Authors
Stephen Kershnar
Fredonia State University
Robert M. Kelly
University at Buffalo
Abstract
If people have stringent moral rights, then the doctrine of double effect is false or unimportant, at least when it comes to making acts permissible or wrong. There are strong and weak versions of the doctrine of double effect. The strong version asserts that an act is morally right if and only if the agent does not intentionally infringe a moral norm and the act brings about a desirable result (perhaps the best state of affairs available to the agent or a promotion of the common good). The weak version asserts that, other things being equal, it is deontically worse to intentionally infringe a norm than to foreseeably do so. A person’s intention or mere foresight might still be relevant to his or her blameworthiness or virtue, but this is a separate issue.
Keywords Doctrine of Double Effect  Norm  The Right  Rights  Intention  Foresight  Warren Quinn  Judith Jarvis Thomson  war  killing
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DOI 10.5840/ijap2021331150
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References found in this work BETA

Culpability and Ignorance.Gideon Rosen - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (1):61-84.
Toward a Consistent Natural-Law Ethics of Killing.G. G. Grisez - 1970 - American Journal of Jurisprudence 15 (1):64-96.

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