Conservatisms about the Valuable

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (1):180-194 (2021)
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Abstract

ABSTRACT Sometimes it seems that an existing bearer of value should be preserved even though it could be destroyed and replaced with something of equal or greater value. How can this conservative intuition be explained and justified? This paper distinguishes three answers, which I call existential, attitudinal, and object-affecting conservatism. I raise some problems for existential and attitudinal conservatism, and suggest how they can be solved by object-affecting conservatism.

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Jake Nebel
Princeton University

Citations of this work

The Shape of History.Michal Masny - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy.
Conservatism and justified attachment.Travis Quigley - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (4):1304-1316.
Papers in Population Ethics.Elliott Thornley - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Oxford

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References found in this work

A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition.John Rawls - 1999 - Harvard University Press.
Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Mind 93 (371):450-455.

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