Purpose of War

The article critically analyzes one of the central assumptions of Michael Walzer’s version of just war theory, as presented in his main work devoted to war ethics. As requested by the author of Just and Unjust Wars, the controversial nature of the principle of the moral equality of soldiers is revealed by discussing the actual course of events of a historical military conflict – namely, the outbreak of World War II, one of the main issues dealt with in Walzer’s book. (...) The exclusion of individual responsibility of people involved in a military operation which finds no moral justification seems to entail a number of consequences that put a heavy burden on Walzer’s overall model of military ethics. In order to ensure the necessary level of coherence of just war theory one may need to modify Walzer’s principle of the moral equality of soldiers – at least in relation to the participants of total war. (shrink)

Первое, что мы должны иметь в виду, что, говоря, что Китай говорит это или Китай делает это, мы говорим не о китайском народе, но социопатов, которые контролируют КПК - Коммунистическая партия Китая, т.е. семь senile sociopathic серийных убийц (SSSSK) Из Постоянного комитета КПК или 25 членов Политбюро и т.д. Планы CCP для WW3 и полного доминирования lay out довольно ясно в китайских изданиях и речи правительства и это «мечта Кита» Си Цзиньпина. Это мечта только для крошечного меньшинства (возможно, от нескольких (...) десятков до нескольких сотен), которые правят Китаем и кошмар для всех остальных (в том числе 1,4 миллиарда китайцев). 10 миллиардов долларов ежегодно позволяет им или их марионеткам владеть или контролировать газеты, журналы, телевизионные и радиоканалы и размещать поддельные новости в большинстве крупных средств массовой информации во всем мире каждый день. Кроме того, у них есть армия (может быть, миллионы людей), которые троллят все средства массовой информации размещения больше пропаганды и заглушая законные комментарии (50 центов армии). В дополнение к зачистке3-й мир ресурсов, основной направленноймноготриллионной инициативы «Пояс и путь» является строительство военных баз по всему миру. Они вынуждают свободный мир врезаться в массовую гонку вооружений для высоких технологий, которая делает холодную войну с Советским Союзом похожей на пикник. Хотя SSSSK, и остальные военные мира, тратят огромные суммы на передовое оборудование, весьма вероятно, что WW3 (или меньше обязательств, ведущих к нему) будет доминировать программного обеспечения. Это не может быть и речи, что SSSSK, с, вероятно, больше хакеров (кодеров), работающих на них, то весь остальной мир вместе взятые, победит будущих войн с минимальным физическим конфликтом, просто парализовав своих врагов через сеть. Ни спутников, ни телефонов, ни связи, ни финансовых операций, ни электросети, ни интернета, ни современного оружия, ни транспортных средств, ни поездов, кораблей, ни самолетов. Есть только два основных пути к удалению КПК, освобождение 1,4 миллиарда китайских заключенных, и окончание сумасшедшего марша к WW3. Мирный одно начать тотаку торговую войну для того чтобы опустошить китайскую экономию до тех пор пока воискаа получает надоеденными вверх и загружает вне CCP. Альтернативой закрытию экономики Китая является ограниченная война, такая как целенаправленный удар, скажем, 50 термобарических дронов на 20-мth конгрессе КПК, когда все высшие члены находятся в одном месте, но это не состоится до 2022 года, чтобы можно было попасть на ежегодное пленарное заседание. Китайцы будут проинформированы, как нападение произошло, что они должны сложить оружие и подготовиться к проведению демократических выборов или быть nuked в каменном вене. Другой альтернативой является тотавлёневая ядерная атака. Военная конфронтация неизбежна, учитывая нынешний курс КПК. Это, скорее всего, произойдет над островами в южно-китайском море или Тайваня в течение нескольких десятилетий, но, как они создают военные базы по всему миру это может произойти в любом месте (см. Крадущийся тигр и т.д.). Будущие конфликты будут иметь hardkill и softkill аспекты с заявленными целями CcP, чтобы подчеркнуть кибервойны путем взлома и парализующих систем управления всех военных и промышленных коммуникаций, оборудования, электростанций, спутников, Интернет, банки, и любое устройство или транспортное средство, подключенное к сети. СС медленно высаживают во всем мире множество пилотируемых и автономных надводных и подводных подводных подводных подводных и подводных подводных подводных аппаратов или беспилотных летательных аппаратов, способных запускать обычное или ядерное оружие, которое может находиться в состоянии покоя в ожидании сигнала из Китая или даже искать подпись американских кораблей или самолетов. Уничтожая наши спутники, тем самым устраняя связь между США и нашими силами по всему миру, они будут использовать их, совместно с беспилотниками, чтобы нацелить и уничтожить наши в настоящее время превосходящие военно-морские силы. Конечно, все это все чаще делается автоматически ИИ. На сегодняшний день крупнейшим союзником КПК является Демократическая партия США. Выбор остановить CCP теперь или наблюдать по мере того как они расширяют китайскую тюрьму над всем миром. Те, кто заинтересован в более подробной информации о сумасшедшем пути современного общества могут проконсультироваться с другими моими работами, такими как Самоубийство демократии-некролог для Америки и мира 3-е издание 2019 и суицидальных утопических заблуждений в 21-мst веке: Философия, человеческая природа и крах цивилизации 4-й ред (2019). (shrink)

我们必须记住的第一件事是，当说中国这样说或中国这样做时，我们不是说中国人民，而是控制中国共产党的社会路径者，即七大社会病态连环杀手。中共常务委员会或中央政治局委员等25人。 -/- 中共对三战和全面统治的计划在中国政府的出版物和演讲中已经非常明确地阐述了，这就是习近平的"中国梦"。只有统治中国的少数人（也许只有几十到几百人）的梦想，也是其他人（包括14亿中国人 ）的噩梦。每年100亿美元使他们或他们的傀儡拥有或控制报纸、杂志、电视和广播频道，每天在世界各地的大多数主要媒体上放置假新闻。 此外，他们有一支军队（也许有数百万人），他们滚动所有媒体进行更多的宣传，淹没合法的评论（50美分的军队）。 -/- 除了剥夺第三世界的资源外，数万亿美元的"一带一路"倡议的主要主旨是在全世界建立军事基地。他们迫使自由世界陷入大规模的高科技军备竞赛，使得与苏联的冷战看起来像是野餐。 -/- 尽管SSSSK和世界上其他的军事国家都在高级硬件上花费巨资，但WW3（或导致它的小型交战）很可能以软件为主。SSSSK，可能有更多的黑客（编码器）为他们工作，然后世界其他国家加起来，通过通过网络瘫痪他 们的敌人，以最小的物理冲突赢得未来的战争。"没有卫星，没有电话，没有通讯，没有金融交易，没有电网，没有互联网，没有先进的武器，没有车辆，火车，船舶和飞机。 -/- 罢免中共只有两条主要途径，即释放14亿中国囚犯，结束向第三次世界大战的疯狂进军。 和平的一个方案是发动一场全面的贸易战来摧毁中国经济，直到军方受够了，把中共赶出去。 -/- 关闭中国经济的替代方案是一场有限的战争，比如在中共第20届大会上，50架热压无人机进行有针对性的打击，当时所有高层成员都在一个地方，但这种情况要到2022年才会发生。一个可以击中年度全体会议。 袭击发生后，中国人将被告知，他们必须放下武器，准备举行民主选举，否则就要进入石器时代。另一种选择是全面核攻击。 鉴于中共目前的路线，军事对抗是不可避免的。 几十年后，这种情况可能会发生在南中国海或台湾的岛屿上，但随着它们在世界各地建立军事基地，它可能发生在任何地方（见"卧虎藏"等）。 未来的冲突将有硬性与软性方面与中共的既定目标，强调网络战争，通过黑客和瘫痪控制系统的所有军事和工业通信，设备，发电厂，卫星，互联网，银行，以及连接到网络的任何设备或车辆。 SS正在缓慢地部署一系列全球载人和自主水面和水下潜艇或无人驾驶飞机，这些潜艇或无人机能够发射可能处于休眠状态，等待中国发出信号，甚至寻找美国船只或飞机的签名。 在摧毁我们的卫星，从而消除美国和我们全球部队之间的通信的同时，他们将使用他们的卫星，与无人机一起瞄准和摧毁我们目前优越的海军部队。 当然，所有这一切都是越来越多地由AI自动完成的。 -/- 到目前为止，中共最大的盟友是美国民主党。 -/- 选择是现在停止中共，或者看着他们把中国监狱扩展到全世界。 -/- 当然，对我们的生活进行普遍监控和数字化是不可避免的。任何不这么认为的人，都是极度脱节的。 -/- 当然，正是那些期待中国社会路径者统治世界的人，而悲观主义者（他们认为自己是现实主义者）则期望AI的社会病态（或我称之为"假愚蠢"或"人造社会病态"）的选择性。） 接管，也许到2030年。 -/- 那些有兴趣在现代社会的疯狂道路的进一步细节可能会参考我的其他作品，如自杀的民主-美国和世界第三版2019年和自杀乌托邦幻想在21日世纪：哲学、人性与文明的崩溃（2019） .

पहली बात हमें ध्यान में रखना चाहिए कि जब यह कहना है कि चीन यह कहता है या चीन ऐसा करता है, तो हम चीनी लोगों की बात नहीं कर रहे हैं, लेकिन उन सोशियोपैथों की जो सीसीपी को नियंत्रित करते हैं - चीनी कम्युनिस्ट पार्टी, अर्थात, सात सेनेले सोसाइपैथिक सीरियल किलर (एसएसएसएसके) के सीसीपी की स्थायी समिति या पोलितब्यूरो आदि के 25 सदस्य। -/- WW3 और कुल प्रभुत्व के लिए सीसीपी की योजना चीनी सरकार के प्रकाशनों और भाषणों में (...) काफी स्पष्ट रूप से बाहर रखी हैं और यह शी जिनपिंग की "चीन ड्रीम" है. यह केवल छोटे अल्पसंख्यक के लिए एक सपना है (शायद कुछ दर्जन से कुछ सौ) जो चीन शासन और हर किसी के लिए एक बुरा सपना (1.4 अरब चीनी सहित). 10 अरब डॉलर वार्षिक उन्हें या उनकी कठपुतलियों के मालिक हैं या समाचार पत्र, पत्रिकाओं, टीवी और रेडियो चैनलों को नियंत्रित करने और सबसे प्रमुख मीडिया में हर जगह हर दिन नकली खबर जगह सक्षम बनाता है. इसके अलावा, वे एक सेना है (शायद लाखों लोगों के) जो सभी मीडिया और अधिक प्रचार रखने और वैध टिप्पणी (50 प्रतिशत सेना) बाहर डूब ट्रोल. -/- संसाधनों के 3rd दुनिया अलग करना के अलावा, बहु खरब डॉलर बेल्ट और सड़क पहल का एक प्रमुख जोर दुनिया भर में सैन्य ठिकानों का निर्माण कर रहा है. वे एक बड़े पैमाने पर उच्च तकनीक हथियारों की दौड़ है कि सोवियत संघ के साथ शीत युद्ध एक पिकनिक की तरह लग रही है में मुक्त दुनिया मजबूर कर रहे हैं. -/- हालांकि SSSSK, और दुनिया की सेना के बाकी, उन्नत हार्डवेयर पर भारी रकम खर्च कर रहे हैं, यह अत्यधिक संभावना है कि WW3 (या छोटे सगाई यह करने के लिए अग्रणी) सॉफ्टवेयर प्रभुत्व होगा. यह सवाल से बाहर नहीं है कि SSSSK, शायद अधिक हैकर्स के साथ (कोडर्स) उनके लिए काम कर रहे तो संयुक्त दुनिया के सभी बाकी, कम से कम शारीरिक संघर्ष के साथ भविष्य के युद्ध जीत जाएगा, बस नेट के माध्यम से अपने दुश्मनों को paralyzing द्वारा. कोई उपग्रहों, कोई फोन, कोई संचार, कोई वित्तीय लेनदेन, कोई पावर ग्रिड, कोई इंटरनेट, कोई उन्नत हथियार, कोई वाहन, गाड़ियों, जहाजों या विमानों. -/- वहाँ केवल दो मुख्य रास्ते सीसीपी को हटाने के लिए कर रहे हैं, 1.4 अरब चीनी कैदियों को मुक्त, और WW3 के लिए पागल मार्च समाप्त. शांतिपूर्ण एक एक सब बाहर व्यापार युद्ध शुरू करने के लिए चीनी अर्थव्यवस्था को तबाह जब तक सेना तंग आ जाता है और सीसीपी बाहर जूते है. -/- चीन की अर्थव्यवस्था को बंद करने के लिए एक विकल्प एक सीमित युद्ध है, जैसे कि सीसीपी के 20वें कांग्रेस पर 50thermobaric ड्रोन कहते हैं, जब सभी शीर्ष सदस्य ों को एक ही स्थान पर हैं, लेकिन यह 2022 तक नहीं होगा तो एक लक्षित हड़ताल एक वार्षिक पूर्ण बैठक हिट सकता है. चीनियों को सूचित किया जाएगा, जैसा कि हमला हुआ है, कि उन्हें अपने हथियार डाल देके और लोकतांत्रिक चुनाव कराने के लिए तैयार रहना चाहिए या पत्थर की उम्र में नकेल कसी हुई है। दूसरा विकल्प एक सर्व-बाह्य परमाणु हमला है। सीपी के वर्तमान पाठ्यक्रम को देखते हुए सैन्य टकराव अपरिहार्य है। यह संभावना कुछ दशकों के भीतर दक्षिण चीन सागर या ताइवान में द्वीपों पर होगा, लेकिन के रूप में वे दुनिया भर में सैन्य ठिकानों की स्थापना यह कहीं भी हो सकता है (क्रोचिंग टाइगर आदि देखें). भविष्य के संघर्षों में सीसीपी के कथित उद्देश्यों के साथ कठोर और नरम पहलुओं को होगा ताकि सभी सैन्य और औद्योगिक संचार, उपकरण, बिजली संयंत्रों, उपग्रहों, इंटरनेट, बैंकों की नियंत्रण प्रणालियों को हैक करके और पैरालाइजिंग करके साइबरवार पर जोर दिया जा सके। और किसी भी डिवाइस या वाहन नेट से जुड़ा है। एसएस धीरे-धीरे मानव और स्वायत्त सतह और पानी के नीचे subs या पारंपरिक या परमाणु हथियार है कि चीन से एक संकेत का इंतजार कर निष्क्रिय झूठ हो सकता है या यहां तक कि अमेरिकी जहाजों या विमानों के हस्ताक्षर के लिए देख शुरू करने में सक्षम ड्रोन की एक दुनिया भर में सरणी क्षेत्ररक्षण कर रहे हैं। जबकि हमारे उपग्रहों को नष्ट करने, इस प्रकार दुनिया भर में संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका और हमारे बलों के बीच संचार को नष्ट करने, वे उनके उपयोग करेंगे, ड्रोन के साथ संयोजन के रूप में लक्ष्य और हमारे वर्तमान में बेहतर नौसेना बलों को नष्ट करने के लिए. बेशक, यह सब तेजी से एअर इंडिया द्वारा स्वचालित रूप से किया जाता है. -/- द्वारा अब तक सीसीपी का सबसे बड़ा सहयोगी संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका के डेमोक्रेटिक पार्टी है. विकल्प सीसीपी अब बंद करो या घड़ी के रूप में वे पूरी दुनिया में चीनी जेल का विस्तार है. -/- बेशक, सार्वभौमिक निगरानी और हमारे जीवन के digitizing हर जगह अपरिहार्य है. जो कोई ऐसा नहीं सोचता है, वह गहराई से संपर्क से बाहर है। -/- बेशक यह optomists जो चीनी socipaths दुनिया पर शासन करने की उम्मीद है, जबकि निराशावादी (जो खुद को यथार्थवादी के रूप में देखने) ऐ socipathy की उम्मीद (या के रूप में के रूप में मैं इसे कहते हैं - यानी, कृत्रिम बेवकूफी या कृत्रिम समाज) पर ले, शायद 2030 तक आधुनिक समाज के पागल रास्ते पर अधिक जानकारी में रुचि रखने वालों को लोकतंत्र द्वारा आत्महत्या जैसे अन्य कार्यों से परामर्श कर सकते हैं- अमेरिका के लिए एक प्रसूति और विश्व 3rd संस्करण 2019 और 21सेंट में आत्मघाती यूटोपियाई भ्रम सदी: दर्शन, मानव प्रकृति और सभ्यता के पतन 5वें एड (2019) . (shrink)

This paper is a part-review analysis into the modern conception of both the word and Jihād and the violent nature of Islam. In order to develop an overarching modern theory of Jihād, current opinions and general argumtations in the literature are examined. Two theories have emerged in defining Islam and the role of Jihād in Islam. The first is that of the so-called Muslim apologists; scholars who define Jihād as mainly a personal struggle, and whose physical application (warfare) is only (...) in self-defence of the Islamic community. The second sponsors the concept of ‘offensive’ Jihād: that Islam is imperialistic and has a vision of global domination. The stark contrast in the divisions that the scholarship have are indicative of two opposing parties, likely each basing their respective policy positions on beliefs on the nature of Islam as a violent of peaceful ‘religion’. (shrink)

«Крим як Храмова гора» – новітній дискурс, артикульований російським президентом Путіним як ідеологічне прикриття анексії Криму 2014 р., що виступає пролонгацією «кримського міфу». Зазначений міф представлений дискурсами «Легендарний Севастополь» у радянський та «Крим наш» у пострадянський періоди. Компенсаторні дискурси започатковано трагічними подіями Кримської війни (1853–1856 рр.) як сублімація посттравматичної ментальності, обумовлена низкою військових та політичних поразок Росії на території Кримського півострова. Експресивні репрезентації образу Севастополя через пісенний інтертекст, передусім, стосуються російської «сакральної географії». Таким чином, тривалий «севастопольський» дискурс структурувався як антиукраїнський, (...) що було очевидним, хоча й ігнорованим фактом з боку держави Україна. Загалом міфопоетика масової культури є проекцією ідеології, яка містить у собі арсенал архаїчних ментальних утворень: архетипів, концептів, семантичних опозицій. Так само сучасна політична міфологія уявляється відкритою системою, що оперує віртуальними категоріями. Їх вияв, інтерпретація та декодування в царині сучасного «кримського міфу» є метою пропонованого дослідження. (shrink)

An armed humanitarian intervention must have a reasonable prospect of success to be justified. It must also be a proportional last resort. These are necessary conditions for legitimate AHI. It has been suggested that, in addition to these necessary conditions, there are also ideal conditions of AHI, namely disinterest and multilateralism. These conditions are said to enhance the moral credentials of an armed intervention without being strictly required. The paper concerns itself with the relationship between these two ideals and the (...) requirement of a reasonable prospect of success. Specifically, I explore the suggestion that the former are in some way instrumental to the latter. On this view, we should aspire towards disinterest and multilateralism because these things contribute to a positive humanitarian outcome. If this is correct then the ideal conditions can be partly grounded in, or justified in reference to, the prospect of success principle. (shrink)

We are living in an imbalanced and insecure world. It is torn by violent conflicts on a global scale: between the West and the East, between rich and poor countries, between Christianity and Islam, between the Great Forces and naughty countries, between a global capitalist elite and workers and between the global democratic community and global terrorism. An optimistic thesis will be grounded asserting that varied cultures and civilizations can solve all existing problems and contradictions peacefully and can carry out (...) mutually advantageous cooperation more effectively irrespective of differences between them. Security problems can be explained and defined by means of making use of fundamental philosophical notions. All levels of security are interrelated on a global scale. The problem of regulation of international relations worldwide as regards guaranteeing security of all participants in them is one of primary importance. The present-day multi-polar world could be based on a social and economic pluralism and peace culture. (shrink)

This chapter argues that, because humanitarian intervention typically involves the military of one state attempting to overthrow another state ’s government, it gives rise to different moral questions from simple cases of interpersonal defensive violence. State sovereignty not only protects institutions within a society that contribute to the satisfaction of individuals’ interests and that cannot be easily restored once overthrown; it also plays a role in the constitution of those interests, which cannot be assumed to be invariant across different forms (...) of social life. As a result, humanitarian intervention will frequently give rise to incommensurability between the pre-intervention and post-intervention states of affairs. The reasons against violating sovereignty, together with reasons for conservativism in action that arise in circumstances of incommensurable value, mean that the threshold for the moral permissibility of humanitarian intervention is high. The chapter concludes by outlining how humanitarian intervention might be internationalized, making it easier to justify. (shrink)

We report three studies which test a sexual selection hypothesis for male war heroism. Based on evolutionary theories of mate choice we hypothesize that men signal their fitness through displaying heroism in combat. First, we report the results of an archival study on US-American soldiers who fought in World War II. We compare proxies for reproductive success between a control sample of 449 regular veterans and 123 surviving Medal of Honor recipients of WWII. Results suggest that the heroes sired more (...) offspring than the regular veterans. Supporting a causal link between war heroism and mating success, we then report the results of two experimental studies. We find evidence that female participants specifically regard men more sexually attractive if they are war heroes. This effect is absent for male participants judging female war heroes, suggesting that bravery in war is a gender specific signal. Finally, we discuss possible implications of our results. (shrink)

Since cyberattacks are nonphysical, standard theories of casus belli — which typically rely on the violent and forceful nature of military means — appear inapplicable. Yet, some theorists have argued that cyberattacks nonetheless can constitute just causes for war — generating a unilateral right to defensive military action — when they cause significant physical damage through the disruption of the target's computer systems. I show that this view suffers from a serious drawback: it is too permissive concerning the types of (...) actions that generate casus belli since many essentially peaceful and non-violent mechanisms can nonetheless cause physical damage. I resolve this difficulty by developing a sovereignty-based account of casus belli and applying it to cyberwarfare. I argue that legitimate states have a constrained right to unilaterally respond with military force to unfriendly actions that bypass or overwhelm the political deliberations of the target state in order to force a change in behaviour contrary to the determinations of the people of the target state. This new account of casus belli avoids the problems of the consequence-based view by plausibly restricting the types of unfriendly action that give rise to casus belli and yet offers an attractive explanation for why some cyberattacks nonetheless do generate a potential right to a unilateral defensive response. (shrink)

Book review of Peter French's "War and Moral Dissonance".

Just War Theory (JWT) replaced an older "warrior code," an approach to war that remains poorly understood and dismissively treated in the philosophical literature. This paper builds on recent work on honor to address these deficiencies. By providing a clear, systematic exposition of "Honor War Theory" (HWT), we can make sense of paradigm instances of warrior psychology and behavior, and understand the warrior code as the martial expression of a broader honor-based ethos that conceives of obligation in terms of fair (...) competition for prestige. Far from being a romantic and outmoded approach to war, HWT accounts for current conflicts and predicts moral intuitions that JWT either rejects or cannot comfortably accommodate. So although it is not recommended as a replacement for JWT, there is good reason think that a fully mature, realistic, and yet properly normative theory of war ethics will incorporate a variety of insights from HWT. (shrink)

In order to address whether states can ever have the proper authority to militarily punish other international agents, I examine three attempts to justify punitive warfare from Augustine, Grotius and Locke for their relevance to both our contemporary international legal and political order and our contemporary security threats from sporadic terrorist or militant violence. Once a plausible model for a state’s valid authority to punish international agents is found, I will consider what punitive aims it can support and what challenges (...) such punitive warfare would have in satisfying the remaining jus ad bellum conditions. (shrink)

This article considers the duty to undertake humanitarian intervention. It first examines the arguments for the duty to intervene and questions the possibility of supererogatory humanitarian intervention. It then considers the leading objections to this duty which, it is argued, are largely unpersuasive. In the final section, the article considers the duty to intervene in the context of the responsibility to protect doctrine, which provides the framework within which debates about humanitarian intervention now in large part occur.

Introduction -- Cosmopolitanism -- Collective self-defense -- Subsistence wars -- Humanitarian intervention -- Commodified wars -- Asymmetrical wars -- Conclusion.

This essay addresses moral hazards associated with the emerging doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). It reviews the broad acceptance by the Vatican and the World Council of Churches of the doctrine between September 2003 and September 2008, and attempts to identify grounds for more adequate investigation of the moral issues arising. Three themes are pursued: how a changing political context is affecting notions of sovereignty; the authority that can approve or refuse the use of force; and plural foundations (...) for human rights in a religiously and otherwise plural world such that the human rights protection does not become tyrannical. (shrink)

Explores the history and background of "humanitarian" intervention with regards to Libya.

The process of globalisation and the so-called war on terror are two prominent features marking our present age. While the process of globalisation promises the prospect of moving beyond or across borders, the war on terror marks a return to fences, check-points, and dividing walls. Terror war is a global politics of fear, a politics conducted under the rigid border control between ‘us’ and ‘them’. This paper examines the ominous development of fear in world politics from a number of angles. (...) First, it explores the growing linkage of politics with terror war by tracing its roots ultimately to the friend-enemy distinction. Next, it discusses the shortcomings of the terror war syndrome, by turning to some prominent critics of this ideology. Finally, it examines possible ways pointing beyond this ideology, enlisting for this purpose a number of theologians and intellectuals, to arrive at the promising notions of ‘border-crossing’ and political-existential Grenzgänger or people who criss-cross multiple borders. (shrink)

The primary purpose of government is to secure public goods that cannot be achieved by free markets. The Coordination Principle tells us to consolidate sovereign power in a single institution to overcome collective action problems that otherwise prevent secure provision of the relevant public goods. There are several public goods that require such coordination at the global level, chief among them being basic human rights. The claim that human rights require global coordination is supported in three main steps. First, I (...) consider Pogge's and Habermas's analyses as alternatives to Hobbesian conceptions of justice. Second, I consider the core conventions of international law, which are in tension with the primacy of state sovereignty in the UN system. Third, I argue that the just war tradition does not limit just causes for war to self-defense; it supports saving innocent third parties from crimes against humanity as a just reason for war. While classical authors focused less on this issue, the point is especially clear in twentieth-century just war theories, such as those offered by the American Catholic bishops, Jean Elshtain, Brian Orend, and Michael Walzer. Against Walzer, I argue that we add intractable military tyranny to the list of horrors meriting intervention if other ad bellum conditions are met. But these results require us to reexamine the "just authority" of first resort to govern such interventions. The Coordination Principle implies that we should create a transnational federation with consolidated powers in place of a treaty organization requiring near-unanimity. But to be legitimate, such a global institution must also be directly answerable to the citizens of its member states. While the UN Security Council is inadequate on both counts, a federation of democracies with a directly elected executive and legislature could meet both conditions. (shrink)

The legitimacy of humanitarian intervention has been contested for more than a century, yet pressure for such intervention persists. Normative evolution and institutional design have been closely linked since the first debates over humanitarian intervention more than a century ago. Three norms have competed in shaping state practice and the normative discourse: human rights, peace preservation, and sovereignty. The rebalancing of these norms over time, most recently as the state’s responsibility to protect, has reflected specific international institutional environments. The contemporary (...) legitimacy of humanitarian intervention is based on UN Security Council authorization of the use of force. Although the Security Council is often viewed as representative of great-power influence, international acceptance of its role is based on the role of non-permanent members and their support for the sovereignty norm. The current rebalanced norms supporting humanitarian intervention, institutional bias that protects state sovereignty, and the changing character of mass violence may undermine the tenuous contemporary legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. Normative adjustments and new institutional designs are required to insure the legitimacy of international action that protects populations against mass violence. (shrink)

This paper reflects on the highly contested Israeli restrictions on the importation of civilian goods into the Gaza Strip, with reference to a wide range of principled questions within military ethics regarding sieges, sanctions and blockades. Beginning with Israel's unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and culminating in its recent easing of sanctions, the paper attempts to bring out the central issues of principle embedded in the political polemic: unilaterally terminated occupation; the responsibilities of a former, though recent, occupier; the (...) semantic distinction between siege and sanction and their respective ramifications; harm to civilians; necessity and proportionality. Overall, it argues in the specific case that Israel's restrictions on Gaza were not indefensible from the start as a first attempt to halt terrorism while avoiding full-scale conflict. In view of their ineffectiveness in achieving these goals, however, the harm they inflicted on civilians increasingly proved unnecessary and therefore excessive. There could then be no justification for continuing to restrict the flow of civilian goods into Gaza, as Israel itself eventually recognized. Nonetheless, Israel retains the right to search and regulate the passage of all relief supplies into Gaza, whether by land or by sea, as well as to secure its own borders for the safety of its citizens. (shrink)

The principle of absolute sovereignty may have been consigned to history, but a strong presumption against foreign intervention seems to have been left in its stead. On the dominant view, only massacre and ethnic cleansing justify armed intervention, these harms must be already occurring or imminent, and the prudential constraints on war must be satisfied. Each of these conditions has recently come under pressure. Those looking to defend the dominant view have typically done so by invoking international peace and stability, (...) or the value of communal self-determination. But the internal aspect of legitimacy has been overlooked in all of this. If a government insists on defending the human rights of foreigners, it must also be sure not to violate the rights of its own citizens in the process. I argue that the current presumption against humanitarian intervention cannot be substantially relaxed for internal reasons, or given the obligations that states owe to their own constituents. (shrink)

abstractMany reasons have been given as to why humanitarian intervention might not be justified even where rebellion with similar aims would be a morally legitimate option. One of them is that intervention involves the imposition of alien values on the target society. Michael Walzer formulates this objection in terms of a people's right to a state that ‘expresses their inherited culture’ and that they can truly ‘call their own’. I argue that this right can plausibly be said to extend sovereignty (...) to at least some illiberal governments, and therefore to impose at least some moral constraints on humanitarian intervention. The problem for Walzer is that this right cannot form the basis of a constraint that applies to foreign intervention exclusively. Once the details of Walzer's argument are teased out, it becomes apparent that civil war and revolution must be equally restricted by this right. Hence a people's prerogative to be governed in accordance with familiar traditions cannot coherently be invoked to show that intervention is impermissible in cases where insurrection is taken to be justified. (shrink)

Relative to the abundance of literature devoted to the legal significance of UN authorisation, little has been written about whether the UN’s failure to sanction an intervention can ever make it immoral. This is the question that I take up here. I argue that UN authorisation (or lack thereof) can have some indirect bearing on the moral status of a humanitarian intervention. That is, it can affect whether an intervention satisfies other widely accepted justifying conditions, such as proportionality, “internal” legitimacy, (...) and likelihood of success. The more interesting question, however, is whether the UN’s failure to provide a mandate can make a humanitarian operation unjust independently of these other familiar considerations. Is a proportional, internally legitimate humanitarian intervention, with a just cause and strong prospect of success, still morally unacceptable if it is not approved by the United Nations Security Council? This is the question that I turn to in the second half of the paper. (shrink)

During the past half-century, the United States has declared war on (among else) poverty, cancer, crime, drugs, and terrorism. This essay examines, in the context of these, war as a model for responding to domestic political problems and focuses on the role that that model has played in representing the state and its relation to those evils identified as the enemy.

International law has one principal mechanism for settling the legality of humanitarian interventions, the United Nations Security Council's power to authorise coercion. However, this is hardly satisfactory in practice and has failed to provide a more secure juridical basis for determining significant conflicts among states over when humanitarian force is justified. This article argues that, in spite of Immanuel Kant's limited analysis of intervention, and his silence on humanitarian intervention, his political theory provides the elements of a compelling analysis on (...) this topic. Five components of Kant's roadmap towards perpetual peace and an eventual world republic give conditional support for humanitarian intervention even in imperfect juridical conditions. This support is conditional on the achievement of juridical progress within and among states and has implications for the development of cosmopolitan citizenship. From Kant we learn that, ultimately, humanitarian intervention should become a matter of coercive law enforcement rather than an ethical question of ‘saving strangers’. (shrink)

Much has been written about the ethics of humanitarian intervention in the past fifteen years. In this paper I discuss a variety of justifications that have been proposed (in fact, seven theories of justification), finding difficulties with each of them, and then I offer a theory of justification of my own. My approach to justification will differ from most of the earlier accounts in two ways. First, I begin the discussion of justification at a different point. Second, I seek to (...) expand the traditional discussion of humanitarian intervention to cover an area not usually addressed, namely, the question of the scope of justified humanitarian intervention. If humanitarian intervention is sometimes justified, precisely when is it justified? This is no merely academic question, given the belated appeal to humanitarian intervention on the part of those scrambling to provide a public justification of the war in Iraq. (shrink)

Discussions of the ethics of war commonly – and reasonably – assume that defensive wars are morally justified if any wars are. They also assume that explanations of why defensive warfare is morally justified must be based on principles that also explain the moral justifiability of individual self-defense. David Rodin has recently argued that the second of these assumptions is mistaken, and he has developed an alternative account of the morality of defensive warfare. The purpose of this paper is to (...) show that Rodin’s argument fails, and to explain how defensive warfare can indeed be justified in terms of principles that also apply to individual self-defense. (shrink)

This book considers who should undertake humanitarian intervention in response to an ongoing or impending humanitarian crisis. It develops a normative account of legitimacy to assess not only current interveners, but also the desirability of potential reforms to the mechanisms and agents of humanitarian intervention.