rationalism: Kant’s Criticisms of ‘Rationalist’ Moral Principles (1762-1785).Stefano Bacin - 2018 - In Stefano Bacin & Oliver Sensen (eds.), The Emergence of Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 48-66.
    This paper sheds light on Kant’s notion of autonomy in his moral philosophy by considering Kant’s critique of the rationalist theories of morality that Kant discussed in his lectures on practical philosophy from the 1760s to the time of the Groundwork. The paper first explains Kant’s taxonomy of moral theories and his perspective on the history of ethics. Second, it considers Kant's arguments against the two main variants of ‘rationalism’ as he construes it, that is, perfectionism and theological voluntarism, pointing (...)
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  19. The Emergence of Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Philosophy.Stefano Bacin & Oliver Sensen (eds.) - 2018 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Autonomy is one of the central concepts of contemporary moral thought, and Kant is often credited with being the inventor of individual moral autonomy. But how and why did Kant develop this notion? The Emergence of Autonomy in Kant's Moral Philosophy is the first essay collection exclusively devoted to this topic. It traces the emergence of autonomy from Kant's earliest writings to the changes that he made to the concept in his mature works. The essays offer a close historical and (...)
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  20. Kantian Constructivism and the Normativity of Practical Identities.Étienne Brown - 2018 - Dialogue 57 (3):571-590.
    Many neo-Aristotelians argue that practical identities are normative, that is, they provide us with reasons for action and create binding obligations. Kantian constructivists agree with this insight but argue that contemporary Aristotelians fail to fully justify it. Practical identities are normative, Kantian constructivists contend, but their normativity necessarily derives from the normativity of humanity. In this paper, I shed light on this underexplored similarity between neo-Aristotelian and Kantian constructivist accounts of the normativity of practical identities, and argue that both ultimately (...)
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  21. Kantian Themes in Ethics and International Relations.Matthew Lindauer - 2018 - In Brent J. Steele & Eric A. Heinze (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Ethics and International Relations. Routledge. pp. 30-42.
    This article highlights two interlocking themes in moral and political philosophy in the Kantian tradition and examines their import for issues in international relations. First, I examine how constructivist interpretations of Kantian moral theory can inform an understanding of Kant’s Perpetual Peace and passages in other key texts that deal with international relations. Second, drawing on the constructivist tradition, I examine Kant’s remarks on the dependency of domestic justice on international justice. By bringing these two themes together, I put forward (...)
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  22. Moral Realism by Other Means: The Hybrid Nature of Kant’s Practical Rationalism.Stefano Bacin - 2017 - In Elke Elisabeth Schmidt & Robinson dos Santos (eds.), Realism and Anti-Realism in Kant’s Moral Philosophy. De Gruyter. pp. 155-178.
    After qualifying in which sense ‘realism’ can be applied to eighteenth-century views about morality, I argue that while Kant shares with traditional moral realists several fundamental claims about morality, he holds that those claims must be argued for in a radically different way. Drawing on his diagnosis of the serious weaknesses of traditional moral realism, Kant proposes a novel approach that revolves around a hybrid view about moral obligation. Since his solution to that central issue combines elements of realism with (...)
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  23. (1 other version)Introduction to Moral Heteronomy. History, Proposals, Arguments.Daniele Bertini - 2017 - Dialegesthai. Rivista Telematica di Filosofia 19 (Thematic issue).
    An introduction to how heteronomous views address the topic of moral autonomy. In the first section I provide a short history of the rise of the autonomy stance in meta ethics. Then I sketch the relationship between Kant and mainstream contemporary Kantians. I finally outline a summary of the papers in the special issue of Dialegesthai.
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  24. Constitutivism, Error, and Moral Responsibility in Bishop Butler's Ethics.David G. Dick - 2017 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (4):415-438.
    In his writings on moral philosophy, Bishop Joseph Butler adopts an identifiably “constitutivist” strategy because he seeks to ground normativity in features of agency. Butler's constitutivist strategy deserves our attention both because he is an influential precursor to much modern moral philosophy and because it sheds light on current debates about constitutivism. For example, Butler's approach can easily satisfy the “error constraint” that is often thought to derail modern constitutivist approaches. It does this by defining actions relative to the kind (...)
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  25. Kantian Ethics, Dignity and Perfection.Paul Formosa - 2017 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    In this volume Paul Formosa sets out a novel approach to Kantian ethics as an ethics of dignity by focusing on the Formula of Humanity as a normative principle distinct from the Formula of Universal Law. By situating the Kantian conception of dignity within the wider literature on dignity, he develops an important distinction between status dignity, which all rational agents have, and achievement dignity, which all rational agents should aspire to. He then explores constructivist and realist views on the (...)
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  26. Reassessing the foundations of Korsgaard’s approach to ethics.Samuel J. M. Kahn - 2017 - Dialegesthai. Rivista Telematica di Filosofia:online.
    In a series of well known publications, Christine Korsgaard argues for the claim that an agent acts morally just in case s/he acts autonomously. Two of Korsgaard's signature arguments for the connection between morality and autonomy are the "argument from spontaneity" and the "regress argument." In this paper, I argue that neither the argument from spontaneity nor the regress argument is able to show that an agent would be acting wrongly even if s/he acts in a paradigmatically heteronomous fashion.
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  27. Gallows Pole: Is Kant's Fact of Reason a Transcendental Argument?Michael Kryluk - 2017 - Review of Metaphysics 70 (4):695-725.
    This essay examines one of the most obscure and controversial tenets of Kant’s critical philosophy, his claim in the Critique of Practical Reason that the moral law is immediately and unquestionably valid as an a priori fact of reason (Factum der Vernunft). This argument curiously inverts Kant’s earlier stance in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in which he justifies the reality of the categorical imperative through a much more cautious and qualified authentication of transcendental freedom. Against constructivist readings (...)
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  28. Practical Reason and Respect for Persons.Melissa McBay Merritt - 2017 - Kantian Review 22 (1):53-79.
    My project is to reconsider the Kantian conception of practical reason. Some Kantians think that practical reasoning must be more active than theoretical reasoning, on the putative grounds that such reasoning need not contend with what is there anyway, independently of its exercise. Behind that claim stands the thesis that practical reason is essentially efficacious. I accept the efficacy principle, but deny that it underwrites this inference about practical reason. My inquiry takes place against the background of recent Kantian metaethical (...)
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  29. (1 other version)Realism and Anti-Realism in Kant’s Moral Philosophy.Elke Elisabeth Schmidt & Robinson dos Santos (eds.) - 2017 - De Gruyter.
    The debate between moral realism and antirealism plays an important role in contemporary metaethics as well as in the interpretation of Kant’s moral philosophy. This volume aims to clarify whether, and in what sense, Kant is a moral realist, an antirealist, or something in-between. Based on an explication of the key metaethical terms, internationally recognized Kant scholars discuss the question of how Kant’s moral philosophy should be understood in this regard. All camps in the metaethical field have their inhabitants: Some (...)
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  30. Unity of Reasons.Adam Cureton - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (4):877-895.
    There are at least two basic normative notions: rationality and reasons. The dominant normative account of reasons nowadays, which I call primitive pluralism about reasons, holds that some reasons are normatively basic and there is no underlying normative explanation of them in terms of other normative notions. Kantian constructivism about reasons, understood as a normative rather than a metaethical view, holds that rationality is the primitive normative notion that picks out which non-normative facts are reasons for what and explains why (...)
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  31. Constitutivism and Kantian Constructivism in Ethical Theory: Editorial Introduction.Christoph Hanisch & Sorin Baiasu - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (4):1125-1128.
    The introduction summarizes the main arguments formulated in the six papers of this special issue on Constitutivism and Kantian Constructivism in Ethical Theory. We highlight the unifying theme addressed in the essays, i.e., the question of whether constitutivism is able to fulfill the promise of providing an account of normativity starting from relatively slender assumptions, including the avoidance of realist presuppositions.
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  32. Rawls on Kantian Constructivism.Nathaniel Jezzi - 2016 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 4 (8).
    John Rawls’s 1980 Dewey Lectures are widely acknowledged to represent the locus classicus for contemporary discussions of moral constructivism. Nevertheless, few published works have engaged with the significant interpretive challenges one finds in these lectures, and those that have fail to offer a satisfactory reading of the view that Rawls presents there or the place the lectures occupy in the development of Rawls's thinking. Indeed, there is a surprising lack of consensus about how best to interpret the constructivism of these (...)
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  33. The Form of Practical Knowledge and Implicit Cognition: A Critique of Kantian Constitutivism.Amir Saemi - 2016 - Social Theory and Practice 42 (4):733-747.
    Moral realism faces two worries: How can we have knowledge of moral norms if they are independent of us, and why should we care about them if they are independent of rational activities they govern? Kantian constitutivism tackles both worries simultaneously by claiming that practical norms are constitutive principles of practical reason. In particular, on Stephen Engstrom’s account, willing involves making a practical judgment. To will well, and thus to have practical knowledge (i.e., knowledge of what is good), the content (...)
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  34. Kant on the Independence of the Moral Law from Sensibility.Laura Papish - 2015 - Kantian Review 20 (1):77-98.
    There are several senses in which Kant’s moral law is independent of sensibility. This paper is devoted mainly to Kant’s account of ‘physical conditions independence’, or the idea that the moral law can compel us to pursue ends that might be impossible to realize empirically. Since this idea has gotten little attention from commentators, this paper addresses both its textual basis in Kant’s writings and its overall philosophical viability.
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  35. Julian Wuerth, Kant on Mind, Action, and Ethics Oxford University Press, 2014 Pp. xvi + 349 ISBN 9780199587629 £50.00. [REVIEW]Spencer Paulson & Colin Marshall - 2015 - Kantian Review 20 (3):512-516.
  36. Naturalism and Realism in Kant's Ethics.Frederick Rauscher - 2015 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    In this comprehensive assessment of Kant's metaethics, Frederick Rauscher shows that Kant is a moral idealist rather than a moral realist and argues that Kant's ethics does not require metaphysical commitments that go beyond nature. Rauscher frames the argument in the context of Kant's non-naturalistic philosophical method and the character of practical reason as action-oriented. Reason operates entirely within nature, and apparently non-natural claims - God, free choice, and value - are shown to be heuristic and to reflect reason's ordering (...)
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  37. Constructivism.Adam Cureton - 2014 - In Michael T. Gibbons (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Political Thought. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
    The term “constructivism” names a family of political, moral and metaethical views that, in general terms, regard some or all normative claims as valid in virtue of being outcomes of a “procedure of construction” in which actual or hypothetical agents react to, choose, or otherwise settle on principles of justice, moral rules, values, etc. Traditionally, moral validity or justifiability was thought to depend on God, the Forms, or some other independent moral order. Various procedures of a different, epistemological, sort were (...)
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  38. Rethinking Kant's Fact of Reason.Owen Ware - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.
    Kant’s doctrine of the Fact of Reason is one of the most perplexing aspects of his moral philosophy. The aim of this paper is to defend Kant’s doctrine from the common charge of dogmatism. My defense turns on a previously unexplored analogy to the notion of ‘matters of fact’ popularized by members of the Royal Society in the seventeenth century. In their work, ‘facts’ were beyond doubt, often referring to experimental effects one could witness first hand. While Kant uses the (...)
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  39. (1 other version)Kant: ragioni e limiti del costruttivismo morale.Stefano Bacin - 2013 - In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Che Fare? Nuove prospettive filosofiche sull’azione. Roma: Carocci. pp. 101-128.
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  40. Legge e obbligatorietà: la struttura dell’idea di autolegislazione morale.Stefano Bacin - 2013 - Studi Kantiani 26:55-70.
    The paper argues for distinguishing two aspects in Kant’s idea of self-legislation of the moral law: the immediate character (i.e., the practical necessity) of the law itself and the lawgiving function attributed to the rational will. I argue that the novelty of Kant’s thesis chiefly consists in the combination of the two aspects, and that this solves the alleged paradoxical character of the idea of self-legislation. As it grounds on the connection of a fundamental law with a lawgiving, Kant’s view (...)
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  41. Constructivism about Practical Knowledge.Carla Bagnoli - 2013 - In Constructivism in Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 153-182.
    It is largely agreed that if constructivism contributes anything to meta-ethics it is by proposing that we understand ethical objectivity “in terms of a suitably constructed point of view that all can accept” (Rawls 1980/1999: 307). Constructivists defend this “practical” conception of objectivity in contrast to the realist or “ontological” conception of objectivity, understood as an accurate representation of an independent metaphysical order. Because of their objectivist but not realist commitments, Kantian constructivists place their theory “somewhere in the space between (...)
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  42. Reason in its Practical Application.E. Sonny Elizondo - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-17.
    Is practical reason a cognitive faculty? Do practical judgments make claims about a subject matter that are appropriately assessed in terms of their agreement with that subject matter? According to Kantians like Christine Korsgaard, the answer is no. To think otherwise is to conflate the theoretical and the practical, the epistemic and the ethical. I am not convinced. In this paper, I motivate my skepticism through examination of the very figure who inspires Korsgaard’s rejection of cognitivism: Kant. For as I (...)
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  43. Korsgaard and the Wille/Willkür Distinction: Radical Constructivism and the Imputability of Immoral Actions.Heidi Chamberlin Giannini - 2013 - Kant Studies Online (1):72-101.
  44. Paradoxes of Autonomy: On the Dialectics of Freedom and Normativity.Thomas Khurana - 2013 - Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy/Revue canadienne de philosophie continentale 17 (1):50-74.
    This paper revisits the concept of autonomy and tries to elucidate the fundamental insight that freedom and law cannot be understood through their opposition, but rather have to be conceived of as conditions of one another. The paper investigates the paradigmatic Kantian formulation of this insight and discusses the diagnosis that the Kantian idea might give rise to a paradox in which autonomy reverts to arbitrariness or heteronomy. The paper argues that the fatal version of the paradox can be defused (...)
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  45. The Problem of Obligation, the Finite Rational Will, and Kantian Value Realism.Anne Margaret Baxley - 2012 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (6):567-583.
    Abstract Robert Stern's Understanding Moral Obligation is a remarkable achievement, representing an original reading of Kant's contribution to modern moral philosophy and the legacy he bequeathed to his later-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century successors in the German tradition. On Stern's interpretation, it was not the threat to autonomy posed by value realism, but the threat to autonomy posed by the obligatory nature of morality that led Kant to develop his critical moral theory grounded in the concept of the self-legislating moral agent. Accordingly, (...)
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  46. Rawls and Kantian Constructivism.Alexander Kaufman - 2012 - Kantian Review 17 (2):227-256.
    John Rawls's account of Kantian constructivism is perhaps his most striking contribution to ethics. In this paper, I examine the relation between Rawls's constructivism and its foundation in Kantian intuitions. In particular, I focus on the progressive influence on Rawls's approach of the Kantian intuition that the substance of morality is best understood as constructed by free and equal people under fair conditions. Rawls's focus on this Kantian intuition, I argue, motivates the focus on social contract that grounds both his (...)
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  47. Is Kant a Moral Constructivist or a Moral Realist?Paul Formosa - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):170-196.
    The dominant interpretation of Kant as a moral constructivist has recently come under sustained philosophical attack by those defending a moral realist reading of Kant. In light of this, should we read Kant as endorsing moral constructivism or moral realism? In answering this question we encounter disagreement in regard to two key independence claims. First, the independence of the value of persons from the moral law (an independence that is rejected) and second, the independence of the content and authority of (...)
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  48. Rounding up the usual suspects: Varieties of Kantian constructivism in ethics.Richard Galvin - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):16-36.
    Some commentators have attributed constructivism to Kant at the first-order level; others cast him as a meta-ethical constructivist. Among meta-ethical constructivist interpretations I distinguish between ‘atheistic’ and ‘agnostic’ versions regarding the existence of an independent moral order. Even though these two versions are incompatible, each is linked with central Kantian doctrines, revealing a tension within Kant's own view. Moreover, among interpretations that cast Kant as rejecting substantive realism but embracing procedural realism, some (i.e., those that are ‘constructivist’) face charges of (...)
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  49. Kant on Construction, Apriority, and the Moral Relevance of Universalization.Timothy Rosenkoetter - 2011 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (6):1143-1174.
    This paper introduces a referential reading of Kant’s practical project, according to which maxims are made morally permissible by their correspondence to objects, though not the ontic objects of Kant’s theoretical project but deontic objects (what ought to be). It illustrates this model by showing how the content of the Formula of Universal Law might be determined by what our capacity of practical reason can stand in a referential relation to, rather than by facts about what kind of beings we (...)
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  50. (1 other version)Review of Christine Korsgaard's "Self-Constitution". [REVIEW]Sergio Tenenbaum - 2011 - Ethics 121 (2):449-455.
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