102 found
Order:
  1. Collective Intentions And Team Agency.Natalie Gold & Robert Sugden - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (3):109-137.
    In the literature of collective intentions, the ‘we-intentions’ that lie behind cooperative actions are analysed in terms of individual mental states. The core forms of these analyses imply that all Nash equilibrium behaviour is the result of collective intentions, even though not all Nash equilibria are cooperative actions. Unsatisfactorily, the latter cases have to be excluded either by stipulation or by the addition of further, problematic conditions. We contend that the cooperative aspect of collective intentions is not a property of (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   96 citations  
  2. Regret theory: an alternative theory of rational choice under uncertainty.Graham Loomes & Robert Sugden - 1982 - Economic Journal 92:805–24.
  3.  82
    Credible Worlds, Capacities and Mechanisms.Robert Sugden - 2009 - Erkenntnis 70 (1):3-27.
    This paper asks how, in science in general and in economics in particular, theoretical models aid the understanding of real-world phenomena. Using specific models in economics and biology as test cases, it considers three alternative answers: that models are tools for isolating the ‘capacities’ of causal factors in the real world; that modelling is ‘conceptual exploration’ which ultimately contributes to the development of genuinely explanatory theories; and that models are credible counterfactual worlds from which inductive inferences can be made. The (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   88 citations  
  4.  82
    Preference purification and the inner rational agent: a critique of the conventional wisdom of behavioural welfare economics.Gerardo Infante, Guilhem Lecouteux & Robert Sugden - 2016 - Journal of Economic Methodology 23 (1):1-25.
    Neoclassical economics assumes that individuals have stable and context-independent preferences, and uses preference satisfaction as a normative criterion. By calling this assumption into question, behavioural findings cause fundamental problems for normative economics. A common response to these problems is to treat deviations from conventional rational choice theory as mistakes, and to try to reconstruct the preferences that individuals would have acted on, had they reasoned correctly. We argue that this preference purification approach implicitly uses a dualistic model of the human (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  5. Thinking as a Team: Towards an Explanation of Nonselfish Behavior.Robert Sugden - 1993 - Social Philosophy and Policy 10 (1):69-89.
    For most of the problems that economists consider, the assumption that agents are self-interested works well enough, generating predictions that are broadly consistent with observation. In some significant cases, however, we find economic behavior that seems to be inconsistent with self-interest. In particular, we find that some public goods and some charitable ventures are financed by the independent voluntary contributions of many thousands of individuals. In Britain, for example, the lifeboat service is entirely financed by voluntary contributions. In all rich (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   88 citations  
  6.  40
    Experimental Economics: Rethinking the Rules.Nicholas Bardsley, Robin Cubitt, Graham Loomes, Peter Moffat, Chris Starmer & Robert Sugden - 2009 - Princeton University Press.
    The authors explore the history of experiments in economics, provide examples of different types of experiments and show that the growing use of experimental methods is transforming economics into an empirical science.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  7. A Broomean Model of Rationality and Reasoning.Franz Dietrich, Antonios Staras & Robert Sugden - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (11):585-614.
    John Broome has developed an account of rationality and reasoning which gives philosophical foundations for choice theory and the psychology of rational agents. We formalize his account into a model that differs from ordinary choice-theoretic models through focusing on psychology and the reasoning process. Within that model, we ask Broome’s central question of whether reasoning can make us more rational: whether it allows us to acquire transitive preferences, consistent beliefs, non-akratic intentions, and so on. We identify three structural types of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  8.  26
    The Community of Advantage.Robert Sugden - 2020 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 13 (1).
    This is an interview by the Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics with Robert Sugden. The interview covers the intellectual trajectory of Sugden, from his early critique of Amartya Sen’s liberalism, to his interactions with James Buchanan and his contributions to behavioural economics. A major theme in the interview is Sugden’s development of a rival program of normative economics based on modern behavioural economics. The interview also discusses Sugden’s recent book The Community of Advantage which synthesizes many of the themes (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  9. Team preferences.Robert Sugden - 2000 - Economics and Philosophy 16 (2):175-204.
    When my family discusses how we should spend a summer holiday, we start from certain common understandings about our preferences. We prefer self-catering accommodation to hotels, and hotels to campsites. We prefer walking and looking at scenery and wildlife to big-city sightseeing and shopping. When it comes to walks, we prefer walks of six miles or so to ones which are much shorter or much longer, and prefer well-marked but uncrowded paths to ones which are either more rugged or more (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   78 citations  
  10. The logic of team reasoning.Robert Sugden - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):165 – 181.
    Abstract Orthodox decision theory presupposes that agency is invested in individuals. An opposing literature allows team agency to be invested in teams whose members use distinctive modes of team reasoning. This paper offers a new conceptual framework, inspired by David Lewis's analysis of common reasons for belief, within which team reasoning can be represented. It shows how individuals can independently endorse a principle of team reasoning which prescribes acting as a team member conditional on assurance that others have endorsed the (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   74 citations  
  11. Common knowledge, salience and convention: A reconstruction of David Lewis' game theory.Robin P. Cubitt & Robert Sugden - 2003 - Economics and Philosophy 19 (2):175-210.
    David Lewis is widely credited with the first formulation of common knowledge and the first rigorous analysis of convention. However, common knowledge and convention entered mainstream game theory only when they were formulated, later and independently, by other theorists. As a result, some of the most distinctive and valuable features of Lewis' game theory have been overlooked. We re-examine this theory by reconstructing key parts in a more formal way, extending it, and showing how it differs from more recent game (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   60 citations  
  12.  35
    Thinking as a team: Towards an explanation of nonselfish behavior*: Robert Sugden.Robert Sugden - 1993 - Social Philosophy and Policy 10 (1):69-89.
    For most of the problems that economists consider, the assumption that agents are self-interested works well enough, generating predictions that are broadly consistent with observation. In some significant cases, however, we find economic behavior that seems to be inconsistent with self-interest. In particular, we find that some public goods and some charitable ventures are financed by the independent voluntary contributions of many thousands of individuals. In Britain, for example, the lifeboat service is entirely financed by voluntary contributions. In all rich (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   56 citations  
  13. Theories of team agency.Robert Sugden & Natalie Gold - 2007 - In Fabienne Peter (ed.), rationality and commitment. Oxford University Press USA.
    We explore the idea that a group or ‘team’ of individuals can be an agent in its own right and that, when this is the case, individual team members use team reasoning, a distinctive mode of reasoning from that of standard decision theory. Our approach is to represent team reasoning explicitly, by means of schemata of practical reasoning in which conclusions about what actions should be taken are inferred from premises about the decision environment and about what agents are seeking (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  14.  73
    Team Reasoning and Intentional Cooperation for Mutual Benefit.Robert Sugden - 2014 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):143–166.
    This paper proposes a concept of intentional cooperation for mutual benefit. This concept uses a form of team reasoning in which team members aim to achieve common interests, rather than maximising a common utility function, and in which team reasoners can coordinate their behaviour by following pre-existing practices. I argue that a market transaction can express intentions for mutually beneficial cooperation even if, extensionally, participation in the transaction promotes each party’s self-interest.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  15. The backward induction paradox.Philip Pettit & Robert Sugden - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):169-182.
  16. Beyond sympathy and empathy: Adam Smith's concept of fellow-feeling.Robert Sugden - 2002 - Economics and Philosophy 18 (1):63-87.
    When modern economists use the notions of sympathy or empathy, they often claim that their ideas have their roots in Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, while sometimes complaining that Smith fails to distinguish clearly enough between the two concepts. Recently, Philippe Fontaine has described various forms of sympathy and empathy, and has explored their respective roles in Smith's work. My objective in this paper is to argue that Smith's analysis of how people's sentiments impinge on one another involves a (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  17.  71
    How fictional accounts can explain.Robert Sugden - 2013 - Journal of Economic Methodology 20 (3):237 - 243.
    In this note, I comment on Julian Reiss's paper ?The explanation paradox?. I argue in support of two of the propositions that make up that paradox (that economic models are false, and that they are explanatory) but challenge the third proposition, that only true accounts can explain. I defend the ?credible worlds? account of models as fictions that are explanatory by virtue of similarity relations with real-world phenomena. I argue that Reiss's objections to the role of subjective similarity judgements in (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  18. Rationality in action.Martin Hollis & Robert Sugden - 1993 - Mind 102 (405):1-35.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  19. The Backward Induction Paradox.Philip Pettit & Robert Sugden - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):169-182.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  20. What we desire, what we have reason to desire, whatever we might desire: Mill and Sen on the value of opportunity.Robert Sugden - 2006 - Utilitas 18 (1):33-51.
    I compare Mill's and Sen's accounts of the value of opportunity, focusing on a tension between two ideas they both uphold: that individual freedom is an important component of well-being, and that, because desires can be adaptive, actual desire is not always a good indicator of what will give well-being. The two writers' responses to this tension reflect different understandings of the relationship between freedom and desire. Sen links an individual's well-being to her freedom to choose what she has reason (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  21.  79
    Explanations in search of observations.Robert Sugden - 2011 - Biology and Philosophy 26 (5):717-736.
    The paper explores how, in economics and biology, theoretical models are used as explanatory devices. It focuses on a modelling strategy by which, instead of starting with an unexplained regularity in the world, the modeller begins by creating a credible model world. The model world exhibits a regularity, induced by a mechanism in that world. The modeller concludes that there may be a part of the real world in which a similar regularity occurs and that, were that the case, the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  22. The Nature of Salience: An Experimental Investigation of Pure Coordination Games.Judith Mehta, Chris Starmer & Robert Sugden - 1994 - The American Economic Review (84(3)):658-673.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  23. Abstract rationality: the ‘logical’ structure of attitudes.Franz Dietrich, Antonios Staras & Robert Sugden - 2024 - Economics and Philosophy 40 (1):12-41.
    We present an abstract model of rationality that focuses on structural properties of attitudes. Rationality requires coherence between your attitudes, such as your beliefs, values, and intentions. We define three 'logical' conditions on attitudes: consistency, completeness, and closedness. They parallel the familiar logical conditions on beliefs, but contrast with standard rationality conditions like preference transitivity. We establish a formal correspondence between our logical conditions and standard rationality conditions. Addressing John Broome's programme 'rationality through reasoning', we formally characterize how you can (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  24.  40
    Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory.Natalie Gold & Robert Sugden (eds.) - 2006 - Princeton University Press.
    Game theory is central to modern understandings of how people deal with problems of coordination and cooperation. Yet, ironically, it cannot give a straightforward explanation of some of the simplest forms of human coordination and cooperation--most famously, that people can use the apparently arbitrary features of "focal points" to solve coordination problems, and that people sometimes cooperate in "prisoner's dilemmas." Addressing a wide readership of economists, sociologists, psychologists, and philosophers, Michael Bacharach here proposes a revision of game theory that resolves (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  25.  53
    Looking for a Psychology for the Inner Rational Agent.Robert Sugden - 2015 - Social Theory and Practice 41 (4):579-598.
    Research in psychology and behavioral economics shows that individuals’ choices often depend on “irrelevant” contextual factors. This presents problems for normative economics, which has traditionally used preference-satisfaction as its criterion. A common response is to claim that individuals have context-independent latent preferences which are “distorted” by psychological factors, and that latent preferences should be respected. This response implicitly uses a model of human action in which each human being has an “inner rational agent.” I argue that this model is psychologically (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  26.  75
    ‘On the Econ within’: a reply to Daniel Hausman.Gerardo Infante, Guilhem Lecouteux & Robert Sugden - 2016 - Journal of Economic Methodology 23 (1):33-37.
    This note replies to a comment by Daniel Hausman on our paper ‘Preference purification and the inner rational agent: a critique of the conventional wisdom of behavioural welfare economics’. We clarify our characterisation of behavioural welfare economics and acknowledge that Hausman does fully endorse this approach. However, we argue that Hausman’s response to our critique, like behavioural welfare economics itself, implicitly uses a model of an inner rational agent.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  27. Opportunity as mutual advantage.Robert Sugden - 2010 - Economics and Philosophy 26 (1):47-68.
    This paper argues that measurements of opportunity which focus on the contents of a person's opportunity set fail to capture open-ended aspects of opportunity that liberals should value. I propose an alternative conception of which does not require the explicit specification of opportunity sets, and which rests on an understanding of persons as responsible rather than rational agents. I suggest that issues of distributive fairness are best framed in terms of real income, and that meaningful measurements of real income are (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  28.  32
    Hume’s theory of justice and Vanderschraaf’s vulnerablity objection.Robert Sugden - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1719-1729.
  29. Opportunity as a space for individuality: Its value and the impossibility of measuring it.Robert Sugden - 2003 - Ethics 113 (4):783-809.
  30.  45
    The Behavioural Economist and the Social Planner: To Whom Should Behavioural Welfare Economics Be Addressed?Robert Sugden - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (5):519 - 538.
    ABSTRACT This paper compares two alternative answers to the question ?Who is the addressee of welfare economics?? These answers correspond with different understandings of the status of the normative conclusions of welfare economics and have different implications for how welfare economics should be adapted in the light of the findings of behavioural economics. The conventional welfarist answer is that welfare economics is addressed to a ?social planner?, whose objective is to maximize the overall well-being of society; the planner is imagined (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  31.  78
    Common reasoning in games: A Lewisian analysis of common knowledge of rationality.Robin P. Cubitt & Robert Sugden - 2014 - Economics and Philosophy 30 (3):285-329.
    We present a new class of models of players’ reasoning in non-cooperative games, inspired by David Lewis's account of common knowledge. We argue that the models in this class formalize common knowledge of rationality in a way that is distinctive, in virtue of modelling steps of reasoning; and attractive, in virtue of being able to represent coherently common knowledge of any consistent standard of individual decision-theoretic rationality. We contrast our approach with that of Robert Aumann, arguing that the former avoids (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  32.  94
    Focal points in pure coordination games: An experimental investigation.Judith Mehta, Chris Starmer & Robert Sugden - 1994 - Theory and Decision 36 (2):163-185.
  33. Liberty, Preference, and Choice.Robert Sugden - 1985 - Economics and Philosophy 1 (2):213-229.
    Ever since its first publication in 1970, Amartya Sen's paper “The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal” has served as the starting point for almost all discussions of liberty in social choice theory. However, a number of people, myself included, have argued that Sen's theorem rests on a misleading characterization of liberty . In a recent paper, addressed to a philosophical audience, Sen has provided a careful defence of his theorem against this charge. I shall argue that this defence does not (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  34.  65
    Regret, recrimination and rationality.Robert Sugden - 1985 - Theory and Decision 19 (1):77-99.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  35. Positive confirmation bias in the acquisition of information.Martin Jones & Robert Sugden - 2001 - Theory and Decision 50 (1):59-99.
    An experiment is reported which tests for positive confirmation bias in a setting in which individuals choose what information to buy, prior to making a decision. The design – an adaptation of Wason's selection task – reveals the use that subjects make of information after buying it. Strong evidence of positive confirmation bias, in both information acquisition and information use, is found; and this bias is found to be robust to experience. It is suggested that the bias results from a (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  36.  25
    A response to six comments on The Community of Advantage.Robert Sugden - 2021 - Journal of Economic Methodology 28 (4):419-430.
    This paper responds to six contributions to a symposium on my 2018 book, The Community of Advantage. I defend that book's claim that most normative behavioural economics implicitly uses a psycholog...
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  37. Moral canals: Trust and social capital in the work of Hume, Smith and Genovesi.Luigino Bruni & Robert Sugden - 2000 - Economics and Philosophy 16 (1):21-45.
    It is a truism that a market economy cannot function without trust. We must be able to rely on other people to respect our property rights, and on our trading partners to keep their promises. The theory of economics is incomplete unless it can explain why economic agents often trust one another, and why that trust is often repaid. There is a long history of work in economics and philosophy which tries to explain the kinds of reasoning that people use (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  38. Contractarianism and norms.Robert Sugden - 1990 - Ethics 100 (4):768-786.
  39.  38
    Rationality, Justice and the Social Contract: Themes from Morals by Agreement.David P. Gauthier & Robert Sugden - 1993
    Here a group of philosophers, economists and political theorists discuss the work of David Gauthier, which seeks to show that rational individuals would accept certain moral constraints on their choices. The possibilities and limitations of a contractarian approach to issues of justice is analyzed.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  40. 10. Jacob Levy, The Multiculturalism of Fear Jacob Levy, The Multiculturalism of Fear (pp. 891-895).Roger Crisp, Larry S. Temkin, Robert Sugden, Robert N. Johnson, George Klosko & Paul Hurley - 2003 - Ethics 113 (4).
  41.  15
    Opportunity and preference learning: A reply to Christian Schubert.Robert Sugden - 2015 - Economics and Philosophy 31 (2):297-303.
    :This paper replies to Christian Schubert's critical review of my work on opportunity as a normative criterion. Schubert argues that the criterion I have proposed would not command general assent because it does not recognize the legitimacy of individuals’ preferences for achieving self-development by constraining their future opportunities. I argue that my account of the ‘responsible agent’ is compatible with self-development, and that preferences for self-constraint are less common than Schubert suggests. For the purposes of normative economics, my opportunity criterion (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  42. Capability, Happiness And Opportunity.Robert Sugden - 2008 - In Luigino Bruni, Flavio Comim & Maurizio Pugno (eds.), Capabilities and Happiness. Oxford University Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  43.  79
    Hume's non-instrumental and non-propositional decision theory.Robert Sugden - 2006 - Economics and Philosophy 22 (3):365-391.
    Hume is often read as proposing an instrumental theory of decision, in which an agent's choices are rational if they maximally satisfy her desires, given her beliefs. In fact, Hume denies that rationality can be attributed to actions. I argue that this is not a gap needing to be filled. Hume's theory provides a coherent and self-contained understanding of action, compatible with current developments in experimental psychology and behavioural economics. On Hume's account, desires are primitive psychological motivations which do not (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  44.  17
    Economics and Social Interaction: Accounting for Interpersonal Relations.Benedetto Gui & Robert Sugden (eds.) - 2005 - Cambridge University Press.
    First published in 2005, Economics and Social Interaction is a fresh attempt to overcome the traditional inability of economics to deal with interpersonal phenomena that occur within the sphere of markets and productive organizations. It makes use of traditional economic concepts for understanding interpersonal events, while venturing beyond those concepts to give a better account of personalised interactions. In contrast to other books, Economics and Social Interaction offers the reader a rigorous effort at extending economic analysis to a difficult field (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  45. The changing relationship between theory and experiment in economics.Robert Sugden - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (5):621-632.
    Until recently, economics was generally understood to be a nonexperimental science with a hypothetico‐deductive methodology. This article considers how the methodology of economics has changed with the spread of experimental methods. Initially, most experimental economists saw their work as testing pre‐existing theories. However, a method of systematic inductive enquiry in which theory plays a less central role is now evolving. This method is structured around the discovery and progressive refinement of regularities. “Exhibits”—experimental designs that generate significant regularities—are taking over some (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  46.  26
    The Principles of Practical Cost-Benefit Analysis.Robert Sugden & Alan Harold Williams - 1978 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Cost effectiveness. Economics. This is an introduction, accessible to non-economists as well as to economists, to the practice of cost benifit analysis. It begins from a discussion of financial appraisal. The distinguishing features of cost benifit analysis are then introduced progressively. Practical examples are used whenever possible to aid the exposition. Economic theory is introduced only where it is immediately relevant to practice. Nonetheless the approach is firmly grounded in economic principles and considerable space is devoted to those ideas that (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  47.  41
    Taking unconsidered preferences seriously.Robert Sugden - 2006 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 59:209-232.
    In normative economic analysis, it is conventional to treat each person’s preferences as that person’s own standard of value, and as the standard by which the effects of public policies on that person should be valued. The proposal that preferences should be treated in this way is usually qualified by two apparently natural conditions—that preferences are internally coherent, and that they reflect the considered judgements of the person concerned. However, there is now a great deal of evidence suggesting that, in (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  48.  55
    II—Robert Sugden: On Modelling Vagueness—and on not Modelling Incommensurability.Robert Sugden - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):95-113.
  49.  66
    On modelling vagueness—and on not modelling incommensurability.Robert Sugden - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):95-113.
    This paper defines and analyses the concept of a 'ranking problem'. In a ranking problem, a set of objects, each of which possesses some common property P to some degree, are ranked by P-ness. I argue that every eligible answer to a ranking problem can be expressed as a complete and transitive 'is at least as P as' relation. Vagueness is expressed as a multiplicity of eligible rankings. Incommensurability, properly understood, is the absence of a common property P. Trying to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  50.  17
    II—O n M odelling V agueness—and on not M odelling I ncommensurability.Robert Sugden - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):95-113.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
1 — 50 / 102