Introduction -- Cosmopolitanism -- Collective self-defense -- Subsistence wars -- Humanitarian intervention -- Commodified wars -- Asymmetrical wars -- Conclusion.

International law and conventional morality grant that states may stand ready to defend their borders with lethal force. But what grounds the permission to kill for the sake of political sovereignty and territorial integrity? In this book leading theorists address this vexed issue, and set the terms of future debate over national defence.

Quels peuvent être les enjeux contemporains d'une philosophie des valeurs dans le contexte éducatif? Quelles sont les valeurs éducatives convoquées dans les discours sur l'éducation aujourd'hui? Sur quels modes le sont-elles? Trois grandes parties structurent cet ouvrage : Philosophie de la valeur, Repenser les valeurs et Focus sur quelques valeurs. [Source : 4e de couv.].

Excerpt from Une Nouvelle Figure du Monde: Les Theories d'Einstein M. Brillouin a bien voulu egalement indiquer lui - meme son point de vue aum lecteurs du present ouvrage; on trouvera sa lettre en appendice. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present (...) in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

"On ne cesse d'oublier d'aller jusqu'au fondement. On ne pose pas assez profond les points d'interrogation", écrivait Wittgenstein. L'oeuvre de Francis Jacques est une franche réplique à cette "remarque". Aussi occupe-t-elle une place originale dans la philosophie de notre temps. L'entreprise était audacieuse ; et elle devait être innovante. Les obstacles philosophiques étaient nombreux ; il fallait les reconnaître et les interroger jusqu'à leurs plus profondes racines. La démarche analytique, en l'occurrence, a fait merveille. Elle ne fut qu'un point de (...) départ. Mais il était décisif parce qu'il conduisait à bouleverser l'échiquier sur lequel la tradition des siècles avait construit ses systèmes philosophiques. Sur le chemin ainsi frayé, l'espace logique de l'interlocution a supplanté le subjectivisme-roi des philosophies de la conscience. L'exploration du dialogisme communicationnel a été la voie d'un questionnement approfondi qui, d'un point de vue métaphysique, a découvert la relation comme source originaire et fondationnelle de la pensée. À cette source pure puise l'exigence transcendantale qui, alliée aux structures formelles du travail de la pensée, commande l'érection du sens. En faisant du questionnement patiemment poursuivi l'activité génétique et critique de la pensée, l'interrogation radicale est devenue, en raison de sa portée ontologique, une élévation spirituelle. Aussi la sagesse peut-elle désormais défier les pathologies qui gangrènent les manifestations de l'existence. L'horizon s'éclaire de la lumière divine : il est un lieu de confiance et d'espérance. Au processus de "dé-construction" généralisée que développent aujourd'hui tant d'ouvrages, l'oeuvre de Francis Jacques oppose le mouvement d'une reconstruction spirituelle que commande, outre l'alliance hardie de la logique et de la métaphysique, l'écoute de la théologie. En fouillant les puissances originaires de l'interrogativité dont l'intégralité et la radicalité font la noblesse de la pensée, elle trace l'itinéraire au long duquel elle propose, contre la désespérance d'un temps de crise, de philosopher autrement pour retrouver les repères effacés et reconquérir, sur le chemin de l'Absolu, l'humanité perdue de l'homme. C'est un recommencement. (shrink)

La 4e de couverture indique : "Les textes de droit envahissent, aujourd'hui plus que jamais, notre vie quotidienne : des constitutions aux lois, des codes aux règlements, ils prennent une autorité si forte que, dans leur extrême diversité, ils forment une sorte de canevas régulateur tel qu'il existe bien peu de situations ou d'actions humaines qui lui échappent. Devant ce constat, il n'est pas possible de rester indifférent : si la textualité du droit se présente d'abord comme un objet graphique (...) qu'explore la sémiotique, elle s'offre aussi et surtout comme un objet philosophique dont la sémantique a charge, parmi les termes usités, les symboles, les structures, les accentuations, les constructions syntaxiques, les relations et les opérateurs logiques, de saisir le sens profond. La recherche philosophique doit être plus exigeante encore : en effet, par leur manifestation, leur organisation, leur signification, les textes font parler le droit. Aussi bien, par-delà l'analytique formelle qui en scrute l'écriture, l'interrogation qui les soumet à une critique transcendantale livre la fondation première et la fin ultime de la juridicité. A la lumière de cette enquête transcendantale, il apparaît que, dans le domaine immense de la production des oeuvres de l'esprit, la textualité du droit ne procède pas, à l'instar du problème scientifique, de l'énigme littéraropoétique ou du mystère théologique, de l'irréductibilité d'un type sui generis d'écriture ; elle n'est possible et valide que si elle plonge ses racines dans le terreau de la philosophie première qui lui apporte ses présuppositions et ses exigences fondamentales. Voilà qui permet de comprendre enfin que le conflit séculaire entre le droit et la philosophie n'a pas lieu d'être.". (shrink)

Given the fact that the history of our brain is a long history of interfaces, connections and exchanges, this text aims to reveal the collective nature of the process involved by and within learning. In fact, the person who learns can only cross-learn: irrespective of the field of learning, he learns across, between and beyond.2 The cross-disciplinary approach suggested in the present study focuses on learning a foreign language.

This paper argues that, if one thinks that the needy have a right to the material resources they need in order to lead decent lives, one must be committed, in some cases, to conferring on the sick a right that the healthy give them some of the body parts they need to lead such a life. I then assess two objections against that view, to wit: to confer on the sick a right to the live body parts of the healthy (...) violates the bodily integrity of the latter; and constitutes too much of an interference in their life. I conclude that although the sick sometimes have a right to some of the body parts of the healthy, the latter still retain a considerable degree of autonomy. (shrink)

Do we have the right to deny others access to our body? What if this would harm those who need personal services or body parts from us? Ccile Fabre examines the impact that arguments for distributive justice have on the rights we have over ourselves, and on such contentious issues as organ sales, prostitution, and surrogate motherhood.

According to the doxastic wrongs thesis, holding certain beliefs about others can be morally wrongful. Beliefs which take the form of stereotypes based on race and gender and which turn out to be false and are negatively valenced are prime candidates for the charge of doxastic wronging: it is no coincidence that most of the cases discussed in the literature involve false beliefs. My aim in this paper is to show that the thesis of doxastic wrongs does not turn on (...) the truth-value or valence of beliefs. (shrink)

Cécile Fabre draws back the curtain on the ethics of espionage and counterintelligence. In a book rich with historical examples she argues that spying is only justified to protect against ongoing violations of fundamental rights. Blackmail, bribery, mass surveillance, cyberespionage, treason, and other nefarious activities are considered.

In his recent Rescuing Justice and Equality, G. A. Cohen mounts a sustained critique of coerced labour, against the background of a radical egalitarian conception of distributive justice. In this article, I argue that Cohenian egalitarians are committed to holding the talented under a moral duty to choose socially useful work for the sake of the less fortunate. As I also show, Cohen's arguments against coerced labour fail, particularly in the light of his commitment to coercive taxation. In the course (...) of defending those claims, I claim that Cohen's remarks on freedom of occupational choice and taxation exhibit partiality towards the interests of the better-off to the detriment of the less fortunate – a partiality which is in tension with his commitment to equality. (shrink)

Dans le cadre imposé par les nouvelles formes du capitalisme, de la marchandisation du savoir et des formes de vie, les concepts d'émancipation, d'aliénation et de reconnaissance retrouvent une nouvelle fonction critique. Cela ne signifie pas que l'on puisse faire un usage naïf et unilatéral de ces concepts, en les opposant simplement aux concepts issus du libéralisme, à commencer par le concept même de liberté. Loin des débats métaphysiques sur le libre-arbitre, ce livre, issu de travaux du séminaire de philosophie (...) de l'éducation du Centre de Recherche en Education de Nantes (CREN), travaille les problèmes actuels de l'éducation à l'aide d'outils intellectuels disponibles dans la tradition philosophique - qu'elle soit antique, moderne ou contemporaine - en les confrontant, au besoin, à des études historiques, sociologiques ou pédagogiques. Ce livre fournit dans sa première partie plusieurs instruments de travail autour de l'aliénation et de l'émancipation, et présente en seconde partie quelques-uns des problèmes que pose la reconnaissance de la liberté, comme but de l'éducation dans le contexte contemporain. Toutefois ces dernières ne sont pas des applications de positions théoriques défendues dans la première. Les contributions sélectionnées ont fait l'objet d'une discussion collective et ont été ensuite retravaillées par les auteurs. Chaque texte revendique son ancrage philosophique propre et développe son questionnement de manière autonome, l'unité relevant plutôt d'un processus de réécriture interactive. (shrink)

This book articulates a cosmopolitan theory of the principles which ought to regulate belligerents' conduct in the aftermath of war. Throughout, it relies on the fundamental principle that all human beings, wherever they reside, have rights to the freedoms and resources which they need to lead a flourishing life, and that national and political borders are largely irrelevant to the conferral of those rights. With that principle in hand, the book provides a normative defence of restitutive and reparative justice, the (...) punishment of war criminals, the resort to transitional foreign administration as a means to govern war-torn territories, and the deployment of peacekeeping and occupation forces. It also outlines various reconciliatory and commemorative practices which might facilitate the emergence of trust amongst enemies and thereby improve prospects for peace. The book offers analytical arguments and normative conclusions, with many historical and/or contemporary examples. (shrink)

In response to commentators, we argue that whether waiving patent rights will meaningfully improve access to COVID-19 vaccines for low income and middle-income countries (LMICs), particularly in the short term, is an empirical matter. We also reject preferentially allocating vaccines to countries that hosted trials because doing so unethically favours those with research infrastructure, rather than those facing the worst burdens from COVID-19.

AI systems are bringing an augmentation of human capabilities to shape the world. They may also drag a replacement of human conscience in large chunks of life. AI systems can be designed to leave moral control in human hands, to obstruct or diminish that moral control, or even to prevent it, replacing human morality with pre-packaged or developed ‘solutions’ by the ‘intelligent’ machine itself. Artificial Intelligent systems (AIS) are increasingly being used in multiple applications and receiving more attention from the (...) public and private organisations. The purpose of this article is to offer a mapping of the technological architectures that support AIS, under the specific focus of the moral agency. Through a literature research and reflection process, the following areas are covered: a brief introduction and review of the literature on the topic of moral agency; an analysis using the BDI logic model (Bratman 1987); an elemental review of artificial ‘reasoning’ architectures in AIS; the influence of the data input and the data quality; AI systems’ positioning in decision support and decision making scenarios; and finally, some conclusions are offered about regarding the potential loss of moral control by humans due to AIS. This article contributes to the field of Ethics and Artificial Intelligence by providing a discussion for developers and researchers to understand how and under what circumstances the ‘human subject’ may, totally or partially, lose moral control and ownership over AI technologies. The topic is relevant because AIS often are not single machines but complex networks of machines that feed information and decisions into each other and to human operators. The detailed traceability of input-process-output at each node of the network is essential for it to remain within the field of moral agency. Moral agency is then at the basis of our system of legal responsibility, and social approval is unlikely to be obtained for entrusting important functions to complex systems under which no moral agency can be identified. (shrink)

The book theoretically examines the recent and topical debates over democracy and social rights, arguing that there are four fundamental rights that should be constitutionalized; minimum income; housing; healthcare; and education. The theoretical discussion is explored within an analysis of important legal cases.

Just war theorists who argue that war is morally justified under certain circumstances infer implicitly that establishing the military institutions needed to wage war is also morally justified. In this paper, I mount a case in favor of a standing military establishment: to the extent that going to war is a way to discharge duties to protect fellow citizens and distant strangers from grievous harms, we have a duty to set up the institutions that enable us to discharge that duty. (...) I then respond to four objections drawn from Ned Dobos's recent book Ethics, Security, and the War-Machine. (shrink)

This article argues that we must sever the ethics of war termination from the ethics of war initiation: a belligerent who embarks on a just war at time t1 might be under a duty to sue for peace at t2 before it has achieved its just war aims; conversely, a belligerent who embarks on an unjust war at t1 might acquire a justification for continuing at t2. In the course of making that argument, the article evaluates the various ways in (...) which belligerents end their wars. (shrink)

Many believe that agent-centred considerations, unlike agent-neutral reasons, cannot show that victims have the right to kill their attackers in self-defence, let alone establish that rescuers have the right to come to their help. In this paper, I argue that the right to kill in self- or other-defence is best supported by a hybrid set of reasons. In particular, agent-centred considerations account for the plausible intuition that victims have a special stake, which other parties lack, in being to thwart the (...) attackers. That special stake plays an important part justifying victims' right to obtain help, and rescuers' right to give it. (shrink)

Should governments give special rights to ethnic and cultural minorities? Should rich countries open their borders to economic immigrants or transfer resources to poor countries? When framing and implementing economic and environmental policies, should current generations take into account the interests of future generations? If our political community committed a wrong against another group a hundred years ago, do we owe reparations to current members of that group? These are just some of the pressing questions which are fully explored in (...) this accessible new analysis of justice in the contemporary world. They force us to reconsider the extent of our obligations to our fellow citizens, future generations and foreigners. Justice in a Changing World introduces the moral debates around issues such as immigration, national self-determination, cultural rights and reparations, as well as resource transfers from one generation to the next and from rich to poor countries, through the lenses of liberalism, communitarianism and libertarianism. In so doing, it helps to unravel the complexity of key ethical dilemmas facing us today. The book will be a valuable resource for students of political theory, and will appeal to anyone wishing to reflect on their deepest values and commitments by putting them to the test of practical politics. (shrink)

In this article, I offer responses to five commentaries on my recently published book, Cosmopolitan Peace. Those articles address my conception of individual and collective agency, my account of self-determination (and its implication for the problem of annexation during and after the war), and my accounts of, respectively, reparations and remembrance after war. I revise or provide further defences of those accounts in the light of my commentators’ probing remarks.

I offer a response to Rodin’s, Statman’s, Stilz’s, and Tadros’ papers on my book Cosmopolitan War.

Treason is one of the most serious legal offences that there are, in most if not all jurisdictions. Laws against treason are rooted in deep-seated moral revulsion about acts which, in the political realm, are paradigmatic examples of breaches of loyalty. Yet, it is not altogether clear what treason consists in: someone’s traitor is often another’s loyalist. In this paper, my aim is twofold: to offer a plausible conceptual account of treason, and to partly rehabilitate traitors. I focus on informational (...) treason, as the act of passing secret intelligence to foreign actors without authorization. I argue that informational treason is sometimes justified, indeed morally mandatory; even when it is morally wrong, its beneficiaries are sometimes justified, indeed obliged, to make use of the intelligence thereby provided. (shrink)