Lactase persistence/persistent (LP), the ability to express the lactase enzyme in adults, is one of the most strongly selected phenotypes in humans. It is encoded by at least five genetic variants that have rapidly become widespread in various human populations. The underlying selective mechanism is not clear however, because dairy products in general are well tolerated in adults, even by lactase non‐persistence/persistent (LNP) individuals. Cultural adaptations to milk consumption, notably fermentation and transformation, which can provide most of the energy (protein, (...) fat) to both LP and LNP individuals without any associated cost seem to have been common in ancient societies. Here, we propose that selection for LP occurred through increased glucose/galactose (energy) from fresh milk intake in early childhood, a crucial period for growth. At the age of weaning indeed, lactase activity has already begun to decline in LNP individuals so the gain in energy from fresh milk by LP children represents a major fitness increase. (shrink)

Les oeuvres de l'annee 1797 sont loin de porter la marque du vieillissement intellectuel de Kant; elles proposent meme une ouverture pathetique sur l'horizon ultime de la philosophie transcendantale et attestent de la sorte leur remarquable continuite avec les trois grandes Critiques qui lui ont precedees. Ciselant une conception de la sagesse dont la richesse apporte a l'idee de l'homme un eclairage eblouissant, Kant entend bien, en 1797, parachever le systeme emanant de la raison auquel il songe depuis trente annees (...) et, pour ce faire, il s'attache tout particulierement a montrer comment la liberte, la vertu et la dignite font l'honneur de l'homme. (shrink)

L'idee de paix perpetuelle, utopie pour les uns, objet d'une esperance fondee pour les autres, ne saurait laisser indifferent. L'annee 1995 qui marquait le 250eme anniversaire de la parution de l'opuscule de Kant Vers la paix perpetuelle a suscite de nombreux travaux qui en ont montre l'importance et le role a l'interieur du systeme critique lui-meme et dans l'elaboration d'une charte universelle de la paix. Ce volume rassemble une serie d'etudes qui montrent les metamorphoses de l'idee de paix de la (...) fin du XVIIe siecle a la Revolution francaise et presente un certain nombre d'ecrits jusqu'ici inedits, ou peu accessible dans leur ensemble en langue francaise. Ainsi figurent des textes de Pierre Nicole, William Penn, Castel de Saint-Pierre, Voltaire, Fichte, Friedrich Schlegel ainsi que des articles de journaux francais de l'epoque parus en 1796 en echo a l'ouvrage de Kant. Une importante bibliographie acheve l'ouvrage. (shrink)

Introduction -- Cosmopolitanism -- Collective self-defense -- Subsistence wars -- Humanitarian intervention -- Commodified wars -- Asymmetrical wars -- Conclusion.

This paper argues that, if one thinks that the needy have a right to the material resources they need in order to lead decent lives, one must be committed, in some cases, to conferring on the sick a right that the healthy give them some of the body parts they need to lead such a life. I then assess two objections against that view, to wit: to confer on the sick a right to the live body parts of the healthy (...) violates the bodily integrity of the latter; and constitutes too much of an interference in their life. I conclude that although the sick sometimes have a right to some of the body parts of the healthy, the latter still retain a considerable degree of autonomy. (shrink)

Si l'invention du sens moderne du mot Etat est due a Machiavel, c'est au XVIIIe siecle que, apres la paix d'Utrecht, l'institution etatique prit franchement le visage de la modernite. Faisant suite a l'Etat baroque (1610-1652) et a l'Etat classique (1652-1715), l'Etat moderne (1715-1848) donna corps aux espoirs de paix, de justice, de bonheur et de liberte secretes par la philosophie des lumieres. Il realisa les grandes mutations juridiques qui devaient contribuer a forger l'epure de l'Idee republicaine a laquelle la (...) Revolution de France donna sa premiere forme historique. Cet ouvrage s'est voulu pluridisciplinaire. En rassemblant des contributions dont la tonalite est historique, juridique, litteraire, philosophique ou politologique, il a pour objectif d'apporter sur la periode fascinante de l'histoire occidentale ou s'est affirme l'Etat moderne, des eclairages diversifies complementaires. (shrink)

The literature on reparative justice focuses for the most part on the grounds and limits of wrongdoers' duties to their victims. An interesting but relatively neglected question is that of what - if anything - victims owe to wrongdoers. In this paper, I argue that victims are under a duty to accept wrongdoers' apologies. To accept an apology is to form the belief that the wrongdoer's apologetic utterance or gesture has the requisite verdictive, commissive and expressive dimensions; to communicate as (...) much to him; and to recognise that his apology changes one's normative status in relation to him, and to comport oneself accordingly. I then offer a Kantian argument for the duty to accept and qualify that argument in the light of some hard cases. I end the paper by addressing the objection that victims do not owe it to wrongdoers to engage in any form of reparative encounter. (shrink)

Suppose that state A attacks state D without warrant. The ensuing military conflict threatens international peace and security. State D (I assume) has a justification for defending itself by means of military force. But do third parties have a justification for intervening in that conflict by such means? To international public lawyers, the well-rehearsed and obvious answer is ‘yes’: threats to international peace and security provide one of two exceptions to the legal and moral prohibition (as set out in article (...) 2(4) of the UN Charter) on using force as a means for resolving interstate disputes. Just war theorists are not as verdictive. Compared to the ethics of humanitarian intervention and the ethics of national self-defense, the ethics of third-party military involvement in interstate conflicts remains strikingly under-developed in contemporary just war theory. This paper makes a start at filling the gap. It argues that to defend such interventions is tantamount to defending preventive military force, deterrent military force, and the resort to force in more cases than standardly thought. It then provides an account and limited defence of the deterrence argument. It shows that deterrence is morally justified in relatively few cases, and examines two problems with the argument: the problems raised by deterrence failures, and the problems raised by the level of uncertainty under which leaders who use deterrent force operate. It ends by concluding that we should take seriously the possibility that non-intervention, construed as the rejection of the direct use of military force, is the morally correct response to the most serious threats to international peace and security. (shrink)

On n'a jamais fini de lire une œuvre qui s'offre selon des points de vue, des perspectives, des niveaux et des résonances multiples. C'est pourquoi lire Rousseau exige que l'on pense avec lui et que l'on retrouve le rythme rarement calme d'une méditation qui, coïncidant avec sa vie, s'élève vers les plus hautes réquisitions critiques de la raison et, tout ensemble, se trouve rongée par un tourment métaphysique. Ce livre montre que si Rousseau, pour qui " tout tient radicalement à (...) la politique ", n'a cessé de disputer à Hobbes l'honneur d'avoir, ne premier, frayé le chemin de la " science politique ", c'est en philosophe - en philosophe profond - qu'il a ouvert cette voie. En effet, sa philosophie politique, qui est d'abord une réflexion sur les " institutions politiques " propres à l'Etat du contrat, se hausse, par une intuition critique encore innomée, jusqu'à l'horizon transcendantal où elle découvre l'idéalité pure de la normativité politique. Mais, dans l'élan d'une pensée réflexive que même les " extravagances " de ses rêveries n'ont pas arrêté, Rousseau, miné par l'angoisse d'exister, cisèle aussi une politique philosophique qui renvoie au mystère ontologique de l'homme condamné à l'errance que lui inflige son historicité. Dès lors, parce que l'ambivalence et les contradictions de la réalité socio-politique taraudent la pensée de Rousseau, celle-ci, déchirée, ne trouve sa cohésion et n'atteint son unité de sens que dans une médiation douloureuse sur l'homme écartelé, incapable d'assumer sa destination dans sa destinée. Jusqu'en ses promenades solitaires, le " subtil Diogène " a, tel un Sphinx, forgé l'énigme de l'homme en ses traits métaphysiques les plus profonds. (shrink)

Dès l'aurore de la pensée, la recherche des raisons du droit a constitué une voie royale pour la philosophie juridique. Sur cette voie précisément, la raison s'est soumise à son auto-examen afin d'apurer sa propre démarche. La philosophie de Kant a, dans ce registre, donné ses lettres de créance à une critique de la raison juridique dont, malgré des divergences d'interprétation et des pluralismes parfois déroutants, l'héritage est, aujourd'hui encore, riche et vivace. Les chemins du criticisme juridique sont d'autant plus (...) escarpés qu'il existe des âges de la rationalité critique et que le philosophe, en s'engageant sur cet itinéraire, se lance dans une quête réflexive qui demeurera toujours inachevée. Il serait en effet présomptueux de croire que, même avec les nuances et les variances apportées par les philosophies contemporaines de l'argumentation et de la discussion, la philosophie critique de la raison juridique conduit à la fondation ultime et définitive des ordres de droit. On peut néanmoins reconnaître qu'elle jalonne la route au bout de laquelle brille, tel un phare, l'a priori transcendantal auquel s'accrochent le sens et la validité du droit. Dans la perspective que dessine la réflexion critique, la juridicité du droit se révèle donc comme le lieu d'excellence de l'Idéal régulateur de la raison. Il apparaît ainsi que, malgré les périls et les drames qui taraudent notre monde, le droit peut encore, dans le champ pratique où réside l'honneur de l'homme, accorder une place à l'espérance. (shrink)

Quels peuvent être les enjeux contemporains d'une philosophie des valeurs dans le contexte éducatif? Quelles sont les valeurs éducatives convoquées dans les discours sur l'éducation aujourd'hui? Sur quels modes le sont-elles? Trois grandes parties structurent cet ouvrage : Philosophie de la valeur, Repenser les valeurs et Focus sur quelques valeurs. [Source : 4e de couv.].

La question du droit naturel a, depuis vingt-cinq siecles, traverse l'histoire de la philosophie du droit en Occident. Cet ouvrage entend montrer que, malgre sa perennite, ce concept qui, pourtant, a resiste a tous les assauts que lui ont livres les positivismes scientifiques, est greve d'une lourde indecision philosophique: qu'il s'agisse d'en determiner le lieu d'ancrage, de preciser les rapports qu'entretiennent avec lui les divers systemes du droit positif ou de suivre les metamorphoses, plus ou moins pertinentes, qui ont affecte (...) la maniere de le penser, le droit naturel s'entoure d'une problematicite radicale qui fait naitre des polemiques et des malentendus. Dans ce climat de conflictualite remanente, son idee se profile neanmoins come une exigence transcendantale qui donne sens et valeur aux ordres du droit positif - ce qui explique que, si souvent decretee de mort, elle connaisse une perpetuelle resurrection. (shrink)

Given the fact that the history of our brain is a long history of interfaces, connections and exchanges, this text aims to reveal the collective nature of the process involved by and within learning. In fact, the person who learns can only cross-learn: irrespective of the field of learning, he learns across, between and beyond.2 The cross-disciplinary approach suggested in the present study focuses on learning a foreign language.

The feminist philosopher and social scientist shows how "gendering" has affected the social and natural sciences as she reconciles the long-standing dichotomy between the quantitative and qualitative methods and demonstrates the tandem use of both experimental and intuitive approaches.

This article focuses on the ethical implications of so-called ‘collateral damage’. It develops a moral typology of collateral harm to innocents, which occurs as a side effect of military or quasi-military action. Distinguishing between accidental and incidental collateral damage, it introduces four categories of such damage: negligent, oblivious, knowing and reckless collateral damage. Objecting mainstream versions of the doctrine of double effect, the article argues that in order for any collateral damage to be morally permissible, violent agents must comply with (...) high standards of care. In order for incidental harm to be permissible, an agent must take pains to avoid such harm even at higher cost to him- or herself. It is argued that accidentally but negligently caused collateral damage may be just as difficult to excuse as incidental harm. Only if high precautionary standards of care are met, can unintended harm to innocents – incidental or accidental – be permissible. In practice, such a strong commitment to avoiding harm to civilians may well lead us to question more generally and rethink more radically how violent conflicts ought to be fought, how military violence ought to be used and whether there are better ways of achieving those aims that we think are legitimate than those we are currently using. (shrink)

A fallibilist theory of knowledge is employed to make sense of the idea that agents know what they are doing 'without observation' (as on Anscombe's theory of practical knowledge).

WINNER BEST SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY BOOK IN 2021 / NASSP BOOK AWARD 2022 -/- Together we can often achieve things that are impossible to do on our own. We can prevent something bad from happening or we can produce something good, even if none of us could do it by herself. But when are we morally required to do something of moral importance together with others? This book develops an original theory of collective moral obligations. These are obligations that individual moral (...) agents hold jointly, but not as unified collective agents. To think of some of our obligations as joint or collective is the best way of making sense of our intuitions regarding collective moral action problems. Where we have reason to believe that our efforts are most efficient as part of a collective endeavor we may incur collective obligations together with others who are similarly placed as long as we are able to establish compossible individual contributory strategies towards that goal. The book concludes with a discussion of “massively shared obligations” to large-scale moral problems such as global poverty. (shrink)

The standard view of ignorance is that it consists in the mere lack of knowledge or true belief. Duncan Pritchard has recently argued, against the standard view, that ignorance is the lack of knowledge/true belief that is due to an improper inquiry. I shall call, Pritchard’s alternative account the Normative Account. The purpose of this article is to strengthen the Normative Account by providing an independent vargument supporting it.

COVID-19 vaccine refusal seems like a paradigm case of irrationality. Vaccines are supposed to be the best way to get us out of the COVID-19 pandemic. And yet many people believe that they should not be vaccinated even though they are dissatisfied with the current situation. In this paper, we analyze COVID-19 vaccine refusal with the tools of contemporary philosophical theories of responsibility and rationality. The main outcome of this analysis is that many vaccine-refusers are responsible for the belief that (...) they should not be vaccinated and epistemically rational in holding it. This is an important result because it provides insights into the legitimacy of certain public health policies. In particular, this result shows that a public health policy that would abandon the project of convincing certain vaccine-refusers with reasons – e.g., by simply making vaccination compulsory – is prima facie illegitimate. (shrink)

Together we can achieve things that we could never do on our own. In fact, there are sheer endless opportunities for producing morally desirable outcomes together with others. Unsurprisingly, scholars have been finding the idea of collective moral obligations intriguing. Yet, there is little agreement among scholars on the nature of such obligations and on the extent to which their existence might force us to adjust existing theories of moral obligation. What interests me in this paper is the perspective of (...) the moral deliberating agent who faces a collective action problem, i.e. the type of reasoning she employs when deciding how to act. I hope to show that agents have collective obligations precisely when they are required to employ ‘we-reasoning’, a type of reasoning that differs from I-mode, best response reasoning, as I shall explain below. More precisely, two (or more) individual agents have a collective moral obligation to do x if x is an option for action that is only collectively available (more on that later) and each has sufficient reason to rank x highest out of the options available to them. (shrink)

Theories of perception have traditionally dismissed the sense of smell as a notoriously variable and highly subjective sense, mainly because it does not easily fit into accounts of perception based on visual experience. So far, philosophical questions about the objects of olfactory perception have started by considering the nature of olfactory experience. However, there is no philosophically neutral or agreed conception of olfactory experience: it all depends on what one thinks odors are. We examine the existing philosophical methodology for addressing (...) our sense of smell: on the one hand appeals to phenomenology that focus on the experiential dimensions of odor perception and on the other approaches that look at odor sources and their material dimensions. We show that neither strategy provides enough information to account for the human sense of smell and argue that the inclusion of the missing dimension of biology, with its concern for the function (or functions) of olfaction, provides the means to develop a satisfactory and empirically informed philosophy of smell. (shrink)

Humans are prone to producing morally suboptimal and even disastrous outcomes out of ignorance. Ignorance is generally thought to excuse agents from wrongdoing, but little attention has been paid to group-based ignorance as the reason for some of our collective failings. I distinguish between different types of first-order and higher order group-based ignorance and examine how these can variously lead to problematic inaction. I will make two suggestions regarding our epistemic obligations vis-a-vis collective (in)action problems: (1) that our epistemic obligations (...) concern not just our own knowledge and beliefs but those of others, too and (2) that our epistemic obligations can be held collectively where the epistemic tasks cannot be performed by individuals acting in isolation, for example, when we are required to produce joint epistemic goods. (shrink)

Local opposition to infrastructure projects implementing renewable energy (RE) such as wind farms is often strong even if state-wide support for RE is strikingly high. The slogan “Not In My BackYard” (NIMBY) has become synonymous for this kind of protest. This paper revisits the question of what is wrong with NIMBYs about RE projects and how to best address them. I will argue that local opponents to wind farm (and other RE) developments do not necessarily fail to contribute their fair (...) share to producing a desirable public good (clean energy). In fact, with landscape concerns being at the heart of much protest, the question of fair burden distribution becomes sidelined: landscape impacts cannot be distributed nor compensated for. Protests may be attempts to express a true conflict of (incommensurable) values. Understanding them as such will help us better address NIMBY concerns and overcome such opposition through ensuring procedural justice. (shrink)

It is often argued that our obligations to address structural injustice are collective in character. But what exactly does it mean for ‘ordinary citizens’ to have collective obligations visà- vis large-scale injustice? In this paper, I propose to pay closer attention to the different kinds of collective action needed in addressing some of these structural injustices and the extent to which these are available to large, unorganised groups of people. I argue that large, dispersed and unorganised groups of people are (...) often in a position to perform distributive collective actions. As such, ordinary citizens can have massively shared obligations to address structural injustice through distributive action, but, ultimately, such obligations are ‘collective’ only in a fairly weak sense. (shrink)

"Deleuze plonge la critique kantienne transcendantale dans le bain dissolvant d'un empirisme renouvelé. Ce livre se propose de restituer cette entreprise, et d'analyser l'étonnante création de ce concept, que Deleuze mène depuis ses premières monographies jusqu'à Différence et Répétition dans un dialogue fécond avec l'histoire de la philosophie. Par quelles opérations de distorsion et de collage, Deleuze compose-t-il l'empirisme de Hume, la théorie du signe comme force de Nietzsche, le virtuel et les multiplicités de Bergson, les modes de Spinoza, les (...) individualisations impersonnelles de Simondon pour renouveler la théorie kantienne du transcendantal? C'est tout l'objet de cette enquête, qui permet d'entrer dans le laboratoire du penseur, pour saisir la philosophie se faisant, mais qui permet également d'expliquer l'insistance du transcendantal dans toute son oeuvre"--P. [4] of cover. (shrink)

This article explores the themes of trust and ethical conduct in social research, with particular attention to the trust that can develop between the members of a research team as well as between researchers and the researched. The authors draw upon a three-year empirical study of destinations and outcomes for young people excluded from alternative educational provision. They also make reference to a contemporary exposition of Aristotle's writing on friendship in order to explore two sets of relevant distinctions that have (...) a bearing upon our understanding of relationships that emerge in the context of social research projects. These distinctions are between impartiality and selectivity on the one hand, and between universality and particularity on the other. The authors attempt to demonstrate that these distinctions influence the development of trust and the conduct of ethical research, arguing that the latter is not synonymous with compliance to ethical guidelines. (shrink)

This chapter provides a high-level introduction to the topic of propaganda. We survey a number of the most influential accounts of propaganda, from the earliest institutional studies in the 1920s to contemporary academic work. We propose that these accounts, as well as the various examples of propaganda which we discuss, all converge around a key feature: persuasion which bypasses audiences’ rational faculties. In practice, propaganda can take different forms, serve various interests, and produce a variety of effects. Propaganda can aim (...) to affect not only audiences’ beliefs and attitudes, but also their emotions and moods, and in turn how audiences subsequently reason or act. While propaganda is often thought of as false or misinformation, it can instead involve framing effects (“The war on drugs”), covert messaging (“There are Muslims among us”), emotionally charged slogans (“Make America Great Again”), or myths (“The American dream”). These forms of propaganda mislead audiences, not by introducing false information, but by making some beliefs and values, rather than others, salient. In fact, propaganda can even employ straightforwardly true claims (again, as in “There are Muslims among us”) and seemingly objective bureaucratic reports (“Crime has risen 4.2%”). To understand how these and other mechanisms enable propaganda to persuade by arational means, further study is needed. To that end, throughout the chapter we identify a number of places where the study of meaning and communication can help elucidate propaganda, as well as the places where propaganda issues challenges for the study of meaning. (shrink)

The challenges facing us today require practical wisdom to allow us to react appropriately. In this paper, we argue that at a group level, we will make better decisions if we respect and take into account the moral judgment of agents with diverse styles of cognition and moral reasoning. We show this by focusing on the example of autism, highlighting different strengths and weaknesses of moral reasoning found in autistic and non-autistic persons respectively.

Die vorliegende Schrift unternimmt eine Revision des vorherrschenden Bildes der Rolle und der Konzeptionen von Moral und Ethik im Wiener Kreis. Dieses Bild wird als zu einseitig und undifferenziert zurückgewiesen. Die Ansicht, die Mitglieder des Wiener Kreises hätten kein Interesse an Moral und Ethik gezeigt, wird widerlegt. Viele Mitglieder waren nicht nur moralisch und politisch interessiert, sondern auch engagiert. Des Weiteren vertraten nicht alle die Standardauffassung logisch-empiristischer Ethik, die neben der Anerkennung deskriptiv-empirischer Untersuchungen durch die Ablehnung jeglicher normativer und inhaltlicher (...) Ethik und der Verfechtung eines extremen Nonkognitivismus geprägt ist. Am meisten entspricht die Standardauffassung den Ansichten Rudolf Carnaps, weniger bereits jenen Karl Mengers, Otto Neuraths oder Philipp Franks. Am weitesten weichen Moritz Schlick, Victor Kraft sowie Herbert Feigl von der Standardauffassung ab. Entgegen dem herkömmlichen Bild weltabgewandter Logiker und Metaethiker wurde im Wiener Kreis sogar Angewandte Ethik betrieben, und dies bereits unter diesem Namen. Neben den ethischen Hauptthemen und Ansichten der jeweiligen Philosophen in ihrer Entwicklung im Rahmen ihres persönlichen und kulturellen Kontextes zeigt die Untersuchung, dass allen Ansätzen eine aufgeklärte und humanistische Version von Moral und Ethik gemeinsam ist. Dieser wissenschaftliche Humanismus, der sich schon in der Programmschrift Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis findet, liegt jedoch in verschiedenen Ausprägungen vor. Was die Abweichungen von der Standardauffassung wesentlich betrifft, ist ihre unterschiedliche Auffassung von Moral als gemeinsames oder individuelles Unternehmen. Carnap führt ein extremer Individualismus zu einem extremen Nonkognitivismus, in dem ihm Menger folgt. Bei Schlick ist die Lage zweideutig, was sich in unterschiedlichen Moralbegriffen widerspiegelt. Bei Kraft und Feigl tritt das Verständnis von Moral als gemeinschaftlich geteilte Praxisform klar hervor. Auf der Basis eines gemeinsamen Begriffs des moralisch Guten, der auch eine Sachkomponente enthält, ist eine Verständigung über moralische Fragen möglich. Von einem extremen Nonkognitivismus kann dort nicht mehr die Rede sein. Mit diesen Ergebnissen verbietet es sich, dem Wiener Kreis allgemein eine Ablehnung normativer Ethik und einen extremen Nonkognitivismus zuzuschreiben. Eine systematische Ethik, die Moral als Gemeinschaftspraxis begreift, steht einigen im Wiener Kreis näher, als das vorherrschende Bild suggerieren möge. Wer meint, mit engem Bezug zur Tradition des Wiener Kreises nur Carnap folgen zu können und Ethik als suspektes Unternehmen betrachten zu müssen, irrt. Ethik war in der Tradition Analytischer Philosophie nicht immer so marginalisiert, wie sie es in manchen ihrer Teilrichtungen heute noch ist und Gegner(innen) der Analytischen Philosophie vorwerfen. Die vorliegende Untersuchung liefert die nötige Revision einer verfänglichen Fehlentwicklung. (shrink)

In this article, I will consider whether, and in what way, doxastic states can harm. I’ll first consider whether, and in what way, a person’s doxastic state can harm her, before turning to the question of whether, and in what way, it can harm someone else.

The book presents a new conceptual framework and a set of research principles with which to study and interpret technology from a phenomenological perspective.

This book explores the way in which, working within the investigative tradition associated with the Royal Society, the philosopher John Locke (1632-1704) used ...

Many philosophers have defended the view that we are subject to the following evidential ought: “One ought to believe in accordance with one's evidence.” Although they agree on this, a more fundamental question keeps dividing them: from where does the evidential ought derive its normative force? The instrinsicalist answer to this question is sometimes described as the claim that "there is a brute epistemic value in believing in accordance with one's evidence" (Cowie, 2014, 4005). But what does this really mean? (...) Intrinsicalists' negative claim is that the normative source of the evidential ought has nothing to do with the fulfilment of our epistemic purposes. But what is their positive claim exactly? This paper aims at improving our understanding of intrinsicalism. Its conclusion is that there is only one possible way of being an intrinsicalist. Intrinsicalists need to be constitutivists. (shrink)

This long-awaited two-volume set constitutes the definitive presentation of the system of classifying moral judgment built up by Lawrence Kohlberg and his associates over a period of twenty years. Researchers in child development and education around the world, many of whom have worked with interim versions of the system, indeed, all those seriously interested in understanding the problem of moral judgment, will find it an indispensable resource. Volume I reviews Kohlberg's stage theory, and the by-now large body of research on (...) the significance and utility of his moral stages. Issues of reliability and validity are addressed. The volume ends with detailed instructions for using the forms in Volume 2. Volume 2, in a specially-designed, user-friendly format, includes three alternative functionally-equivalent forms of the scoring system. (shrink)

Une morale pour les mortels est une etude d'ensemble de l'ethique de Platon et d'Aristote, a partir de la problematique philosophique qui lui donne corps: la mortalite de l'etre humain, source de ses desirs et de leur perpetuelle insatisfaction. Par contraste avec une morale du devoir, on decouvre ici une morale qui s'exprime par un il faut, poussant vers une fin qui puisse repondre au manque et au besoin qui marquent la condition humaine. A partir de cette problematique sont repris (...) et eclaires tous les concepts et theses classiques de l'ethique ancienne: la question de la mesure et de l'harmonie, la vertu dans son unite et sa pluralite, le bonheur, le bien, le plaisir, l'amitie, l'amour de soi, la volonte et les autres desirs, l'intention, l'action, et surtout la verite du paradoxe nul n'est mechant de plein gre, dont sont exposees la resistance face aux critiques d'Aristote et les consequences dans le domaine penal. L'ensemble met en valeur la specificite de l'etre humain decelee par les Anciens: qu'il soit un etre tout a la fois desirant et pensant. (shrink)

Institutional economics and discourse theory stand unconnected next to each other, in spite of the fact that they both ask for the legitimacy of institutions (normative) and the functioning and effectiveness of institutions (positive). Both use as theoretical constructions rational individuals and the concept of consensus for legitimacy. Whereas discourse theory emphasizes the conditions of a legitimate consensus and could thus enable institutional economics to escape the infinite regress of judging a consensus legitimate, institutional economics has a tested social science (...) paradigm (rational choice) of explaining and predicting the functioning of institutions. The article outlines a theoretical synthesis of the two theories by finding points in common and possibilities of fruitful combinations concerning the problem of legitimacy, institutional design and effectiveness of legal norms. (shrink)

Cherche à mettre en évidence les principes théoriques qui peuvent être au fondement de toute recherche ou réflexion en sociologie de la musique.