African Political Philosophy

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the question, ‘What do we owe each other as members of a global community during a global health crisis?’ In tandem, it has raised underlying concerns about how we should prepare for the next infectious disease outbreak and what we owe to people in other countries during normal times. While the prevailing bioethics literature addresses these questions drawing on values and concepts prominent in the global north, this paper articulates responses prominent in sub-Saharan Africa. The (...) paper first introduces a figurative ‘global health village’ to orient readers to African traditional thought. Next, it considers ethical requirements for governing a global health village, drawing on the ethic of ubuntu to formulate African renderings of solidarity, relational justice and sufficiency. The final section of the paper uses these values to critique current approaches, including COVAX, the vaccines pillar of the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) accelerator, and a proposed international Pandemic Treaty. It proposes a path forward that better realizes ubuntu in global health. (shrink)

When it comes to how to hold people responsible for wrongdoing, much of the African philosophical tradition focuses on reconciliation as a principal final aim. This essay expounds an interpretation of reconciliation meant to have broad appeal, and then draws out its implications for responsibility in respect to three matters. First, when it comes to criminal justice, it shows that prizing reconciliation entails that offenders should be held responsible to “clean up their own mess,” i.e., to compensate victims and reform (...) their characters in ways they find burdensome, an approach to punishment that differs from the deterrence and desert theories of punishment prominent in the West. Second, regarding civil justice, the chapter argues that reconciliation means that holding responsible for wrongful harm involves compensating victims in ways expected to improve their quality of life, which contrasts with the default position in the West of producing a state of affairs that would have occurred in the absence of the wrong. Third, in the contexts of both criminal and civil justice, the value of reconciliation can mean putting on trial more than just the offender, for instance those who had been able to influence his behavior and been allied with him, e.g., family members. On all three matters, the chapter provides reasons to take the African approaches seriously that will be found prima facie attractive by those from non-African backgrounds, supporting the idea that reconciliation is at least one final aim when holding people responsible for wrongdoing. (shrink)

I critically discuss respects in which conceptions of community have featured in African moral-political philosophy over the past 40 years or so. Some of the discussion is in the vein of intellectual history, recounting key theoretical moves for those unfamiliar with the field. However, my discussion is also opinionated, noting prima facie weaknesses with certain positions and presenting others as more promising, particularly relative to prominent Western competitors. There are a variety of forms that African communitarianism has taken and could (...) take in respect of moral status, good character, and just policy, and my aims include arguing that some are more plausible than others and should give more individualist thinkers in Euro-American traditions pause. (shrink)

The core idea of A Relational Theory of Justice is that normative political and legal philosophy should be grounded on people’s relational features, in particular their ability to commune with others and be communed with by them. Usually, philosophers of justice in the West have based their views on people’s intrinsic features, ones that make no essential reference to others, such as their autonomy, self-ownership, or well-being. In addition, often critics of basing politics and law on justice, whether in the (...) African, feminist/care, Marxian, or Confucian traditions, have appealed to non-intrinsic values as leverage, roughly contending that relationships are more important than justice. In contrast to both major camps, this book articulates and defends accounts of justice based on the dignity of people’s relational nature. A proper valuation of people’s capacity to be party to communal relationships does not transcend categories of justice, but instead calls for certain sorts that differ in plausible ways from those grounded on intrinsic properties. Applications are discussed in the contexts of political, economic, compensatory, criminal, transitional, and global justice. (shrink)

French translation of 'What Africa Can Contribute to the World', a commissioned chapter for UNESCO'S General History of Africa project.

This chapter demonstrates that the African philosophical tradition offers four interesting ways to broaden global thought about human rights, where all four involve an appeal to the value of community in some way. Firstly, some African philosophers are skeptical about the normative category of human, i.e., individual rights, with some appealing to communal considerations to deny they exist at all and others doing so to argue that they should not play a central role in moral-political thought. Secondly, there is the (...) view, enshrined in the African (“Banjul”) Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights for more than 40 years, that there are group rights and not merely rights of individuals. Thirdly, some thinkers in the African tradition have held that we have dignity because of relational features such as our ability to enter into community with others, contrasting with more globally familiar features such as our autonomy, rationality, or life. Fourthly, many African political philosophers hold that there is a human right to have a voice in any major political decision, a kind of democracy that would forge community among all by forbidding rule by a majority. The chapter argues that the grounds for skepticism about human rights are weak and instead that a communitarian foundation of human rights and its implications for group rights and democratic rights should be taken seriously by a global audience. (shrink)

Reprint of an article first appearing in Philosophical Papers (2017).

I draw on resources from the African moral-philosophical tradition to construct a new theory of human rights that presents a challenge to the globally dominant autonomy-based approach. Whereas the latter conceives of human rights violations as degradations of our rational nature, the former does so in terms of degradation of our relational nature, specifically, our capacity to be party to harmonious or friendly relationships. I argue that understanding human rights violations as roughly behavior that treats innocent parties in an extremely (...) discordant or unfriendly way does a good job of accounting for many widely shared intuitions about human rights. In addition, I argue that the African theory sometimes does a better job than a broadly Kantian understanding of human rights, for instance when it comes to those not to be tortured or raped. It is not merely considerations of a suppressed will, the absence of consent, and the restriction of liberty that explain why there are strong rights not to be treated in these ways. In addition, relevant is the reduced quality of life, and particularly the retarded ability to relate to others, that characteristically comes in the wake of such treatment, a claim that naturally follows from the African approach of conceiving of human rights violations as instances of enmity. (shrink)

Shortened and mildly revised reprint of an article first appearing in Ethical Perspectives (2020).

A summary of my relational approach to a variety of questions in economic justice, including what to distribute, how much wealth each should have, with the point of a firm is, how to punish in the workplace, and others.

Invited critical discussion of recent work from the African tradition on the topic of political power and perhaps some closely related topics.

Scholars have compared the transitional justice processes of Colombia and South Africa in some respects, but there has yet to be a systematic moral-philosophical evaluation of them regarding how they have sought to allocate economic goods. Here I appraise the ways that South Africa and Colombia have responded to their respective historical conflicts in respect of the distribution of property and opportunities. I do so in the light of a conception of reconciliation informed by a relational ethic of harmony, a (...) value salient in the worldviews of many indigenous peoples in both Africa and South America. I argue that, given such an account of reconciliation, one of Colombia’s major proposed ways of allocating property and opportunities, whereby offenders would labour for the sake of improving victims’ socio-economic conditions, would be much better than what South Africa has done, even if Colombia has yet to put such a policy systematically into practice. (shrink)

In contributions elsewhere to this volume, we considered the histories of Colombia and South Africa and how some of the values indigenous to those locales might plausibly bear on transitional justice in them. We advanced broadly relational and constructive (non-retributive) approaches to the social conflicts that had taken place there, ones that make victim compensation central. In this chapter we consider how Metz’s ubuntu-based reconciliatory approach to reparations might be relevant to Colombia in ways he did not consider, after which (...) we reflect on how the kinds of communitarian practices advanced by Bautista might apply to South Africa. We conclude that these cross-applications are revealing, pointing out how economic compensation in Colombia should plausibly be influenced by cultural factors, and how considerations of culture in South Africa call for compensation beyond economic factors. (shrink)

A collection of several articles on African moral and political philosophy by Thaddeus Metz, translated into French by Emmanuel Fopa, and edited and introduced by Pius Mosima of the University of Bamenda, Cameroon.

This collection contributes to the understanding of the idea of development from Africa-based perspectives. African(ist) thinkers investigate the notion of beauty as a source for alternative approaches to pressing global issues such as poverty, inequality, and climate change.

Shortened version of an article that first appeared in Philosophical Papers (2017).

Harmony as a basic value is neglected in internationally influential philosophical discussions about rights, power, and other facets of public policy; it is not prominent in articles that appear in widely read journals or in books published by presses with a global reach. Of particular interest, political philosophers and policy makers remain ignorant of the similarities and differences between various harmony-oriented approaches to institutional choice from around the world. In this chapter, I begin to rectify these deficiencies by critically discussing (...) the way harmony has figured into political philosophies from three major traditions in the Global South, namely, African ubuntu, East Asian Confucianism, and South American buen vivir. I point out that, although harmony is at the core of all three political philosophies, it is conceived in different ways, entailing incompatible prescriptions about things such as who should make laws and which sorts of beings have rights against the state. Such contrasting views call for rigorous cross-cultural dialogue amongst theorists of harmony, beyond mounting challenges to more individualist approaches that have been salient in modern Western political thought. (shrink)

The first case of COVID-19 infection in Africa was recorded in Egypt on 14 February 2020. Following this, several projections of the possible devastating effect that the virus can have on the population of African countries were made in the Western media. This paper presents evidence for Africa’s successful responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and under-reporting or misrepresentation of these successes in Western media. It proceeds to argue for accounting for these successes in terms of Africa’s communitarian way of life (...) and conceptions of self, duty, and rights; and that a particular orientation in theorizing on global justice can highlight the injustices inherent in the misrepresentation of these successes and contribute shared perspectives to formulating a framework of values and concepts that would facilitate the implementation of global policy goals for justice. The paper is thus grounded in a rejection of the insular tenets of theorizing prevalent in the global justice debate and to persistent inclinations in Western scholarship to the thinking that theorizing in the African context that draws inspiration from the cultural past has little to contribute to the quest for justice globally. On the contrary, it argues that reflexive critique of cultural history is a necessary source of normative ideals that can foster tolerant coexistence and a cooperative endeavour toward shared conceptions of justice in the contemporary world. (shrink)

The Philosophical Forum, Volume 53, Issue 1, Page 31-45, Spring 2022.

The scholarship and legal products of the Global South, argued Daniel Bonilla Maldonado,1 occupy ‘a low level’. Their constitutions and attendant jurisprudential theories were seen as mere transpla...

The scholarship and legal products of the Global South, argued Daniel Bonilla Maldonado,1 occupy ‘a low level’. Their constitutions and attendant jurisprudential theories were seen as mere transpla...

Philosophy Compass, Volume 17, Issue 3, March 2022.

Utilizaremos o conceito de sociedade sem mediações, calcada no racismo estrutural, tal como proposto por Frantz Fanon, para explicar a tendência regressiva própria às sociedades de modernização periférica, mormente o Brasil. A partir de uma crítica a Gilberto Freyre e a Florestan Fernandes, os quais assumem uma noção de objetivismo sociológico necessitarista com caráter apolítico-despolitizado para explicar o desenvolvimento e as contradições da sociedade brasileira hodierna (o sadismo-masoquismo de Freyre; a incapacidade negra para a ética protestante do trabalho, por causa (...) do escravismo), recusando, ambos, seja o racismo estrutural, seja o branqueamento racial, apontaremos exatamente para (a) a evolução sistêmica como um projeto político intencionado e planificado do branco/colonizador sobre o negro/colonizado enquanto o efetivo mote e dinâmica práticos da formação e do desenvolvimento da sociedade colonial; (b) a inexistência ou a fragilidade das mediações jurídicas, institucionais e normativas entre essas realidades compartimentadas e estanques da raça (branco sobre o – e contra o – negro); (c) a violência direta e a regressão permanente como as tendências estruturais da constituição e do desenvolvimento de uma sociedade de modernização periférica e racializada, inclusive com o apagamento e a falsificação da história colonial; e, finalmente, (d) a correlação intrínseca, mais uma vez negada por Freyre e Fernandes e, ao contrário, afirmada por Fanon, de raça e classe, raça como classe, classe como raça. (shrink)

Resumo: O objetivo deste estudo é analisar a noção do Ubuntu como contribuição para pensar a democracia, especialmente a crise que esta enfrenta, no Brasil, da atual realidade histórica de intolerância, discriminação racial, exclusão social e desumanização. Para isso, levanta-se a seguinte questão: pode a África contribuir para o pensamento da democracia, pela sua filosofia de vida expressa em Ubuntu? A primeira parte do texto analisa o conceito de Ubuntu, destacando seu caráter filosófico. A segunda parte desenvolve duas características estruturais (...) do Ubuntu: a comunidade e a tolerância. A metodologia de pesquisa se caracteriza como um trabalho bibliográfico, cujo aporte é a análise filosófica da expressão Ubuntu, fundamentada no modo de vida africano, a partir das obras de Ramose: African Philosophy Through Ubuntu ; de Gyekye: Person and Community in African Thought. Entende-se que compreender Ubuntu como um modo de vida africano, baseado na interdependência, interconstituição, interconexão e inter-humanização é cooperar para pensar a democracia como modo de vida ético, social e político, o qual reconhece e considera o outro como sujeito de diferenças que possibilitam a humanização.: This study aims at analysing the notion of Ubuntu as a contribution to think about democracy, especially the crisis it faces in Brazil, before the current historical reality of intolerance, racial discrimination, social exclusion, and dehumanization. For this reason, we raise the following question: can Africa contribute to think about democracy through her life’s philosophy expressed in Ubuntu? The first part of the text analyses the concept of Ubuntu, highlighting its philosophical character. The second part develops two structural characteristics of Ubuntu: community and tolerance. The research methodology is characterised as a bibliographical work, whose contribution is a philosophical analysis of the expression Ubuntu, based on the African way of life, from the works of Ramose: African Philosophy Through Ubuntu ; of Gyekye: Person and community in African thought. We defend that understanding Ubuntu as an African way of life, based on interdependence, inter-constitution, interconnection and inter-humanisation is to contribute to think about democracy as an ethical, social and political way of life that recognises and considers the other as individual of differences that make humanisation possible. (shrink)

The ongoing debate on how best to regulate international commercial surrogacy defies consensus, as the most cogent normative and jurisprudential grounds for and against non-altruistic surrogacy remain controversial. This paper contributes to the debate by focusing on social justice issues arising from transnational, moneymaking surrogacy, with a focus on the Global South. It argues that existing theoretical perspectives on balancing interests, rights, privileges, and resources in the context of cross-border surrogacy—such as cosmopolitanism, communitarianism, liberal feminism, radical feminism, and neorealism—are not (...) sufficient to treat the question of justice underpinning transnational surrogacy in the Global South. An Afro-communal theory of social justice is proposed as an alternative model for addressing the shortcomings in existing global justice theories. Building on Thaddeus Metz’s construction of Afro-communal social theory and a bioethic of communion, this article reveals the fundamental nature of injustices in the Global South surrogacy foray. This approach provides prima facie grounds for making commercial surrogacy more just in the evolving global order. (shrink)

International Indigenous rights coalitions increasingly involve Indigenous and non-Indigenous civil society organizations with diverse backgrounds and interests. As these organizations more frequently interact and partner with one another, what issues are being emphasized in their advocacy efforts? This study utilizes content analysis of 60 Indigenous rights organizations’ websites, as well as interviews of several leaders and staff, to explore whether African Indigenous organizations emphasize different aspects of Indigenous rights in their messaging and advocacy than their other Indigenous and non-Indigenous coalition (...) partners, We find that African Indigenous CSOs discuss issues of unequal treatment more frequently, and issues of self-determination and assimilation less frequently, than their coalition partners. The messaging of Indigenous organizations outside of Africa contained similar themes as that of non-Indigenous CSOs. This raises questions regarding why these messages differ: do African Indigenous groups have distinct concerns and/or are there other reasons for the variance in messaging across international Indigenous rights coalitions. (shrink)

Dialogue on African Philosophy and Development: Proceedings of the 2022 International Conference of the Association for the Promotion of African Studies.

Concerns related to the future of work has precipitated various studies aimed at ensuring that the labour market is a place where people can earn a living, work in dignity, and flourish as human beings. Studies on labour market inequalities and how macroeconomic policies can be used to address such inequalities are also plentiful. What macroeconomic studies have often failed to do, however, is highlight the differences _between_ individuals in the labour market. This is important, especially in an economy with (...) large inequalities, such as South Africa. These inequalities are further entrenched given that wage employment is the primary mode of income generation for the majority of households in South Africa. The purpose of this study was to investigate changes in quality of work at the microeconomic level in relation to changes in the macroeconomy, using a decent work index built from secondary labour force survey data. The data show that changes in the macroeconomic policy environment coincide with differential outcomes for different groups of workers in the labour market, with women benefitting in terms of quality of work during times in which the government undertakes an expansionary fiscal approach, although only in occupation groups which are male-dominated. The study also finds, however, that in some occupation groups, quality of work does not change in relation to shifts in the macroeconomy. The study highlights the need for microeconomic analyses to inform macroeconomic policies to ensure that expected outcomes are distributed in the intended way. (shrink)

Shortened and mildly revised version of an essay that initially appeared in Murove (ed.) African Ethics (2009). This chapter is a work of applied ethics that aims to provide a convincing comprehensive account of how a government official in a post-independence sub-Saharan country should make decisions about how to allocate goods such as civil service jobs and contracts with private firms. Should such a person refrain from considering any particulars about potential recipients, or might it be appropriate to consider, for (...) example, family membership, party affiliation, race, or revolutionary stature as reasons to benefit certain individuals at some cost to the public? Which of these factors should be considered an unjust or corrupt basis on which to allocate state goods and which should not? Drawing on an African ethic, this chapter answers these questions with what it calls a “moderate partialism,” according to which a government agent may rightly favor at some cost to the public veterans and victims of state injustices, but not those in her family or party. This chapter seeks to provide a new, unified explanation of why characteristically sub-Saharan values permit some forms of partiality, such as the preferential hiring of those who suffered from or struggled against colonialism, but forbid other, nepotist or prebendalist forms of partiality. (shrink)

I propose a theory of punishment that is unfamiliar in the West, according to which the state normally ought to have offenders reform their characters and compensate their victims in ways the offenders find burdensome, thereby disavowing the crime and tending to foster improved relationships between offenders, their victims, and the broader society. I begin by indicating how this theory draws on under-appreciated ideas about reconciliation from the Global South, and especially sub-Saharan Africa, and is distinct from the protection and (...) retribution theories that have dominated the Western philosophy of punishment for about 250 years. Then I argue that it neatly avoids objections to them and is prima facie plausible in its own right. I conclude that this reconciliation theory of state punishment should be taken seriously by philosophers of law and policy makers. (shrink)

The former South African first black President’s vision aimed to unite and fight racial tensions and inequalities by introducing and envisioning a South Africa for all who live in it. However, twenty-five years later, the post-apartheid South Africa is riddled with cancerous ills such as racial inequality, racism, and failure to bridge the gap between the poor and the rich. This paper will attest to the notion that the 1994 rainbow nation ideology is dead because racial inequality is still a (...) norm, and that the implication of the negotiated settlement has preserved racial inequality and its core racist foundations. The ideology of the “rainbow nation” has failed to erode racial inequality in South Africa. It has failed to close the gap between the poor and the rich and most importantly, the “rainbow nation” ideology has shown that it was a one-sided concord dependent on whose privilege matters most and not a collective view to addressing racial inequality. Black South Africans have, therefore, continued to bear the brunt of poverty, unemployment and inequality compared to white South fricans. I argue that the “rainbow nation” has failed to address racial inequality and build the imperative ideology of sameness and togetherness. I will employ a standard method of applied analytical philosophy to perform this task, which is grounded in critical conceptual analysis and systematic rational argumentation. (shrink)

I contend that if theories of justice are often constructed from a specific understanding of the nature of humans, then Ubuntu can serve as a base for a normative theory of justice from an African context. The underlying claim here is that Ubuntu encapsulates a prevalent view in the intellectual heritage of Africa about the nature of human beings. I buttress this position by following the research imperative of conversational philosophy which posits that critical and creative engagement with extant perspectives (...) is a necessary prelude that makes the articulation of a more profound proposal possible. My focus is mainly on the approach to Ubuntu as a theory of personhood−an Africa-inspired philosophical anthropology. One basic objection that one faces in this approach is the view that Ubuntu is an exclusivist theory of personhood. And if Ubuntu is inherently and irredeemably exclusivne, then it cannot be a plausible base for a theory of justice in a diverse society inhabited by those it excludes. Contrary to this, my conversational engagement with some of the prominent works on the nature of Ubuntu suggests that Ubuntu is inherently an inclusive theory of personhood. The said exclusivist sense of Ubuntu is a distortion that often emerges from attempts to arrive at a fixed definition of Ubuntu that is absolute, complete and eternal independent of its social and historical affinities. (shrink)

There has been a strong impetus to set the definitional parameters of study in African political philosophy and theory. Many scholars advance the idea of a discipline intended to provide lessons that stem from “original” African moral, ideological, and political traditions. Often, these traditions and their ideas are presented as holding categorical moral substance in so far as they are seen to be specific to a culturally essentialist understanding of “Africa.” In turn, an influential part of the literature estimates the (...) normative value of the intellectual ideas and arguments afforded by a varied historical, socio-cultural and economic African geography by the degree to which, in being tethered to a seemingly homogenous, “culturally African” influence, these ideas can be opposed to a “Western” equivalent. In this article, I argue that the effects on the discipline of attending to, and being defined by, this cultural essentialism are at best unclear, at worst detrimental. I aim to contribute to the side of those who advocate a universalist perspective to the study of African political philosophy and thought, and who argue for jettisoning an unhelpful dichotomy between “West” and “African,” in favour of a methodological, conceptual and historical specificity that allows the discipline to be truly useful to itself and to others. (shrink)