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Summary This subcategory collects entries related to various value concepts and distinctions, including intrinsic/extrinsic, final/instrumental, objective/subjective, unique, expressive, symbolic, moral, prudential, aesthetic, epistemic.
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  1. Kantian Telicism: Our Legitimate Ends and Their Moral Significance.Douglas W. Portmore - manuscript
    This chapter explains a key tenet of the moral theory that I call Kantsequentialism. That tenet is Kantian Telicism: the view that a subject’s will along with the value of things determine their legitimate ends, which include all their discretionary ends (say, mastering kung fu or traveling the world) as well as the following four obligatory ends: (a) never manifesting a lack of recognition respect for a person, (b) the well-being of every other existing sentient being, (c) the maximization of (...)
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  2. Nietzsche’s Legacy and Constitutional Values: A Deconstructive Reading.Jacques de Ville - forthcoming - Law and Critique:1-19.
    Derrida’s recently published Life Death seminars have again highlighted the importance of values within the ongoing philosophical conversation about overcoming metaphysics. The seminars further indirectly raise a matter of great importance for constitutional theory. Values have become central to constitutional discourse since the mid-twentieth century despite critique due to their supposedly subjective nature, the potential conflict between them, and the legal uncertainty that they bring about. This essay enquires into the origin, logic, structure, and operation of (constitutional) values. It does (...)
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  3. Bastiat on Economic Harmony.Mark LeBar - forthcoming - Social Philosophy and Policy.
    Frederick Bastiat’s last work was the Economic Harmonies, published in 1851. He died while completing it, and — though it had some uptake in the 19th century — in recent times scholarly interest has focused on his other work. In the Harmonies, he makes a remarkable claim: when properly understood, in a free market society all people’s economic interests are in harmony. If we consider that Karl Marx was arguing at the same time that those same societies are afflicted by (...)
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  4. Reasons of Love and Conceptual Good-for-Nothings.Matthieu Queloz - forthcoming - In Michael Frauchiger & Markus Stepanians (eds.), Themes from Susan Wolf. Berlin: De Gruyter.
    What reasons do we have to use certain concepts and conceptions rather than others? Approaching that question in a methodologically humanistic rather than Platonic spirit, one might seek “reasons for concept use” in how well concepts serve the contingent human concerns of those who live by them. But appealing to the instrumentality of concepts in meeting our concerns invites the worry that this yields the wrong kind of reasons, especially if the relevant concerns are nonmoral ones. Drawing on Susan Wolf’s (...)
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  5. Intrinsically Good, God Created Them.Daniel Rubio - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion.
    Erik Wielenberg [2014] and Mark Murphy [2017], [2018] have defended a series of arguments for the conclusion that creatures are not good intrinsically. In response, I take two steps. First, I introduce a conception of intrinsic value that makes created intrinsic value unproblematic. Second, I respond to their arguments in turn. The first argument is from the sovereignty-aseity intuition and an analysis of intrinsicality that makes derivative good extrinsic. I challenge the analysis. The second comes from a conception of perfection (...)
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  6. ‘Relational Values’ is Neither a Necessary nor Justified Ethical Concept.Patrik Baard - 2024 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 1 (1).
    ‘Relational value’ (RV) has intuitive credibility due to the shortcomings of existing axiological categories regarding recognizing the ethical relevance of people’s relations to nature. But RV is justified by arguments and analogies that do not hold up to closer scrutiny, which strengthens the assumption that RV is redundant. While RV may provide reasons for ethically considering some relations, much work remains to show that RV is a concept that does something existing axiological concepts cannot, beyond empirically describing relations people have (...)
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  7. The relational foundations of epistemic normativity.Cameron Boult - 2024 - Philosophical Issues 34 (1):285-304.
    Why comply with epistemic norms? In this paper, I argue that complying with epistemic norms, engaging in epistemically responsible conduct, and being epistemically trustworthy are constitutive elements of maintaining good epistemic relations with oneself and others. Good epistemic relations are in turn both instrumentally and finally valuable: they enable the kind of coordination and knowledge acquisition underpinning much of what we tend to associate with a flourishing human life; and just as good interpersonal relations with others can be good for (...)
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  8. Beyond Intrinsic and Instrumental: Third-Category Value in Environmental Ethics and Environmental Policy.Anna Https://Orcidorg Deplazes-Zemp - 2024 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 27 (2):166-188.
    Values have always tended to play a central role in discourse on the environment, a tendency which is currently particularly evident in the biodiversity context. Traditionally, arguments about the environment have invoked instrumental value to highlight the necessity or utility of a healthy environment for people and intrinsic value to emphasize the importance of protecting nature for its own sake. More recently, this value dichotomy has been challenged, and the notion of a third value category – relational value – has (...)
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  9. Why nature matters: A systematic review of intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values.A. Himes, B. Muraca, C. B. Anderson, S. Athayde, T. Beery, M. Cantú-Fernández, D. González-Jiménez, R. K. Gould, A. P. Hejnowicz, J. Kenter, D. Lenzi, R. Murali, U. Pascual, C. Raymond, A. Ring, K. Russo, A. Samakov, S. Stålhammar, H. Thorén & E. Zent - 2024 - BioScience 74 (1).
    In this article, we present results from a literature review of intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values of nature conducted for the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, as part of the Methodological Assessment of the Diverse Values and Valuations of Nature. We identify the most frequently recurring meanings in the heterogeneous use of different value types and their association with worldviews and other key concepts. From frequent uses, we determine a core meaning for each value type, which is (...)
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  10. The Specter of Value: The Beginning of Marx’s Capital and Hegel’s Logic of Being.Andrea Ricci - 2024 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80 (1-2):95-128.
    The beginning of Marx’s Capital has references to Hegel’s Logic of Being. From the individual commodity considered in isolation, Marx derives the value form as the germ cell of capitalist society. Marx’s materialist inversion of the Hegelian dialectic posits the value form as a spectral objectivity that constitutes the real abstraction specific to capitalism. As the most abstract expression of capital, it rules unconsciously the totality of social praxis as an absolute fetish. Value arises from a double mystification: the reification (...)
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  11. Cultural Values and their Reception. Exploring the Case of Cultural Heritage.Moritz von Kalckreuth - 2024 - Culture and Values 38:9-31.
    In the debates of value-theory, it is often assumed that the problem of relativism is to be addressed in a general way, taking moral values as archetype of values. The aim of this paper is to contribute to a differentiation of this debate by facing the problem of relativism in terms of a specific kind of values, namely that of cultural values ascribed to heritage. It shall be shown that by involving both cultural and value-dimensions, the case of cultural heritage (...)
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  12. The Trouble with Relational Values.Rogelio Luque-Lora - 2023 - Environmental Values 32 (4):411-431.
    This paper questions the conceptual and pragmatic worth of the category of relational values. Combining philosophical reasoning with ethnographic field-work in Wallmapu/Chile, I analyse a variety of ways in which people think about, value and behave toward the land. I thereby demonstrate that relational-ity is inherent to held, instrumental and intrinsic values. This means that there is no meaningful way in which to distinguish relational values from more familiar types of values. Yet, to be able to argue that a distinct (...)
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  13. A Kantian Reading of 'Good' and 'Good For'. Some Reflections on Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen's Fitting Attitude Analysis of Value.Herlinde Pauer-Studer - 2023 - Value,Morality and Social Reality.
    The paper argues that Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen’s fitting-attitude analysis of ‘good’ and ‘good for’ allows us to interpret and justify Kant’s Formula of Humanity (FH) in a constructive way. His classification of ‘good’ as a non-relational intrinsic final value and ‘good for’ as a relational extrinsic final value sheds light on two main features of FH, namely that it requires us to display a specific attitude to human beings, while also obligating us to recognize this value in the relational dimension. Based (...)
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  14. Value Approaches to Virtue and Vice: Intrinsic, Instrumental, or Hybrid?Timothy Perrine - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (4):613-626.
    According to one tradition, the virtues and vices should be understood in terms of their relation to value. But inside this tradition, there are three distinct proposals: virtues are intrinsically valuable; virtues are instrumentally valuable; or a hybrid proposal on which virtues are either intrinsically or instrumentally valuable. In this paper, I offer an alternative proposal inside this tradition. I propose that virtues and vices should be understood in terms of the degreed properties of being virtuous and being vicious, which (...)
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  15. Art, Affectivity, and Aesthetic Value: Geiger on the Role of Emotions in Aesthetic Appreciation.Íngrid Vendrell Ferran - 2023 - Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology 10 (2):143 - 159.
    This paper explores Moritz Geiger’s work on the role of emotions in aesthetic appreciation and shows its potential for contemporary research. Drawing on the main tenets of Geiger’s phenomenological aesthetics as an aesthetics of value, the paper begins by elaborating his model of aesthetic appreciation. I argue that, placed in the contemporary debate, his model is close to affective models which make affective states responsible for the apprehension of the aesthetic value of an artwork, though Geiger also makes important concessions (...)
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  16. Against Relational Value.Simon P. James - 2022 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 29:45-54.
    In some environmental circles, talk of relational values is very much in fashion. It is said that we must think in terms of such values if we are to understand how such things as canyons, mangroves, and coral reefs matter to people. But that is bad advice. Appeals to relational values are typically misleading in several respects. Granted, those who make such appeals often do so in order to make the important point that some values are neither intrinsic nor instrumental (...)
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  17. Veritism and ways of deriving epistemic value.Ylwa Sjölin Wirling - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3617-3633.
    Veritists hold that only truth has fundamental epistemic value. They are committed to explaining all other instances of epistemic goodness as somehow deriving their value through a relation to truth, and in order to do so they arguably need a non-instrumental relation of epistemic value derivation. As is currently common in epistemology, many veritists assume that the epistemic is an insulated evaluative domain: claims about what has epistemic value are independent of claims about what has value simpliciter. This paper argues (...)
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  18. Children's Prudential Value.Anthony Skelton - 2022 - In Christopher Wareham (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of the Ethics of Ageing. Cambridge University Press. pp. 38-53.
    Until recently, the nature of children’s well-being or prudential value remained all but unexplored in the literature on well-being. There now exists a small but growing body of work on the topic. In this chapter, I focus on a cluster of under-explored issues relating to children’s well-being. I investigate, in specific, three distinct (and to my mind puzzling) positions about it, namely, that children’s lives cannot on the whole go well or poorly for them, prudentially speaking; that the prudential goods (...)
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  19. How Final and Non-Final Valuing Differ.Levi Tenen - 2022 - The Journal of Ethics 26 (4):683-704.
    How does valuing something for its own sake differ from valuing an entity for the sake of other things? Although numerous answers come to mind, many of them rule out substantive views about what is valuable for its own sake. I therefore seek to provide a more neutral way to distinguish the two valuing attitudes. Drawing from existing accounts of valuing, I argue that the two can be distinguished in terms of a conative-volitional feature. Focusing first on “non-final valuing”—i.e. valuing_ (...)
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  20. Das Wertproblem und die religiösen Werte ‒ eine Bestandsaufnahme.Moritz von Kalckreuth - 2022 - In Philosophische Anthropologie und Religion Religiöse Erfahrung, soziokulturelle Praxis und die Frage nach dem Menschen. De Gruyter. pp. 181–209.
    In this paper I intend to bring together three different, but somehow connected problems: First of all, I will discuss the possibilities and prospects of a philosophy of value (axiology). This philosophical discipline may rely on our experience of meaningfulness in our everyday life but nevertheless its usual theoretical framework is challenged by different fundamental objections. I shall argue that to be capable of articulating the tension between the historical character of our goods and valuations on one hand and the (...)
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  21. (1 other version)An Argument Against Treating Non-Human Animal Bodies as Commodities.Marc G. Wilcox - 2022 - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-13.
    Some animal defenders are committed to complete abstinence from animal products. However the strongest arguments for adopting veganism only seem to require that one avoid using animal products, where use or procurement of these products will harm sentient animals. As such, there is seemingly a gap between our intuition and our argument. In this article I attempt to defend the more comprehensive claim that we have a moral reason to avoid using animal products, regardless of the method of procurement. I (...)
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  22. On final values and states of affairs.Youssef Aguisoul - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Tartu
    Are finally valuable states of affairs intrinsically good (good in themselves) or extrinsically good (good for us)? G.E. Moore argues that finally valuable states of affairs are intrinsically good. I do not believe that this is the case. Against Moore, I argue that finally valuable states of affairs are good for us on the grounds that states of affairs involving human beings have a function, namely, to ‘place’ human beings into certain relations with the spatiotemporal world, and that the good (...)
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  23. The ABCs of Relational Values: Environmental Values that Include Aspects of Both Intrinsic and Instrumental Valuing.Anna Deplazes-Zemp & Mollie Chapman - 2021 - Environmental Values 30 (6):669-693.
    In this paper we suggest an interpretation of the concept of ‘relational value’ that could be useful in both environmental ethics and empirical analyses. We argue that relational valuing includes aspects of intrinsic and instrumental valuing. If relational values are attributed, objects are appreciated because the relationship with them contributes to the human flourishing component of well-being (instrumental aspect). At the same time, attributing relational value involves genuine esteem for the valued item (intrinsic aspect). We also introduce the notions of (...)
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  24. A New Argument for the Non-Instrumental Value of Truth.Veli Mitova - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (5):1911-1933.
    Many influential philosophers have claimed that truth is valuable, indeed so valuable as to be the ultimate standard of correctness for intellectual activity. Yet most philosophers also think that truth is only instrumentally valuable. These commitments make for a strange pair. One would have thought that an ultimate standard would enjoy more than just instrumental value. This paper develops a new argument for the non-instrumental value of truth: (1) inquiry is non-instrumentally valuable; and (2) truth inherits some of its value (...)
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  25. Relational Values: A Unifying Idea in Environmental Ethics and Evaluation?Bryan Norton & Daniel Sanbeg - 2021 - Environmental Values 30 (6):695-714.
    There has been a recent spate of publications on how we should evaluate change to ecological systems, some of which have introduced the concept of ‘relational values’. Environmental ethicists have, with a few exceptions, not engaged with this debate. We survey the literature on relational values, noting that most advocates of the concept introduce relational values as an additional type of value, in addition to ‘instrumental’ and ‘intrinsic’ values. In this paper, we explore the idea that all environmental values are (...)
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  26. Value, Fittingness and Partiality : On the Partiality Problem for Fitting Attitude Analyses of Value.Nils Sylvan - 2021 - Dissertation, Stockholm University
    This dissertation is about the partiality problem for fitting attitude (FA) analyses of value. More specifically, it is about whether and how the problem might be resolved. In Chapter 1, I set the stage by offering a short introduction to the topic and a rationale for investigating it. I then give a more detailed account of FA analyses of value in Chapter 2, including a brief outline of their history and appeal, before explaining more thoroughly just what the partiality problem (...)
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  27. The intrinsic value of risky prospects.Zeev Goldschmidt & Ittay Nissan-Rozen - 2020 - Synthese 198 (8):7553-7575.
    We study the representation of attitudes to risk in Jeffrey’s decision-theoretic framework suggested by Stefánsson and Bradley :602–625, 2015; Br J Philos Sci 70:77–102, 2017) and Bradley :231–248, 2016; Decisions theory with a human face, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017). We show that on this representation, the value of any prospect may be expressed as a sum of two components, the prospect’s instrumental value and the prospect’s intrinsic value. Both components have an expectational form. We also make a distinction between (...)
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  28. A Fresh Look at ‘Relational’ Values in Nature: Distinctions Derived from the Debate on Meaningfulness in Life.Stijn Neuteleers - 2020 - Environmental Values 29 (4):461-479.
    Some recent policy-oriented publications have put forward a third category of environmental values, namely relational or eudaimonic values, in addition to intrinsic and instrumental values. In this debate, there is, however, much confusion about the content of such values. This paper looks at a fundamental debate in ethics about a third category of reasons besides reasons from morality and self-interest, labelled as reasons of love, care or meaningfulness. This category allows us, first, to see the relation between relational and eudaimonic (...)
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  29. No Intrinsic Value? No Problem.Levi Tenen - 2020 - Environmental Ethics 42 (2):119-133.
    Heirlooms and memorabilia are sometimes thought to be valuable for their own sakes even if they lack intrinsic value. They can have extrinsic final value, meaning that they can be valuable for their own sakes on account of their relation to other things. Yet if heirlooms and memorabilia can have this sort of value, then perhaps so can natural entities. If correct, this idea secures the claim that nature is valuable for its own sake without requiring that it have a (...)
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  30. An Account of Extrinsic Final Value.Levi Tenen - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (3):479-492.
    A number of writers argue that objects can be valuable for their own sakes on account of their extrinsic features. No one has offered an account, though, that shows exactly how or why objects have this sort of value. I seek to provide such an account. I suggest that an object can have final value on account of its relation to someone one loves or admires, where it is one’s warranted love or admiration for the person that renders the related (...)
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  31. The Goodness of Means: Instrumental and Relational Values, Causation, and Environmental Policies.Patrik Baard - 2019 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 32 (1):183-199.
    Instrumental values are often considered to be inferior to intrinsic values. One reason for this is that instrumental values are extrinsic and rely on two factors: (a) a means–end relationship that is (b) conducive to something of final or intrinsic value. In this paper, I will investigate the conditions under which bearers of instrumental value are given different value or owed different levels of respect. Such conditions include the number of means that are conducive to something of final or intrinsic (...)
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  32. Valor intrínseco y valor extrínseco en ética ambiental. Una alternativa antropocéntrica al instrumentalismo.Juan Pablo Hernández Betancur - 2019 - Isegoría 61:641-654.
    In the first place, I propose to specify the debate between non-anthropocentrists and anthropocentrists as one between those who defend that the environment has intrinsic value, that is, value that while independent of all relation to human beings is still morally binding, and those who deny this, i.e., assert that the environment only has extrinsic value. I argue for the second option but claim that this should not be an obstacle to address some of the worries of environmental ethics, since (...)
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  33. The Relational Value of Empathy.Monika Betzler - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (2):136-161.
    ABSTRACTPhilosophers and scholars from other disciplines have long discussed the role of empathy in our moral lives. The distinct relational value of empathy, however, has been largely overlooked. This article aims to specify empathy’s distinct relational value: Empathy is both intrinsically and extrinsically valuable in virtue of the pleasant experiences we share with others, the harmony and meaning that empathy provides, the recognition, self-esteem, and self-trust it enhances, as well as trust in others, attachment, and affection it fosters. Once we (...)
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  34. Are values related to culture, identity, community cohesion and sense of place the values most vulnerable to climate change?Kristina Blennow, Erik Persson & Johannes Persson - 2019 - PLoS ONE 14 (1):e0210426.
    Values related to culture, identity, community cohesion and sense of place have sometimes been downplayed in the climate change discourse. However, they have been suggested to be not only important to citizens but the values most vulnerable to climate change. Here we test four empirical consequences of the suggestion: at least 50% of the locations citizens' consider to be the most important locations in their municipality are chosen because they represent these values, locations representing these values have a high probability (...)
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  35. A Paradox for the Intrinsic Value of Freedom of Choice.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2019 - Noûs 54 (4):891-913.
    A standard liberal claim is that freedom of choice is not only instrumentally valuable but also intrinsically valuable, that is, valuable for its own sake. I argue that each one of five conditions is plausible if freedom of choice is intrinsically valuable. Yet there exists a counter-example to the conjunction of these conditions. Hence freedom of choice is not intrinsically valuable.
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  36. Hybrids and the Boundaries of Moral Considerability or Revisiting the Idea of Non-Instrumental Value.Magdalena Holy-Luczaj & Vincent Blok - 2019 - Philosophy and Technology 34 (2):223-242.
    The transgressive ontological character of hybrids—entities crossing the ontological binarism of naturalness and artificiality, e.g., biomimetic projects—calls for pondering the question of their ethical status, since metaphysical and moral ideas are often inextricably linked. The example of it is the concept of “moral considerability” and related to it the idea of “intrinsic value” understood as a non-instrumentality of a being. Such an approach excludes hybrids from moral considerations due to their instrumental character. In the paper, we revisit the boundaries of (...)
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  37. Achievement and the Value of Knowledge.Brian Kim - 2019 - Episteme 18 (2):269-281.
    How does being a knower and possessing knowledge contribute to living well? Some have assumed that the eudaimonic value of knowledge is exhausted by its role as either a means or a final end. On this basis, it has been concluded that knowledge is not always valuable since its value will depend upon the ends that one has. I propose to expand our exploration by considering how knowledge might be valuable in virtue of being constitutive of certain eudaimonic goods. Using (...)
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  38. Do mathematical explanations have instrumental value?Rebecca Lea Morris - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-20.
    Scientific explanations are widely recognized to have instrumental value by helping scientists make predictions and control their environment. In this paper I raise, and provide a first analysis of, the question whether explanatory proofs in mathematics have analogous instrumental value. I first identify an important goal in mathematical practice: reusing resources from existing proofs to solve new problems. I then consider the more specific question: do explanatory proofs have instrumental value by promoting reuse of the resources they contain? In general, (...)
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  39. From an axiological standpoint.Miles Tucker - 2019 - Ratio 32 (2):131-138.
    I maintain that intrinsic value is the fundamental concept of axiology. Many contemporary philosophers disagree; they say the proper object of value theory is final value. I examine three accounts of the nature of final value: the first claims that final value is non‐instrumental value; the second claims that final value is the value a thing has as an end; the third claims that final value is ultimate or non‐derivative value. In each case, I argue that the concept of final (...)
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  40. Intrinsic vs. extrinsic value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Intrinsic value has traditionally been thought to lie at the heart of ethics. Philosophers use a number of terms to refer to such value. The intrinsic value of something is said to be the value that that thing has “in itself,” or “for its own sake,” or “as such,” or “in its own right.” Extrinsic value is value that is not intrinsic.
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  41. Why the intrinsic value of public goods matters.Avigail Ferdman - 2018 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 21:661-676.
    Existing accounts of public-goods distribution rely on the existence of solidarity for providing non-universal public goods, such as the humanities or national parks. There are three fundamental problems with these accounts: they ignore instances of social fragmentation; they treat preferences for public goods as morally benign, and they assume that these preferences are the only relevant moral consideration. However, not all citizens unanimously require public goods such as the humanities or national parks. Public-goods distribution that is based only on citizens’ (...)
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  42. Basic Final Value and Zimmerman’s The Nature of Intrinsic Value.Timothy Perrine - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (4):979-996.
    This paper critically examines Michael Zimmerman’s account of basic final value in The Nature of Intrinsic Value. Zimmerman’s account has several positive features. Unfortunately, as I argue, given one plausible assumption about value his account derives a contradiction. I argue that rejecting that assumption has several implausible results and that we should instead reject Zimmerman’s account. I then sketch an alternative account of basic final value, showing how it retains some of the positive features of Zimmerman’s account while avoiding its (...)
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  43. From Intrinsic Value to the Emotion of Wonder.Gao Shan - 2018 - Environmental Ethics 40 (1):81-91.
    Since environmental ethics research started in China in the 1980s, it has been deeply influenced by environmental ethics theory in the United States. Some Chinese environmental philosophers have adopted the key concept of intrinsic value to construct Chinese environmental ethics. However, in recent decades, the concept of intrinsic value has been criticized by scholars in both the United States and China. Many Chinese have found that environmental ethics in the United States that is founded on the concept of intrinsic value (...)
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  44. Transformable Goods and the Limits of What Money Can Buy.David G. Dick - 2017 - Moral Philosophy and Politics 4 (1):121-140.
    There are some things money literally cannot buy. Invariably transformable goods are such things because when they are exchanged for money, they become something else. These goods are destroyed rather than transferred in monetary exchanges. They mark out an impassable limit beyond which money and the market cannot reach. They cannot be for sale, in the strongest and most literal sense. Variably transformable goods are similar. They can be destroyed when offered or exchanged for money, but they differ in their (...)
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  45. Artistic Value is Attributive Goodness.Louise Hanson - 2017 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 75 (4):415-427.
    It is common to distinguish between attributive and predicative goodness. There are good reasons to think that artistic value is a kind of attributive goodness. Surprisingly, however, much debate in philosophical aesthetics has proceeded as though artistic value is a kind of predicative goodness. As I shall argue, recognising that artistic value is attributive goodness has important consequences for a number of debates in aesthetics.
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  46. A New Argument for the Irrelevance of Equality for Intrinsic Value.Stephen Kershnar & Duncan Purves - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (1):277-297.
    This paper introduces a novel approach to evaluating theories of the good. It proposes evaluating these theories on the basis of their compatibility with the most plausible ways of calculating overall intrinsic value of a world. The paper evaluates the plausibility of egalitarianism using this approach, arguing that egalitarianism runs afoul of the more plausible ways of calculating the overall intrinsic value of a world. Egalitarianism conflicts with the general motivation for totalism and critical-level totalism, which is that independent contributions (...)
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  47. Finding Meaning in an Imperfect World.Iddo Landau - 2017 - New York: Oup Usa.
    Is life meaningless? Does life have enough meaning to make it feel worthwhile? If we think our lives lack meaning, what can we do about it? Finding Meaning in an Imperfect World answers these and other difficult questions, while confronting head-on famous, recurrent theories that insist on life's meaninglessness. Landau shows us how to single out what is meaningful, explains why we sometimes fail to recognize meaning, and suggests ways in which we can resensitize ourselves to it.
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  48. Epistemic Value and the New Evil Demon.B. J. C. Madison - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):89-107.
    In this article I argue that the value of epistemic justification cannot be adequately explained as being instrumental to truth. I intend to show that false belief, which is no means to truth, can nevertheless still be of epistemic value. This in turn will make a good prima facie case that justification is valuable for its own sake. If this is right, we will have also found reason to think that truth value monism is false: assuming that true belief does (...)
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  49. Truth is not (Very) Intrinsically Valuable.Chase B. Wrenn - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):108-128.
    We might suppose it is not only instrumentally valuable for beliefs to be true, but that it is intrinsically valuable – truth makes a non-derivative, positive contribution to a belief's overall value. Some intrinsic goods are better than others, though, and this article considers the question of how good truth is, compared to other intrinsic goods. I argue that truth is the worst of all intrinsic goods; every other intrinsic good is better than it. I also suggest the best explanation (...)
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  50. Skepticism about Ought Simpliciter.Derek Baker - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.
    There are many different oughts. There is a moral ought, a prudential ought, an epistemic ought, the legal ought, the ought of etiquette, and so on. These oughts can prescribe incompatible actions. What I morally ought to do may be different from what I self-interestedly ought to do. Philosophers have claimed that these conflicts are resolved by an authoritative ought, or by facts about what one ought to do simpliciter or all-things-considered. However, the only coherent notion of an ought simpliciter (...)
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