Disagreement, Epistemic Paralysis, and the Legitimacy of Technocracy

Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 32 (1-3):62-84 (2020)
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Abstract

Jeffrey Friedman convincingly argues that technocrats may often lack the knowledge required to enact public policies that will effectively promote their consequentialist goals. Friedman’s argument is strong enough to produce technocratic paralysis, in many cases, but “epistemic gambles” may present a way out of this problem. His discussion of exitocracy also raises the question of how to square his internal form of technocratic critique with the question of democratic legitimacy.

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Étienne Brown
San Jose State University

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Against Democracy: New Preface.Jason Brennan - 2016 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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