12 found
Order:
  1. Making sense of powerful qualities.Ashley Coates - 2021 - Synthese 198 (9):8347-8363.
    According to the powerful qualities view, properties are both powerful and qualitative. Indeed, on this view the powerfulness of a property is identical to its qualitativity. Proponents claim that this view provides an attractive alternative to both the view that properties are pure powers and the view that they are pure qualities. It remains unclear, however, whether the claimed identity between powerfulness and qualitativity can be made coherent in a way that allows the powerful qualities view to constitute this sort (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  2. Essence and the inference problem.Ashley Coates - 2021 - Synthese 198 (2):915-931.
    Discussions about the nature of essence and about the inference problem for non-Humean theories of nomic modality have largely proceeded independently of each other. In this article I argue that the right conclusions to draw about the inference problem actually depend significantly on how best to understand the nature of essence. In particular, I argue that this conclusion holds for the version of the inference problem developed and defended by Alexander Bird. I argue that Bird’s own argument that this problem (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  3. Tropes, Unmanifested Dispositions and Powerful Qualities.Ashley Coates - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2143-2160.
    According to a well-known argument, originally due to David Armstrong, powers theory is objectionable, as it leads to a ‘Meinongian’ ontology on which some entities are real but do not actually exist. I argue here that the right conclusion to draw from this argument has thus far not been identified and that doing so has significant implications for powers theory. Specifically, I argue that the key consequence of the argument is that it provides substantial grounds for trope powers theorists, but (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  4. Essence, Triviality, and Fundamentality.Ashley Coates - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (5):502-516.
    I defend a new account of constitutive essence on which an entity’s constitutively essential properties are its most fundamental, nontrivial necessary properties. I argue that this account accommodates the Finean counterexamples to classic modalism about essence, provides an independently plausible account of constitutive essence, and does not run into clear counterexamples. I conclude that this theory provides a promising way forward for attempts to produce an adequate nonprimitivist, modalist account of essence. As both triviality and fundamentality in the account are (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  5. The meta-grounding theory of powerful qualities.Ashley Coates - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (8):2309-2328.
    A recent, seemingly appealing version of the powerful qualities view defines properties’ qualitativity via an essentialist claim and their powerfulness via a grounding claim. Roughly, this approach holds that properties are qualities because they have qualitative essences, while they are powerful because their instances or essences ground causal-modal facts. I argue that this theory should be replaced with one that defines the powerfulness of qualities in terms of both a grounding claim and a ‘meta-grounding’ claim. Specifically, I formulate and defend (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6. Unmanifested powers and universals.Ashley Coates - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-22.
    According to a well-known argument against dispositional essentialism, the nature of unmanifested token powers leaves dispositional essentialists with an objectionable commitment to the reality of non-existent entities. The idea is that, because unmanifested token powers are directed at their non-existent token manifestations, they require the reality of those manifestations. Arguably the most promising response to this argument works by claiming that, if properties are universals, dispositional directedness need only entail the reality of actually existing manifestation types. I argue that this (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7. Events and the regress of pure powers: Reply to Taylor.Ashley Coates - 2022 - Analysis 82 (4):647-654.
    Taylor has recently argued that adopting either the standard Kimian or Davidsonian approaches to the metaphysics of events quite directly solves the regress of pure powers. I argue, though, that on closer inspection Taylor’s proposal does not succeed, given either the Kimian or the Davidsonian account of events.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8.  71
    The grounding conception of governance.Ashley Coates - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    According to the governing conception of the laws of nature, laws, in some sense, determine concrete goings-on. Just how to understand the sort of determination at play in governance is, however, a substantial question. One potential answer to this question, which has recently received some attention, is that laws govern by grounding what happens in the concrete world. If this account succeeded, it would show that governance can be understood in terms of an independently motivated and widely accepted notion. Thus (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. The primitivist response to the inference problem.Ashley Coates - forthcoming - Dialectica.
    While the inference problem is widely thought to be one of the most serious problems facing non-Humean accounts of laws, Jonathan Schaffer has argued that a primitivist response straightforwardly dissolves the problem. On this basis, he claims that the inference problem is really a pseudo-problem. Here I clarify the prospects of a primitivist response to the inference problem and their implications for the philosophical significance of the problem. I argue both that it is a substantial question whether this sort of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10.  47
    Sentience, communal relations and moral status.Ashley Coates - forthcoming - Environmental Ethics.
    Thaddeus Metz has developed and defended a “modal-relational” account of moral status based on his interpretation of salient Sub-Saharan African values. Roughly, on this account, a being has moral status to the degree that it can enter into friendly or communal relationships with characteristic human beings. In this paper, it is argued that this theory’s true significance for environmental ethics has thus far not been recognized. Metz’s own view is that the theory entails that only sentient beings have moral status. (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11.  52
    Awe’s Place in Ethics.Ashley Coates - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (5):851-864.
    After a period of relative neglect, awe has been the focus of substantial empirical work in psychology and has also begun to receive some philosophical attention. Thus far, though, little attention has been devoted to a line of reasoning present in the literature on environmental ethics that moves from being awe-inspiring to being worthy of preservation. I argue here that this neglect ought to be remedied, as this argument potentially has a significant role to play in various ethical contexts involving (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Powerful Qualities, Phenomenal Properties and AI.Ashley Coates - 2023 - In William A. Bauer & Anna Marmodoro (eds.), Artificial Dispositions: Investigating Ethical and Metaphysical Issues. New York: Bloomsbury. pp. 169-192.