- From “Is” to “Ought” in one easy step.Jude Arnout Durieux - manuscriptdetails
- Ecocentrism and Appeals to Nature's Goodness: Must they Be Fallacious?Antoine C. Dussault - manuscriptdetails
- Causation and the is-ought gap.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscriptdetails
- How to derive morality from Hume's Maxim.Gerald Hull - manuscriptdetails
- Dissolving the Is-Ought problem: An essay on moral reasoning.Jeremiah Joven Joaquin - manuscriptdetails
- What Hume was really up to with no-ought-from-is.Charles Pigden - manuscriptdetails
- The Moral Parody Argument Against Panpsychism.Zach Blaesi - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):1821–1852.details
- The Worth of Persons: The Foundation of Ethics.James Franklin - 2022 - New York: Encounter Books.details
- The Normative Stance.Marcus Arvan - 2021 - Philosophical Forum 52 (1):79-89.details
- No need to get up from the armchair.Dan Baras - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (3):575-590.details
- Philosophie zwischen Sein und Sollen – Normative Theorie und empirische Forschung im Spannungsfeld.Alexander Max Bauer & Malte Meyerhuber (eds.) - 2019 - Berlin and Boston: Walter de Gruyter.details
- Evolutionary Ethics.Michael Klenk - 2019 - Introduction to Philosophy: Ethics.details
- Survenance et Fondation Morales.Olivier Massin - 2019 - In O. Desmons, Patrick Turmel & Stéphane Lemaire (eds.), Manuel de Métaéthique. Paris, France: pp. 271-306.details
- Hobbes and the Two Faces of Ethics. [REVIEW]Sandra Leonie Field - 2018 - European Hobbes Society Online Colloquium.details
- Deontology defended.Nora Heinzelmann - 2018 - Synthese 195 (12):5197–5216.details
- Conflictos prácticos genuinos y racionalidad práctica. Una solución modal.Pau Luque & Alessandro Torza - 2018 - In Daniel Gonzalez Lagier & Sebastián Figueroa Rubio (eds.), Libertad, razón y normatividad La vigencia del pensamiento de G. H. von Wright a cien años de su nacimiento. Lima: Palestra.details
- The Naturalistic Fallacy and the History of Metaethics.Neil Sinclair - 2018 - In The Naturalistic Fallacy. Cambridge University Press.details
- Anscombe on the mesmeric force of ‘ought’ and a spurious kind of moral realism.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2017 - Etica E Politica 19 (2):51-86.details
- Verdade e Normatividade.Ricardo Tavares Da Silva - 2017 - Anatomia Do Crime/Anatomy of Crime 2017 (6):209-232.details
- Sentimentalism, Blameworthiness, and Wrongdoing.Antti Kauppinen - 2017 - In Karsten Stueber & Remy Debes (eds.), Ethical Sentimentalism. Cambridge University Press.details
- The Autonomy of Ethics.Barry Maguire - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 431-442.details
- Lei de Hume e falácia naturalista.Ricardo Tavares Da Silva - 2016 - Anatomia Do Crime 4:187-204.details
- Naturalismo Moral e Normatividade: Uma investigação sobre as origens e os limites da naturalização do fenômeno moral.Luca Nogueira Igansi - 2016 - Saarbrücken, Germany: Novas Edições Acadêmicas.details
- Two Versions of Hume's Law.Campbell Brown - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (1):2-7.details
- Fact/Value Holism, Feminist Philosophy, and Nazi Cancer Research.Sharyn Clough - 2015 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 1 (1):1-12.details
- Mind the Is-Ought Gap.Daniel J. Singer - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (4):193-210.details
- How To Be a Moral Platonist.Knut Olav Skarsune - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics (10).details
- Minding the Is-Ought Gap.Campbell Brown - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (1):53-69.details
- The Naturalistic Fallacy Is Modern.Lorraine Daston - 2014 - Isis 105 (3):579-587.details
- How not to be a metaethical naturalist –Jesse Prinz on the emotional construction of morals.Tanya de Villiers-Botha - 2014 - South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):145-154.details
- A Falácia Naturalista na Metaética Contemporânea: Usos e Equívocos.L. N. Igansi - 2014 - Fundamento 1 (8):11-31.details
- Normatividade e Valor no Naturalismo Moral.Luca Nogueira Igansi - 2014 - Dissertation, details
- Darwinian Normative Skepticism.Dustin Locke - 2014 - In Michael Bergmann & Patrick Kain (eds.), Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution. Oxford University Press.details
- Hume’s Law Violated?Rik Peels - 2014 - Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (3):449-455.details
- When, and How, Should Cognitive Bias Matter to Law.Govind Persad - 2014 - Law and Ineq 32:31.details
- From Ought to Is: Physics and the Naturalistic Fallacy.Matthew Stanley - 2014 - Isis 105 (3):588-595.details
- Models of rationality and the psychology of reasoning: From is to ought, and back.Crupi Vincenzo & Vittorio Girotto - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.details
- L’écocentrisme et ses appels normatifs à la nature : sont-ils nécessairement fallacieux ?Antoine C. Dussault - 2013 - In É Litalien (ed.), Peut-on tirer une éthique de l'étude de la nature ? Les Cahiers d'Ithaque. pp. 43-76.details
- Collective Acceptance and the Is-Ought Argument.Frank Hindriks - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):465-480.details
- Some Observations on Natural Law.Michaael Pakaluk - 2013 - Diametros 38:152-174.details
- Against Normative Naturalism.Matthew S. Bedke - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):111 - 129.details
- Reconstruction in Moral Philosophy?Matthew Braddock & Alexander Rosenberg - 2012 - Analyse & Kritik 34 (1):63-80.details
- Ayn Rand and Deducing 'Ought' from 'Is'.Lachlan Doughney - 2012 - Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 12 (1):151-168.details
- Deus Ex Machina: A Cautionary Tale for Naturalists.Cailin O'Connor, Nathan Fulton, Elliott Wagner & P. Kyle Stanford - 2012 - Analyse & Kritik 34 (1):51-62.details
- A 'Sensible Knave'? Hume, Jane Austen and Mr Elliot.Charles R. Pigden - 2012 - Intellectual History Review 22 (3):465-480.details
- Sollen: il dover essere è un oggetto?: le riposte di Meinong e Veber.Venanzio Raspa - 2012 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia Del Diritto 89 (2):239-262.details
- Is ‘ought’ an object? Meinong’s and Veber’s answers.Venanzio Raspa - 2012 - In T. Pirc (ed.), Object, Person, and Reality: An Introduction to France Veber. JSKD. pp. 53-65.details
- Subtracting “ought” from “is”: Descriptivism versus normativism in the study of human thinking.Shira Elqayam & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):251-252.details
- Sentimentalism and the Is-Ought Problem.Noriaki Iwasa - 2011 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):323-352.details
- Gilotyna Hume'a.Piotr T. Makowski - 2011 - Przegląd Filozoficzny 4 (80):317-334.details
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