Philosophy of Archaeology

The most discussed of architectural marvels tend to be the Temple of Zeus at Olympia, the Mausoleum at Halicarnassus or the Parthenon at Athens, supposedly because they are the ones we happen to have nominated ‘world wonders’; but that doesn’t mean all the rest of temple-type sites to be found across the greater Mediterranean area have less wonder about them. On the contrary; when wanting to explore and explain the role temples played in the lives of their ‘subscribers’ and a (...) temple site’s place as often the nucleus of a community, the Serapeum at Alexandria is as excellent a piece of architecture to examine as any. (shrink)

An aesthetic sense—a taste for the creation and/or appreciation of that which strikes one as, e.g., attractive or awesome—is often assumed to be a distinctively H. sapiens phenomenon. However, recent paleoanthropological research is revealing its archaeologically visible, deeper roots. The sensorimotor/perceptual and cognitive capacities underpinning aesthetic activities are a major focus of evolutionary aesthetics. Here we take a diachronic, evolutionary perspective and assess ongoing scepticism regarding whether, and to what extent, aesthetic capacity extends to our evolutionary cousins, the Neanderthals. The (...) goal of this article is twofold. First, it serves as a defence of the attribution of Neanderthal aesthetic capacity by marshalling archaeological data best explained by positing a Neanderthal aesthetic sense. Second, it offers an opportunity to make progress on understanding some epistemically relevant features of the wider debate in evolutionary aesthetics. First, we outline and analyse a range of distinct ‘sceptical arguments’ derived from attitudes and claims found in the literature and broader debate that aim to dial down the case for Neanderthal aesthetic capacity. We show that these arguments not only miss their target, they divert the debate away from more compelling questions. We then consider the case for protoaesthetic capacities and sensitivities in the Acheulean stone tool industry and argue that Neanderthals likely inherited the protoaesthetic package from ancient ancestors that they shared with H. sapiens. Finally, we sketch and defend a research agenda for framing Neanderthal aesthetic niche(s) beyond H. sapiens-derived standards, which we see as a priority for future archaeological, cognitive, and philosophical research. While we resist sceptical arguments and the often-implied inferiority of Neanderthals to humans, we also deny that Neanderthals and ancient humans were indistinguishable. Understanding the differences is an important goal of interpretation, and we apply this line of reasoning to the case of aesthetics. (shrink)

When does art history begin? Art historiographers typically point to the Renaissance (Vasari) or, alternatively, to Hellenism (Pliny the Elder). But such origin stories become increasingly disconnected from contemporary disciplinary practices, especially as the latter try to rise to the challenge of conducting art history in a more diversified and global way. This essay provides an alternative account of art history’s origin, one that does not try to alleviate the sense of disconnect, but rather develops a global, non-Eurocentric account. The (...) account focuses less on genealogy and more on what necessitates something like an art-historical awareness or attention in the first place. Relying on examples from ancient Mesopotamia, it argues that art-historical thought can be identified whenever and wherever material objects are attended to or produced for their potential to manifest visibly and over time their meaning. (shrink)

There is a tendency to take mounted dinosaur skeletons at face value, as the raw data on which the science of paleontology is founded. But the truth is that mounted dinosaur skeletons are substantially intention-dependent—they are artifacts. More importantly, I argue, they are also substantially imagination-dependent: their production is substantially causally reliant on preparators’ creative imaginations, and their proper reception is predicated on audiences’ recreative imaginations. My main goal here is to show that dinosaur skeletal mounts are plausible candidates for (...) art-status. But, what is more, I think they are artworks—specifically, sculptures. (shrink)

Archaeology for Today and Tomorrow explores how cutting-edge archaeological theories have implications not only for how we study the past, but also how we think about and prepare for the future. Ranging from how we understand migration or political leadership to how we think about violence or ecological crisis, the book argues that archaeology should embrace a "future-oriented" attitude. Behind the traditional archaeological gaze on the past are a unique and useful collection of skills, tools, and orientations for rethinking the (...) present and future. Further, it asserts that archaeological theory is not only vital for how we conduct our work as archaeologists, and how we create narratives about the past, but also for how we think about the broader world in the present and, crucially, how we envision and shape the future. Each of the chapters in the book links specific theoretical approaches and global archaeological case studies to a specific contemporary issue. It examines such issues as human movement, violence, human and non-human relations, the Anthropocene, and fake news to showcase the critical contributions that archaeology, and archaeological theory, can make to shaping the world of tomorrow. An ideal book for courses on archaeology in the modern world and public archaeology, it will also appeal to archaeology students and researchers in general and all those in related disciplines interested in areas of critical contemporary concern. (shrink)

The philosophy of cognitive paleoanthropology involves three related tasks: (1) asking what inferences might be drawn from the paleontological and archaeological records to past cognition, behavior and culture; (2) constructing synthetic accounts of the evolution of distinctive hominin capacities; (3) exploring how results from cognitive paleoanthropology might inform philosophy. We introduce some distinctive cognitive paleoanthropological inferences and discuss their epistemic standing, before considering how attention to the material records and the practice of paleoanthropology can inform and transform philosophical approaches.

The chin, a distinguishing feature of Homo sapiens, has sparked ongoing debates regarding its evolutionary origins and adaptive significance. We contend that these controversies stem from a fundamental disagreement about what constitutes a well-defined biological trait, a problem that has received insufficient attention despite its recognized importance in biology. In this paper, we leverage paleoanthropological research on the human chin to investigate the general issue of character or trait identification. First, we examine four accounts of the human chin from the (...) existing literature: the mandibular differential growth byproduct, the bony prominence, the inverted T-relief, and the symphyseal angle. We then generalize from these accounts and propose a three-stage framework for the process of character identification: description, detection, and justification. We use this framework to reinterpret the four accounts, elucidating key points of contention surrounding the chin as well as other morphological characters. We show that debates over the chin carry broad and important biological implications that extend beyond this trait and that are not mere semantic issues of definition. (shrink)

Exploring the current clash between the prevailing conceptions of heritage as, on the one hand, something valued and thus worth saving and, on the other, a haunting and unwanted legacy, this book urges a radical reconsideration of our understanding of heritage in line with the notion of an unruly legacy. The fundamental argument is based on a less anthropocentric and more ecologically focussed perspective, where case studies are presented on the following countries: Canada, Iceland, Japan, Norway, Poland, Sweden and the (...) United States. (shrink)

Cecilia Heyes recently developed a novel framework for understanding human cognitive evolution. Contrary to many traditional views, cultural evolutionary psychology argues that distinctively human cognitive traits are transmitted culturally, not biologically. In labeling these mechanisms of thought “cognitive gadgets,” Heyes draws a direct analogy with the cultural artifacts studied by archaeologists. This chapter explores how cultural evolutionary psychology can inform research in cognitive archaeology and vice versa. On the former line of thought, the chapter argues that adopting Heyes’ framework goes (...) some way to addressing the Wynn’s methodological challenge by bringing the categories of the psychological and archaeological sciences closer together. Nonetheless, deep inferential challenges remain. This chapter looks at how we can interpret the record through the lens of cognitive gadgets, using behavioral modernity as a case study. It then examines the way cognitive archaeology can inform research in cultural evolutionary psychology. Using research on the evolution of language, it argues that evidence from cognitive archaeology strengthens Heyes’ case that language is a gadget. -/- . (shrink)

Broken bodies, places and objects demonstrates the breadth of fragmentation and fragment use in prehistory and history, and provides an up-to-date insight into the current archaeological thinking around the topic. A seal broken and shared by two trade parties, dog jaws accompanying the dead in Mesolithic burials, fragments of ancient warships commodified as souvenirs, parts of an ancient dynastic throne split up between different colonial collections... Pieces of the past are everywhere around us. Fragments have a special potential precisely because (...) of their incomplete format - as a new matter that can reference its original whole but can also live on with new, unrelated meanings. Deliberate breakage of bodies, places and objects for the use of fragments has been attested from all time periods of the past. It has now been over 20 years since John Chapman's major publication introducing fragmentation studies, and the topic is more present than ever in archaeology. This volume offers the first European-wide review of the concept of fragmentation, collecting case studies from the Neolithic to the Modern, and extending the ideas of fragmentation theory into new directions. The book is written for scholars and students in archaeology but it is also relevant for neighbouring fields taking an interest in material culture, such as anthropology, history, cultural heritage studies, museology, art and architecture. (shrink)

Archaeological Theory: The Basics is an accessible introduction to an indispensable part of what archaeologists do. The book guides the reader to an understanding of what theory is, how it works, and the range of theories used in archaeology. The growth of theory and the adoption of theories drawn from both the natural and social sciences have broadened our ability to produce trustworthy knowledge about the past. This book helps readers to see the value of archaeological theory and beyond what (...) is sometimes thought to be just the use of indigestible jargon. Key theories and concepts are introduced to the reader. Among the main questions discussed are the following: What is theory and why do we need it? What major areas of theory are, and have been, used and debated in archaeology? What do they tell us about themes including human society, evolution, culture, identity and agency? How might archaeological theory change in the future? This book is written mainly for readers new to archaeology and will help them to understand archaeological theory. It assumes no prior knowledge of archaeological theory and presents it in a selective and clear way, with case studies showing how theory is used in practice. (shrink)

Claims that our species is an “evolutionary success” typically do not feature prominently in academic articles. However, they do seem to be a recurring trope in science popularization. Why do we seem to be attracted to viewing human evolution through the lense of “success”? In this chapter we discuss how evolutionary success has both causal-descriptive and ethical-normative components, and how its ethical status is ambiguous, with possible hints of anthropocentrism. We also place the concept of “success” in a wider context (...) of biological thought, contrasting it with two other value-laden concepts: evolutionary progress and human uniqueness. Claiming the human species to be an evolutionary success is ostensibly grounded in metrics such as the dominance or the size of the human population, but often goes beyond this, suggesting that humans are a unique species or the pinnacle of evolutionary progress. (shrink)

Volume IV (which comprises two half-volumes) focuses on the life sciences, whose object of research is life itself, that which (necessarily) mediates between the physical and the psyche. Typical philosophical questions in this context include: What is “life” in the sense of the term relevant to the life sciences? How do we know that life has not “always existed” but must have arisen in the course of abiogenesis from inanimate nature? And how is it possible to know something about how (...) evolution has occurred? These are explored in the first half-volume. In its second half-volume, the book first deals with methodological and conceptual questions regarding the concrete natural history of mankind. Examples for pertinent questions in this context are: "What would be adequate criteria for singling out autapomorphic traits defining the genus "homo"?" and "Has the concept of "race" biological meaning and reality?" (Spoiler: The answer to the latter question is "no".) In the context of that question, a considerable part of the second half-volume deals with the history of "scientific" theories of race from the 17th century up until the 1990ies. In particular, Kant's theory of race and his racism (as well as his sexism) are discussed thoroughly. Pertinent questions are: "Did Kant invent the concept of race?", "Was Kant the founder of "scientific racism"?", "Did Kant invent and promote a concept of "racial purity"?" and "Did Kant endorse slave trade?". Furthermore, for anyone whose own philosophical positions rest on Kantian premises, the following questions will be of special importance: "Is Kant's racism implied by his transcendental philosophy?" and "Is Kant's racism implied by his ethics?" Regarding all these questions, the contributions of important authors like Eze, Bernasconi, Kleingeld and Mills are discussed and critically examined. Finally, the second half-volume closes with a thorough exploration of the methodological foundations of neuroscience and its limitations as a contribution to philosophy of mind (which as such will have its say in Volume VI). (shrink)

Cognitive archaeologists attempt to infer the cognitive and cultural features of past hominins and their societies from the material record. This task faces the problem of _minimum necessary competence_: as the most sophisticated thinking of ancient hominins may have been in domains that leave no archaeological signature, it is safest to assume that tool production and use reflects only the lower boundary of cognitive capacities. Cognitive archaeology involves selecting a model from the cognitive sciences and then assessing some aspect of (...) the material record through that lens. We give examples to show that background theoretical commitments in cognitive science that inform those models lead to different minimum necessary competence results. This raises an important question: what principles should guide us in selecting a model from the cognitive sciences? We outline two complementary responses to this question. The first involves using _independent_ lines of evidence to converge on a particular capacity. This can then influence model choice. The second is a broader suggestion. Theoretical diversity is a good thing in science, but is only beneficial over a limited amount of time. According to recent modelling work, one way of limiting diversity is to introduce extreme priors. We argue that having a broad spectrum of views in the philosophy of cognitive science may actually help cognitive archaeologists address the problem of minimum necessary competence. (shrink)

In their landmark 2010 paper, “The weirdest people in the world?”, Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan outlined a serious methodological problem for the psychological and behavioural sciences. Most of the studies produced in the field use people from Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich and Democratic (WEIRD) societies, yet inferences are often drawn to the species as a whole. In drawing such inferences, researchers implicitly assume that either there is little variation across human populations, or that WEIRD populations are generally representative of the (...) species. Yet neither of these assumptions is justified. In many psychological and behavioural domains, cultural variation begets cognitive variation, and WEIRD samples are recurrently shown to be outliers. In the years since the article was published, attention has focused on the implications this has for research on extant human populations. Here we extend those implications to the study of ancient _H. sapiens_, their hominin forebears, and cousin lineages. We assess a range of characteristic arguments and key studies in the cognitive archaeology literature, identifying issues stemming from the problem of sample diversity. We then look at how worrying the problem is, and consider some conditions under which inferences to ancient populations via cognitive models might be provisionally justified. (shrink)

In 2011, a 5,000-year-old “male” skeleton buried in a “female” way was discovered by an archaeological team just outside of modern-day Prague. This article queries the impulse to name such a discovery as evidence of transgender identity, and bodies, in an increasingly ancient past. To do so, it takes up the work of Denise Ferreira da Silva, Sylvia Wynter, and Hortense Spillers as a means to push back against the impetus to name such discoveries “transgender” in order to shore up (...) the legitimacy of contemporary trans identity. Each of these three thinkers offers a different vantage point for rethinking such naming practices that push the reader to consider how desires to name and place “transgender” in a distant past papers over the violence of plantation slavery, global imperialism, and the Enlightenment's shift toward scientific reason. This article argues not that such anthropological discoveries should not be considered transgender, but rather that the desire for them to be, or become, transgender does not legitimate contemporary transgender identity, and may instead treat certain iterations of transness as spatially and temporally universal. (shrink)

This book is an introduction to theory in archaeology--but with a difference. Archaeological Situations avoids talking about theory as if it was something you apply but rather as something embedded in archaeological practice from the start. Rather than see theory as something worked from the outside in, this book explores theory from the inside out, which means it focuses on specific archaeological practices rather than specific theories. It starts from the kinds of situations that students find themselves in and learn (...) about in other archaeology courses, avoiding the gap between practice and theory from the very beginning. It shows students the theoretical implications of almost everything they engage in as archaeologists, from fieldwork, recording, writing-up and making and assessing an argument, to exploring the very nature of archaeology and justifying its relevance. Essentially, it adopts a structure which attempts to pre-empt one of the most common complaints of student's taking theory courses: how is this applicable? Aimed primarily at undergraduates, this book is the ideal way to engage students with archaeological theory. (shrink)