Nature of War

我们必须记住的第一件事是，当说中国这样说或中国这样做时，我们不是说中国人民，而是控制中国共产党的社会路径者，即七大社会病态连环杀手。中共常务委员会或中央政治局委员等25人。 中共对三战和全面统治的计划在中国政府的出版物和演讲中已经非常明确地阐述了，这就是习近平的"中国梦"。只有统治中国的少数人（也许只有几十到几百人）的梦想，也是其他人（包括14亿中国人 ）的噩梦。每年100亿美元使他们或他们的傀儡拥有或控制报纸、杂志、电视和广播频道，每天在世界各地的大多数主要媒体上放置假新闻。 此外，他们有一支军队（也许有数百万人），他们滚动所有媒体进行更多的宣传，淹没合法的评论（50美分的军队）。 除了剥夺第三世界的资源外，数万亿美元的"一带一路"倡议的主要主旨是在全世界建立军事基地。他们迫使自由世界陷入大规模的高科技军备竞赛，使得与苏联的冷战看起来像是野餐。 尽管SSSSK和世界上其他的军事国家都在高级硬件上花费巨资，但WW3（或导致它的小型交战）很可能以软件为主。SSSSK，可能有更多的黑客（编码器）为他们工作，然后世界其他国家加起来，通过通过网络瘫痪他 们的敌人，以最小的物理冲突赢得未来的战争。"没有卫星，没有电话，没有通讯，没有金融交易，没有电网，没有互联网，没有先进的武器，没有车辆，火车，船舶和飞机。 罢免中共只有两条主要途径，即释放14亿中国囚犯，结束向第三次世界大战的疯狂进军。 和平的一个方案是发动一场全面的贸易战来摧毁中国经济，直到军方受够了，把中共赶出去。 关闭中国经济的替代方案是一场有限的战争，比如在中共第20届大会上，50架热压无人机进行有针对性的打击，当时所有高层成员都在一个地方，但这种情况要到2022年才会发生。一个可以击中年度全体会议。 袭击发生后，中国人将被告知，他们必须放下武器，准备举行民主选举，否则就要进入石器时代。另一种选择是全面核攻击。 鉴于中共目前的路线，军事对抗是不可避免的。 几十年后，这种情况可能会发生在南中国海或台湾的岛屿上，但随着它们在世界各地建立军事基地，它可能发生在任何地方（见"卧虎藏"等）。 未来的冲突将有硬性与软性方面与中共的既定目标，强调网络战争，通过黑客和瘫痪控制系统的所有军事和工业通信，设备，发电厂，卫星，互联网，银行，以及连接到网络的任何设备或车辆。 SS正在缓慢地部署一系列全球载人和自主水面和水下潜艇或无人驾驶飞机，这些潜艇或无人机能够发射可能处于休眠状态，等待中国发出信号，甚至寻找美国船只或飞机的签名。 在摧毁我们的卫星，从而消除美国和我们全球部队之间的通信的同时，他们将使用他们的卫星，与无人机一起瞄准和摧毁我们目前优越的海军部队。 当然，所有这一切都是越来越多地由AI自动完成的。 到目前为止，中共最大的盟友是美国民主党。 选择是现在停止中共，或者看着他们把中国监狱扩展到全世界。 当然，对我们的生活进行普遍监控和数字化是不可避免的。任何不这么认为的人，都是极度脱节的。 当然，正是那些期待中国社会路径者统治世界的人，而悲观主义者（他们认为自己是现实主义者）则期望AI的社会病态 （或我称之为"假愚蠢"或"人造社会病态"）的选择性。）接管，也许到2030年。 那些有兴趣在现代社会的疯狂道路的进一步细节可能会参考我的其他作品，如自杀的民主-美国和世界第三版2019年和自 杀乌托邦幻想在21日世纪：哲学、人性与文明的崩溃（2019）.

America and the world are in the process of collapse from excessive population growth, most of it for the last century and now all of it due to 3rd world people. Consumption of resources and the addition of one or two billion more ca. 2100 will collapse industrial civilization and bring about starvation, disease, violence and war on a staggering scale. Billions will die and nuclear war is all but certain. In America this is being hugely accelerated by massive immigration (...) and immigrant reproduction, combined with abuses made possible by democracy. Depraved human nature inexorably turns the dream of democracy and diversity into a nightmare of crime and poverty. The root cause of collapse is the inability of our innate psychology to adapt to the modern world, which leads people to treat unrelated persons as though they had common interests. This, plus ignorance of basic biology and psychology, leads to the social engineering delusions of the partially educated who control democratic societies. Few understand that if you help one person you harm someone else—there is no free lunch and every single item anyone consumes destroys the earth beyond repair. Consequently, social policies everywhere are unsustainable and one by one all societies without stringent controls on selfishness will collapse into anarchy or dictatorship. Without dramatic and immediate changes, there is no hope for preventing the collapse of America, or any country that follows a democratic system. Hence my essay “Suicide by Democracy”. It is also now clear that the seven sociopaths who rule China are winning world war 3, and so my concluding essay on them. The only greater threat is Artificial Intelligence which I comment on briefly. The key to everything about us is biology, and it is obliviousness to it that leads millions of smart educated people like Obama, Chomsky, Clinton, the Democratic Party and the Pope to espouse suicidal utopian ideals that inexorably lead straight to Hell on Earth. As W noted, it is what is always before our eyes that is the hardest to see. We live in the world of conscious deliberative linguistic System 2, but it is unconscious, automatic reflexive System 1 that rules. This is the source of the universal blindness described by Searle’s The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), Pinker’s Blank Slate and Tooby and Cosmides’ Standard Social Science Model. The first group of articles attempt to give some insight into how we behave that is reasonably free of theoretical delusions. In the next three groups I comment on three of the principal delusions preventing a sustainable world— technology, religion and politics (cooperative groups). People believe that society can be saved by them, so I provide some suggestions in the rest of the book as to why this is unlikely via short articles and reviews of recent books by well-known writers. Another section describes the religious delusion – that there is some super power that will save us. The next section describes the digital delusions, which confuse the language games of System 2 with the automatisms of System one, and so cannot distinguish biological machines (i.e., people) from other kinds of machines (i.e., computers). Other digital delusions are that we will be saved from the pure evil (selfishness) of System 1 by computers/AI/robotics/nanotech/genetic engineering created by System 2. The No Free Lunch principal tells us there will be serious and possibly fatal consequences. The last section describes The One Big Happy Family Delusion, i.e., that we are selected for cooperation with everyone, and that the euphonious ideals of Democracy, Diversity and Equality will lead us into utopia, if we just manage things correctly (the possibility of politics). Again, the No Free Lunch Principle ought to warn us it cannot be true, and we see throughout history and all over the contemporary world, that without strict controls, selfishness and stupidity gain the upper hand and soon destroy any nation that embraces these delusions. In addition, the monkey mind steeply discounts the future, and so we cooperate in selling our descendant’s heritage for temporary comforts, greatly exacerbating the problems. (shrink)

这不是一本完美的书,但它是独特的,如果你浏览前400页左右,最后300页(约700页)是一个很好的尝试,将已知的行为应用于社会变化在暴力和礼仪随着时间的推移。基本的主题是:我们的遗传学如何控制和限制社 会变化？令人惊讶的是,他未能描述亲属选择(包容性健身)的本质,这解释了动物和人类社会生活的很多原因。他还(像几乎每个人都一样)缺乏一个清晰的框架来描述理性的逻辑结构(LSR-John Searle的首选术语),我更愿意称之为高阶思想的描述性心理学(DPHOT)。他应该说一些关于虐待和剥削人和地球的许多其他方式,因为现在这些方式更加严重,以至于使其他形式的暴力几乎无关紧要。扩大暴力的 概念,包括复制某人基因的全球长期后果,并掌握进化过程的性质(即亲属选择),将提供一个完全不同的历史视角,时事,以及未来几百年的情况可能如何发展。人们可能首先指出,历史上身体暴力的减少与地球不断发生的无 情强奸(即人们摧毁自己后代的未来)相吻合(并成为可能)。平克尔(和大多数人一样,大多数时候)常常被文化的肤浅所分心,而生物学才是最重要的。在这里和网上查看我最近对威尔逊的《地球的社会征服》和诺瓦克和高 菲尔德的"超级合作者"的评论,了解"真正的利他主义"(群体选择)的空虚性简要摘要,亲属选择的运作,以及用文化术语描述行为的无用和肤浅。 这是经典的自然/培育问题,自然胜过培育——无限。真正重要的是,人口和资源破坏的无情增加(由于医药和技术以及警察和军队对冲突的镇压),给地球造成了暴力。每天约有20万人(每10天再下一个拉斯维加斯,每月 另一个洛杉矶),6吨左右表土进入大海/人/年——约占全世界每年消失总量的1%,等等,这意味着除非生物圈和文明将在未来两个世纪内大为崩溃,各种饥荒、苦难和暴力将发生惊人规模。 人们实施暴力行为的举止、观点和倾向是没有意义的,除非他们能够做些什么来避免这场灾难,而我看不出这是怎么回事。没有争论的空间,也没有意义(是的,我是一个宿命论者),所以我只做一些评论,好像它们是事实一样 。不要以为我以牺牲他人利益来推销一个团体有个人利益。我78岁,没有后代,没有近亲,不认同任何政治、民族或宗教团体,认为我属于的人,默认和所有其他团体一样令人厌恶。 父母是地球上最可怕的生命敌人,从事物的广义来看,当人们认为女性的暴力(像大多数由男性做的一样)大部分是在慢动作、在时间和空间上保持距离时,女性和男性一样暴力。由代理人 - 由他们的后代和男人。妇女越来越生孩子,无论她们是否有伴侣,阻止一名妇女生育的效果平均远远大于阻止一个男人,因为她们是生殖瓶颈。人们可以认为,无论遭受什么苦难,人们及其后代都值得,(除了极少数例外),富 人和名人是最恶劣的罪犯。梅丽尔·斯特里普或比尔·盖茨或J.K·罗琳和他们每个孩子可能在未来几代人中每年每年销毁50吨表土,而印度农民和他的可能摧毁1吨。如果有人否认那很好,对他们的后代,我说" ;欢迎来到地球上的地狱"(WTHOE)。 现在的重点总是放在人权上,但很明显,如果文明要有机会,人类的责任必须取代人权。没有人没有负责任的公民就得到权利,而这意味着第一件事就是破坏环境。最基本的责任是,除非你的社会要求你生产孩子,否则没有孩子 。一个允许人们随意繁殖的社会或世界总是被自私的基因所利用,直到它崩溃(或者达到生命如此可怕以至于不值得活下去)。如果社会继续以人权为首要,那么对其后代,人们可以满怀信心地说"WTHOE&qu ot;。 那些希望从现代两个系统的观点来看为人类行为建立一个全面的最新框架的人,可以查阅我的书《路德维希的哲学、心理学、Min d和语言的逻辑结构》维特根斯坦和约翰·西尔的《第二部》(2019年)。那些对我更多的作品感兴趣的人可能会看到《会说话的猴子——一个末日星球上的哲学、心理学、科学、宗教和政治——文章和评论2006-20 19年3月(2019年)和21年的自杀乌托邦幻想St世纪4日 (2019) .

This chapter examines whether, as Jeff McMahan argues, we should not integrate what he refers to as the “deep morality” of war into our military and international public policies and laws, because of the possible negative consequences of doing so. On the basis of feminist epistemology, I argue that McMahan is wrong to think that publicizing and legalizing the deep morality of war will have the negative consequences that he claims. Through a comparison with the Women's Suffrage Movement in the (...) United States, I argue that McMahan's argument is epistemically biased, in that it reflects and incorporates stereotypical views of poor people as stupid, thoughtless, and brutish. We would do better to think hard about how we conceptualize combatants, and to recognize in our arguments that the abilities to reason well and to act morally are not restricted to the upper echelons of society. (shrink)

It has been commonly claimed that prehistoric warfare in Japan began in the Yayoi period. Population increases due to the introduction of agriculture from the Korean Peninsula to Japan resulted in the lack of land for cultivation and resources for the population, eventually triggering competition over land. This hypothesis has been supported by the demographic data inferred from historical changes in Kamekan, a burial system used especially in the Kyushu area in the Yayoi period. The present study aims to examine (...) the previous claim by using an expanded dataset of human skeletal remains and Kamekan. First, in order to quantify the intensity of warfare, we developed a database of injured individuals found in the middle phase of the Yayoi period in two large populations in the northern Kyushu area, the Fukuoka plain and the upperand middle-stream of the Homan River. Second, we collected Kamekan data from site reports published after 1990 and constructed a comprehensive database to infer the demography in these areas. Finally, we compared the frequency of injured individuals and the inferred demography. The results suggest that the frequency of injured individuals and the population increase tended to be higher at the upper- and middle-stream of the Homan River than on the Fukuoka plain. Different assumptions of the lifetime of each type of Kamekan can produce mixed results on the relationship between demography and the frequency of injured individuals. They were positively correlated under the traditional assumption of constant time intervals, while there was no correlation using time intervals based on carbon dating by the National Museum of Japanese History. Thus, our results are partially consistent with the previous claim that the population increase and the lack of land and resources due to the introduction of agriculture were causes of warfare in the northern Kyushu area in the middle phase of the Yayoi period. (shrink)

Este não é um livro perfeito, mas é único, e se você desnatado o primeiro 400 ou assim páginas, o último 300 (de alguns 700) são uma tentativa muito boa para aplicar o que é conhecido sobre o comportamento de mudanças sociais na violência e maneiras ao longo do tempo. O tema básico é: como o nosso controle genético e limitar a mudança social? Surpreendentemente, ele não descreve a natureza da seleção de parentes (aptidão inclusiva), o que explica grande parte (...) da vida social animal e humana. Ele também (como quase todos) carece de um quadro claro para descrever a estrutura lógica da racionalidade (LSR — termo preferencial de John Searle) que eu prefiro chamar a psicologia descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior (DPHOT). Ele deveria ter dito algo sobre as muitas outras maneiras de abusar e explorar as pessoas e o planeta, uma vez que estes são agora muito mais graves para tornar outras formas de violência quase irrelevante. Estender o conceito de violência para incluir as conseqüências globais a longo prazo da replicação dos genes de alguém, e ter um entendimento da natureza de como a evolução funciona (ou seja, a seleção de parentes) fornecerá uma perspectiva muito diferente sobre a história , eventos atuais, e como as coisas são susceptíveis de ir nas próximas centenas de anos. Pode-se começar por notar que a diminuição da violência física sobre a história tem sido combinada (e tornou possível) pelo estupro constantemente crescente impiedoso do planeta (ou seja, pela destruição das pessoas do seu próprio futuro descendente's). Pinker (como a maioria das pessoas a maior parte do tempo) é muitas vezes distraído pelas superficialidades da cultura, quando é a biologia que importa. Veja meus comentários recentes de Wilson ' a conquista social da terra ' e Nowak e Highfield ' SuperCooperators ' aqui e na net para um breve resumo da vacuidade de "verdadeiro altruísmo" (seleção de grupo), e a operação de seleção de parentes e a inutilidade e superficialidade de descrever o comportamento em termos culturais. Esta é a natureza clássica/nutrir a questão ea natureza supera nutrir-infinitamente. O que realmente importa é a violência feita para a terra pelo aumento implacável da população e destruição de recursos (devido à medicina e tecnologia e supressão de conflitos por policiais e militares). Cerca de 200.000 mais pessoas por dia (outra Las Vegas a cada 10 dias, outro Los Angeles a cada mês), as 6 toneladas ou assim de solo superior indo para o mar/pessoa/ano -cerca de 1% do total do mundo desaparecendo anualmente, etc. significa que, a menos que algum milagre acontece que a biosfera e 2 a civilização vão desmoronar em grande parte durante os próximos dois séculos, e haverá fome, miséria e violência de todo tipo em uma escala escalonamento. As maneiras, as opiniões e as tendências das pessoas para cometer atos violentos não são relevantes a menos que possam fazer algo para evitar essa catástrofe, e eu não vejo como isso vai acontecer. Não há espaço para argumentos, e nenhum ponto ou (Sim, eu sou um fatalista), então eu vou fazer apenas alguns comentários como se fossem fatos. Não imagine que eu tenha uma participação pessoal na promoção de um grupo à custa de outros. Eu sou 78, não têm descendentes e não parentes próximos e não se identificam com qualquer grupo político, nacional ou religioso e consideram os que eu pertenço por padrão como tão repulsivo como todo o resto. Os pais são os piores inimigos da vida na terra e, tomando a visão ampla das coisas, as mulheres são tão violentas quanto os homens, quando se considera o fato de que a violência das mulheres (como a maior parte do que feito pelos homens) é largamente feito em câmera lenta, a uma distância no tempo e no espaço e principalmente realizado por procuração por seus descendentes e por homens. Cada vez mais, as mulheres carregam crianças, independentemente de terem um companheiro e o efeito de parar uma mulher de reprodução é, em média, muito maior do que parar um homem, uma vez que são o gargalo reprodutivo. Pode-se ter a visão de que as pessoas e seus descendentes merecem ricamente qualquer miséria que vem seu caminho e (com raras exceções) os ricos e famosos são os piores infratores. Meryl Streep ou Bill Gates ou J. K Rowling e cada um de seus filhos podem destruir 50 toneladas de solo superior cada por ano para gerações no futuro, enquanto um agricultor indiano e seu pode destruir 1 tonelada. Se alguém nega que é bom, e aos seus descendentes eu digo "bem-vindo ao inferno na terra" (Welcome To Hell On Earth) (WTHOE). A ênfase hoje em dia é sempre sobre direitos humanos, mas é claro que se a civilização é ter uma chance, as responsabilidades humanas devem substituir os direitos humanos. Ninguém recebe direitos sem ser um cidadão responsável e a primeira coisa que isto significa é a destruição ambiental do minimo. A responsabilidade mais básica não é nenhuma criança, a menos que sua sociedade lhe peça para produzi-las. Uma sociedade ou um mundo que permite que as pessoas se reproduzem aleatoriamente serão sempre exploradas por genes egoístas até que ela desmorona (ou atinge um ponto onde a vida é tão horrível que não vale a pena viver). Se a sociedade continua a manter os direitos humanos como primários, a seus descendentes pode-se dizer com confiança "WTHOE". Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3ª Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) e outras. (shrink)

The use of armed drones in post-9/11 US military conflicts has increasingly been the subject of academic writings; few, however, examine its collateral effects from a biopolitically-framed, phenomenological lens. This article examines how the indeterminate field of threat produced and sustained by the preventive military paradigm of drone warfare transforms potential threats into determinate targets of military violence. The spatial disruption experienced by inhabitants of the "space of death" generated by the "drone zone" thus transforms their existential comportment of living (...) under drones into that of 'walking corpses' whose relationships to space expose the devastating phenomenological consequences of drone warfare. (shrink)

The present article studies the epictetean philosophical use of some passages of the Greek and Roman history. The concepts of love-friendship (philía) and personal con- venience (sumphéron) second the philosopher to explain why happiness (eudaimonía) has not been reached by the human being in all history. All historical war or strife (pólemos), such as the Trojan, the Medics and the Peloponnesian wars, is provoked by epistemological-moral mistakes derived from the ignorance of which is the correct place to put the sumphéron; (...) such correct place is only the personal “rational capacity” ( proháiresis). This causal explanation of the incorrect and vicious human actions, of which history is full and which destroy the existent philía between nations and provoke pólemos, constitutes an authentic epictetean philosophy of history. Nevertheless, those vicious actions have a justification in a superior Cosmological level because they are pre-determined and ordered by the God-Providence. This leads us to the possibility of observing that the stoic philosophy of history, particularly the epictetean, is analogous to some modern speculative systems of history like the ones developed by Vico or Hegel. (shrink)

Though the duties of care owed toward innocents in war and in civil life are at the bottom univocally determined by the same ethical principles, Bazargan-Forward argues that those very principles will yield in these two contexts different “in-practice” duties. Furthermore, the duty of care we owe toward our own innocents is less stringent than the duty of care we owe toward foreign innocents in war. This is because risks associated with civil life but not war (a) often increase the (...) expected welfare of the individuals upon whom the risk is imposed, (b) are often imposed with consent, and (c) are often imposed reciprocally. The conclusion—that we have a pro tanto reason for adopting a more stringent standard of risk imposition toward foreign innocents in war—has implications for not only what standards of risk we should adopt in war, but also how we should weigh domestic versus foreign civilian lives. (shrink)

More work has gone into thinking about the philosophical justifications for starting a just war than bringing political violence to an end. The papers in this special section explore themes in Nir Eisikovits’s groundbreaking book A Theory of Truces and why truces deserve greater philosophical attention. This introduction briefly raises these issues and provides an overview of the papers.

The origins and consequences of warfare or largescale intergroup violence have been subject of long debate. Based on exhaustive surveys of skeletal remains for prehistoric hunter-gatherers and agriculturists in Japan, the present study examines levels of inferred violence and their implications for two different evolutionary models, i.e., parochial altruism model and subsistence model. The former assumes that frequent warfare played an important role in the evolution of altruism and the latter sees warfare as promoted by social changes induced by agriculture. (...) Our results are inconsistent with the parochial altruism model but consistent with the subsistence model, although the mortality values attributable to violence between hunter-gatherers and agriculturists were comparable. (shrink)

Although humans qualify as one of the most cooperative animal species, the scale of violent intergroup conflict among them is unparalleled. Explanations of the underlying motivations to participate in an intergroup conflict, however, remain unsatisfactory. While previous research shows that intergroup conflict increases individually costly behavior to the benefit of the in-group, it has failed to identify robust triggers of aggressive behavior directed at out-groups. Here, we present a controlled laboratory experiment which demonstrates that such aggression can be provoked systematically (...) by manipulating the extent to which the own group is perceived to be on the offensive or the defensive side of a conflict. We find direct and causal evidence that the motivation to protect the in-group is not only a predictor of retaliatory aggression, but also promotes preemptive offensive actions against out-groups if they pose a potential threat. This finding improves our understanding of the escalation of intergroup conflicts and may have important implications for their prevention, as we find in our experiment that removing out-group threat substantially reduced intergroup aggression and led to full peace. (shrink)

Whether man is predisposed to lethal violence, ranging from homicide to warfare, and how that may have impacted human evolution, are among the most controversial topics of debate on human evolution. Although recent studies on the evolution of warfare have been based on various archaeological and ethnographic data, they have reported mixed results: it is unclear whether or notwarfare among prehistoric hunter–gathererswas common enough to be a component of human nature and a selective pressure for the evolution of human behaviour. (...) This paper reports the mortality attributable to violence, and the spatio-temporal pattern of violence thus shown among ancient hunter–gatherers using skeletal evidence in prehistoric Japan (the Jomon period: 13 000 cal BC–800 cal BC). Our results suggest that the mortality due to violence was low and spatio-temporally highly restricted in the Jomon period, which implies that violence including warfare in prehistoric Japan was not common. (shrink)

I address a foundational problem with accounts of the morality of war that are derived from the Just War Tradition. Such accounts problematically focus on ‘the moment of crisis’: i.e. when a state is considering a resort to war. This is problematic because sometimes the state considering the resort to war is partly responsible for wrongly creating the conditions in which the resort to war becomes necessary. By ignoring this possibility, JWT effectively ignores, in its moral evaluation of wars, certain (...) types of past wrongdoing. I argue that we can address this problem by incorporating an account of compensatory liability into an account of the morality of war. Doing so yields the view that, if we have culpably failed to compensate victims for past wrongs, we might be morally required to weigh the well-being of those victims more heavily in our calculation of proportionality when determining the permissibility of a defensive act that harms the victim as a side-effect. This, in turn, makes satisfying t. (shrink)

Although humans qualify as one of the most cooperative animal species, the scale of violent intergroup conflict among them is unparalleled. Explanations of the underlying motivation to participate in an intergroup conflict, however, remain unsatisfactory. While previous research shows that intergroup conflict increases ‘in-group love’, it fails to identify robust triggers of ‘out-group hate’. Here, we present a controlled laboratory experiment, which demonstrates that ‘out-group hate’ can be provoked systematically. We find direct and causal evidence that the intention to protect (...) the in-group is not only a crucial motivator of ‘out-group hate’ in defensive reactions, but also promotes preemptive offensive actions against out-group threat. Hence, the strength of ‘out-group hate’ depends on whether the own group is perceived to be on the offensive or the defensive side of the conflict. This finding improves our understanding of the escalation of intergroup conflicts and may have important implications for their prevention, as we find in our experiment that removing out-group threat substantially reduces intergroup aggression, leading to full peace. (shrink)

We report three studies which test a sexual selection hypothesis for male war heroism. Based on evolutionary theories of mate choice we hypothesize that men signal their fitness through displaying heroism in combat. First, we report the results of an archival study on US-American soldiers who fought in World War II. We compare proxies for reproductive success between a control sample of 449 regular veterans and 123 surviving Medal of Honor recipients of WWII. Results suggest that the heroes sired more (...) offspring than the regular veterans. Supporting a causal link between war heroism and mating success, we then report the results of two experimental studies. We find evidence that female participants specifically regard men more sexually attractive if they are war heroes. This effect is absent for male participants judging female war heroes, suggesting that bravery in war is a gender specific signal. Finally, we discuss possible implications of our results. (shrink)

Humans are one of the most cooperative and altruistic species on the planet. At the same time, humans have a long history of violent and deadly intergroup conflicts, i.e. wars. Recently, contemporary evolutionary theorists have revived Charles Darwin’s idea that human in-group altruism and out-group hostility might have co-evolved. Groups with more cooperatively aggressive men, they suggest, were more likely to prevail in the frequent lethal quarrels of human pre-history, and these men, therefore, more likely to have passed on their (...) genes. After a short introduction to evolutionary perspectives on war heroism, we describe selected characteristics of 988 modern war heroes, the US-American Medal of Honor recipients of WWI, WWII, the Korean and the Vietnam War, and discuss whether an evolutionary perspective can help us understand why these men risked their lives ‘beyond the call of duty’. (shrink)

Since cyberattacks are nonphysical, standard theories of casus belli — which typically rely on the violent and forceful nature of military means — appear inapplicable. Yet, some theorists have argued that cyberattacks nonetheless can constitute just causes for war — generating a unilateral right to defensive military action — when they cause significant physical damage through the disruption of the target's computer systems. I show that this view suffers from a serious drawback: it is too permissive concerning the types of (...) actions that generate casus belli since many essentially peaceful and non-violent mechanisms can nonetheless cause physical damage. I resolve this difficulty by developing a sovereignty-based account of casus belli and applying it to cyberwarfare. I argue that legitimate states have a constrained right to unilaterally respond with military force to unfriendly actions that bypass or overwhelm the political deliberations of the target state in order to force a change in behaviour contrary to the determinations of the people of the target state. This new account of casus belli avoids the problems of the consequence-based view by plausibly restricting the types of unfriendly action that give rise to casus belli and yet offers an attractive explanation for why some cyberattacks nonetheless do generate a potential right to a unilateral defensive response. (shrink)

The destruction wrought by even just wars lends undeniable appeal to radical pacifism, according to which all wars are unjust. Yet radical pacifism is fundamentally flawed. In the past decade, a moderate and more defensible form of pacifism has emerged. According to what has been called ‘contingent pacifism’, it is very unlikely that it is morally permissible to wage any given war. This chapter develops the doctrine of contingent pacifism by distinguishing and developing various versions of it, and by assessing (...) the merits and drawbacks of each. According to ‘proportionality-based’ contingent pacifism, almost all wars with just causes are unjust ‘tout court’ because the in bello harms such wars impose on the innocent are too great relative to the relevant evils averted by achieving the war’s aims. After arguing against this view, the chapter introduces a novel, more defensible form of contingent pacifism, called ‘epistemic-based’ contingent pacifism, according to which the prevalence of mistaken judgements regarding the justness of wars, combined with the devastating harmfulness of unjust wars, requires imposing prohibitions against waging war, where the strength of the prohibition varies according to whether the government has a history of mistakes or deception regarding the justness of wars. (shrink)

Drawing on an idea proposed by Darwin, it has recently been hypothesised that violent intergroup conflict might have played a substantial role in the evolution of human cooperativeness and altruism. The central notion of this argument, dubbed ‘parochial altruism’, is that the two genetic or cultural traits, aggressiveness against out-groups and cooperativeness towards the in-group, including self-sacrificial altruistic behaviour, might have coevolved in humans. This review assesses the explanatory power of current theories of ‘parochial altruism’. After a brief synopsis of (...) the existing literature, two pitfalls in the interpretation of the most widely used models are discussed: potential direct benefits and high relatedness between group members implicitly induced by assumptions about conflict structure and frequency. Then, a number of simplifying assumptions made in the construction of these models are pointed out which currently limit their explanatory power. Next, relevant empirical evidence from several disciplines which could guide future theoretical extensions is reviewed. Finally, selected alternative accounts of evolutionary links between intergroup conflict and intragroup cooperation are briefly discussed which could be integrated with parochial altruism in the future. (shrink)

Building on and partially refining previous theoretical work, this paper presents an extended simulation model of ancestral warfare. This model (1) disentangles attack and defense, (2) tries to differentiate more strictly between selfish and altruistic efforts during war, (3) incorporates risk aversion and deterrence, and (4) pays special attention to the role of brutality. Modeling refinements and simulation results yield a differentiated picture of possible evolutionary dynamics. The main observations are: (i) Altruism in this model is more likely to evolve (...) for defenses than for attacks. (ii) Risk aversion, deterrence and the interplay of migration levels and brutality can change evolutionary dynamics substantially. (iii) Unexpectedly, one occasional simulation outcome is a dynamically stable state of ‘tolerated intergroup theft’, raising the question if corresponding patterns also exist in real intergroup conflicts. Finally, possible implications for theories of the co-evolution of bellicosity and altruism in humans are discussed. (shrink)

Przemocy jest coraz mniej – zarówno w czasie pokoju, jak i podczas wojen. Na przykładzie trzech konfliktów zbrojnych z ostatnich lat zastanawiam się, czy decydenci powinni prowadzić działania zbrojne w taki sposób, by zminimalizować całkowitą liczbę ofiar. Pokazuję, że ani obowiązujące obecnie normy prawa międzynarodowego, ani osądy moralne na temat dopuszczalności stosowania przemocy nie wymagają od decydentów ograniczania całkowitej liczby ofiar konfliktów zbrojnych w każdym przypadku.

According to “epistemic-based contingent pacifism” a) there are virtually no wars which we know to be just, and b) it is morally impermissible to wage a war unless we know that the war is just. Thus it follows that there is no war which we are morally permitted to wage. The first claim (a) seems to follow from widespread disagreement among just war theorists over which wars, historically, have been just. I will argue, however, that a source of our inability (...) to confidently distinguish just from unjust wars lies in how we evaluate “morally heterogeneous” wars—i.e., wars with just and unjust aims. Specifically, the practice of reaching a univocal evaluation of a morally heterogeneous war as a whole by aggregating the evaluations of that war’s just and unjust aims is wrongheaded, because it undermines the action-guiding character of jus ad bellum. We ought instead to adopt what I call the “disaggregate approach” to jus ad bellum, according to which we evaluate the various aims of a war individually, without aggregating them into an evaluation of the war as a whole. Adopting this approach will eliminate a source of our disagreement over which wars have been just, and will ipso fact eliminate a basis for epistemic-based contingent pacifism. (shrink)

Book review of Peter French's "War and Moral Dissonance".

What are emergencies and why do they matter? In this chapter (in its penultimate version), I seek to outline the morally significant features of the concept of emergency, and demonstrate how these features generate corresponding first- and second-order challenges and responsibilities for those in a position to do something about them. In section A, I contend that emergencies are situations in which there is a risk of serious harm and a need to react urgently if that harm is to be (...) averted or minimized. These conceptual features matter morally, since it is precisely to them that those who invoke emergencies to justify otherwise impermissible actions tend to appeal. The basic first-order challenge facing emergency responders is two-fold. It is, first, to identify how these features shape circumstances of action in ways that affect (or do not affect) which reasons for action and which corresponding courses of conduct are justifiably available to them. In situations when emergency responders are compelled to make authoritative determinations due to significant contestability and indeterminacies in the contours or materialization of the said features, their challenge is then also to make these determinations legitimately. In section B, I argue that second-order challenges having to do with the foreseeability of emergencies, the value(s) of exposure to them, and their preventability further compound the predicament of emergency responders. I conclude, in section C, by saying a few words about one last morally salient feature shared by many, though not all, emergencies considered in the chapter — namely, their public dimension. (shrink)

British popular newspapers were fascinated by the terrible power of the nuclear bomb, and they devoted countless articles, editorials and cartoons to it. In so doing, they played a significant role in shaping the nuclear culture of the post-war period. Yet scholars have given little sustained attention to this rich seam of material. This article makes a contribution to remedying this major gap by offering an overview of the coverage of nuclear weaponry in the two most popular newspapers in Britain, (...) the Daily Express and the Daily Mirror, in the period from 1945 to the early 1960s. Although both papers supported British possession of the bomb, claiming that it was essential for the maintenance of great-power status, their reporting was more complex and critical than the existing scholarship has tended to assume. This article argues that sceptical voices in the press often disrupted official narratives and that journalists emphasized the potential dangers involved in the nuclear arms race. Newspapers frequently highlighted, rather than downplayed, the horrors of the bomb: it was repeatedly portrayed as a ‘monster’ threatening the world. (shrink)

The nuclear age had a profound impact on politics and international affairs. More fundamentally, it altered the way people saw the planet and their relationship with it. These attitudes changed gradually in the post-war period, with the 1960s a key transitional moment. This article explores these changing attitudes towards the environment within the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament . At the beginning of the 1960s CND's concerns about nuclear testing and fallout fit easily into the dominant anthropocentric view of the environment. (...) However, by the end of the decade they espoused a much more holistic, even ecocentric, attitude. This article examines how attitudes towards the environment were changing in the 1960s through a close examination of attitudes within CND, and argues that the modern environmental movement was a product of the nuclear age. (shrink)

Introduction -- Cosmopolitanism -- Collective self-defense -- Subsistence wars -- Humanitarian intervention -- Commodified wars -- Asymmetrical wars -- Conclusion.

Abstract In the last 20 years the ruthless competition for natural resources, political instability, armed conflicts, and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 have paved the way for private military and security companies (PMSCs) to operate in areas which were until recently the preserve of the state. PMSCs, less regulated than the toy industry, commit grave human rights violations with impunity. The United Nations has elaborated an international binding instrument to regulate their activities but the opposition of the U.S., U.K., and (...) other Western governments?and from PMSCs, which prefer self-regulation?have prevented any advancement. (shrink)

Without doubt, terrorism is one of the most vehemently debated subjects in current political affairs as well as in academic discourse. Yet, although it constitutes an issue of general socio-political interest, neither in everyday language nor in professional (political, legal, or academic) contexts does there exist a generally accepted definition of terrorism. The question of how it should be defined has been answered countless times, with as much variety as quantity in the answers. In academic discourse, it is difficult to (...) find two scholars who use the term ‘terrorism’ in the same way. -/- While it is impossible to formulate a definition which satisfies everyone, discussing the definition question is indispensable. The necessity to review existing definitions with a view to improving them is especially obvious in legal and political contexts. How terrorism is defined in these contexts has serious consequences, and if we lack clear definitions we run into problems. How can we have laws or take political measures against something we have not clearly defined? Without doubt, there exists a practical necessity for a definition in these fields. It is important to have clear standards for defining terrorism. -/- In my view, the definition should meet three basic criteria: first, it should cover those cases that we concurrently consider to be instances of terrorism (such as the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in September 2001 or those on commuting trains in Madrid Atocha in March 2004). That is, ideally, our definition of terrorism remains close to uncontroversial usages of the term. Second, the definition should abstain from morally judging the act in question. Later I will say more about so called “moral” definitions of terrorism. For now, it suffices to say that defining an action and evaluating it are distinct tasks and should remain so. Third, the definition must identify characteristics that are specific to terrorism alone, characteristics which clearly distinguish it from other phenomena. (shrink)

The notion of biopolitical sovereignty and the theory of the state of exception are perspectives derived from Carl Schmitt’s thought and Michel Foucault’s writings that have been popularized by critical political theorists like Giorgio Agamben and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri of late. This article argues that these perspectives are not sufficient analytical points of departure for a critique of the contemporary politics of terror, violence and war marked by a growing global exploitation of bodies, tightened management of life, and (...) endless and unpredictable abusive force. To better capture the singularity of our present condition of violence, war and terror, a supplementation of Schmitt’s and Foucault’s approaches by way of Hannah Arendt’s language of political action and agonistic engagement is useful. By bringing Arendt’s language of political agony to bear on contemporary biopolitical debates and discourses, we wish to revisit common practices of war and terror as matters of ‘agonal sovereignty’. ‘Agonal sovereignty’ allows us to peer into the ‘abyss of total violence’ that manifests itself after sovereign decisionism and biopolitical modalities of power have taken over the everyday conduct of political affairs. (shrink)

Common sense suggests that if a war is unjust, then there is a strong moral reason not to contribute to it. I argue that this presumption is mistaken. It can be permissible to contribute to an unjust war because, in general, whether it is permissible to perform an act often depends on the alternatives available to the actor. The relevant alternatives available to a government waging a war differ systematically from the relevant alternatives available to individuals in a position to (...) contribute to the war. Hence the conditions determining whether it is permissible for a government to wage a war often differ from the conditions determining whether it is permissible for others to promote that war. This difference is manifest most often in unjust wars with putatively humanitarian aims—an increasingly common type of war. (shrink)

Bringing together contributors from philosophy, international relations, security studies, and strategic studies, New Wars and New Soldiers offers a truly interdisciplinary analysis reflective of the nature of modern warfare. This comprehensive approach allows the reader to see the broad scope of modern military ethics, and to understand the numerous questions about modern conflict that require critical scrutiny. Aimed at both military and academic audiences, this paperback will be of significant interest to researchers and students in philosophy, sociology, military and strategic (...) studies, international relations, politics, and security studies, acting as an ideal course text or as supplementary reading. (shrink)

Non-uniformed combat morally infringes on civilians’ fundamental right to immunity and exacts an impermissible form of unofficial conscription that is morally prohibited even if the civilians knowingly consent to it. It is often argued that revolutionary groups burdened by resource disparities relative to the state or who claim alternative sources of political legitimacy (such as national self-determination or the constitution of a political collective) are justified in using unconventional tactics such as non-uniformed combat. Neither those reasons nor the provision of (...) public goods, however, are sufficient to justify such rights violations and this form of conscription, and it calls into question the suitability of current international legal protections for the non-uniformed. (shrink)

This book examines the role of military virtues in today's armed forces. -/- Although long-established military virtues, such as honor, courage and loyalty, are what most armed forces today still use as guiding principles in an effort to enhance the moral behavior of soldiers, much depends on whether the military virtues adhered to by these militaries suit a particular mission or military operation. Clearly, the beneficiaries of these military virtues are the soldiers themselves, fellow-soldiers, and military organizations, yet there is (...) little that regulates the behavior of soldiers towards civilian populations. As a result, troops trained for combat in today's missions sometimes experience difficulty in adjusting to the less aggressive ways of working needed to win the hearts and minds of local populations after major combat is over. It can be argued that today's missions call for virtues that are more inclusive than the traditional ones, which are mainly about enhancing military effectiveness, but a convincing case can be made that a lot can already be won by interpreting these traditional virtues in different ways. -/- This volume offers an integrated approach to the main traditional virtues, exploring their possible relevance and proposing new ways of interpretation that are more in line with the military tasks of the 21st century. -/- The book will be of much interest to students of military ethics, philosophy, and war and conflict in general. (shrink)

Plato arguably stands as one of the precursors to what we today know as the Just War Tradition, and he has more to say about ethics and the use of force than what is often acknowledged. In this article I try to show, by analyzing selected passages and perspectives from the Republic, that Plato regards the role of military ethics as crucial in the construction of the ideal city, and he sees limitation of brutality and more generally a philosophical approach (...) to the use of force as crucial elements of the city’s approach to warfare. Military power and, indeed, harsh preparations for it do occupy a central position in Plato’s political thought, but use of armed force is at the same time closely linked to the virtue of justice as well as the other virtues. (shrink)

W artykule wykażę, że szeroko rozpowszechnione poglądy na temat norm, które obowiązują żółnierzy na wojnie, pozostają w sprzeczności z moralnością ogólną. Etyka wojny dopuszcza działania, które w zwyczajnych sytuacjach nie tylko są uznawane za moralnie niedopuszczalne, ale wydają się czynami godnymi najwyższego moralnego potępienia. Zwracam uwagę na dwie wybrane rozbieżności między etyką ogólną a etyką wojny, tj. na problem związany z istnieniem asymetrii pomiędzy atakującymi i atakowanymi oraz na kwestię tego, kto jest właściwym celem moralnie usprawiedliwionego aktu przemocy. Odrzucając stanowiska (...) skrajne (realizm w stosunkach międzynarodowych i różne odmiany pacyfizmu), uznaję, że możliwe są dwa rozwiązania problemu tych rozbieśności: albo godzimy się na status quo, czyli mocną niezgodność etyki wojny z etyki ogólną, albo uznajemy, że należy znacząco przeformułować tradycyjną etykę wojny, a być może także obowiązujące normy prawa międzynarodowego. (shrink)

The paper first demonstrates the ability to provode objective data and analyses during war and then examines the need for such objective gathering of data and analysis in the context of mass violence and war, specifically in the 2009 Gaza War. That data and analysis is required to assess compliance with just war norms in assessing the conduct of the war, a framework quite distinct from human rights norms that can misapply and deform the application of norms such as proportionality (...) and obligations not to target civilians. (shrink)

In discussing warfare we tend to maintain a theoretical cleavage between the "home front" and the "battle front" that is supposed to parallel the physical distance that separates them. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the academic literature that surrounds World War I, with each discipline for decades having studied its correspondent aspect of the war. While this has provided us with incredibly detailed research into the minutiae of battles and the changing attitudes of the masses, it has done (...) little to help us combine these details into a full-scale picture of what was actually experienced by civilians and soldiers alike. Therefore this paper will instead attempt an interdisciplinary approach to understanding this war by looking at the alarmism that helped lead to the war and the censorship and propaganda campaigns that helped shape it. Thus it will be shown that only by returning to the concerted efforts of politicians and journalists years before the war can we see how the "war to end all war" eventually led to the creation of "shell shock" and the loss of a generation. (shrink)

The classic opening scene of 2001, A Space Odyssey shows an ape-man wreaking havoc with humanity's first invention--a bone used as a weapon to kill a rival. It's an image that fits well with popular notions of our species as inherently violent, with the idea that humans are--and always have been--warlike by nature. But as Douglas P. Fry convincingly argues in Beyond War , the facts show that our ancient ancestors were not innately warlike--and neither are we.

Antologia tekstów poświęconych etycznym aspektom agresji i przemocy stosowanej przez państwo. Obejmuje teksty najwybitniejszych naukowców z dziedziny etyki praktycznej i filozofii politycznej.

Abstract. This paper combines reflections on the current "state of war" in the Middle East with an epistemological discussion of the meaning and implications of the category "war" itself, in order to dissipate the confusions arising from the idea of a "War on Terror." The first part illustrates the insufficiency of the ideal type involved in dichotomies which are implicit in the naming and classifications of wars. They point nevertheless to a deeper problem which concerns the antinomic character of a (...) collective institution of violence. The second part discusses the extent to which, in spite of the historical transformations in the means and political objectives of wars, the contemporary confrontation still obeys the rules of warfare described by Clausewitz, particularly with respect to temporality ("friction"). The third part discusses "non-clausewitzian" aspects of the "new wars" defined by Martin Van Creveld and Mary Kaldor, while suggesting that they have left aside the most salient contradiction illustrated by the US interventions, which results from the combination of a claim to universal sovereignty and a reduction of war to generalized police operations. (shrink)