Is It Fitting to Divide Value? A Review of The Value Gap [Book Review]

Journal of Moral Philosophy 20 (5-6):533-544 (2023)
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Abstract

Rønnow-Rasmussen’s The Value Gap is an extended argument for Value Dualism, the view that both goodness and goodness for are coherent value concepts that are not fully understandable in terms of each other. In the first part of the book, he criticizes attempts to fully understand one type of value in terms of the other. In the second part of the book, he argues that both concepts are value concepts by appealing to a “Fitting Attitude” analysis of value concepts. This book review exposits Rønnow-Rasmussen’s argument for Dualism, and his proposed analysis of both goodness and goodness for. More critically, it briefly defends a strategy for understanding goodness for in terms of goodness and criticizes Rønnow-Rasmussen’s proposed analysis of goodness for.

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2023-10-27

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Timothy Perrine
Rutgers - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

Towards an account of basic final value.Timothy Perrine - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Principia Ethica.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 13 (3):7-9.
Basic intrinsic value.Fred Feldman - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 99 (3):319-346.
Rossian totalism about intrinsic value.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2069-2086.

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