Aesthetic Value

Hình ảnh: Quả cây dâu ta, non màu trắng, lớn hồng nhạt, rồi đậm dần. Tới lúc đỏ tươi là sắp chín. Khi chín, quả tím sẫm, thậm chí đen.

Mikkonen’s new book and his emphasis on understanding should be regarded as an important contribution to the contemporary debate on the cognitive value of literary narratives. As I shall argue, his notion of understanding can also help explain how literature is existentially valuable. In so doing, his account can support a radicalized contemporary neo-cognitivism according to which literature can affect us existentially and lead to a personal transformation.

This paper applies the account developed by Susanna Siegel in The Rationality of Perception to aesthetic cases and explores the implications of such an account for aesthetic engagement as well as curatorial and exhibitionary practices. It argues that one’s prior outlook – expertise, beliefs, desires, fears, preferences, attitudes – can have both aesthetically good and bad influences on perceptual experiences, just as it can have both epistemically good and bad influences. Analysing these bad influences in cases of ‘hijacked’ aesthetic perception (...) will reveal that, unless we recognize that our perception of high-level and low-level aesthetically relevant properties is norm-governed, we will be at a loss to explain what goes wrong in these cases. Just as perception can be rational or irrational, so too can it be apt or inapt. (shrink)

For many members of contemporary western societies, the environment is either the theatre upon which we plan and play out our own aspirations, or a basket of resources from which to extract, produce and commercialize consumable ‘goods.’ Infrequently noticed, thought about, or cared for in any substantive way, it is merely the theatre upon which we plan and play out our own aspirations. The same might be said of many ‘sustainability enterprises,’ as the environment is taken, quite literally, as a (...) place-less basket of resources from which to extract, produce and commercialize consumable ‘goods. There is a need, then, for continued work in reframing how we see, interact with, and respond to the environment.Within the world of environmental conservation, one powerful tool employed to motivate care for the environment is drawn from the field of aesthetics. The attractive qualities of the natural world have long played a crucial role in shaping environmental policy and public concern. Even a cursory overview of the history of conservation work amply demonstrates the motivational leverage of beauty in stimulating significant change to environmental policy and even societal values. However, reliance upon the aesthetic realm also holds its own set of difficulties; employed as a designator of value, it can be overly anthropocentric, exclusionary and unjust, and its ethical purchase weak. What, then, are we to do with beauty and the aesthetic realm? Is it extraneous, representative of elitist ephemera, and even damaging in its influence upon ethical questions?Against those who are critical of the use of aesthetics in environmental ethics, I take the position that drawing upon aesthetics is crucial if we hope to change human behavior. However, in a departure from the use of aesthetics as a designator of value in service of environmental ethics, I argue that the aesthetic-moral notion of ‘fittingness,’ useful for its familiarity in everyday language, holds normative potential for directing our manner of seeing and relating to the world around us. It holds particular value for the manner in which it directs attention to the local ecology, and challenges our manner of being within that ecology, or, more specifically, an ecological neighborhood. As such, the structure of decorum holds interesting potential for informing a more just and democratic approach to questions of sustainability. (shrink)

Can one have an aesthetically valuable experience of fiction that takes an immoral perspective? Some have argued that one can. However, some important objections have been raised against this idea. Two objections are: that the immorality involved is confined to fictional reality, and that the aesthetic value of immoral fiction is dictated by a pluralistic attitude that not everyone accepts. My aim is to respond to these challenges and to argue, on the basis of two examples, that even an unlimited (...) immoral perspective can enhance a widespread aesthetic value. (shrink)

In The Aesthetic Value of the World, Tom Cochrane sets out to defend Aestheticism—the view that aesthetic value, and only aesthetic value, makes the world worth.

What is the nature of the concept BEAUTY? Does it differ fundamentally from nearby concepts such as PRETTINESS? It is argued that BEAUTY, but not PRETTINESS, is a dual-character concept. Across a number of contexts, it is proposed that BEAUTY has a descriptive sense that is characterised by, inter alia, having intrinsically pleasing appearances; and a normative sense associated with deeply-held values. This account is supported across two, pre-registered, studies (N=500), and by drawing on analysis of corpus data. It is (...) suggested that this can help to explain why beauty, unlike prettiness, is thought to be deep in both the sense of being important, and in the sense of being less closely tied to sensory surfaces. (shrink)

When are morally good actions beautiful, when indeed they are? In this paper, it is argued that morally good actions are beautiful when they appear to express the deep or true self, and in turn tend to give rise to an emotion which is characterised by feelings of being moved, unity, inspiration, and meaningfulness, inter alia. In advancing the case for this claim, it is revealed that there are additional sources of well-formedness in play in the context of moral beauty (...) in addition to those that have tended to be focused on to date: one which is connected to imagining a deep location for the goodness concerned, and another which is connected to imagining that the goodness stems from capacities which are essential to the person. (shrink)

Throughout his lectures and published writings on anthropology, Kant describes a form of unintentional, unstructured, obscure, and pleasurable imaginative mental activity, which he calls fantasy (Phantasie), where we ‘take pleasure in letting our mind wander about in obscurity.’ In the context of his pragmatic anthropology, Kant was concerned not only to describe this form of mental activity as a fact of human psychology, but more importantly, to criticize and discourage it. But must we share Kant’s negative evaluation? Could fantasy play (...) a positive role in some kinds of experience? In this paper I first reconstruct Kant’s conception of fantasy, and then consider what role fantasy might play in aesthetic experience. Precisely because of his anxieties about fantasy, Kant is careful to distinguish between the lawless freedom of the imagination in fantasy and the ‘free lawfulness’ of the imagination in aesthetic judgment. Departing from Kant, and with help from Susan Sontag, I argue that certain aesthetic objects, especially certain works of modernist art, positively invite fantasy, making fantasy part of proper aesthetic appreciation. I conclude by suggesting that while fantasy can indeed play a positive role in aesthetic appreciation, there is still reason to regard fantasy as ‘normatively ambiguous.’. (shrink)

According to the most important objection to the existence of moral beauty, true judgements of moral beauty are not possible as moral judgements require being motivated to act in line with the moral judgement made, and judgements of beauty require not being motivated to act in any way. Here, I clarify the argument underlying the objection, and show that it does not show that moral beauty does not exist. I present two responses: namely, that the beauty of moral beauty does (...) not lie in the moral goodness per se (the “adjacent properties” response); and that only a dispositional motivation to act is required for the moral judgements that are typically made as part of judgements of moral beauty, whereas aesthetic judgements only rule out state motivations to act (the “equivocation of motivation required” response). In addressing the objection, I show how moral beauty is consistent with disinterestedness, and so should be accepted more widely; and also clarify where the beauty in moral beauty resides, and how the moral-aesthetic distinction should be drawn. (shrink)

The subject of the thesis is the relationship between aesthetic and God. It aims to discuss whether the sense of beauty is proof of the existence of God and to determine the plausibility of aesthetic proof. As a matter of fact that reality and the perception of beauty point to two-way consciousness. In this context, it will be inevitable to mention God's relation with consciousness in the emergence of beauty. In the first part, the concepts of aesthetics will be analyzed, (...) and their philosophical discussions will be investigated. In the second part, the source of beauty will be questioned, and beauty will be grounded way of a priori and a posteriori with God. Afterward, aesthetic proofs will be presented and an evaluation will be made in the context of naturalistic claims and objections. Among the traditional arguments in the philosophy of religion, aesthetic proof offers a value-oriented approach rather than a mechanical view. It appreciates beauty from an inclusive perspective and has an existential aspect. The study concentrates on the nature of beauty and aesthetics, philosophical discussions, and the rational value of aesthetic proof and concludes that it is rational to suppose that the existence of God can be ontologically and epistemologically explanatory for aesthetic properties. (shrink)

This paper explores Moritz Geiger’s work on the role of emotions in aesthetic appreciation and shows its potential for contemporary research. Drawing on the main tenets of Geiger’s phenomenological aesthetics as an aesthetics of value, the paper begins by elaborating his model of aesthetic appreciation. I argue that, placed in the contemporary debate, his model is close to affective models which make affective states responsible for the apprehension of the aesthetic value of an artwork, though Geiger also makes important concessions (...) to the intellectualist. Indeed, like proponents of the affective model, Geiger argues that a work’s aesthetic values are extracted by means of an affective state though the affective state in question is neither an emotion nor a feeling but a “liking”. In fact, like the intellectualist, he considers that a focus on the emotions might on certain occasions interfere in the aesthetic appreciation of the artwork. Next, I reconstruct Geiger’s distinction between surface and depth effects in terms of a distinction between two types of emotional responses to artworks. It is argued that Geiger’s distinction offers a powerful tool to distinguish those emotions that are intrinsically related to aesthetic values from those that are not and that this distinction can be useful to understand how different kinds of emotions contribute to aesthetic appreciation. I proceed to examine the historical sources of Geiger’s distinction between surface and depth effects in Theodor Lipps’s aesthetics and compare Geiger’s account with the works of other early phenomenologists working on values. In the final part, I illustrate the place of Geiger’s model in the contemporary discussion by means of an example. (shrink)

Accounts of aesthetic valuing emphasize two constraints on the formation of aesthetic belief. We must form our own aesthetic beliefs by engaging with aesthetic value first-hand (the acquaintance principle) and by using our own capacities (the autonomy principle). But why? C. Thi Nguyen’s proposal is that aesthetic valuing has an inverted structure. We often care about inquiry and engagement for the sake of having true beliefs, but in aesthetic engagement this is flipped: we care about arriving at good aesthetic beliefs (...) for the sake of the values that arise in the process of doing so. The engagement is the point, so we must use our own capacities in first-hand encounters. Here I challenge Nguyen’s account. I argue that it misconstrues the value of aesthetic belief; it conflicts with restrictions on aesthetic testimony; and it has trouble harnessing engagement-value for a theory of aesthetic value. A better approach emphasizes the social character of aesthetic valuing. On this view, aesthetic valuing is a social practice structured around the collaborative exercise and improvement of certain special capacities. The autonomy and acquaintance principles tell us to engage these capacities in forming our aesthetic beliefs. Understood aright, and contrary to consensus, these rules are identical. (shrink)

Value capture occurs when an agent’s values are rich and subtle; they enter a social environment that presents simplified — typically quantified — versions of those values; and those simplified articulations come to dominate their practical reasoning. Examples include becoming motivated by FitBit’s step counts, Twitter Likes and Re-tweets, citation rates, ranked lists of best schools, and Grade Point Averages. We are vulnerable to value capture because of the competitive advantage that such crisp and clear expressions of value have in (...) our private reasoning and our public justification. There is, however, a price. In value capture, we take a central component of our autonomy — our ongoing deliberation over the exact articulation of our values — and we outsource it. And the metrics to which we outsource usually engineered for the interests of some external force, like a large-scale institution’s interest in cross-contextual comprehensibility and quick aggregability. That outsourcing cuts off one of the key benefits to personal deliberation. In value capture, we no longer adjust our values and their articulations in light of own rich experience of the world. Our values should often be carefully tailored to our particular selves or our small-scale communities, but in value capture, we buy our values off the rack. In some cases – like decreasing CO2 emissions – the costs of non-tailored values are outweighed by the benefit of precise collective coordination. In other cases, like in our aesthetic lives, they are not. This suggests that we should want different values suited to different scales. We should want value federalism. Some values are perhaps best pursued at the largest-scale level, others at smaller scales. The problem occurs when we exhibit an excess preference for the largest-scale values – when we consistently let the universal metrics swamp our quieter interests. (shrink)

Aestheticians have had a great deal to say recently in praise of (aesthetic) appreciation. This enthusiastic appreciation for appreciation may seem unsurprising given the important role it plays in many of our aesthetic practices, but we maintain that some prominent aestheticians have overstated the role of appreciation (and, perhaps more importantly, understated the role of other elements we will discuss) when it comes to the exercise of aesthetic taste. This is not, of course, to deny the obvious fact that appreciation (...) often plays an important role in our aesthetic practices but merely that it is a mistake to cast it in the role of the sine qua non of aesthetics. (shrink)

There is broad agreement in aesthetics that some artworks are greater than others despite bearing equivalent (or lesser) aesthetic value. One explanation of this difference in artistic value is that creation of the greater artwork represents a greater achievement. The aim of this article is to refine this explanation and to defend it against recent criticisms. First, I present a prima facie case in favor of the achievement explanation. Second, I draw on the history of photography to motivate three objections (...) to it: namely, that it wrongly excludes (1) lucky, (2) easy, and (3) failed creations from being artistically great. Third, I present my refined version of the achievement explanation and show how it avoids these objections. On my view, an artistic achievement consists in creating a work it would have been especially hard for comparable artists to create. Finally, I raise and address several additional objections. In responding to these objections, I argue, among other things, that my explanation of artistic value enhances our understanding of good-bad art: specifically, it allows us to see how good-bad art is artistically great despite being aesthetically flawed. (shrink)

The editorial introduces issue 21.1 of Technoetic Arts via a critical reflection on the artificial intelligence hype (AI hype) that emerged in 2022. Tracing the history of the critique of Large Language Models, the editorial underscores that the recent calls for slowing down the development of AI, as promoted by the technology industry, do not signify a shift towards reason and considerate economics. Instead, as these calls are firmly embedded in narratives where the power to decide for the majority of (...) humanity lies solely with the CEOs of AI companies, they are indicative of a relentless pursuit of economic interests. The technology industry has consistently downplayed criticism over the years. -/- While patterns of creative output can be replicated without a thorough understanding of underlying concepts, the editorial highlights the distinction between the current AI technology's reliance on extensive pre-existing human-generated data for pattern recognition and the performative process inherent in art practice. This performative process, as explored through the conceptual frameworks of creativity by Noam Chomsky, Charles Sanders Peirce, and Roger T. Ames and with reference to an earlier publication of the editorial's author, continually 'strives to extend itself towards the unknown.' -/- Following this introductory section, the editorial provides an overview of the ten articles featured in this issue of Technoetic Arts. The first four texts engage with emerging technologies from various perspectives in art and design. The subsequent six articles, part of a special section titled 'Perspectives from Chandigarh,' reflect a quest for meaningful existence within colonial, patriarchal, and biopolitical structures that frame everyday practices of exclusion and oppression. (shrink)

In the first part of his magnum opus Hans Urs von Balthasarpresents his project of theological aesthetics where the experience of art becomes an entrance to a religious act and an ennobling way leading to the contemplation of God. Defining the essence of being human as a spiritual being directed towards God bears a deep ethical meaning in this consideration. H.U. von Balthasar’s reflection over the religious dimension of the essence of art is shaped within theology but at the same (...) time in the opposition to aesthetic theology which is de-scribed as ‘aesthetisation’ of the Mystery of Revelation. The art of music occupies a particular place in this reflection. For this reason Mass in B Minor BWV 232 by Johann Sebastian Bach, which is an emblematic example of the revelation of the glory of the Lord (Herrlichkeit), will be analysed not only from the perspective of philosophical or musicological aesthetics, but also theological aesthetics. This article outlines characteristic features of theological aesthetics specifically developed from traditional philosophical aesthetics whose range was extended by the human being’s relation to God. (shrink)

We are capable of engaging in different kinds of relations with objects and situations we meet. Any relation is, in principle singular and thus einmalig, unique. Still, certain general types of relationality do exist. Relations may be established with focus (“attention”) on usability, truth, ethics, power, authenticity—and of course, on “beauty,” on aesthetic value. This differentiation is an invention of the Modern world and in itself subject to historical change. In terms of “discursive areas” it has been theorized in varying (...) keys—including quite many universalist ones. We are free to choose our modes of attention. Still, institutionalized discourses in practice pre-configure these modes. Especially when it comes to art and Modernity’s “great divide” between poiesis and aesthesis, the conditions for attentional approaches appear largely pre-figured. The article discusses this pre-configuration and the institutionalized “freedoms” of art and its audience, respectively—including current calls to abolish such differentiations and to transgress the discursive boundaries of art. (shrink)

The late Vivienne Westwood sketched a role for fashion that elevates it from the prosaic to the status of art, as something important, life-enhancing, and worthy of pursuit. Here, a philosophical treatment of Westwood’s vision of fashion that does justice to the artistic and life-enhancing value that fashion can realise is offered, using an emergent theory in contemporary analytic aesthetics. The virtue theory of art delineates the intrinsic worth of art in terms of the opportunities it provides for us to (...) exercise and cultivate virtues such as courage, self-expression, imagination, wit, or authenticity. Our engagement with art can subsequently be genuinely life-enhancing in lieu of the constitutive role the virtues play in living well. The present study takes Westwood’s claims as a jumping-off point, considering how they speak not just to her own designs but to our relationship with our clothes more broadly. Fashion is defended as a practice that performs this function in analogous ways to other genres of art and thus has clear artistic value as well as enables us to live well. Given this potential, just as Westwood claimed, there are reasons to perform the practice well because it has importance for the ways in which it can realise artistic value and aid us in living well. (shrink)

Activist artists often face a difficult question: is striving to change the world undermined when pursued through difficult and experimental artistic means? Looking closely at Adrian Piper's 'Four Intruders plus Alarm Systems' (1980), I will consider why this is an important concern for activist art, and assess three different responses in relation to Piper’s work. What I call the conciliatory stance recommends that when activist artists encounter misunderstanding, they should downplay their experimental artistry in favor of fitting their work to (...) their audience's appreciative capacities. What I call the steadfast stance recommends that activist artists have reason to use their privilege of artistic exceptionalism to challenge their audience's expectations, even if this leads to misunderstanding. I claim that a middle position that I call liberal conciliation best balances the demands for actual change placed on activism and the experimental means that artists bring to activism. (shrink)

Aesthetic statements of the form ‘X is beautiful’ are evaluative; they indicate the speaker’s positive affective attitude regarding X. Why is this so? Is the evaluative content part of the truth conditions, or is it a pragmatic phenomenon (i.e. presupposition, implicature)? First, I argue that semantic approaches as well as these pragmatic ones cannot satisfactorily explain the evaluativity of aesthetic statements. Second, I offer a positive proposal based on a speech-act theoretical version of hybrid expressivism, which states that, with the (...) literal utterance of ‘X is beautiful’, we perform two illocutionary acts simultaneously, an assertive and an expressive one. I will specify this theory in detail and argue that it can satisfactorily account for the evaluative content of aesthetic statements. I will also discuss the advantages of the theory over other variants of expressivism in meta-aesthetics. (shrink)

This paper develops an aesthetics of crossword puzzles. I present a taxonomy of crosswords in the Anglophone world and argue that there are three distinct sources of aesthetic value in crosswords. First, and in common with other puzzles, crosswords merit aesthetic experiences of our own agency: paradigmatically, the aesthetic experience of struggling for and hitting upon the right solution. In addition to instantiating the aesthetic value of puzzles in general, crosswords in particular can have two other sources of aesthetic value: (...) the visual appeal of grid art and the poetic delight of idiomatic language. Crossword aesthetics takes place at the intersection of the recently popular aesthetics of puzzles and games and the more familiar aesthetics of the visual and literary arts. (shrink)

This first-ever article of cultural criticism on the black female body was to prove germinal and continues to be widely referenced in scholarly and other works. Occasionally, controversial, it has been frequently anthologized, most recently in Amelia Jones, ed., The Feminism and Visual Cultural Reader, 2nd edition (Routledge, 2010). The first part of this article--delivered in a panel of the College Art Association early in 1992--was published in Afterimage 20:1 (Summer 1992). The revised version, including "Postscript," originally appeared in the (...) work cited here: Freueh, Langer and Raven, eds., New Feminist Criticism: Art, Identity, Action (1994). (shrink)

This revelatory study investigates how changing modes of representing the black female figure were foundational to the development of modern art. Posing Modernity examines the legacy of Edouard Manet's Olympia (1863), arguing that this radical painting marked a fitfully evolving shift toward modernist portrayals of the black figure as an active participant in everyday life rather than as an exotic "other." Denise Murrell explores the little-known interfaces between the avant-gardists of nineteenth-century Paris and the post-abolition community of free black Parisians. (...) She traces the impact of Manet's reconsideration of the black model into the twentieth century and across the Atlantic, where Henri Matisse visited Harlem jazz clubs and later produced transformative portraits of black dancers as icons of modern beauty. These and other works by the artist are set in dialogue with the urbane "New Negro" portraiture style with which Harlem Renaissance artists including Charles Alston and Laura Wheeler Waring defied racial stereotypes. The book concludes with a look at how Manet's and Matisse's depictions influenced Romare Bearden and continue to reverberate in the work of such global contemporary artists as Faith Ringgold, Aime Mpane, Maud Sulter, and Mickalene thomas, who draw on art history to explore its multiple voices. Featuring over 175 illustrations and profiles of several models, Posing Modernity illuminates long-obscured figures and proposes that a history of modernism cannot be complete until it examines the vital role of the black female muse within it. Published in association with the Miriam and Ira D. Wallach Art Gallery, Columbia University in the City of New York. Exhibition schedule: Wallach Art Gallery (10/24/2018-02/1019); Musee d'Orsay (3/26/2019-07/14/2019). (shrink)

"Presence" is a word that can function both as a descriptor of the uniqueness, identity, and strength of an(y) identifiable, individual work of art (as used in the phrase, its "artistic presence") and, more specifically, and with a capital P, the name of a year-long exhibit consisting of a series of artworks in a uniquely created architectural environment with the Speed Art Museum in Louisville, Kentucky. In addition, as well-known art theorist Donald Preziosi points out in his 2004 essay ["Art (...) and the Contemplation off Presence"] included in this publication, the term "presence" may also refer to the character of the artist that is embodied _in_ a physical work of art, whereby the _form_ of the work is "in some way a _figure_ of its truth--the truth or essence or being of the artist..." Indeed I would suggest an even stronger defense of the artist, what I call the Intentionality Thesis, which states: _The most important spokesperson capable of elucidating the meaning of a work of art is the artist_. The Intentionality Thesis is a substantive component of my recommendation for art viewers to practice what I call "contemplative contextual criticism" (CCC, for short). Such an emphasis on intentionality is often fraught with controversy, but the Intentionality Thesis can function (within the broader framework of one's CCC) as a fruitful interpretive tool that optimizes our actual experiences of art. -/- CCC is the deliberate cognitive analysis--the act of contemplation--of a work of art that enhances the potential of artistic presence; both of the work itself and the artist who created it. It is the process of studying a work of art in its full context... (shrink)

The idea of beauty in the West has often been connected with the idea of woman, whose beauty has been celebrated in sculptures of the nude since classical Greece and in paintings since the sixteenth century. the nude is not a genre in either traditional or contemporary Chinese art, however, and although there has been nakedness in the representations of the body in the contemporary art of China, its presence is marked by two characteristics that distance the Chinese naked body (...) from the Western nude. (shrink)

The global economy has an impact on female beauty today, regardless of the multicultural and historical factors in its formation and construction, resulting in monolithic crazes in women's fashion and appearance. but female beauty in china has been greatly contested with China's turbulent modern history, and this contestation deserves serious consideration, together with the politics by which the Chinese state apparatus has promoted and regulated female beauty. I argue that certain factors have been constant in contemporary discourses of female beauty. (...) Ideal bodies, in all their specifics, are defined by physical standards very few women can attain. These standards are accompanied by demeaning characterizations of women who fail to achieve them, and who are therefore destined to be discontent. It is now necessary for feminist theorists to examine the social and cultural roles of the body in terms of gender, power, the established patriarchy, and its oppression of women. (shrink)

"Orientalism" is a term made prominent by critic Edward Said in his 1978 book of that title. . . . Said specifically used the term to designate a field of self-constituted experts who proposed to explain the Orient to the West. . . . This essay explores the visual artwork of Soody Sharifi who left Iran before the Islamic Revolution of 1979, but returns to photograph women and girls. After a trip back to Iran in 1999, she began a self-portrait (...) series exploring how she felt about being a Muslim woman in a hijab for the first time. (shrink)

Art reconfigures experience. Art is a mentalized physical object. Danto remarks that art is embodied meaning. Hein says that feminist art chats on the edge. Our mental life is filled with meaning, but art opens the question of the meaning of experience. . . . Art, chatting on the edge of experience, nevertheless invites us to choose our stance in that world. I suggest that that is the beauty, or, at least the value, of art. The art experience presents us (...) with a sensory exemplar that can convey, and exhibits, content. The exhibited content of the mode of presentation of the exemplar suggests a reconfiguration of the content of experience outside of art as well as within. Art, then, is that part of experience that changes us to changing the content of our experience. My claim here is that feminist art provides us with a paradigm of what art does, and the tis why I admire it. (shrink)

Breda Beban's stunning two-screen video installation, The Most Beautiful Woman in Gucha, documents a mutually seductive encounter between a beautiful belly dancer and an inebriated young man at a Romany brass band festival in Serbia. . . . With The Most Beautiful Woman in Gucha, you can have your cake and eat it too, because this cake has a whole-grain antioxidant, omega-3 excellence running through it.

In this chapterI discuss beauty and youth in Balinese dance, with special reference to Legong. Legong is the "classic" Balinese dance genre for females and is represented by Balinese to the world as the quintessence of grace, charm, and beauty in their performing arts. . . . Apparently, the notion of beauty that is invoked here is not straightforwardly equivalent to the heterosexual male norms for female sexual attractiveness, which may favor younger women but don't require them to be under (...) twenty. What then is the connection between beauty and youth in Balinese legong? (shrink)

Beauty, disability, and gender crossing: The first two, though provocative, are not an altogether unexpected pair. Disability can be an object of beauty, as Anita Silvers has shown, just as it can be fetishized. Yet one more often thinks of beauty and disability as opposites. But what is gender crossing doing in this mix? Sometimes, apparently, when beauty is conjugated with disability in an atmosphere of glamour and celebrity, games with gender result. this is certainly the case with the representation (...) of the Mexican female artist Frida Kahlo, especially as seen in a book of paper dolls for children. (shrink)

When I was asked to write an essay about beauty from a gendered or ethnic perspective, two Native American expressions came to my mind and served as inspiration: "Beauty surrounds us' and "Walk in beauty." "Walk in beauty" is a well-known Navajo saying and philosophical outlook. It encompasses both inner beauty and carrying oneself in a dignified manner the brings harmony to one's environment. The phrase is applicable to both women and men. The phrase "Beauty surrounds us" is also well (...) known, although I do not know if it has a specific tribal origin. However, "Beauty Surrounds Us" was also the the title of a 2006 exhibit at the New York branch of the National Museum of the American Indian (NMAI). . . .For the purposes of this feminist anthology, I will mainly focus on the beauty inherent in the female form, but I have to include some male examples as well to achieve the male/female balance that is so essential to native life. (shrink)

In a season rife with related events [i.e., 2007], the Brooklyn Museum's "Global Feminisms: New Directions in Contemporary Art" is an eagerly anticipated component of a nationwide reevaluation of feminist art. It takes its place alongside the presentation of "WACK! Art and the Feminist Revolution" at the Museum of Contemporary Art in Los Angeles, and the installation of Judy Chicago's The Dinner Party (1974-79) and opening of the Elizabeth A. Sackler Center for Feminist Art at the Brooklyn Museum, for which (...) "Global Feminisms" acted as the opening salvo; there are also numerous panels, lectures, and other activities around the country. . . . Altogether there are almost ninety artists in the show, hailing from fifty countries and working in mediums that range from painting, sculpture, and installation to photography, video, and performance. This essay was originally published in Art in America 95, no. 6 (June-July, 2007): 154-165. (shrink)

Whatever approach one favors, the relationships between the most abstract and disembodied sense of beauty and the physical, erotic sense are clearly harder to sever than many philosophers have previously realized. The soul may be glad to forget its connection with the body, as Santayana put it, but that gladness indicates that the connection is there to be forgotten in the first place. And often it is not so much forgotten as reshaped and transfigured. Such transformations are explored here with (...) excursions into the place of beauty in art; into the queering of beauty in the exemplars of beautiful artworks; into explorations of the marginal and exotic that allure while defying conventional models; into the literal carving of facial features for cosmetic and artistic purposes that both conform to and challenges norms of appearance. In such different contexts these authors dramatize the various ways that beauty can function in relation to personal desires, artistic values, and social authority. Here we can discover beauty not only as a quality and a value, but also as a project and a practice that drives our lives from both within and without--internal standards, external expectations, and ambivalence meeting in provocative disputation. (shrink)

Advocates of interactionism in the ethical criticism of art argue that ethical value impacts aesthetic value. The debate is concerned with “the intrinsic question”: the question of whether ethical flaws/merits in artworks’ manifested attitudes affect their aesthetic value (Gaut 2007: 9). This paper argues that the assumption that artworks have intrinsic ethical value is problematic at least in regards to a significant subset of works: fictional artworks. I argue that, insofar as their ethical value emerges only from attitudes attributable to (...) actual agents, fictional artworks only have extrinsic ethical value. I show that what is at stake for interactionism is whether ethical judgements concerning artists’ attitudes in a context, rather than manifested attitudes, are ever aesthetically relevant. I conclude that, without buying into extreme actual intentionalism, a still controversial theory of interpretation that ties artworks’ meaning to actual artists, interactionism fails to show that ethical flaws/merits are aesthetic flaws/merits. (shrink)

For the generation of feminists who emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, female beauty was suspect, for it simply pandered to male desire. And for the modernist artists of that period, beauty in art had long since been banished. but for Armitage's generation, already empowered by the political gains of feminism on the one hand, and engaged in a postmodernist challenge to the values of artistic modernism on the other, beauty in art and in the female body could once again (...) be appreciated. If Armitage was drawn, as a child, to the beauty and glamour of ballet, her own interventions into the history of the art form have given that beauty a new, more complex face. Her unabashed love of ballet's beauty (especially its female beauty) and its erotic display, combined with her intelligent interrogation of the grounds for that beauty, her historical references, and her witty irreverence, wickedly and triumphantly reclaim the art form for our post-feminist times. (shrink)

The "Actresses" series by Yasumasa Morimura brutally exposes the position, attitude, or stance we assume when we see this body of work. The viewer's one-sided gaze, inflicted upon the women Morimura has impersonated, is repelled and hurled back to the viewer as the point questions: "Who are you?" and "What is your position?" You yourself, not an abstract human being, are being interrogated here. It is easy to speak lofty ideas while casting ourselves as objective transparent beings: disappearing borders, the (...) self in flux, anti-essentialism. . . . However, it is not an abstract narrator who manipulates language but an actual you defined by your sex, gender, and sexuality who is being questioned in front of Morimura's "Actresses.". (shrink)

This essay explores the implications of Irigaray's discussion of the concept "beauty" . . . Her writings indicate moments of strategic or structural possibility from which women can create beauties appropriate to their subjectivities, and outline how becoming subjects, women, and mediating the resultant subjectivity is in itself to create beauty. Although in Western culture the Symbolic has a phallocentric syntax and what is read as beauty of body and beauty in art are products of phallocentric structures, nonetheless moments of (...) resistance and disruption can be discerned in contemporary artworks by women. It is against the backdrop of Irigaray's reconfiguring of "beauty" that I discuss some of these works. (shrink)

Although it may appear that the Miss America Pageant is responsible for breaking down class barriers, the fact is that the pageant was always governed by upper-class patriarchal values of what constitutes the proper woman. . . . [it] fosters sexist practices, and exploits, commodities, and objectifies women and girls; consider the case of the murdered JonBenet Ramsey--who competed in children's beauty pageants at age six. If there is still any question in your mind about how deeply ingrained Miss American (...) Beauty pageant values are, consider this: six-year-old JonBenet Ramsey was buried in one of her pageant outfits and a rhinestone tiara--the ultimate sleeping beauty. (shrink)

Putting classical art to the side for the moment, the naked and near-naked female body became an object of mainstream consumption first in Playboy and its imitators, then in movies, and only then in fashion photographs. With the male body, the trajectory has been different. Fashion has taken the lead, the movies have followed. Hollywood may have been a chest-fest in the fifties, but it was male clothing designers [e.g., Calvin Klein] who went south and violated the really powerful taboos--not (...) just against the explicit depiction of penises and male bottoms but against the admission of all sorts of forbidden "feminine" qualities into mainstream conceptions of manliness. . . . Images of masculinity that will do double (or triple or quadruple) duty with a variety of consumers, straight and gay, male and female, are not difficult to create in a culture like ours, in which the muscular, male body has a long and glorious aesthetic history. (shrink)

One of the reasons for the disappearance of beauty in the artistic ideology of the late twentieth century has been the seeming similarity of beauty to certain kinds of kitsch. Beauty has also been associated with flawlessness and with glamour. I will content that the flawless and the glamorous are actually categories of kitsch, and that the dominance of these images in marketing has contributed to our societal tendency to confuse them with beauty. The quests for flawlessness and glamour are (...) both self-sabotaging, a premise on which the marketing of beauty depends. These false paradigms of beauty have ob cured the fact that human beauty manifests an ideal of balance and health that is neither self-conscious nor a consequence of deliberate effort. I will defend the relevance of this ideal to beauty to our personal and cultural well-being. (shrink)

Hegel has identified what I have preemptively designated a third aesthetic realm--in addition to natural beauty and artistic beauty--one greatly connected with human life . . . art applied to the enhancement of life . . . But the other border of what I shall designate the Third Realm is equally non-exclusionary, especially when we consider what Hegel singles out under the head of beautiful people--the kind of beauty possessed by Helen of Troy, say, which we must suppose a wonder (...) of nature. But Helen's choice of hairstyles, makeup, or garments would have belonged to the Third Realm, since it would have been chosen for enhancement, like the setting of a jewel. (shrink)

In this essay I want to consider how Penola's (character in Toni Morrison's novel, The Bluest Eye) circumstance es motivate her petition--"asking for beauty"--and two others, after which I will offer my own petition concerning the practice of aesthetics.

In this essay, I am concerned with the representation of groups in popular culture. My interest has to do with the politics of representing people. The couplet beauty/nonbeauty (or, more specifically, beauty/ugliness) frequently figures importantly in the representation of groups, including most notably, for my purposes, ethnic and racial minorities. This couplet can be politically significant because beauty is often associated in our culture with moral goodness. . . . Thus, beauty and non beauty can serve as a basis for (...) political rhetoric. . . . If one concept of human beauty (which is connected to ideas of goodness) sees beauty as the instantiation or near approximation of the concept human being, then the related idea of human ugliness (which is connected with ideas of moral degradation) is rooted in problematic exemplifications of the concept of the human. These "problematic exemplifications" can take many forms. The two that will preoccupy me in this essay are the imperfect exemplifications of the human found in the popular genres of horror and humor. (shrink)