Rights and Values

This article argues for a new interpretation of the realist claim that politics is autonomous from morality and involves specific political values. First, this article defends an original normative...

This chapter demonstrates that the African philosophical tradition offers three particularly interesting ways to broaden global thought about human rights, where all three involve an appeal to the value of community in some way. First off, there is in the African tradition a clear theme of skepticism about the normative category of human rights, with some thinkers who prize groups such as clans denying they exist at all and others contending they are of less importance than normally ascribed in the (...) West. Secondly, there is the view, enshrined in the African (‘Banjul’) Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, that there are group rights and not merely rights of individuals. Thirdly, some African thinkers have held that we have a dignity because of our relational features such as our ability to enter into community with others, a view that has implications for human rights differing from those of the view that our dignity inheres in an individualist feature such as our autonomy or rationality. The chapter points out that the first and third positions are at least prima facie incompatible; for if we have a relational dignity respect for which grounds human rights, as per the third approach, then they exist and are probably robust, contra the first. The chapter argues that the grounds for skepticism about human rights found in the African tradition are weak and instead that the relational foundation of human rights that it offers should be taken seriously by a global audience, as should its positing of group rights alongside them. (shrink)

If people have stringent moral rights, then the doctrine of double effect is false or unimportant, at least when it comes to making acts permissible or wrong. There are strong and weak versions of the doctrine of double effect. The strong version asserts that an act is morally right if and only if the agent does not intentionally infringe a moral norm and the act brings about a desirable result (perhaps the best state of affairs available to the agent or (...) a promotion of the common good). The weak version asserts that, other things being equal, it is deontically worse to intentionally infringe a norm than to foreseeably do so. A person’s intention or mere foresight might still be relevant to his or her blameworthiness or virtue, but this is a separate issue. (shrink)

Examines the possibility of converging support for animal well being rendered by a non-standard version of new classical natural law theory and the kind of institutional framework suggested by spontaneous-order natural law theory. Argues that non-state mechanisms consistent with the latter kind of natural law theory could maintain the rights defended by the former.

The issue of voting rights for older children has been high on the political and philosophical agenda for quite some time now, and not without reason. Aside from principled moral and philosophical reasons why it is an important matter, many economic, environmental, and political issues are currently being decided—sometimes through indecision—that greatly impact the future of today’s children. Past and current generations of adults have, arguably, mortgaged their children’s future, and this makes the question whether (some) children should be granted (...) the right to vote all the more pressing. Should (some) children be given the right to vote? Moreover, does the answer to this question depend on civic education, on whether children have been deliberately prepared for the exercise of that right? These are the questions that will occupy us in this article. Our answer to the first will be that older children—children roughly between 14 and 16 years of age1—ought to be given the right to vote. (shrink)

In this paper I take up (what I call) the pregnancy loss objection to defenses of abortion that deny fetal moral status. Though versions of this objection have been put forth by others—particularly Lindsey Porter’s in a 2015 paper—I argue that the existing versions of the objection are unsuccessful in various ways: failing to explain the ground of moral considerability that would apply to embryos/fetuses in very early pregnancy, lack of clarity about what it means to take grief after miscarriage (...) seriously, and implausible implications regarding pre-embryo and infertility cases. I go on to offer a more plausible version of the objection, which I apply only to mid-pregnancy and fetuses, by drawing on personal narratives of later pregnancy loss and abortion and emphasizing practices that indicate the relevant kind of mourning. I then take up the question of how experience of the sort I have in mind can function as evidence, by situating my version of the objection in a pragmatist ethical view. Finally I consider and respond to some worries about the very idea of taking experience of pregnancy loss to be evidence regarding fetal moral status. (shrink)

Interventions in medicine require multicenter clinical trialson a large rather than limited number of subjects from various genetic and cultural backgrounds. International guidelines to protect the rights and well-being of human subjects involved in clinical trialsarecriticizedforthe priority they place on Western cultural values. These discussions become manifest especially with regard to the content and methodology of the informed consent procedure. The ethical dilemma emerges from the argument that there are fundamental differences about the concept of respect for the autonomy of (...) individuals in different cultures and religions. Some communities prioritize the consent of community leaders or the head of family –usually men – over the voluntary and free consent of the individual. The aim of this work is to discuss this ethical dilemma to determine a base for a consensus that satisfies the sensibilities of different cultures without damaging the rights and autonomy of human subjects. (shrink)

Disabled women were absent for many years from the discipline that has become known as women and gender studies. This field of study had its origins in the late 1970s following the second wave of feminism. In the latter decades of the twentieth century, disabled women and their allies introduced the necessary task of exploring disabled women's embodiment to the wider feminist community. A wealth of research now exists that incorporates disabled women's bodies into a range of disciplines: from literature, (...) film, art, social sciences, geography, and the environment to many other areas of scholarship. Indeed, many of the themes covered in this special issue have been addressed in different contexts in the disciplines .. (shrink)

Many of the millions of women in the developed world who experience infertility have difficulty coping with its psychological and social consequences, as well as attaining a resolution to these potentially devastating effects. Nevertheless, these women enjoy a relative benefit vis-à-vis infertile women in the developing world insofar as they live in a society that does not force them out of their own houses, curse at them in the streets, or condemn them to a life of poverty and destitution due (...) to their infertility. For example, a woman in the United States with a history of anovulation may not only be able to both seek compassionate and competent medical care for her infertility, but may also find emotional and .. (shrink)

I argue that riskier killings of innocent people are, other things equal, objectively worse than less risky killings. I ground these views in considerations of disrespect and security. Killing someone more riskily shows greater disrespect for him by more grievously undervaluing his standing and interests, and more seriously undermines his security by exposing a disposition to harm him across all counterfactual scenarios in which the probability of killing an innocent person is that high or less. I argue that the salient (...) probabilities are the agent’s sincere, sane, subjective probabilities, and that this thesis is relevant whether your risk-taking pertains to the probability of killing a person or to the probability that the person you kill is not liable to be killed. I then defend the view’s relevance to intentional killing; show how it differs from an account of blameworthiness; and explain its significance for all-things-considered justification and justification under uncertainty. (shrink)

The challenges facing the life-worlds of political societies in the Islamic world require a radical shift of perspective that can improve our understanding of the contemporary situation of human rights politics. Not only the classical formulation of secularism, which aims at liberating the public sphere from domination of ‘the sacred’, but also the political-theological approach, which addresses the problems of modernity within the context of a disguised and refurbished dominance of ‘the transcendence’, suffer from and share a basic insufficiency in (...) handling human rights issues. According to these approaches, the basic issue stems from a realignment in relations between logics of the sovereign and the sacred or a redefinition of the position of state against religion. In this article, my object is shifting the scope of discussion concerning the rights beyond this logic of sovereignty by adopting an approach which provides a political ground for discussing the intermingling of religion in the life-world. From my point of view, the first step that should be taken to deepen our understanding of the argument of freedom is to unveil the nature of the sacred within the framework of a power network that longs for control over the whole lives of individuals constituting the society. In this regard, by going beyond the concepts such as fanaticism, fundamentalism or terrorism provided by ‘state mentality’, the significance of lifestyle politics for ‘rights talk’ will become more evident. From this point of view, the detection and critique of a zone of ‘weak citizenship’ constructed through restrictions stemming from the values and norms arising from the perceptions of particular communities organized through family, tradition and justice are essential. Such a critique will pave the way for a radical politicization of lifestyles by way of criteria of the demands for equal respect and dignity. (shrink)

The current concepts of autonomy, surrogate autonomy and informed consent often lead to futile and expensive care at the ends of life. They may impinge on the dignity of the patient as well as subject society to unwarranted expense. In order to provide affordable healthcare for all, these concepts are in need of modification.

A growing number of healthcare practices implicate serious moral concerns for growing numbers of healthcare providers. Social, legal, and medical developments, including abortion, contraception, euthanasia, withdrawal of feeding, blood transfusions, organ transplants, and routine autopsies, have put healthcare providers in the vortex of some of society's most controversial moral dilemmas.

In this essay, Paula McAvoy addresses the problem caused by the liberal state's necessary tolerance of insular fundamentalist groups and the concern that children raised in such groups do not have a fair opportunity to evaluate their inherited beliefs. This tension comes to the fore around disagreements over schooling and requests for religious accommodation. Often, these requests are treated as straightforward dilemmas — either the state accommodates the group at the expense of the child's future interest in autonomy, or the (...) state must use its power to coerce the group into compliance. McAvoy argues for a principled middle ground between these two views. Using William Galston's conditions for securing the right to exit and evidence from Anabaptist apostates, McAvoy shows that insular groups cannot satisfy these conditions. Consequently, when accommodation is necessary, the state must mitigate the foreseeable costs to children by enacting policies that “facilitate entrance” for those who later choose to exit. (shrink)

In 1970 Amartya Sen exposed an apparent antinomy that has come to be known as the Paradox of the Paretian Libertarian. Sen introduced his paradox by establishing a simple but startling theorem. Roughly put, what he proved was that if a mechanism for selecting social choice functions satisfies two standard adequacy conditions, there are possible situations in which it will violate either the very weak libertarian precept that every individual has at least some rights or the seemingly innocuous Paretian principle (...) that an option should be judged unacceptable if there is an available alternative that everyone prefers to it. Many economists and philosophers have proposed solutions to Sen's problem, but there is no general consensus on what solution is correct. In the present paper I argue that Sen's original theorem fails to establish the existence of any conflict between libertarianism and Paretianism. Furthermore, I contend that Sen has misinterpreted certain other theorems which he has used to defend the existence of a paradoxical conflict between these two doctrines. In general, I try to show that whenever Sen posits a Paretian-libertarian conflict to explain an apparently troubling result in social choice theory, the difficulty can be better dealt with either by claiming that the theorem in question imposes overly strong background constraints on the form of social choice functions or by claiming that it relies on an unacceptable construal of individual rights. (shrink)

Economic approaches to both social evaluation and decision-making are typically Paretian or utilitarian in nature and so display commitments to both welfarism and consequentialism. The contrast between the economic approach and any rights-based social philosophy has spawned a large literature that may be divided into two branches. The first is concerned with the compatibility of rights and utilitarianism seen as independent moral forces. This branch of the literature may be characterized as an example of the broader debate between the teleological (...) and deontological approaches. The second is concerned with the possibility that substantial rights may be grounded in utilitarianism with the moral force of rights being derived from more basic commitments to welfarism and consequentialism. This branch of the literature may be characterized as an exploration of the flexibility of the teleological approach, and, in particular, its ability to give rise to views more normally associated with the deontological approach. This essay is concerned with the second branch of the literature. (shrink)

In addition to obviating the use of synthetic agrochemicals and emphasizing farming in accordance with agro-ecological guidelines, organic farming acknowledges the integrity of plants as an essential element of its natural approaches to crop production. For cultivated plants, integrity refers to their inherent nature, wholeness, completeness, species-specific characteristics, and their being in balance with their (organically farmed) environment, while accomplishing their “natural aim.” We argue that this integrity of plants has ethical value, distinguishing integrity of life, plant-typic integrity, genotypic integrity, (...) and phenotypic integrity. We have developed qualitative criteria to ethically evaluate existing practices and have applied these criteria to assess whether current plant breeding and propagation techniques violate the integrity of crop plants. This process has resulted in a design of a holistic, scientific approach of organic plant breeding and seed production. Our evaluation has met considerable criticism from mainstream (crop) scientists. We respond to the following questions: (1). Can ethics be incorporated into objective crop sciences? (2). What is the nature of the intrinsic value of plants in organic farming? We argue that criteria to take integrity into account can only be assessed from a holistic perspective and we show that a holistic approach is needed to design such ethical notions in a consistent way. The ethical notions have been further elaborated by formulating human responsibility and respect towards crop plants. Responsibility and respect can only be shown by providing crop plants the right to be nurtured and to express natural behavior at all levels of integrity. (shrink)

Bentham's dictum, ‘everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one’, is frequently noted but seldom discussed by commentators. Perhaps it is not thought contentious or exciting because interpreted as merely reminding the utilitarian legislator to make certain that each person's interests are included, that no one is missed, in working the felicific calculus. Since no interests are secure against the maximizing directive of the utility principle, which allows them to be overridden or sacrificed, the dictum is not usually (...) taken to be asserting fundamental rights that afford individuals normative protection against the actions of others or against legislative policies deemed socially expedient. Such non-conventional moral rights seem denied a place in a utilitarian theory so long as the maximization of aggregate happiness remains the ultimate standard and moral goal. (shrink)

Political theory has a good deal to say both for and against the establishment of the modern welfare state. As one might expect, most of that discussion is directed toward the expanded set of basic rights that the state confers on its members. In its most canonical form, the welfare state represents a switch in vision from the regime of negative rights in the nineteenth century to the regime of positive rights so much in vogue today. Negative rights—an inexact and (...) somewhat misleading term— stress the right of an individual to be free from certain kinds of external interventions. These rights arrange themselves on two basic lists. The first list generates a set of civil capacities that all individuals enjoy over their own labor and property: the right to contract, to make wills, to sue and be sued, to give evidence, and the like. The second list, from which the term “negative rights” derives, protects all persons from interference, either by force or by fraud, in the conduct of their own affairs. The resulting set of rights is short, snappy, and knowable; it is internally consistent; and it prepares the stage for productive human behavior while limiting destructive forms of behavior. Even though it is not couched in explicit utilitarian language, it can surely be defended on general functional grounds. (shrink)

This paper deals with three topics: types of rights, the development of the terminology of rights, and the question of the primacy of welfare rights. Because these topics are interrelated, my exposition does not observe rigid boundaries among them. There is no pretence at all that any of these subjects is fully covered here; nor is it proposed, except for one writer, to touch upon the contemporary literature on rights, as noteworthy as some of that literature is. In order to (...) gain entrance into the field, on which the writing has grown to massive proportions, I shall begin with an interesting historical phenomenon, some of whose philosophical import I want to explore. I should say at the outset, however, that the general motivation of this paper is the problem of the significance of the language of “rights.” Does it really make a difference, for instance, to speak of the “rights of man” rather than the “common duties of humanity”? Does the term “rights” add anything of special significance or is its only significance rhetorical and ideological? Can we dispense with the language of rights and still say everything we need to say about our moral relations? I confess to a moderate skepticism about the necessity of the language of rights in the last analysis. At any rate, this paper is intended as a contribution, however small, to this problem. The historical phenomenon with which I am going to begin will enable us to bring into focus the issue of the meaning of “rights.”. (shrink)

An alleged moral right to informational privacy assumes that we should have control over information about ourselves. What is the philosophical justification for this control? I think that one prevalent answer to this question—an answer that has to do with the justification of negative rights generally—will not do.

In recent years, increasing pressures have been brought to bear upon nurses and others more closely to inform, involve and support the rights of parents or guardians when crucial ‘life and death’ ethical decisions are made on behalf of their seriously ill child. Such decisions can be very painful for all involved, and may easily become deadlocked when there is an apparent clash of moral ideals or values between the medical team and the parents or guardians. This article examines a (...) growing number of such cases in New Zealand and analyses the moral parameters, processes, outcomes and ethical responses that must be considered when life and death ethical decisions involving children are made. The article concludes with a recommendation that nurses should be recognized as perhaps the most suitable of all health care personnel when careful mediation is needed to produce an acceptable moral outcome in difficult ethical situations. (shrink)

This paper describes a holistic approach and an interdisciplinary curriculum in enhancing critical thinking and education for democracy at the junior-high schools and highschools levels. The curriculum includes academic subjects such as the humanities, sciences, social sciences and art. The aim of this curriculum is not to teach an additional lesson in history, political sciences, art, etc., but to fostercritical thinking and democratic behavior. The theoretical framework has two bases. The first derives from eighteenth century rationalism and scientific thinking, while (...) the second is from the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century. Both produced social economies and a political structure of mass democracy. The focal point here is that critical thinking is a prerequisite for the existence of democratic values and principles in a post-modern society. The program integrates McPeck’s strategies on the conception of critical thinking and the dialectic technique of Richard Paul. The curriculum is designed forone or two semesters. It is built in a modular fashion, in which each subject stands on its own and is presented by various lecturers from different domains. The curriculum was implemented in junior high and high schools in Haifa and vicinity."It is this consensus around liberal democracy as the final form of government that I have called “the end of history.” in Fortune, January 15, 1990, p. 75). (shrink)

Despite widespread agreement that we have moral responsibilities to future generations, many are reluctant to frame the issues in terms of justice and rights.There are indeed philosophical challenges here, particularly concerning nonoverlapping generations. They can, however, be met. For example, talk of justiceand rights for future generations in connection with climate change is both appropriate and important, although it requires revising some common theoreticalassumptions about the nature of justice and rights. We can, in fact, be bound by the rights of (...) future people, despite the “non-identity problem,” and the force of these rights cannot be diluted by “discounting” future costs. Moreover, a rights-based approach provides an effective answer to political arguments against taking mandatory measures to curb greenhouse gas emissions when these are unpopular with a democratic populace. (shrink)

Over the past decade or so political leaders around the world have begun to apologize for, and even seek reconciliation between perpetrators and victims of large-scale moral wrongs such as slavery, campaigns of ethnic cleansing, and official regimes of racial segregation. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission is probably the most well-known example of such political efforts to effect what might be called moral healing within and between nations. In this essay, I canvass various senses of reconciliation, clarifying which (...) are appropriate for understanding these recent political efforts to heal the wounds caused by state-sanctioned moral atrocities. I argue that interpersonal reconciliation is not likely to be a promising model for understanding political efforts to achieve moral closure for large-scale wrongs, and I close with some worries about the efficacy of state-sponsored attempts to reconcile victims to their wrongdoers. (shrink)

Over the last thirty years, personal debt loads have increased dramatically. Lower income earners borrow money to purchase basic goods and services, so their debt is frequently non-discretionary. The impact of non-discretionary personal debt on debtors can be as, if not more, harmful than government regulations that have been declared unconstitutional. In this regard, the impact of personal debt is tantamount to the impact of a civil rights violation. What separates the impact of unconstitutional state action from that of personal (...) debt is the assumption that only the latter are the result of consensual transactions. Consent, however, is not a dyadic phenomenon, it exists in gradations. The quality of consent is weakened when the agent is making choices in response to pressures, and the empiricalquestion of the extent to which a consent transaction is unforced is distinct from the normative question of whether a transaction is legitimate, or fair. It is necessary to devise a new taxonomy of language to clearly distinguish the empirical and normative questions. This elucidates the fact that lower income people are under more pressure to borrow money than are upper income individuals to pay progressive rates of income tax. To argue that the latter are ‘coerced,’ is to admit that the low income individual’s decision to borrow is similarly forced. This admission suggests that a significant portion of citizens of market-based economies are being forced to endure harms tantamount to civil rights violations. The admission also suggests that free markets harbour forces that undermine individual autonomy, and the absence of corrective state regulation exacerbates the problem. (shrink)