Synthese 199 (5-6):12103-12119 (2021)

Timothy Perrine
Wuhan University
This paper exposits and makes steps towards solving a puzzle about epistemic value. The puzzle is that several principles about the epistemic value of true beliefs and epistemic disvalue of false beliefs are, individually, plausible but, collectively, contradictory. My solution claims that sometimes false beliefs are epistemically valuable. I nonetheless show how my solution is not in deep tension with the Jamesian idea that true beliefs are epistemically valuable and false beliefs are epistemically disvaluable. I conclude by indicating how the results here are relevant to formulating and defending Veritism.
Keywords Final Epistemic Value  Final Epistemic Disvalue  Veritism
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-021-03325-y
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Principia Ethica.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.
True Enough.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2017 - Cambridge: MIT Press.
Aboutness.Stephen Yablo - 2014 - Princeton University Press.

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