Hannah Arendt

This was a draft written in a hurry for a submission somewhere. Like all submissions done in a hurry this is not the perfected work. This paper shows how modernist Yogic praxes are totalitarian in the sense in which Hannah Arendt discusses totalitarianism. Further it attacks structuralist critiques of Yoga and comments on the state of Hindu and even, Buddhist studies today. One has to be cautious in reading this paper since the author ranges through many references which have not (...) been brought out fully. (shrink)

This paper examines the unique structures of identity formation within the craftsperson/maker mindset and their relation to Western views of work and labor. The contemporary Maker Movement has its origins not only in the internet revolution, but also in the revival of handicraft during the last several economic recessions. Economic uncertainty drives people toward the ideals and practices of craft as a way to regain a sense of agency and control. One learns how to become an active participant in our (...) material lives by making and maintaining the objects that surround us. This orientation toward craft has the potential to alter the practitioner's sense of self going forward. I will argue that the work-based nature of craft leads to a unique and positive sense of self that the assumed freedom of ‘art’ and intellectualized labor unwittingly discourages. Tacit mechanisms shape the craft mindset through emphasis on skill, mastery of materials, polymathic problem solving, and quality. Hannah Arendt’s notion of the vita activa and Martin Heidegger’s arguments on modern technology reveal the dynamics between physical and intellectual labor and how many have greatly misunderstood the ‘essence’ of the craftsperson’s work. Peter Dormer and Glenn Adamson’s analysis of the nature of craft demonstrate how these two lines of thought can be unified into one system of selfhood granting the greater sense of agency many seek without relying on an individualized sense of self. The Richard Sennett shows how this sense of self challenges the desire to liberate ourselves from labor via technology and poetic autonomy as seen in Franco Berardi’s Manifesto of Post-Futurism. Malcolm Gladwell's work on intuition examines the impact of this tacit craft mindset and the psychological mechanisms that drive it. This will allow Peter Korn’s first-hand account of his own craft practice to demonstrate this structure and its inherent points of resistance against today’s hyper-individualized and resultingly selfish ways of life. Throughout this paper, a clear emphasis on materiality as a profound source of embodied knowledge will be maintained to reveal craftspersonhood as a source of deep existential fulfillment and practical philosophy. Acknowledging and embracing our intrinsic materiality and all that it has to teach us is imperative in the face of a consumption-centric culture of excess and exploitation that looms over much of the West. (shrink)

In his recently published posthumous works "Prefiguration" and "The Rigorism of Truth" Hans Blumenberg surprisingly steps into the area of political history that he had left widely unconsidered in "Work on Myth". While "Prefiguration" tackles the “demonic” aspects of Napoleon and Hitler that Blumenberg tries to dismantle and bring into derision, in "Rigorism of Truth" he attacks Hannah Arendt's phrase of the Banality of Evil in relation to the Jerusalem trial against Adolf Eichmann in 1961. In this latter issue Blumenberg (...) defends the demonic he sees culminated in the form of Eichmann to assert what he calls the “mythical dimension“ in the Israeli process of nation-building. To him, Eichmann represents a prototypical demon incarnate that must be slaughtered by the heroic character seen in young state Israel. This obviously turns Blumenberg's criticism of Napoleon and Hitler into an affirmation of political myths that, on the face of it, appears to be a contradiction in terms. The essay focuses on this theoretical tension and tries to point out that significance (“Bedeutsamkeit”) is not only a necessity for individual self-assertion (“Selbstbehauptung”) but also a category of communality that must be handled with care. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger’s view of conformity comes in his description and understanding of Das Man or “the One”. There is controversy within Heidegger scholarship regarding the interpretation of Das Man as an existential mode. Most scholars interpret Das Man to mean the existential mode of inauthenticity and delineate the two modes of authenticity and inauthenticity in Heideggerian existentialism. Less popularly, scholars like Hubert Dreyfus and Michael Zimmerman interpret the positive and negative aspects of Das Man and suggest the third mode of (...) indifference in Heidegger’s _Being and Time_. This paper follows Dreyfus’ understanding of Das Man to posit indifference as a third mode of being that is structurally similar to inauthenticity but motivationally different from it. It then uses this difference to categorize two forms of moral conformity in Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the difference between a morality of custom and a morality of conviction. The problematic of this paper concerns the distinction between these two forms of moral conformity and the moral status of people like Adolf Eichmann whose actions Arendt describes as the banality of evil. Usually seen as preservative of morality, Arendt shows how conformity may be a site for moral conflict. (shrink)

In this article I demonstrate how Hannah Arendt both appropriates and transforms Aristotle’s view of political friendship. I argue that the brief discussion of Aristotelian political friendship in The Human Condition relies on an earlier de-materialization of Aristotle’s work on friendship. This de-materialization of Aristotle’s view of friendship allows Arendt to discuss Aristotelian friendship as a kind of ‘respect’, where ‘respect’ is a philosophical notion unavailable to Aristotle. Ultimately, for Arendt, the experience of friendship opens up a space for human (...) beings to begin to practice a distinct way of seeing one another – a ‘respect’ – that can in turn be practiced in public, making the experience of friendship an important precursor to action. (shrink)

According to the traditional Western concept of freedom, the ability to exercise free will depends on the availability of options and the possibility to consciously decide which one to choose. Since neuroscientific research increasingly shows the limits of what we in fact consciously control, it seems that our belief in free will and hence in personal autonomy is in trouble. -/- A closer look at the phenomenology of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) gives us reason to doubt the traditional concept of freedom (...) in terms of conscious control. Patients suffering from OCD experience themselves as unfree. The question is whether their lack of freedom is due to a lack of will power. Do they have too little conscious control over their thoughts and actions? Or could it be the opposite: are they exerting too much conscious control over their thoughts and actions? -/- In this chapter, we will argue that OCD patients testify to the general condition that exercising an increased conscious control over actions can in fact diminish the sense of agency rather than increase the experience of freedom. The experiences of these patients show that the traditional conception of freedom in terms of ‘free will’ has major shortcomings. There is an alternative, however, to be found in the work of Hannah Arendt. She advocates a conception of freedom as freedom in action. Combined with phenomenological insights on action, Arendt’s account of freedom helps us to get a more adequate understanding of the role of deliberation in the experience of freedom. We argue that the experience of freedom depends on the right balance between deliberate control and unreflective actions. (shrink)

Part of 'Works of Philosophy and Their Reception' series / -/- Contributors include: Ronald Beiner, Linda Zerilli, D.N. Rodowick, Cecilia Sjöholm, Martin Blumenthal-Barby, Helga Varden, Roger Berkowitz.

O texto analisa quais teriam sido as razões estruturais pelas quais Habermas, no seu texto sobre a desobediência civil de 1983, estranhamente, não referencia o nome de Arendt, mas o de Rawls. Para isso, apresenta alguns elemen tos do t ratamento arendtiano da desobediên cia civil que inviabilizaram o alinhamento do trabalho de Habermas sobre a desobediência civil [1983] com aquele da pensadora. Por fim, aponta para as prox imidades da teoria de Habermas com aq uela de Rawls, muito embora (...) com ciência das diferenças importantes entre as duas propostas. (shrink)

In the face of seemingly new truth-related political phenomena, Hannah Arendt’s theory of truth in politics has recently seen a flare of renewed attention. Central to her theory is the distinction between rational and factual truths, and the claim that the latter, unlike the former, belongs to the political. The coherence of this claim, however, has been the object of much discussion and criticism. This article intervenes in the debate by foregrounding her conception of factual truth as “the outcome of (...) action” and advancing that this is best understood as an “extended” conception, one that includes in its compass a future-regarding concern for the facts yet-to-be. In so doing it contributes to clarify why it can be said that Arendt does not—like her critics have maintained—exclude truth from the realm of politics, but that in fact it brings to light truth’s most political dimension. (shrink)

In the present article, I offer a new reading of Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism, specifically her argument that ideologies such as racism engender totalitarianism when the lonely and disenfranchised laborers of modern society develop a pathological fixation on formal logic, which I term “logomania.” That is, such logical deductions, from horrifically false premises, are the closest thing to thinking that individuals can engage in after their psyches, relationships, and communities have broken down. And it is only thus that (...) totalitarianism can achieve power, since it offers at least some form of connectedness and meaning, regardless how terrifying and violent. The danger persists, clearly, with the resurgence of the far Right, including in the extraordinary regime of Trump in the United States. From this I conclude that, along with the admirable calls to fight loneliness and rebuild our communities, we should also supplement all formal logical instruction and community education with instruction in creative thinking (including aesthetics), thereby discouraging the monomaniac reliance on formal logic as inadvertent weapon of totalitarianism. (shrink)

Phenomenology and ancient Greek philosophy. The title of this book, indicating these topics as its two main subjects, could give the impression that the subjects are held together by a circumstantial “and.” The title would then indicate a connection between phenomenology and a topic, ancient Greek philosophy, the way titles such as Art and Phenomenology, Phenomenology and Psychological Research, Phenomenology and Virtue Ethics do. This impression would be wrong. First, ancient Greek philosophers take pride of place in the dialogues initiated (...) by many phenomenologists with various figures from the history of philosophy. Second, this is not just because phenomenological philosophers have tended to regard ancient Greek philosophy as the revered beginning of Western thought, reflection upon which may help illuminate any topic modern human beings wish to inquire into or give it a kind of historical dignity. It is first and foremost because ancient Greek philosophy, understood as the scientific attempt to understand the world, ourselves, and our place in the world, in the phenomenological tradition is regarded as one important origin of contemporary Western philosophy and science, even if contemporary philosophy and science is also determined by a new ideal of philosophy that emerges in early modernity. Indeed, for most phenomenologists, Greek philosophy can be regarded as the roots supporting this new ideal—even if these roots are sometimes hidden from sight or forgotten. The main rationale for confronting ancient Greek philosophy phenomenologically is accordingly the attempt to bring to light in its full radicality the phenomenon “philosophy.” Unearthing philosophy as it was originally understood by Greek thinkers may, according to many phenomenologists at least, help us understand what philosophy in the full sense of the word was, has been, and may be again, but also what it has become or even degenerated into in modern times, for instance positivism. It is this way of approaching ancient Greek philosophy that we wish to concentrate on in this book, in the hope that the volume will prove instructive both to people who have an interest in ancient Greek philosophy and wish to know more about the phenomenological approach to it and to people who work within phenomenology and wish to know more about the various approaches to ancient Greek philosophy characterizing the phenomenological movement. We have therefore sought to make the introduction and the individual chapters accessible to non-experts, for instance by transliterating all Greek text, and confining quotes in other languages than English to footnotes and glosses. (shrink)

Since the 1990s, political theorists studied the impact of digital media on the public sphere. These debates extensively employ Arendt’s theory of the public sphere to evaluate whether social media meets the expectations and criteria set forth in her account. This common approach rests on a methodological assumption that is itself not critically examined: it asserts that one should start with a clear understanding of what political action ‘truly’ is and only then attend to its potential relation with technology. However, (...) this article identifies two issues with this approach: it overlooks the complex interplay between technology and political action, and struggles to adapt Arendt’s pre-digital era theory to digital environments. Nonetheless, I argue that Arendt’s phenomenological methodology (i.e., how she develops her political theory) does offer an effective starting point to explore the changing relationship between politics and technology in the contemporary public sphere. This approach begins with an exploration of the technological conditions shaping political action rather than with a pre-established notion of political action. I demonstrate how this methodological blueprint can be expanded with a postphenomenological framework to bring Arendt’s political theory into the digital age, revealing how digital technologies continuously re-stabilize the intentional structure of political action. (shrink)

If the instance of human rights cannot ensure the protection of the rightless, as Arendt famously claimed, how can the rightless struggle for freedom and equality? In this essay, I attempt to answer this question by reconsidering Arendt’s influential critique of human rights in light of the two polar responses it evoked from contemporary French philosophers Jacques Rancière and Étienne Balibar. Rancière, who objects to Arendt’s delimiting of the political, finds her argument excluding and dangerous. Balibar, on the other hand, (...) believes that it conveys an immense potential for politics to come, as it points to the dialectical political truth of equaliberty. In the following, I show the problematics of Rancière’s ingenious formulation of rights, and the answer Balibar’s original interpretation of Arendt’s thought might suggest in response. I contend that working through Rancière’s critique of Arendt’s argument and Balibar’s affirmation of it not only highlights the merits of her critical account but also points to the fundamental relation between Arendt’s work on rights and her later discussions of the human condition of non-sovereignty and the power of promises. I believe that such a reading can contribute to our interpretation of Arendt, and pave new routes of action for non-citizens (such as refugees, stateless persons and subjects of military occupation), who cannot employ the authorities’ strength for their protection. (shrink)

Arendt’s reading of Kant’s aesthetics as political theory has proven contentious, as exegesis regarding the Critique of the Power of Judgment and still more as description of the concerns and norms of political action. Although Arendt’s politicisation of aesthetics is more fraught than she at times admits (but less reckless than some of her critics maintain while also more anarchic than some of her defenders acknowledge), I argue her insight into the republican promise of the model of non–conformist sociability that (...) Kant discerns among aesthetic judges is worth securing. Arendt appeals to Kant’s sensus communis, pure aesthetic judgement, impure aesthetic judgement and works of art in order to make sense of a mode of political sociability that avoids both atomisation and uniformity. For Arendt, the various ways political history and philosophy have conceived political bodies have been less adroit at preserving the openness of the political than Kant’s aesthetic community. (shrink)

Kimberlé Crenshaw arrived at her famous phrase “intersectionality” by carefully thinking through speeches and writings given to us by early Black feminists, such as like Sojourner Truth and Anna J. Cooper. In this paper, I expand on this groundbreaking work in two somewhat surprising ways. First, I bring the ideas of these early Black feminists together with important, related proposals from W.E.B. Du Bois, Karl Marx, Hannah Arendt, and Simone de Beauvoir. Second, I relate these works to central ideas in (...) Kant’s practical philosophy in an effort to develop a Kantian theory of intersectionality. In addition to grasping the distinctive, destructive directions of oppressive forces aimed at women, the poor, and minorities, I seek to understand better the new, violently destructive elements found in European modernity, as evidenced both in European colonialization as well as the Holocaust. (shrink)

This paper shows ways to develop, integrate, and transform Kant’s and Arendt’s theories on political evil into a unified Karendtian theory. Given the deep influence Kant had on Arendt’s thinking, the deep philosophical compatibility between their projects is not surprising. But the results of drawing on the resources left by both is exciting and groundbreaking with regard to both political evil in general and the challenges of modernity and totalitarianism in particular.

In this paper, we examine the political and educational relevance of Hannah Arendt’s account of friendship. Drawing from Arendt’s central works on friendship, we offer a novel interpretation of the concept by connecting the notion with the idea of educational ‘love for the world’, amor mundi. With this interpretation, we seek to demonstrate that the concept of friendship has both direct educational and indirect political significance. Thereby, we distinguish our interpretation from two previous understandings of the educational relevance of the (...) Arendtian notion of friendship—those by (1) Aaron Schutz and Marie G. Sandy, and (2) Morten T. Korsgaard—in which friendship is either assigned a specifically political role (as in (1)) or its significance to education is narrowly understood (as in (2)). We argue our interpretation of friendship offers both a new contribution to the understanding of the relationship between education and politics in the context of Arendt scholarship, and a novel way of thinking about the educational significance of friendship in the context of contemporary democratic politics, especially the prevailing political polarization. (shrink)

A recepção de Hannah Arendt ocorre principalmente no domínio da filosofia política, de modo a interpretá-la como uma teórica das crises do século XX. Contudo, essa perspectiva perde de vista os pressupostos e compromissos teóricos que a obra arendtiana assume com a tradição filosófica alemã, os quais permitem identificar problemas ainda não tratados em sua recepção. Assim, por meio de uma revisão bibliográfica, aliada à análise de ensaios teóricos da autora, esse artigo objetiva apontar uma lacuna na literatura arendtiana ao (...) verificar, de um lado, a presença de uma estrutura fenomenológica nos textos de Hannah Arendt e, por outro, conexões entre os seus temas e métodos e o problema da crise de identidade da filosofia. Dessa forma, ao evidenciar o tratamento deste problema na obra de Hannah Arendt, amplia-se sua recepção além do domínio da filosofia política. (shrink)

This book addresses a lacuna in scholarship concerning Hannah Arendt's Augustinian heritage that has predominantly focused on her early work. It de-canonises the sources that political theology has appealed to by shifting the interpretive focus to her mature treatment in The Life of the Mind. Arendt's initial criticism of Augustinian desiring is that it generates worldlessness. In her later works, Arendt develops a more nuanced reading of the movements of thinking, desiring, and loving in her engagement with Augustine. This study (...) attends to these movements and inspects the spatio-temporal framework which structure Arendt's conception of the political. The author assesses the claim that Arendt's conception of the political is drawn from a pedagogy of desiring and thinking from Augustine severed from his mystagogy. Although respecting the method of political theory, the author contends that Arendt's severing of Augustinian pedagogy from mystagogy brings her to an insurmountable aporia. Instead, the author embeds these pedagogical practices within Augustine's theology and suggests how that aporia might be overcome and used to develop a mystagogy for contemporary political life. The book will be of particular interest to scholars of political theology, as well as political theory, and political philosophy. (shrink)

A questão feminina não é um tema visado por Arendt. O paradoxo encontrado por algumas teóricas em relação ao fato desta reconhecer-se enquanto judia, mas não enquanto mulher, faz afastar a essência do pensamento político arendtiano do movimento filosófico do feminismo, acusando Arendt de ceder à hegemonia masculina. Este prisma perde muito ao não reconhecer como sua crítica da modernidade oferece uma base sólida para pensar a mulher contemporaneamente. Sobretudo, tolhe a saída mais digna: a que reconhece o humano. O (...) escrito, a partir da revisão bibliográfica de obras como Entre o Passado e o Futuro (ARENDT, 2016) e Feminism theory and Hannah Arendt’s concept of public space (BENHABIB, 1993a), propõe demonstrar como o sujeito arendtiano, na condição de original, capaz de ação e na imprevisibilidade, existe e age no ínterim do passado-futuro é o sustentáculo teórico dos principais quadros dessa última fase do feminismo. O ponto central é retomar a discussão sobre teorias que retiram do ser a capacidade de agir, reduzindo-os ao homogêneo, e fazer a crítica às teorias contemporâneas sobre as mulheres. A partir da pesquisa, foi possível levantar diversas pensadoras que, iluminadas pela teoria de Arendt, pensam horizontes femininos para uma nova política. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt plačiai žinoma kaip filosofė, kuri mėgino reabilituoti senovės graikų politikos sampratą. Remiantis Žmogaus būklės skaitymu, Arendt paprastai laikoma „graikofile“, jai prikišama „Atėnų nostalgija“. Sunku paneigti Arendt simpatijas graikams – ji iš tiesų atsigręžė į atėniečių politikos supratimą, bandydama jame iškristalizuoti kertinius autentiškos politikos elementus. Vis dėlto ši interpretacija yra pernelyg vienpusiška. Didžiausius nuopelnus politikos suvokimo srityje Arendt priskiria ne graikams, o romėnams. Pastarieji žymiai geriau sprendė politikos stabilumo, tęstinumo ir tvarumo problemą. Visą dėmesį sutelkiant į veiksmą, spontaniškumą ir (...) nepaprastus žygdarbius, kyla grėsmė destabilizuoti ir „išcentruoti“ politinės bend­rijos gyvenimą. Romėnai, įvesdami tokias sąvokas kaip tradicija, autoritetas, steigties (įkūrimo) šventumas, teisė (lex), taip pat pabrėždami politinę atleidimo ir pažado reikšmę, atveria graikams svetimą politinės sedimentacijos plotmę. Ši plotmė suteikia būtinus saugiklius, be kurių tvari politinė egzistencija yra neįmanoma. (shrink)

It is often claimed that social media accelerate political extremism by employing personalization algorithms that filter users into groups with homogenous beliefs. While an intuitive position, recent research has shown that social media users exhibit self-filtering tendencies. In this paper, I apply Hannah Arendt’s theory of political judgment to hypothesize a cause for self-filtering on social media. According to Arendt, a crucial step in political judgment is the imagination of a general standpoint of distinct yet equal perspectives, against which individuals (...) compare their own judgments in order to test their defensibility. I argue that social media inhibit this step by gamifying the pursuit of social status, which encourages users to consider the perspectives of others not for the sake of a general standpoint but for the sake of improving their social status, resulting in self-filtering. Consequently, ameliorating political extremism on social media requires not just reforming the algorithms that deliver content to users, but the interfaces on which users present their social identities. (shrink)

El texto es una traducción de la conferencia que Hannah Arendt dió en la Rand School of Social Science en 1962. Retoman importancia sus palabras en torno al argumento del analísis filosófico de la técnica y especialmente frente a producciones cinematográficas como Oppenheimer y nuevas tecnologías como la inteligencia artificial y los drones usados en la invasión a Ucrania.

Dana Villa’s Hannah Arendt: A Very Short Introduction offers the reader an introduction to Hannah Arendt’s thought in five concise chapters. As part of the broader Oxford University Press series of...

Parto de uma conceitualização geral de como o problema do mal fora abordado ao longo da tradição filosófica e religiosa, enquanto problema ontológico e relativo, no mais das vezes, a uma teodiceia que busca explicar a existência do mal no mundo. Em seguida, abordo uma nova forma de se pensar o problema do mal através do pensamento idealista de Immanuel Kant, que movimentou a problemática em uma direção outra àquela anterior, ou seja, afirmando que o mal não era um problema (...) localizado na realidade, mas no sujeito enquanto ser dotado de moralidade, residindo na dimensão mais radical da natureza humana. Em Arendt, o mal deixa o plano do sujeito singular e passa a ser compreendido enquanto um fenômeno político. Para a autora, o mal não deve ser um fenômeno político, todavia com a ascensão dos movimentos totalitários e outros fenômenos de ruptura com o fio da tradição, esse problema passa a ocupar a dimensão da vida pública. Desta forma, o objetivo da autora é tentar compreender as condições para se pensar o mal enquanto fenômeno político, assim como aquilo que lhe fundamenta e garante legitimidade. O fio condutor deste artigo são as obras Origens do Totalitarismo (ARENDT, 2018) e o conjunto de ensaios publicados no período de 1930-54 (ARENDT, 2008). O produto da presente análise refere-se à experiência humana da solidão enquanto fundamento do mal na esfera política. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt’s political thought is generally regarded as advocating nonviolence. Witnessing the rise of totalitarianism and its tragedy, she developed her political theory to recover the politica...

Neste artigo, pretendo analisar alguns pontos centrais que culminam no amadurecimento da reflexão de Arendt em relação ao pensamento de Marx e ao marxismo. Para tanto, será analisado a leitura de Arendt a partir dos excertos presentes em Karl Marx and the Tradition of Western Political Thought, escrito no início da década de 1950, texto que é uma espécie de complementação do The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) e fazia parte de um projeto pensado por Arendt de escrever um livro sobre (...) os “elementos totalitários do marxismo”. Visto que esse escrito nunca foi finalizado e o esse projeto foi abandonado, considero que a análise desse texto além de esclarecer muitos pontos importantes da crítica de Arendt a Marx e ao marxismo, pode nos servir também de ponte para o seu Magnum Opus The Human Condition (1958). A minha hipótese é de que, na visão de Arendt, a ruptura presente no pensamento de Marx em relação a tradição da filosofia política acontece com base em um tipo de linguagem que é resultado da própria tradição. Portanto, os resultados práticos do pensamento marxiano e dos marxismos seriam consequência da tradição do pensamento político ocidental quando convertido numa práxis radical. (shrink)

In the months after Donald Trump's election, Hannah Arendt's seminal work, The Origins of Totalitarianism crashed onto the Amazon bestseller lists. "Never has our future been more unpredictable," she had written in the preface to the first edition in 1951, "never have we depended so much on political forces that cannot be trusted to follow the rules of common sense and self-interest - forces that look like sheer insanity, if judged by the standards of other centuries." With an uncannily accurate (...) prescience, Arendt's dark history of her times seemed to be describing the insanity of our own. Arendt would've recognized the extremes of the twenty-first century from her own: the disenchantment with politics; the rise of conspiracy theories; self-censorship; powerlessness; tyranny and occupation, the climate catastrophe, the banality of evil. She had lived through it already. Born in the first decade of the last century, just before it lurched into war, she escaped Fascist Europe to make a new life for herself in America, where she became one its most influential-and controversial-public intellectuals. She wrote about power and terror, exile and love, and above all about freedom. Hannah Arendt wrote, and thought, in order to engage directly with the political chaos of her time. Questioning - thinking - was her first defence against tyranny. Her approach was to change the world by examining it unflinchingly, and not simply to criticise and protest. It is this defiance that attracts so many to her work today. (shrink)

O objetivo do presente artigo é mostrar a relevância das reflexões de Hannah Arendt sobre a possibilidade de encontrar uma fonte de autoridade na política que não se remeta a algo que esteja acima dessa esfera. Em um primeiro momento, buscaremos definir autoridade e sua importância. Em segundo momento, será investigada a tentativa de Arendt de localizar a fonte da autoridade na esfera imanente, com os exemplos das revoluções modernas francesa e americana. Por fim, será apontado a organização política espontânea (...) dos conselhos como uma tentativa de resolução da questão da autoridade, na medida em que busca conciliá-la com a igualdade. Para esse percurso serão analisadas obras de Arendt, sobretudo Entre o Passado e o Futuro, além de comentadores específicos. (shrink)

Using insights from two of the major proponents of the hermeneutical approach, Paul Ricoeur and Hannah Arendt—who both recognized the ethicopolitical importance of narrative and acknowledged some of the dangers associated with it—I will flesh out the worry that “narrativity” in political theory has been overly attentive to story telling and not heedful enough of story listening. More specifically, even if, as Ricoeur says, “narrative intelligence” is crucial for self-understanding, that does not mean, as he invites us to, that we (...) should always seek to develop a “narrative identity” or become, as he says, “the narrator of our own life story.” I offer that, perhaps inadvertently, such an injunction might turn out to be detrimental to the “art of listening.” This, however, must also be cultivated if we want to do justice to our narrative character and expect narrative to have the political role that both Ricoeur and Arendt envisaged. Thus, although there certainly is a “redemptive power” in narrative, when the latter is understood primarily as the act of narration or as the telling of stories, there is a danger to it as well. Such a danger, I think, intensifies at a time like ours, when, as some scholars have noted, “communicative abundance” or the “ceaseless production of redundancy” in traditional and social media has often led to the impoverishment of the public conversation. (shrink)