Egalitarianism

Many authors adopt a relational egalitarian outlook to explain why discrimination is wrongful. Roughly, for relational egalitarians, (social) equality is about whether all are treated and regarded as equals in society. However, this raises an important puzzle: how can relational egalitarians explain the wrong of indirect discrimination, which captures instances of differential impact absent differential treatment? In this paper, I consider three arguments relational egalitarians have put forward to respond to this question: (1) the compounding argument; (2) the negligence argument; (...) and (3) the no-such-thing-as-indirect-discrimination argument. I argue that none is fully convincing. In closing, I offer a positive proposal: indirect discrimination is wrong either when (1) it contributes to the structural disadvantaging of a group in society by tracking a basing trait, or (2) when a particular practice amounts to wrongful negligence. I argue that each is sufficient to say that a practice is wrongfully indirectly discriminatory. (shrink)

I argue for the relational egalitarian theory of reparations for historical injustice, which holds that 1) reparations are owed to persons who are public social inferiors in part because they are members of a group that has been subject to injustice in the past, and 2) reparations are to be such that a) they ameliorate and undo positions of public inferiority and b) members of the relevant group are assured of their recognition as moral equals. That argument proceeds by laying (...) out two basic desiderata of theories of reparations, explaining the notions of social inferiority and assurance of recognition, and showing that the relational egalitarian view satisfies the two desiderata. In the course of that argument, I consider alternative grounds for reparations based in considerations of harm or inheritance, and the implications of the relational egalitarian view for the supersession of reparative claims. (shrink)

The idea of a ‘tobacco-free generation’ promises to make smoking a thing of the past by making cigarettes unavailable to birth cohorts in the future. If implemented, such a generational ban would lead to a society in which some individuals are allowed the freedom to smoke while others are not. This paper examines the ethical significance of this fact through the lens of ‘relational egalitarianism’, an approach to social justice that emphasises equal and respectful social relationships. It explores various dimensions (...) in which a society can fail to live up to the idea of equal status, such as the denial of moral agency, discrimination, stigmatisation, the unequal recognition of interests and violations of political equality. While acknowledging the complexity of practical and ethical challenges, the paper maintains that the generational ban need not violate egalitarian commitments. (shrink)

Affirmative action is typically presumed to apply to recruitment but never lay-offs. Policies of affirmative action which only apply to recruitment are known as entry initiatives whilst exit initiatives involve lay-offs. In this paper, I challenge the status quo presumption against mixed exit initiatives which involve both lay-offs and preferential recruitment. Assuming that we have reasons to enact affirmative action initiatives whenever doing so promotes equality of opportunity, I strengthen the case for mixed exit initiatives by showing how, in at (...) least some cases, the relevant initiatives will be likely to provide a greater reduction in inequalities of opportunity both within and across different birth cohorts. I consider various objections to exit initiatives as I construe them and argue that none of them are immediately decisive such that the status quo presumption is justified. I conclude by gesturing towards the plausibility of the initiatives discussed and other policies which merit further consideration. (shrink)

Recently, Will Kymlicka reconsidered his multicultural citizenship-infused liberal nationalist project, in light of systematic empirical research on minority and majority dynamics in multicultural settings. Empirical findings are disheartening, demonstrating that majorities judge various minorities as less deserving of access to social rights and recognition as legitimate agents making political claims, leading to membership penalties. These led Kymlicka to recalibrate his normative position into multicultural nationalism. In my response, I will assess Kymlicka’s renewed normative position according to a moderate critique of (...) methodological nationalism. I will argue that if multicultural nationalism aims to promote inclusive membership for immigrants, by transforming the existing prominent and exclusive stories of peoplehood, then it should avoid relying on fixed, methodologically nationalist epistemic presuppositions. (shrink)

Welche Theorie(n) bzw. Auffassungen eines Rechts auf Eigentum werden im gerechtigkeitstheoretischen Egalitarismus vertreten? Spezifischer stellt sich die Frage: Lässt der Egalitarismus als eine Theorie der Gleichverteilung Eigentumsrechte überhaupt zu oder schränkt er sie nur stark ein, um Umverteilung zu ermöglichen? Zur Beantwortung dieser Frage wird zuerst der Egalitarismus näher bestimmt. Sodann wird zweitens bestimmt, was Eigentum ausmacht, um dann auf die eigentumstheoretischen Aspekte im Egalitarismus eingehen zu können. Dazu wird drittens gezeigt, dass und warum es für die dominante Rawls’sche Version (...) des Egalitarismus keine moralischen Ansprüche auf Eigentum vor den Ergebnissen der Umsetzung (s)einer übergeordneten Gerechtigkeitstheorie gibt. Anschließend wird auf zwei egalitäre Alternativen zur Rawls’schen Verteilungsgerechtigkeit eingegangen, nämlich die linkslibertäre (im vierten Abschnitt) sowie die linksliberale Eigentumstheorie (im fünften Abschnitt). Die linkslibertäre Auffassung argumentiert mittels einer naturrechtlichen und die (links-)liberale Auffassung mittels einer moralischen Begründung für Freiheits- und Eigentumsrechte als grundlegend. So gelangen beide auf unterschiedlichen Wegen zu egalitaristischen Implikationen für ihre Eigentumsauffassungen. -/- What theory or conception of property rights does egalitarianism as a theory of justice advocate? More specifically, as a theory of equal distribution, does egalitarianism allow for property rights at all, or does it severely restrict them in order to allow for redistribution? To answer this question, we first need to define egalitarianism. Second, it is necessary to determine what constitutes property in order to be able to address the property-theoretical aspects of egalitarianism. Third, it will be shown for the dominant Rawlsian version of egalitarianism that and why there are no moral claims to property before the results of the implementation of a higher ranking theory of justice. Two egalitarian alternatives to Rawlsian distributive justice are then discussed, namely the left-libertarian (in the fourth section) and the left-liberal (in the fifth section) theories of property. The libertarian view argues for freedom and property rights on the basis of natural law, while the (left) liberal view does so on the basis of morality. In this way, both arrive at egalitarian implications for their concepts of property by different routes. (shrink)

In recent years, Fabian Wendt’s sufficientarian or moderate libertarianism has stood out among theories of distributive justice. This theory is based on the project pursuit argument and recognizes individual’s rights to self-ownership and ownership of external resources. But the second of these rights is limited by the sufficiency proviso, which requires that all people have a minimum sufficient share of resources to engage in personal projects. This article takes a critical look at moderate libertarianism, showing that its limitation to the (...) sufficiency threshold is incompatible with its reliance on the project pursuit argument, since this argument implicitly assumes a presumption of equal concern for persons. In the absence of additional reasons, this presumption requires that people as projects pursuers be given not a sufficient, but an equal share of external resources. (shrink)

Construed as a theory of justice, relational egalitarianism says that justice requires that people relate as equals. Construed as a theory of what makes democracy valuable, it says that democracy is a necessary, or constituent, part of the value of relating as equals. Typically, relational egalitarians want their theory to provide both an account of what justice requires and an account of what makes democracy valuable. We argue that relational egalitarians with this dual ambition face the justice-democracy dilemma: Understanding social (...) relations in such a way that renders relational egalitarianism plausible as an answer to what makes democracy valuable comes at the price of understanding social relations in a way that makes it less plausible as a theory of justice, and vice versa. We also argue that there is no easy way out of the dilemma and that relational egalitarians, who want relational equality to provide both accounts mentioned, may simply have to set their ambitions lower on behalf of relational equality. (shrink)

According to the difference principle, social and economic inequalities are justified only when they maximize the benefits of the least advantaged. John Rawls attempted to justify this principle using the thought experiment known as the veil of ignorance. The idea is that it would be rational for all people to agree to the principle if they did not know what position they would occupy in society. John Harsanyi objected to this argument on the grounds that the difference principle is rational (...) only for people with low-risk propensity. For those willing to risk their position, the utilitarian expected-utility maximization principle is no less rational. Thus, Rawls’s veil of ignorance discriminates against people based on their risk propensity. Many Rawlsians respond to this objection by arguing that there is no discrimination because people leave their risk propensity behind the veil of ignorance. This article defends Harsanyi’s objection against this response. People cannot leave their risk propensity behind a veil because they need it to choose principles of justice based on their impact on their own life prospects. However, the article offers a different response to Harsanyi’s objection. His objection fails because it ignores the fact that principles of justice must not only be rational but also reasonable. The expected-utility maximization principle is rational but not reasonable because it imposes risks on other people, which is not the case with the difference principle. However, to use this response to Harsanyi’s objection, Rawlsians must abandon the neutralist liberalism of later Rawls and elaborate the Kantian foundations of his early philosophical project. (shrink)

One prominent criticism of luck egalitarianism is that it requires either shameful revelations or otherwise problematic declarations by the state toward those who have had bad brute luck. Relational egalitarianism, by contrast, is portrayed as an alternative that requires no such revelations or declarations. I argue that this is false. Relational equality requires the state to draft anti-discrimination laws for both state and private action. The ideal of relational egalitarianism requires these laws to be asymmetric, that is to allow affirmative (...) action for disadvantaged groups while prohibiting affirmative action for advantaged groups. Hence, the state needs to make a public declaration on which groups are privileged and which are underprivileged; and individuals need to reveal whether they belong to groups officially declared underprivileged. These declarations are no more problematic in this case than in the case of luck egalitarianism. (shrink)

Axel Gosseries considers, and partly defends, several strategies to address the non-identity problem (NIP). We engage critically with two strategies endorsed by Gosseries: the severance strategy and the overlap strategy. The latter comprises two different sub-strategies: the containment sub-strategy and the indirect sub-strategy. We believe that severance is less promising than Gosseries suggests. It comes at a high theoretical cost, which is important to acknowledge even if, ultimately, there is reason to pay it. The sub-strategies that comprise the overlap strategy (...) are more promising, and they can justify more in terms of the scope and content of inter-generational justice than Gosseries suggests in his book. Endorsing the overlap strategies is attractive because doing so limits the need for impersonal considerations in theories of inter-generational justice. (shrink)

In his influential 1949 essay, The Intellectuals and Socialism, F.A. Hayek prophesied that the “revival of liberalism” must coincide with the resurgence of “the courage to be Utopian.” Today, at a time when liberalism is under attack from multiple fronts, we need courage more than ever. Indeed, the rediscovery of the Utopian potential of liberalism coincides with going back to its roots. My paper shows that liberalism, especially in its so-called “epistemic” or "evolutionary" branch whose notable theorists include Adam Smith, (...) J.S. Mill, Herbert Spencer, and F.A. Hayek, provides a framework for “real Utopian” theory and practice. However, I argue that evolutionary liberalism should be enriched with the insights of contemporary evolutionary theory and complexity theory to properly account for the downsides of social evolution and to overcome the understandable charge of social Darwinism. Only then can it robustly realise its emancipatory aspirations and real Utopian promise. (shrink)

The Finnish experiment of 2017–18 is a crucial test case. It provides one of the most robust experimental tests of a universal basic income (UBI) in the context of an advanced industrialised society. And it is a real milestone, since it represents a nonutopian approach to UBI that can be palatable to middle class voters. But its partial success is also a partial failure. Although it is too early to render judgement, the Finnish case shows that there are many obstacles (...) for the successful implementation of theoretical models. Experiments often fall short of the ideal experimental conditions. This speaks against taking too optimistic a view on the next steps. (shrink)

Is a Universal Basic Income the answer to an increasingly precarious job landscape? Could it bring greater financial freedom for women, tackle the issue of unpaid but essential work, cut poverty and promote greater choice? Or is it a dead-end utopian ideal that distracts from more practical and cost-effective solutions? Contributors from musician Brian Eno, think tank Demos Helsinki, innovators such as California’s Y Combinator Research and prominent academics such as Peter Beresford OBE offer a variety of perspectives from across (...) the globe on the politics and feasibility of basic income. Sharing research and insights from a variety of nations – including India, Finland, Uganda, Brazil and Canada - the collection provides a comprehensive guide to the impact this innovative idea could have on work, welfare and inequality in the 21st century. (shrink)

The classical liberal paradigm has always argued for strong economic freedom combined with limits on government power. But it has also been always openminded about using government programs to improve the society. These principles, if applied to today’s society, are simultaneously a criticism of “really existing” welfare state ideology – with its lack of economic freedom and its reliance on the expansive bureaucracy – but also an opportunity for reforming welfare states toward more freedom-based alternatives. There is a utopian potential (...) in classical liberalism. This book articulates how several strands of liberalism, including Austrian school liberalism and Chicago school liberalism, may support something like universal basic income (UBI). (shrink)

Karl Widerquist is one of the world’s leading theorists and proponents of Universal Basic Income (UBI). His argument for UBI, however, is only one important cornerstone of his broader theory of justice and freedom. This theory entails a critical reassessment of the justification and proper scope of property rights. This is the task of The Problem of Property, a nifty little book which originates in previously unpublished parts of his doctoral thesis—the same thesis that formed the foundation of his Independence, (...) Propertylessness, and Basic Income: Freedom as the Power to Say No (2013, New York: Palgrave MacMillan). The current book is thus a welcome companion piece to that magnum opus. At the same time, The Problem of Property, thanks to its brevity and clarity, is a decent standalone introduction to Widerquist’s philosophy. While some fans of his previous works might be disappointed that UBI takes an unexpected backseat, the book’s narrow critical focus on the normative justifications of property rights makes it a goldmine for political philosophers. Even Lockean right-libertarians, his ostensible main targets, should find its freedom-based arguments familiar and easy to grasp, even if they may be puzzled by some of the radical conclusions that he draws from them. (shrink)

How can libertarianism—which is thought to be hostile to any redistribution—support universal, unconditional cash transfers in the form of a Basic Income? Surprisingly, many vocal proponents of programmes similar to Basic Income—such as economist Milton Friedman, public intellectual Charles Murray, and eBay co-founder Pierre Omidiyar—are self-described libertarians. As this chapter demonstrates, these and other libertarian proponents are not deviating from libertarian thought: instead, they reflect the nuance and diversity of its theoretical foundations. To that end, this chapter explores several justifications (...) for a Basic Income grounded in libertarianism. By libertarianism, we mean a family of theories that emphasize the right of the individual to be free from coercion, a strong respect for private property rights and the free market, and a presumption that market distributions are just and should be disturbed only in limited circumstances. We argue that each variant of libertarianism justifies, but does not mandate, redistribution, although for differing reasons and at different levels. Because this conclusion runs counter to most readers’ impressions of libertarianism, this chapter focuses on making the libertarian case for redistribution. We further show that once one accepts the case for redistribution, providing such redistribution through unrestricted, unconditional cash transfers best reflects core libertarian principles. (shrink)

This handbook brings together scholars from various disciplines and from around the world to examine the history, characteristics, effects, viability and implementation of basic income. The first edition of this book contributed a comprehensive treatment of multiple aspects of the basic income debate. This updated, expanded edition tackles new topics that are becoming increasingly prominent in the global debate. New chapters are devoted to recent research on the history of basic income; the development and peacemaking potential of basic income in (...) conflict zones; municipal experiments in the United States; requirements for pilot projects and experiments; and the public health implications of basic income. Existing chapters on the implementation of basic income have also been substantially updated to take account of new research on microsimulation, land value tax, local currencies, and blockchain technology and cryptocurrency, along with new material on the increasing use of opinion polls and the difficulties related to that. New political and ethical perspectives on the role of trade unions and their increasing engagement with the basic income debate are also introduced, while the section on pilot projects and experiments has been updated to cover recent political developments. Fully updated to reflect new global developments in the basic income debate, this handbook will be of interest to researchers, teachers and research-oriented policymakers in a range of fields. (shrink)

The human race has been socially organizing itself for probably about 1.8 million years. The first form of human organization was the hunter-gatherer, which was the form of organization in which man lived for about 99 % of his history. This mode of life caused humans to organize themselves into small groups and lead a nomadic life. The nomadic life ensured that these groups had no possessions and no wealth could be accumulated. In this manner, this form of human organization (...) ensured egalitarianism, a form of primitive communism. This changed dramatically with the development of agriculture in the so-called Neolithic Revolution in 10,000 BC. With the development of agriculture and the consequent development of technology, man became sedentary, the first towns were formed, and the class system made its appearance, that is, the separation between an administrative class and a productive class. The egalitarian and communist primitive society gave way to an increasingly centralized and hierarchical society. From network theory, they have been insisting for years on the benefits of the so-called scale-free networks, networks governed by certain privileged nodes called hubs. These networks are said to be slightly vulnerable and highly robust to errors. In this work, we perform a deep network analysis of a group of centralized-hierarchical networks and a group of decentralized-distributed networks. This work provides clear and compelling evidence that, contrary to what is maintained, decentralized-distributed networks are the least vulnerable and most robust networks, and are the networks that ensure an equitable and equal distribution of power and influence among their members. These results are analyzed in the context of network theory, and are discussed in relation to the theories of Jeremy Rifkin, Ernst Schumacher, Alexander Bogdanov and Aldous Huxley. (shrink)

Relational egalitarians sometimes argue that a degree of distributive equality is necessary for social equality to obtain among members of society. In this paper, we consider how such arguments fare when extended to the intergenerational case. In particular, we examine whether relational reasons for distributive equality apply between non-overlapping generations. We claim that they do not. We begin by arguing that the most common reasons relational egalitarians offer in favour of distributive equality between contemporaries do not give us reasons to (...) object to distributive inequality between non-overlapping generations. This argument by itself however will not fully suffice to show that there are no relational reasons to care about intergenerational distributive equality, given the nature of relational equality and its requirements in the intergenerational case are likely to be qualitatively different than in the contemporary case. Therefore, we also make the positive argument that for the intergenerational case to satisfy the requirements demanded by the ideal of relational equality it suffices that future persons’ interests are meaningfully incorporated and protected in the decision-making of preceding generations, and there is no basis for a concern with distributive equality. While some have argued that the one-way and asymmetrical causal influence between non-overlapping generations means concerns of social equality are inapplicable in the intergenerational case, we argue that the ongoing nature of this influence makes concerns of social equality appropriate. If successful, the upshot of the argument is that it can be coherent to maintain a commitment to relational equality between non-overlapping generations, all while remaining agnostic about distributive equality between them. (shrink)

The online dating application has in recent years become a major avenue for meeting potential partners. But while the digital public sphere has gained the attention of political philosophers, a systematic normative evaluation of issues arising in the ‘digital sexual sphere’ is lacking. I provide a philosophical framework for assessing dating app corporation conduct, capturing why people use these apps and their experience so often is unsatisfactory. Identifying dating apps as agents intervening in a social institution necessary for the reproduction (...) of society, with immense power over people's lives, I ask if they exercise their power in line with individuals’ interests. Acknowledging that people have claims to non-interference, equal standing, and choice improvement relating to intimacy, I find that the traditional, non-digital, sexual sphere poses problems to their realisation, especially for sexual minorities. In this context, apps’ potential for justice in the sexual sphere is immense, but unfulfilled. (shrink)

Savulescu and Cameron supported selectively locking down the elderly during the COVID-19 pandemic on two grounds: first, that preserving total lockdown would entail levelling down and, second, that levelling down is wrong. Their first assumption has been thoroughly addressed, but more can be said about their wider antiegalitarian point that levelling down is simply wrong. Egalitarians are not defenceless against the levelling-down objection. Even though some consider it the most serious challenge to supporters of equality, egalitarianism possesses sound reasons to (...) assert, not only that something valuable is preserved when we level down, but also that preserving it may be, in certain circumstances, preferable to pursuing other fundamental moral goals. Although troublesome from a well-being maximising standpoint, levelling down ensures that healthcare policy reflects a commitment with the idea that people are equal in moral worth. That commitment is important enough to trump certain improvements in individual well-being. In the case of pandemic lockdowns, not all the interests protected by free movement are as fundamental as to pursue them at the cost of equality. Savulescu and Cameron’s framework is so reliant on the view that levelling down is wrong that it fails to account for the valuable loss that having the elderly suffer alone represents. (shrink)

This article examines G. A. Cohen’s endorsement of a hybrid ethical theory and its relationship to his critique of John Rawls’s egalitarian liberalism. Cohen claimed that Rawls’s appeal to special incentives was a distortion of his own difference principle. I argue that Cohen’s acceptance of a personal prerogative (the central element of Samuel Scheffler’s version of a hybrid ethical theory) has several untoward consequences. First, it illuminates how any reasonable challenge to Rawls’s liberalism must recognise Thomas Nagel’s arguments concerning the (...) problems that arise when one attempts to implement a political theory analogous to a hybrid theory of ethics. Second, it undermines Cohen’s critique of Rawls. Third, it undermines the plausibility of Cohen’s ethos-driven social egalitarianism. The article concludes that, despite Nagel’s concerns, the most plausible form of egalitarianism—one that can accommodate the requirements of a hybrid ethical theory—will be Rawlsian, rather than Cohen’s ethos-based system. (shrink)

Relational egalitarians differ from distributive egalitarians by focusing on the structure of social relationships—a just society is one in which citizens relate as equals. While we can relate (un)equally along different dimensions, the importance of relating as aesthetic equals has been underexplored. Here, I offer an account of aesthetic equality in relational egalitarian terms. I argue that, to relate as aesthetic equals, individuals must be subject to the same basic normative aesthetic rules, not be stigmatized or feel inferior because of (...) their aesthetic standing, and not suffer certain material harms because of their aesthetic standing. Thus, a society of aesthetic equals would not have oppressive beauty norms. It would also address discrimination against the aesthetically disadvantaged, or lookism. The distinctly relational egalitarian conception of aesthetic equality considered here provides a novel framework for distinguishing between permissible and unjust inequalities of bodily beauty. The relational approach also reveals that while redistribution may not be sufficient to fully address lookism, aesthetic equality can be achieved without radical revision or total rejection of our current conception of beauty. (shrink)

Egalitarianism, Rothbard wrote, is a revolt against nature. Yet such was precisely the creed of the analytical Marxist and socialist Gerald Cohen. Cohen's basic morality was twisted by his communist upbringing but not _completely_ which makes uncovering his errors interesting. Which is what this book does. Cohen believes that justice consists in equality. Though he is brilliant and lucid, his attitude can be summed up as follows: "Humans are my toy soldiers. I happen to like all my soldiers equally, and (...) so will give all of them the same stuff and make sure they are equally well maintained. I will then play with these toy soldiers, and all shall be well." Negatively, his case is dismantled; positively, a view is advanced, building on the author's book on John Rawls, Distribute This, that justice is a social order that fosters harmony and progress among men, and that it is libertarian capitalism that realizes this virtue. By drawing attention to this key thinker, this book fills an important gap in the refutation of egalitarianism, a task that is still unfinished and that desperately needs doing today. (shrink)

I develop an egalitarian account of what's objectionable about coercion. The account is rooted in the idea that certain relationships, like those of master to slave or lord to peasant, are relationships of subordination or domination. These relationships are morally objectionable. Such relationships are in part constituted by asymmetries of power. A master subordinates a slave because the master has more power over the slave than vice versa. Coercion is objectionable, I argue, because it creates such asymmetries of power and (...) so creates relationships of subordination. This account, moreover, illuminates what's wrong with blackmail, exploitation, withholding aid, and compulsion. (shrink)

John Rawls was a major 20th-century political philosopher, and his work was animated by his loathing of the fact that many of the circumstances of human lives were due to fortune. Why should there be inequalities among men, he asked, that were produced by mere blind luck? To support his intuition, he came up with a version of social contract theory built around the device of the "original position." We imagine that people gather up for a discussion of what social (...) institutions are best, but they forget, in order not to be swayed by their own personal interests, who they are in the actual society. They do not know their religion, social position, wealth and income, their particular ends, or anything else that might prejudice their judgment. Under this veil of ignorance, they – or rather the philosopher who is shattered into numerous ghostly persons – seek to come to an agreement regarding the just basic structure of society. This book demolishes Rawls' every argument in support of his egalitarianism and shows that the original position, to the extent that it is not completely sterile, outputs libertarianism and laissez-faire capitalism. It defends the view of justice as either a virtue or a legal system that promotes harmony and progress in human affairs. (shrink)

Within democratic theory, electoral competition is typically associated with minimalist and realist views of democracy. In contrast, this article argues for a reinterpretation of electoral competition as an important element of an egalitarian theory of democracy. Current relational egalitarian theories, in focusing on the equalization of individual power-over, present electoral institutions as in tension with equality. Against this view, the article contends that electoral competition can foster equality by incentivizing the equalization of cooperative power. The article develops the normative category (...) of equal opportunity to access cooperative power and shows how it can generate an egalitarian defense of electoral competition. Yet this ideal is not an affirmation of the status quo. Rather, it points to the need to reform electoral systems to make them more competitive and so more likely to foster cooperative power, as well as reforms to provide direct support to associations like unions that equalize cooperative power. (shrink)

Discrimination laws usually prohibit discrimination based on some traits, like race, caste, and sex, and not on others, like sports team allegiance. Should socioeconomic class be included among the protected traits? We examine an argument for the view that it should which leads to the conclusion that both direct and indirect socioeconomic discrimination should be prohibited by the state. The argument has three premises: (1) direct paradigmatic discrimination should be prohibited by law; (2) if direct paradigmatic discrimination should be prohibited (...) by law, then so should direct socioeconomic discrimination; and (3) where direct discrimination based on a certain trait should be prohibited by law, so should indirect discrimination on the basis of the same trait. Since we assume most readers will accept (1), the paper is largely devoted to the defense of (2) and (3). The outlawing of direct socioeconomic discrimination would involve an adjustment of the political and legal status quo, but we argue that it should nevertheless be implemented. By contrast, a prohibition on indirect socioeconomic discrimination would require a radical change to the way in which our societies are structured, because many of our laws, policies, and practices systematically (re)produce inequality to the disproportionate detriment of the poor. Our main aim, therefore, is not to defend the prohibition of indirect socioeconomic discrimination, but to show that most people’s views about discrimination are in deep tension with their attitude to current law. Resolving this tension would require for most of us to revise our beliefs either about whether indirect socioeconomic discrimination should be prohibited or about (1)–(3). One might reject the view that law should prohibit socioeconomic discrimination and still accept this claim about a deep tension in most people’s views on discrimination. (shrink)

If you are a member of an organization, how should you be committed to its aims and values? I argue that relational equality requires organizational superiors – those endowed with higher authority within organizations – generally to make decisions on the basis of pertinent organizational aims and values, even when there are competing extra-organizational moral considerations. I start with cases of objectionable managerial moral activism, in which superiors take the moral law into their own hands, shirking organizational aims and values (...) for the sake of extra-organizational moral considerations. Since these managerial decisions enforce moral norms on subordinates, and since the moral norms that superiors enforce do not correspond to reasonably expected organizational aims and values (at least those that are compatible with relational equality), the superiors thereby treat subordinates as moral inferiors. This implies that relational equality requires an important form of organizational partiality of organizational superiors. (shrink)

This book provides an analytical defence of egalitarian anarchism, arguing that there is a libertarian path to socialist conclusions.

Liberal egalitarian jurisprudence and critical legal studies have often been at odds, despite sharing a core of set of political and analytical commitments. This paper makes the case for their conciliation in the 21st century on the basis that both traditions have much to offer one another. Liberal egalitarians offer the theoretical tools for developing an egalitarian normative approach to law, and critical legal theorists offer a vital realism about power.

The main point in this chapter is that SDG 4 targets cannot be achieved without education justice, which entails that every child, young person and adult benefit from quality education and lifelong learning. There is no justification for the injustices arising from poor-quality education and exclusion as they exist today. Accordingly, tackling the problem of social, political and economic exclusion that emerges from the education sector, and the limitations they impose on the prospects of some individuals, must be prioritised to (...) expedite the realisation of SDG 4. That entails, among other things, ensuring inclusive and equitable quality education and promoting lifelong learning opportunities for all. Drawing a nexus between education justice in basic education and higher education, the chapter exposes the nature of the challenges that sustain the injustices of educational exclusion and poor-quality education. These include the knock-on effects that injustices in basic education have on higher education, especially for students from marginalised schools. Interventions that seek to advance education justice towards attaining SDG 4 are also discussed. (shrink)

The main point in this chapter isthat SDG 4 targets cannot be achieved without education justice, which entails that every child, young person and adult benefit from quality education and lifelong learning. There is no justification for the injustices arising from poor-quality education and exclusion as they exist today. Accordingly, tackling the problem of social, political and economic exclusion that emerges from the education sector, and the limitations they impose on the prospects of some individuals, must be prioritised to expedite (...) the realisation of SDG 4. That entails, among other things, ensuring inclusive and equitable quality education and promoting lifelong learning opportunities for all. Drawing a nexus between education justice in basic education and higher education, the chapter exposes the nature of the challenges that sustain the injustices of educational exclusion and poor-quality education. These include the knock-on effects that injustices in basic education have on higher education, especially for students from marginalised schools. Interventions that seek to advance education justice towards attaining SDG 4 are also discussed. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

In health care, the provision of pertinent information to patients is not just a moral imperative but also a legal obligation, often articulated through the lens of obtaining informed consent. Codes of medical ethics and many national laws mandate the disclosure of basic information about diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment alternatives. However, within publicly funded health care systems, other kinds of information might also be important to patients, such as insights into the health care priorities that underlie treatment offers made. While (...) conventional perspectives do not take this as an obligatory part of the information to be shared with patients, perhaps through viewing it as clinically “non-actionable,” we advocate for a paradigm shift. Our proposition diverges from the traditional emphasis on actionability. We contend that honoring patients as equal moral agents necessitates, among other principles, a commitment to honesty. Withholding specific categories of information pertinent to patients’ comprehension of their situation is inherently incompatible with this principle. In this article, we advocate for a recalibration of the burden of proof. Rather than requiring special justifications for adding to the standard set of information items, we suggest that physicians should be able to justify excluding relevant facts about the patient’s situation and the underlying considerations shaping health care professionals’ choices. This perspective prioritizes transparency and empowers patients with a comprehensive understanding, aligning with the ethos of respect for the patient as person. (shrink)

There is a large and growing body of empirical work on people’s intuitions about distributive justice. In this paper, we investigate how well luck egalitarianism and desertism—the two normative approaches that appear to cohere well with people’s intuitions—are supported by more fine-grained findings in the empirical literature. The time is ripe for a study of this sort, as the positive literature on justice has blossomed over the last three decades. The results of our investigation are surprising. In three different contexts (...) (good option luck, good brute luck, and bad brute luck) in which the demands of luck egalitarianism and those of a mainstream desert-based view come apart, the latter carries the day. One ramification of these findings is that people’s intuitions about justice are moralized; that is, they appeal to particular conceptions of the good. Luck egalitarians must decide whether to embrace these moralized intuitions by adopting desertism—or to resist them. (shrink)

The ideal of relating as equals is, in part, an ideal of virtue – the attitudes and dispositions that support social relations of equality. These are standardly taken to involve accepting the Equal Authority of other persons, giving other persons Equal Consideration, and treating the interests of other persons as having Equal Importance. But why does relational equality involve these attitudes and dispositions, and what exactly do they entail? I aim to make progress on answering these questions by focusing on (...) adult autonomy, using the workplace as an apt setting for exploring the resulting autonomy-focused conception of relational egalitarian virtue. I first consider and reject an interest- focused conception of relational egalitarian virtue, which treats Equal Importance as central. This view allows for a paternalistic stance that is incompatible with social relations of equality. I then develop an autonomy-focused view that treats Equal Authority as central, what I call the “Authority-Centered Relational Egalitarian” virtue (ACRE). ACRE avoids the paternalistic implications of the interest-focused view. I conclude by exploring how managers can sustain and enact ACRE in exercising organizational authority over employees. (shrink)

Of all the risks we face in life, ranging from unemployment to old age, early death is among the most tragic and yet most neglected by modern states. Liberal egalitarians might find it easy to dismiss social insurance against early death, but I argue they should not. Early in this paper, I explain why social insurance should include the risk of premature death by replying to four common criticisms. What follows is a case for a novel form of insurance that (...) is more liberal and egalitarian across ages than the status quo. More specifically, I show that granting storable pensions in all life stages - youth, middle and old age - promotes liberty and reduces lifetime inequality. Writers on age group and longevity justice often overlook the extent to which liberal lifetime equality can supply insightful arguments against inequality across ages. These call for a policy that gives each age group the freedom to draw a storable pension. I call that policy "freetirement". (shrink)

Relational egalitarianism is a theory of justice according to which justice requires that people relate as equals. According to some relational egalitarians, X and Y relate as equals if, and only if, they (1) regard each other as equals; and (2) treat each other as equals. In this paper, we argue that relational egalitarians must give up 1.

Sophia Moreau, in her important book, offers an insightful account of (one strand of) the wrong of discrimination based on the evil of subordination. My symposium contribution seeks to clarify the structure of Moreau's account of subordination and its normative and axiological status. On one plausible view, subordination is fundamentally bad or wrong. On another view, subordination is a distinctive social phenomenon, which is bad or wrong only derivatively. I will outline each view, and consider the implications each has for (...) certain issues central to Moreau's book. (shrink)

Philanthropy is a contentious and often polarising topic within egalitarian social movements. There are good reasons for this. Philanthropy is reliant on the inequalities inherent in the capitalist system, is fundamentally at odds with democratic relationships, and can moderate or control the activities of recipients. This article therefore starts from the premise that philanthropy violates egalitarian ideals in very significant ways. However, it goes on to suggest that, absent a ruptural change that would drastically weaken the bases of philanthropic wealth, (...) there is a strategic and contingent case for its selective use so long as it pushes existing configurations of power in more egalitarian directions. In making this case, the article draws primarily on the work of Wright ( 2010 ) but also on recent developments in the political theory of philanthropy. It calls for a critical literacy around philanthropy that combines an openness to experimentation with a clear-eyed sense of its significant risks. In this respect, it outlines specific conditions and strategies that movements should adopt if they pursue or accept philanthropic funding. Firstly, movements must deliberately articulate and actively defend their transformative vision, clarifying in the process the tactical place of philanthropy within this. Secondly, they must resist funder conditionalities, and preserve egalitarian modes of organising in the face of practices which undermine participatory ideals and threaten relations of care and solidarity. The article’s chief contribution is to integrate normative insights with lessons from the sociological literature on movement-philanthropy relations, for the sake of systematically untangling a live and troublesome issue within the praxis of radical movements. (shrink)

Derek Parfit held that in evaluating the future, we should ignore the difference between necessary persons and merely possible persons. In this article, I look at one of the most prominent alternatives to Parfit's view, namely Michael Otsuka and Larry Temkin ‘shortfall complaints’ view. In that view, we aggregate future persons’ well-being and deduct intrapersonal shortfall complaints, giving extra weight to the complaints of necessary persons. I offer here a third view. I reject Parfit's no difference view in that I (...) register a difference between necessary and possible persons. But I also reject the Shortfall View and replace its intra-personal complaints with an inter-personal complaints mechanism. I argue that the value of a population is its aggregate prioritarian value minus the egalitarian complaints that necessary persons hold. I show that the egalitarian view has all the explanatory power of the Shortfall view in easy cases, while significantly improving on it in three sorts of tough cases. (shrink)

Indirect discrimination (or disparate impact) is one of the focal points of current antidiscrimination policies. However, few political/moral philosophers have paid substantial attention to indirect discrimination until recently. This contribution provides an overview of the two philosophical questions in this context: the definitional question (DQ) and the moral question (MQ). DQ concerns what distinguishes indirect discrimination from direct discrimination and inequality. Conceptually, either (1) indirect discrimination is not a genuine subtype of discrimination; (2) it is a subtype of discrimination secondary (...) to direct discrimination; or (3) it is a subtype of discrimination independent of direct discrimination. A more substantial distinction between direct and indirect discrimination can be drawn according to the discriminator’s intention, the disproportionateness of intergroup disadvantage, and so forth. MQ addresses what makes indirect discrimination morally wrong. Conceptually, either (1) indirect discrimination cannot be morally wrong qua discrimination in its own right; (2) it can be morally wrong qua discrimination in its own right, where the wrongness must be connected to past direct discrimination; or (3) it can be morally wrong qua discrimination regardless of past direct discrimination. Substantially, possible wrong-making factors of indirect discrimination include the discriminator’s objectionable intentions, the objectionable message that discriminatory practices may carry, and their harmful effects. This framework is a first step for future works that are necessary to yield a comprehensive insight into the relationship between discrimination and inequality and address contemporary forms of discrimination that tend to be indirect rather than direct. (shrink)