This article looks at Adorno’s negative dialectics by focusing on the concepts of negativity and utopia. Against later Critical Theory and social theories similarly oriented towards emancipation, which tend to discredit the concept of utopia in favor of an orientation towards pragmatic goals, I want to show that Adorno’s negative dialectics formulates a position that surpasses the antithesis of realism and utopia by presenting us with pragmatic goals while still retaining a strong concept of utopia.

English summary: The idea of a negative dialectics encapsulates the critical theory of Theodor W. Adorno in its entirety. In a critical engagement with Hegel's philosophy, Adorno develops a dialectic that is no longer tied to the idealistic concept of a speculative identity of subject and object, yet nevertheless aims at a concept of the absolute. So far neither the scope nor the argumentative consistency of this model of dialectics has been taken into account. Marc Nicolas Sommer reconstructs (...) negative dialectics through its engagement with Hegelian dialectics and defends its central claim: that negative dialectics liberates dialectics from its idealistic shackles and in doing so develops a viable concept of the absolute after Auschwitz. German description: Die kritische Theorie Theodor W. Adornos findet ihre vollstandige Artikulation im Konzept einer negativen Dialektik. In kritischer Auseinandersetzung mit der hegelschen Philosophie entwickelt Adorno die Idee einer Dialektik, die nicht mehr an das idealistische Konzept einer spekulativen Identitat von Subjekt und Objekt gebunden ist, deren gedankliche Bewegung dennoch auf einen Begriff des Absoluten ausgerichtet ist. Konzeptueller Anspruch, begrifflicher Umfang und argumentative Konsistenz dieses zweiten grossen Modells dialektischen Denkens sind bis heute nicht geklart.Marc Nicolas Sommer rekonstruiert negative Dialektik aus der Auseinandersetzung mit Hegel und verteidigt ihren Anspruch, den eigentlichen Gehalt der hegelschen Dialektik von seinen idealistischen Schlacken befreit zu haben und aus dieser Denkbewegung einen nach Auschwitz tragfahigen Begriff des Absoluten zu entwickeln. (shrink)

Metaphysics is, as Adorno once notes, the nuisance of philosophy. On the one hand, metaphysics is the reasons of philosophy's existence; on the other hand, it is nearly impossible to characterise metaphysics precisely. This tension is reflected with reference to the contemporary political and cultural situation in Adorno's "Meditations on Metaphysics", the last part of his opus magnum *Negative Dialectics*. The essays in this volume are devoted to different facets of Adorno's examination of metaphysics. They do, however, not only concern (...) themselves with Adorno's metaphysical reflections in a narrow sense, but also extend to other themes Adorno relates to metaphysics: critique of concepts, history, truth, and materialism. Thereby, they render a hardly investigated topic of the *Negative Dialectics* accessible. -/- Contributors: Emil Angehrn, Dirk Braunstein, Peggy H. Breitenstein, Gunnar Hindrichs, Axel Hutter, Philip Hogh, Christian Iber, Julia Jopp, Guido Kreis, Ansgar Martins, Brian O'Connor, Mario Schärli, Marc Nicolas Sommer, Tilo Wesche. (shrink)

This paper offers a framework for consciousness of internal reality. Recent PET experiments are reviewed, showing partial overlap of cortical activation during self-produced actions and actions observed from other people. This overlap suggests that representations for actions may be shared by several individuals, a situation which creates a potential problem for correctly attributing an action to its agent. The neural conditions for correct agency judgments are thus assigned a key role in self/other distinction and self-consciousness. A series of behavioral experiments (...) that demonstrate, in normal subjects, the poor monitoring of action-related signals and the difficulty in recognizing self-produced actions are described. In patients presenting delusions, this difficulty dramatically increases and actions become systematically misattributed. These results point to schizophrenia and related disorders as a paradigmatic alteration of a ''Who?'' system for self-consciousness. (shrink)

Jean-Marc Narbonne est reconnu internationalement pour ses travaux sur le néoplatonisme et la métaphysique grecque. Il dirige actuellement la Chaire de recherche du Canada en Antiquité critique et modernité émergente (ACMÉ), qui vise à mettre en lumière le rôle que l’héritage philosophique et littéraire de la Grèce antique a joué dans la modernité, et son importance pour la démocratie telle que nous la connaissons et qu’il nous revient encore aujourd’hui de la construire. Les présents entretiens permettent de mieux comprendre (...) les liens qui unissent ces deux moments de sa trajectoire, depuis son point de départ dans la vie intellectuelle au Québec et dans les débats contemporains de la philosophie continentale. Il se veulent ainsi le portrait d’un penseur original, qui est resté fidèle à des questions posées dès ses années de formation et à une culture antique qu’il n’a cessé par ses travaux d’illustrer et de faire connaître. (shrink)

In this paper, we advance a novel conception of normative ethics and draw out its implications within the domain of professional ethics. We argue that all moral agents, and thus professionals, share a fundamental and constitutive normative interest in correctly conceiving of their ends. All professionals, we claim, by virtue of their positions of social power, have special role responsibilities in cultivating and sustaining societies oriented by this shared ideal of practically oriented ethical understanding. We defend this conception against a (...) familiar opponent of a philosophical approach to professional ethics: the morally skeptical student. By taking the skeptic’s challenge seriously, we clarify the conditions for a sound account of normative ethics and then provide a response that meets this test. Against this type of skeptic, we claim that a fundamental commitment to the ideal of understanding our ends ought to be included within any curriculum of professional et... (shrink)

Alexander Pho and Benjamin A. White respond to Nicolas Dixon’s critique of mixed martial arts (MMA) through a ‘companions in innocence’ argument. Taking up a counterexample that Dixon is quick to dismiss, the authors argue that MMA techniques are on a par with the ‘pain-leveraging’ tactics used by cyclists and that pressing for a moral distinction between cycling and MMA leads to absurd conclusions about other practices. So, because cycling is morally permissible, MMA is morally permissible. This companions in (...) innocence argument fails. But cycling can be used to develop a better, though only partial, defense of MMA. (shrink)

Cette oeuvre majeure de Nicolas de Cues, aussi essentielle que la Docte Ignorance bien que moins connue, est, selon les termes de Jocelyne Sfez, un « Discours de la méthode ». Elle expose en effet une méthode novatrice pour atteindre le vrai, à partir de l'explicitation de sa racine métaphysique. L'ouvrage suit inlassablement les deux mouvements inséparables de progression de l'unité dans l'altérité et de retour de l'altérité vers l'unité. L'unité infinie, divine, absolue, est en elle-même in...

Cette oeuvre majeure de Nicolas de Cues, aussi essentielle que la Docte Ignorance bien que moins connue, est, selon les termes de Jocelyne Sfez, un « Discours de la méthode ». Elle expose en effet une méthode novatrice pour atteindre le vrai, à partir de l'explicitation de sa racine métaphysique. L'ouvrage suit inlassablement les deux mouvements inséparables de progression de l'unité dans l'altérité et de retour de l'altérité vers l'unité. L'unité infinie, divine, absolue, est en elle-même in..

ABSTRACT This article examines how Owen’s ideas and their application in his factory in New-Lanark were understood and judged by the two leading members of Geneva’s liberal élite, J.C.L. Simonde de Sismondi and Marc-Auguste Pictet, who wrote extensively on questions pertaining to the development of industry. While Pictet and Sismondi shared Owen’s concerns over the deleterious consequences of industrialisation, and examined with interest his proposals to resolve these problems, they were quick to distance themselves from his solutions, and rejected (...) his ideas on co-operation and shared ownership. The article concludes with an analysis of Sismondi’s work and his reflections on the two courses open to industrial civilisation: it could be either liberal, with all that entailed – competition, antagonism, conflict, but also liberty, imaginative and creative development – or ‘planned’, with the consequences that flowed from that: collective ownership, peace, security, but also an extinguishing of creative impulses, of inventiveness, and of the human spirit. (shrink)

Les essais rassemblés dans ce livre sont un hommage rendu à la carrière exceptionnelle et au cheminement si fécond du professeur Raymond Klibansky. Etudes sur la philosophie antique et la tradition médiévale, sur la Renaissance et l'époque moderne, éléments de réflexion sur les enjeux démocratiques contemporains et la dimension dialogique de la recherche en philosophie, ces textes font écho à certaines des préoccupations majeures du travail poursuivi par Klibansky sur plusieurs décennies. Cette diversité, loin d'être un obstacle, rejoint ici l'une (...) des convictions les plus profondes du personnage célébré, pour qui l'oeuvre de vérité elle-même est intrinsèquement multiforme et ne saurait, sans danger, être réduite à une approche ou à un discours particulier. Una veritas in variis signis resplendet, énonçait Nicola de Cues, que Klibansky s'est souvent plu à citer : voilà qui traduit bien l'esprit même de son oeuvre et de son parcours. Après la préface du professeur Melkevik et la mise en contexte de Michèle le Doeuff, le lecteur pourra compter sur les contributions savantes des professeurs Naddaf, Dorion, Eberle, Narbonne, Lafleur et Simard (Perspectives antiques et médiévales); Valcke, Knee, Bitpol-Hespériès, Markovits, Melkevik, Grapotte et Despland (De la Renaissance à la modernité); Bodéus, Lafrance, Prak et Courtois (Le dialogue philosophique contemporain). (shrink)

La notion d'" unité " est, avec celle de l'" être ", du " bien " et du " beau ", l'une des plus déterminantes de l'histoire de la philosophie et trouve sa place autant dans la pensée ancienne que dans la philosophie moderne. Les néoplatoniciens, tout spécialement, en ont fait la source et le principe explicatif de toute la réalité, à la fois au-delà de l'être, de la pensée et du discours. Les contributions qu'on lira ici, rassemblées sous ce (...) thème, veulent rendre hommage à la recherche foisonnante mais elle-même inspirée et pour ainsi dire " unifiée " par l'idée de l'Un, du professeur Werner Beierwaltes, dont les études sur Plotin, Proclus, Jean Scot Érigène, Nicolas de Cues, Schelling, Hegel et Heidegger, ont marqué la recherche contemporaine. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn the seventeenth century, when the modern Self emerged in the shape of a self-assured Cartesian cogito, a radically opposite movement of ‘emptying’ or ‘deconstructing’ that Self took place. The religious subject, having become modern, understood its ultimate aim as becoming selfless. The battlefield on which the new subject fought the fight with its own modern condition was the issue of ‘love’. ‘What is the status of his Self when it is involved in the act of love?’ was the central (...) question in seventeenth century religiosity. This essay examines the early modern idea of pur amour and focuses only on two voices in the Querelle Du Quiétisme, François de Fénelon and Nicolas Malebranche. Fénelon vehemently defended the pur amour, a concept he adopted from a century-long tradition of spirituality in France and which he tried to explain and legitimize in a systematic and theoretical way. Malebranche was highly critical of that tradition, but refused neither to use the term nor to refer to the ideal of pur amour. His interpretation of the Self, however, forced him to draw different conclusions on the nature of pure love. (shrink)

La phénoménologie vise à décrire les choses mêmes telles qu'elles se donnent à la conscience, sans y ajouter des éléments tirés d'héritages métaphysiques ou d'interprétations traditionnelles. Mais à cette fin, elle doit élucider le langage dans lequel elle tend à réaliser ce programme. Ce langage peut-il consister en une expression 'pure,' spontanée, ou doit-il se démarquer des usages quotidiens? N'est-il pas nécessairement marqué par une histoire, et n'obéit-il pas, qu'il le veuille ou non, à une rhétorique? Ne reconnaît-on d'ailleurs pas (...) la phénoménologie à un certain style? De telles questions n'ont été ignorées ni par Husserl, ni par Heidegger, ni par Merleau-Ponty, ni par Ricoeur, ni par Hans Blumenberg, ni par Marc Richir--autant d'auteurs ici étudiés pour les réponses très variées qu'ils y ont apportées, pour la façon dont ils ont thématisé le rapport de la philosophie à son médium linguistique et au langage ordinaire, les modalités de la description, l'histoire de la rhétorique ou encore les apports possibles de la littérature (Goethe, Claude Simon...), de l'herméneutique, de la linguistique (Jakobson) et de l'art en général. Les études réunies ici explorent ces 'langages de la phénoménologie,' avec aussi la traduction d'un texte inédit en français de Hans Blumenberg sur le traitement husserlien des 'significations occasionnelles'."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Charles E. SCOTT, Susan M. SCHOENBOHM, Daniela VALLEGA-NEU, Alejandro VALLEGA, Companion to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, IndianaUniversity Press, Bloomington & Indianapolis, 2001 ; Gernot BÖHME, Aisthetik. Vorlesungen über Ästhetik als allgemeine Wahrnehmungslehre, Wilhelm Fink Verlag, München, 2001 ; Dean KOMEL, Osnutja k Filozofski in Kulturni Hermenevtiki [Outlines to Philosophical and Cultural Hermeneutics], Nova revija, Ljubljana, 2001 ; Marc RICHIR, L’institution de l’idéalité. Des schématismes phénoménologiques, Association pour la promotion de la Phénoménologie, Paris, 2002 ; Fred EVANS & Leonard LAWLOR, (...) Chiasms. Merleau-Ponty's Notion of Flesh, State University of New York Press, 2000 ; Udo TIETZ, Ontologie und Dialektik. Heidegger und Adorno über das Sein, das Nichtidentische, die Synthesis und die Kopula, Passagen Verlag, Wien, 2003 ; Etienne FERON, Phénoménologie de la mort. Sur les traces de Levinas, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, London, 1999. (shrink)

Sam Harris (2010) argues that, given our neurology, we can experience well-being, and that seeking to maximize this state lets us distinguish the good from the bad. He takes our ability to compare degrees of well-being as his starting point, but I think that the analysis can be pushed further, since there is a (non-religious) reason why well-being is desirable, namely the finite life of an individual organism. It is because death is a constant possibility that things can be assessed (...) as “for” or “against” one (Champagne 2011a; Smith 2000). Such an account lets us objectively adjudicate moral questions, as Harris desires. However, by anchoring itself in the mortal body as a whole and not just the brain, such an account dampens the claim that neuroscience would have all the answers. Moreover, it pivots on an affirmation of one’s life that can seem mysterious by regular scientific standards. This chapter thus explains why the trade-off is worthwhile. (shrink)

Malebranche's Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion is in many ways the best introduction to his thought, and provides the most systematic exposition of his philosophy as a whole. In it, he presents clear and comprehensive statements of his two best-known contributions to metaphysics and epistemology, namely, the doctrines of occasionalism and vision in God; he also states his views on such central issues as self-knowledge, the existence of the external world and the problem of theodicy. His skilful handling of (...) the dialogue form enables the reader to see how he responds to objections made to his earlier work The Search after Truth. This edition presents a translation of the text which is clear, readable and more accurate than any of its predecessors, together with an introduction that analyses Malebranche's central teachings and explains the importance of the Dialogues in the context of seventeenth-century philosophy. (shrink)

We aim to do two things in this article. On the positive end, our goal is to explain how some seemingly incompatible aspects of belief live together, by presenting distinct mechanistic explanations of each of them: in particular we want to show how belief can be discerning, credulous, rational, and irrational. After clarifying our positive view, we take aim at some competitor views in the second half of the paper, particularly offering critiques of epistemic vigilance and social marketplace accounts of (...) belief. We conclude by inviting proponents to provide an architecture for belief that can be tested against existing models. (shrink)

What is structural rationality? Specifically, what is the distinctive feature of structural requirements of rationality? Some philosophers have argued, roughly, that the distinctive feature of structural requirements is coherence. But what does coherence mean, exactly? Or, at least, what do structuralists about rationality have in mind when they claim that structural rationality is coherence? This issue matters for making progress in various active debates concerning rationality. In this paper, I analyze three strategies for figuring out what coherence means in the (...) debates on structural rationality. I argue that these strategies face problems. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that many nonhuman animal beings are conscious and have some sense of self. Rather than ask whether they are conscious, I adopt an evolutionary perspective and ask why consciousness and a sense of self evolved---what are they good for? Comparative studies of animal cognition, ethological investigations that explore what it is like to be a certain animal, are useful for answering this question. Charles Darwin argued that the differences in cognitive abilities and emotions among animals (...) are differences in degree rather than differences in kind, and his view cautions against the unyielding claim that humans, and perhaps other great apes and cetaceans, are the only species in which a sense of self-awareness has evolved. I conclude that there are degrees of consciousness and self among animals and that it is likely that no animal has the same highly developed sense of self as that displayed by most humans. Many animals have a sense of “body-ness‘ or “mine-ness‘ but not a sense of “I-ness.‘ Darwin’s ideas about evolutionary continuity, together with empirical data (“science sense‘) and common sense, will help us learn more about consciousness and self in animals. Answers to challenging questions about animal self-awareness have wide-ranging significance, because they are often used as the litmus test for determining and defending the sorts of treatments to which animals can be morally subjected. (shrink)

Scientists have long counseled against interpreting animal behavior in terms of human emotions, warning that such anthropomorphizing limits our ability to understand animals as they really are. Yet what are we to make of a female gorilla in a German zoo who spent days mourning the death of her baby? Or a wild female elephant who cared for a younger one after she was injured by a rambunctious teenage male? Or a rat who refused to push a lever for food (...) when he saw that doing so caused another rat to be shocked? Aren’t these clear signs that animals have recognizable emotions and moral intelligence? With _Wild Justice_ Marc Bekoff and Jessica Pierce unequivocally answer yes. Marrying years of behavioral and cognitive research with compelling and moving anecdotes, Bekoff and Pierce reveal that animals exhibit a broad repertoire of moral behaviors, including fairness, empathy, trust, and reciprocity. Underlying these behaviors is a complex and nuanced range of emotions, backed by a high degree of intelligence and surprising behavioral flexibility. Animals, in short, are incredibly adept social beings, relying on rules of conduct to navigate intricate social networks that are essential to their survival. Ultimately, Bekoff and Pierce draw the astonishing conclusion that there is no moral gap between humans and other species: morality is an evolved trait that we unquestionably share with other social mammals. Sure to be controversial, _Wild Justice_ offers not just cutting-edge science, but a provocative call to rethink our relationship with—and our responsibilities toward—our fellow animals. (shrink)

What is the place of coherence, or structural rationality, in good first-personal deliberation? According to Kolodny (2005), considerations of coherence are irrelevant to good first-personal deliberation. When we deliberate, we should merely care about the reasons or evidence we have for our attitudes. So, considerations of coherence should not show up in deliberation. In response to this argument, Worsnip (2021) argues that considerations of coherence matter for how we structure deliberation. For him, we should treat incoherent combinations of attitudes as (...) off-limits in deliberation. Some important questions are left unanswered by both camps. What do we mean by considerations of coherence “showing up” in first-personal deliberation? How do we interpret the divide between reasons-responsiveness and coherence? How should we interpret cases in which considerations of coherence interact with other norms or requirements? In this paper, I show how Haack’s (1993) crossword puzzle analogy sheds light on these questions. Also, the crossword puzzle analogy allows us to evaluate Kolodny’s objection and identify promising avenues for future research. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that many nonhuman animal beings are conscious and have some sense of self. Rather than ask whether they are conscious, I adopt an evolutionary perspective and ask why consciousness and a sense of self evolved—what are they good for? Comparative studies of animal cognition, ethological investigations that explore what it is like to be a certain animal, are useful for answering this question. Charles Darwin argued that the differences in cognitive abilities and emotions among animals (...) are differences in degree rather than differences in kind, and his view cautions against the unyielding claim that humans, and perhaps other great apes and cetaceans, are the only species in which a sense of self-awareness has evolved. I conclude that there are degrees of consciousness and self among animals and that it is likely that no animal has the same highly developed sense of self as that displayed by most humans. Many animals have a sense of “body-ness” or “mine-ness” but not a sense of “I-ness.” Darwin's ideas about evolutionary continuity, together with empirical data (“science sense”) and common sense, will help us learn more about consciousness and self in animals. Answers to challenging questions about animal self-awareness have wide-ranging significance, because they are often used as the litmus test for determining and defending the sorts of treatments to which animals can be morally subjected. (shrink)

This article defends a relational account of personhood. I argue that the structure of personhood consists of dyadic relations between persons who can wrong or be wronged by one another, even if some of them lack moral competence. I draw on recent work on directed duties to outline the structure of moral communities of persons. The upshot is that we can construct an inclusive theory of personhood that can accommodate nonhuman persons based on shared community membership. I argue that, once (...) we unpack the internal relation between directed duties, moral status, and flourishing, relations can ground personhood and include nonhuman animals. (shrink)

Most people believe that suffering is intrinsically bad. In conjunction with facts about our world and plausible moral principles, this yields a pro tanto obligation to reduce suffering. This is the intuitive starting point for the moral argument in favor of interventions to prevent wild animal suffering. If we accept the moral principle that we ought, pro tanto, to reduce the suffering of all sentient creatures, and we recognize the prevalence of suffering in the wild, then we seem committed to (...) the existence of such a pro tanto obligation. Of course, competing values such as the aesthetic, scientific or moral values of species, biodiversity, naturalness or wildness, might be relevant to the all-things-considered case for or against intervention. Still, many argue that, even if we were to give some weight to such values, no plausible theory could resist the conclusion that WAS is overridingly important. This article is concerned with large-scale interventions to prevent WAS and their tractability and the deep epistemic problem they raise. We concede that suffering gives us a reason to prevent it where it occurs, but we argue that the nature of ecosystems leaves us with no reason to predict that interventions would reduce, rather than exacerbate, suffering. We consider two interventions, based on gene editing technology, proposed as holding promise to prevent WAS; raise epistemic concerns about them; discuss their potential moral costs; and conclude by proposing a way forward: to justify interventions to prevent WAS, we need to develop models that predict the effects of interventions on biodiversity, ecosystem functioning, and animals’ well-being. (shrink)