El objetivo de este artículo es indagar en la fundamentación schmittiana del individuo y de la reserva de conciencia. En la actualidad, buena parte de la recepción contemporánea considera al jurista renano como un antiliberal y, por lo tanto, como un antiindividualista. Sin embargo, nuestra hipótesis es que es posible encontrar en su obra no solo una crítica a la noción liberal de individuo, sino también una concepción propositiva a través de sus reflexiones sobre la crítica frente a la autoridad (...) y al poder público. Para demostrarla, se propone un abordaje hermenéutico-exegético de sus obras —principalmente, de las conferencias sobre El Leviatán en la teoría del Estado de Thomas Hobbes y del artículo "La visibilidad de la Iglesia. Una reflexión escolástica”— para indagar la acción humana como fundadora del orden político y las posibilidades del individuo de criticar a la autoridad. El artículo sostiene que Carl Schmitt formula una noción de individualidad de signo distinto a la liberal y que se vincula íntimamente con la idea de Derecho, el entramado institucional-estatal y el sustrato comunitario. (shrink)

El presente texto busca desarrollar una reflexión filosófica respecto de las posibles relaciones entre la noción de identidad y las formas de gobierno contemporáneas. A partir de un breve análisis sobre los principales desarrollos de la noción, se busca tensionar el campo de comprensión habitual y plantear un determinado modo en que esta puede pensarse como un engranaje epistemológico-ético respecto de los modos en que los individuos son llamados a nombrarse y reconocerse dentro de los límites impuestos por una cartografía (...) política. La tesis que sostiene este escrito dice relación con que la categoría de individuo moderno no es sostenible sin una adscripción a un orden de los nombres que tiende al autogobierno en base a la apelación de un ideal ético de correspondencia consigo mismo. (shrink)

El Ethos es el fenómeno de la moralidad en su sentido más amplio. El presente trabajo –de naturaleza programática– esboza la idea de una fenomenología integral del ethos capaz de pensar, evitando toda forma de reduccionismo, sus diversos niveles de sentido. Procedemos en cinco pasos: en primer lugar, sostenemos que las experiencias humanas fundamentales –en particular la experiencia ética– son del orden de la contingencia y que, en consecuencia, sus verdades no se dejan captu-rar por el análisis fenomenológico-transcendental. En segundo (...) término, presentamos la noción de experiencia ética, a la que describimos como la experiencia del contacto traumático de la Ley en su cuádruple carácter: singular, universal, verdadero, y contingente. En tercer lugar, vía la lectura del ensayo de Derrida Violencia y metafísica. Ensayo sobre el pensamiento de Emmanuel Levinas, ponemos en cuestión la tesis de la supuesta preeminencia de la fenomenología –en tanto que idealismo transcendental– respecto del discurso ético. En cuarto término, introducimos la noción de testimonio como la modalidad narrativa, “pre-filosófica”, capaz de expresar de la manera más fiel el sentido de la experiencia ética. Por último, distinguimos cinco niveles fundamentales del ethos y, sobre esta base, señalamos algunas de las tareas específicas de una fenomenología integral del ethos.The Ethos is the phenomenon of morality in its broadest sense. Our programmatic essay sketches the idea of a comprehen-sive phenomenology of the ethos capable of thinking –non-reductively– its different layers of meaning. We proceed in five steps: first, we claim that fundamental human experiences –in particular, ethical experience– are contingent in nature and that, as a consequence, their truths cannot be grasped by a phenomenologico-transcendental analysis. Second, we describe the notion of ethical experience as a traumatic experience of contact with the Law in its quadruple character: singular, universal, true, and contingent. Third, through a reading of Derrida’s Violence and Metaphysics. An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas, we question the alleged preeminence of phenomenology –as transcendental idealism– over ethical discourse and praxis. Fourth, we introduce the notion of testimony as the kind of “pre-philosophical” narrative able to convey most faithfully the meaning of ethical experience. Finally, we distinguish five fundamental layers of the ethos and, on the basis of these distinctions, we identify some of the specific tasks of a comprehensive phenomenology of the ethos. (shrink)

Se plantea la cuestión del papel de la armonía en la concepción de la racionalidad de Leibniz. Se sitúa esta noción en el marco de la metafísica de la individualidad sistémica, y aparece en dos lugares concretos. En primer lugar en el eje categorial uniformidad-diversi­dad, como principio de equilibrio entre ambos polos. Y en segundo lugar, aparece la noción de armonía en el nivel último de la racionalidad, concretamente en plano de la lógica de los principios. Este nivel se rige (...) por el principio general del orden, y precisamente este principio es explicado por Leibniz frecuentemente en relación con la armonía. (shrink)

El autor trata de justificarse en el orden de la composición de la Crítica del Juicio. Al analizar el estatuto del arte en Kant, muestra cómo la crítica del juicio estético prepara para el análisis del juicio teleológico sobre la “conspiración” del orden de la naturaleza al orden del espíritu.

Un agente está en un estado de akrasia epistémica moderada cuando cree que p y, simultáneamente, suspende el juicio sobre si su evidencia apoya p. En este artículo se argumenta que, dada cierta manera de entender la suspensión del juicio, un agente moderadamente acrático es doxásticamente irracional. En primer lugar, se introducen ciertos conceptos básicos para el argumento y se discute la dialéctica del debate. En segundo lugar, se elabora la conocida distinción entre racionalidad doxástica y racionalidad proposicional, y se (...) discuten algunos casos de fundación impropia desarrollados por Turri. En tercer lugar, se consideran dos posibles casos a partir de los cuales podría argumentarse que la akrasia epistémica moderada es doxásticamente racional y se argumenta que ninguno de ellos funciona. En cuarto lugar, se examinan varias objeciones a la propuesta. (shrink)

Nunca tal vez como ahora el hombre ha estado tan amenazado de una quiebra de los valores que sustentan su vida espiritual, su cultura y aun su misma coexistencia y subsistencia sobre la tierra. En el orden social internacional y nacional, en el mejor de los casos, pareciera que sólo existe un equilibrio de fuerzas, continuamente amenazado por quebrarse con el predominio de una de las partes, pero en modo alguno una paz interna lograda por un auténtico orden jurídico-moral. De (...) hecho tal equilibrio está roto en muchos casos; y en el plano internacional son muchos los pueblos sojuzgados por guerras o imposiciones injustas de otros Estados más fuertes, impedidos en el libre ejercicio de su soberanía —Hungría es un ejemplo—; y en el plano nacional son muchos los dictadores que con violencia imponen su régimen sobre los individuos, privados de sus derechos personales y sometidos a vejaciones y humillaciones de toda índole; y las clases sociales más fuertes que imponen una verdadera esclavitud sobre las más débiles —la explotación humana de los trabajadores o, lo que es peor, de pobres mujeres indefensas sometidas a las garras de un comercio infame—. Ha desaparecido el orden humano-moral, el orden intrínseco y jerárquico, que desde la conciencia y de un modo absoluto imponía a cada uno —al Estado, familia e individuos— sus obligaciones, con lo cual y correlativamente aseguraba también a cada uno sus derechos frente a los demás, organizando a los individuos en la familia e instituciones, a éstas en el Estado y a éste en la Comunidad internacional. Y este orden se ha perdido, porque los valores correlativos de justicia y de derecho con las consiguientes normas moral-jurídicas o son desconocidas o han perdido su carácter de vigencia absoluta y han sido substituidas por la fuerza, la austucia y los intereses y pasiones en general. (shrink)

Taste as Experience puts the pleasure of food at the center of human experience. It shows how the sense of taste informs our preferences for and relationship to nature, pushes us toward ethical practices of consumption, and impresses upon us the importance of aesthetics. Eating is often dismissed as a necessary aspect of survival, and our personal enjoyment of food is considered a quirk. Nicola Perullo sees food as the only portion of the world we take in on a daily (...) basis, constituting our first and most significant encounter with the earth. Perullo has long observed people's food practices and has listened to their food experiences. He draws on years of research to explain the complex meanings behind our food choices and the thinking that accompanies our gustatory actions. He also considers our indifference toward food as a force influencing us as much as engagement. For Perullo, taste is value and wisdom. It cannot be reduced to mere chemical or cultural factors but embodies the quality and quantity of our earthly experience. (shrink)

This book is the first extensive treatment of Husserl's phenomenology of time-consciousness. Nicolas de Warren uses detailed analysis of texts by Husserl, some only recently published in German, to examine Husserl's treatment of time-consciousness and its significance for his conception of subjectivity. He traces the development of Husserl's thinking on the problem of time from Franz Brentano's descriptive psychology, and situates it in the framework of his transcendental project as a whole. Particular discussions include the significance of time-consciousness for (...) other phenomenological themes: perceptual experience, the imagination, remembrance, self-consciousness, embodiment, and the consciousness of others. The result is an illuminating exploration of how and why Husserl considered the question of time-consciousness to be the most difficult, yet also the most central, of all the challenges facing his unique philosophical enterprise"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

In the historical context of a crisis in biological psychiatry, psychedelic drugs paired with psychotherapy are globally re-emerging in research clinics as a potential transdiagnostic therapy for treating mood disorders, addictions, and other forms of psychological distress. The treatments are poised to soon shift from clinical trials to widespread service delivery in places like Australia, North America, and Europe, which has prompted ethical questions by social scientists and bioethicists. Taking a broader view, we argue that the ethics of psychedelic therapy (...) concerns not simply how psychotherapies are different when paired with psychedelic drugs, but how psychedelic therapies shape and are shaped by different values, norms, and metaphysical commitments. Drawing from the published literature and interviews with seven psychedelic therapists working in clinical trials in the United States, Germany, Switzerland, and Australia, this article opens the black box of the treatments to consider the values and informal debates currently animating the therapies. Considering questions of patient autonomy, mechanisms of therapeutic action, and which therapies are best suited to pair with psychedelic substances, we examine the ethics of psychedelic therapy as an emergent form of life. To bring this form of life out in fuller relief, we conclude by comparing and contrasting it with ayahuasca use in Amazonian shamanism. (shrink)

For decades, liberal democracy has been extolled as the best system of governance to have emerged out of the long experience of history. Today, such a confident assertion is far from self-evident. Democracy, in crisis across the West, must prove itself. This highly timely volume is both a conceptual and practical guide of impressive scope to the challenges of good governance as the world continues to undergo profound transformation in the coming decades.

Methexiology is not a particular theory, but rather a general philosophical orientation. Therefore, in Methexiology: Philosophical Theology and Theological Philosophy for the Deification of Humanity, Nicolas Laos elucidates the significance of methexiology for the study of ontology, epistemology, ethics, philosophical psychology, theory of justice, philosophy of history, and philosophy of religion. Laos argues that, faced with the modern and the postmodern crises of meaning, we need a new myth, a new spiritual formula, for the resacralization of humanity and the (...) cosmos, without restoring defunct totems, without using tales as "cheap" substitutes for the lack of a life-giving myth, and without negating history. In his Methexiology, Laos studies the "genealogy" of the modern and the postmodern crises of meaning, and, based on his new interpretation of classical Greek philosophy and Hesychasm, proposes methexiology as a way of overcoming the crises of meaning and as a way of resacralizing humanity and the cosmos through a new metaphysically grounded humanism. (shrink)

Blaise Pascal est le penseur radical des limites et des contradictions de l'homme, ni ange ni bête. Contrairement à ce qu'en prétend l'orgueil de toute une modernité, la raison ne peut pas tout ; mais contrairement au désespoir du fanatisme, la raison n'est pas sans force. Jusqu'où alors peut-elle s'exercer? Pour Pascal, la philosophie ne saurait faire l'économie de la question de Dieu, Elle doit donc croiser la théologie. Mais comment vont se nouer l'ordre de l'esprit et celui de la (...) charité? Pascal produit ainsi une analyse critique de la philosophie comme telle, de ses capacités et de ses limites, que le présent ouvrage se donne pour tâche de clarifier. Que peut la philosophie? Mais qui décide de ce qu'elle peut, et surtout de ce qu'elle ne peut pas? Comment s'établissent alors ses rapports avec la théologie? Ce que Pascal nous invite ainsi à penser, c'est toujours à la fois la misère et la grandeur de la philosophie. (shrink)

Dans son dernier cours au Collège de France, Michel Foucault nous parle d'un oubli, plus fondamental à ses yeux que le fameux "oubli de l'être", ou plus précisément d'une négligence ; une négligence dont la philosophie est responsable, ce qui est d'autant plus paradoxal qu'il concerne précisément la vie philosophique. "Je voudrais, en tout cas, suggérer simplement que s'il est vrai que la question de l'être a bien été ce que la philosophie occidentale a oublié et dont l'oubli a rendu (...) possible la métaphysique, peut-être aussi la question de la vie philosophique n'a-t-elle pas cessé d'être, je ne dirais pas oubliée, mais négligée ; elle n'a pas cessé d'apparaître comme en trop par rapport à la philosophie, à la pratique philosophique, à un discours de plus en plus indexé au modèle scientifique" Cette négligence a une histoire. Car le problème de la vie philosophique a été posé dans toute sa radicalité dans l'Antiquité ; il n'était pas complètement oublié à l'époque moderne, comme en témoigne l'oeuvre de Spinoza ; mais à partir du moment "où la philosophie est devenue un métier de professeur, c'est-à-dire au début du XIXème siècle", elle a évacué du champ des problèmes pertinents, des problèmes "sérieux", cela même qui pourtant lui avait donné son horizon et sa raison d'être : la possibilité de définir une vie philosophique, c'est-à-dire une vie juste, une vie bonne, une "vraie vie". (shrink)

Die Utopien sind tot, es leben die Utopien. In diesem Buch wird die Utopie sozialer Gerechtigkeit entwickelt. INhaltlich besteht es in dem Dreischritt, (1) aus im Alltag von jedermann hin und wieder geauSSerten situativen Urteilen das gemeinsame Grundverstandnis von Gerechtigkeit zu destillieren, (2) anhand dieses Gelanders die bedeutendsten zeitgenossischen Theoretiker sozialer Gerechtigkeit akribisch zu lesen und in konstruktiver Absicht zu kritisieren, um (3) in ersten Ansatzen eine gerechtere Zukunftsgesellschaft zu skizzieren, deren quer zu tradierten Ideologien liegendes System sich ethischer Sozialismus (...) nennen lieSSe. (shrink)

This book advances a new interpretation of Hart's penal philosophy. Positioning itself in opposition to current interpretations, the book argues that Hart does not defend a mixed theory of punishment, nor a rule-utilitarian theory of punishment, nor a liberal form of utilitarianism, nor a goal and constraint approach. Rather, it is argued, his penal philosophy is based on his moral pluralism, which comprises two aspects: value pluralism and pluralism with respect to forms of moral reason. It is held that this (...) means, on the one hand, that criminal law has an irreducible complexity due to the compromises it makes to accommodate competing values, and on the other hand, that there need not be one single justification of punishment. This original interpretation is not based only on Hart's key volume on the subject Punishment and Responsibility, but on a careful reading of his complete works. The book will be a valuable resource for academics and researchers interested in Hart's philosophy, the philosophy of law and criminal law. (shrink)

Die Suche nach historischen Quellen für die Leibniz’sche Philosophie scheint zunächst unerschöpflich. Durch alle in diesem Band versammelten Arbeiten wird der Einfluss der Philosophie des Aristoteles auf das Leibniz’sche Denken näher umrissen. Ein wesentliches Ziel ist es hierbei, einen Beitrag zur Analyse dieser philosophischen Beziehung zu leisten und zu zeigen, dass auch Aristoteles’ Philosophie nach Ansicht unserer Autoren entscheidend zum Verständnis des Leibniz’schen Denkens beiträgt. Die Texte befassen sich mit wesentlichen Themen der Leibniz’schen Logik und Metaphysik, z. B. mit den (...) Grundbegriffen „Monade“ (und deren „Körperhaftigkeit“), „Entelechie“, „Nous“, mit dem Problem der Individuation (Individuum, Atomismus, Einheit), mit den substanziellen Formen, mit der Wissenschaft im Allgemeinen und der Technik, mit der Transformation der Logik, mit den Prinzipien (nämlich denjenigen des zureichenden Grundes, der Individuation und der Notwendigkeit), mit Zukunft und Kontingenz sowie Vergänglichkeit, mit der Theorie der syllogistischen Folgerung, usw. Diese Themen werden stets in der Gegenüberstellung von Leibniz und Aristoteles behandelt – sie zeigen daher, wie Leibniz aristotelische Thesen übernahm, veränderte oder kritisierte. The search for the historical sources of Leibniz’s philosphy initially seems to be unending. All the essays in this volume outline more clearly the influence of Aristotle’s philosophy on Leibniz’s thought. In this context a fundamental aim is to contribute to the analysis of this philosophical relationship and to demonstrate that Aristotle’s philosophy, in the opinion of our authors, plays a decisive role in the understanding of Leibniz’s thought. The texts address fundamental themes of Leibniz’s logic and metaphysics, e.g. the basic concepts of ‘monads’ (and their ‘corporality’), ‘entelechy’ and ‘nous; the problem of individuation (individual, atomism, unity); substantial forms; knowledge in general, and technology; the transformation of logic; principles (namely those of sufficient grounds, of individuation and of necesssity); future and contingency and transientness; the theory of syllogistic deduction, etc. These themes are regularly considered in the comparison between Leibniz and Aristotle – they demonstrate how Leibniz took over, treated or criticised Aristotelian theses. (shrink)

1. L'oeuvre musicale et son écoute -- 2. Le monde-musique et son solfège -- 3. Le musicien et son intellectualité musicale -- 4. Les raisonances du monde-musique ; postlude d'Alain Badiou.

Trente et un penseurs, parmi lesquels Jacques Derrida, Françoise Héritier, Edgar Morin, Jean-Luc Nancy, Michel Onfray ou encore Jacques Rancière, pour comprendre les errements et les raisons d'espérer d'une planète convulsée. Dix-neuf entretiens et débats avec les intellectuels les plus engagés dans la réflexion sur le temps présent dressent un état des lieux des questions qui taraudent notre modernité. Issu du Théâtre des idées, cycle de rencontres intellectuelles du Festival d'Avignon (2004-2012), ces dialogues singuliers s'attachent à faire vivre l'esprit critique, (...) cette faculté de juger, de soumettre la réalité sociale, artistique ou politique au tamis du jugement argumenté, qu'il soit sérieux ou ironique, virulent ou tempéré. De très actuelles "résistances intellectuelles" qui esquissent ce que pourrait être un service public des idées, c'est-à-dire un accès direct, libre et partagé à l'intellectualité. (shrink)

Brain damage may doubly dissociate cognitive modules, but the practice of revealing dissociations is predicated on modularity being true (T. Shallice, 1988). This article questions the utility of assuming modularity, as it examines a paradigmatic double dissociation of reading modules. Reading modules illustrate two general problems. First, modularity fails to converge on a fixed set of exclusionary criteria that define pure cases. As a consequence, competing modular theories force perennial quests for purer cases, which simply perpetuates growth in the list (...) of exclusionary criteria. The first problem leads, in part, to the second problem. Modularity fails to converge on a fixed set of pure cases. The second failure perpetuates unending fractionation into more modules. (shrink)

This chapter deals with one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, inappropriate appeal to authority (IAA). IAA has many different facets. At its core, it is a fallacy that assumes that because someone is an authority, we should listen to that person. The problem with IAA is that it ignores content in favor of credentials and power. There are a few different ways in which IAA can occur. IAA seems to be the result of a flaw in human thinking. (...) Social cognitive theory, a theory that helps explain human action, notes that humans tend to act like each other. The tendency to listen to authorities who are not authorities explains why celebrities are able to sell us stuff. The important thing to remember about IAA is that it is not just a fallacy that comes up in arguments that do not matter. (shrink)

The method of positron emission tomography illustrates the circular logic popular in subtractive neuroimaging and linear reductive cognitive psychology. Both require that strictly feed-forward, modular, cognitive components exist, before the fact, to justify the inference of particular components from images after the fact. Also, both require a "true" componential theory of cognition and laboratory tasks, before the fact, to guarantee reliable choices for subtractive contrasts. None of these possibilities are likely. Consequently, linear reductive analysis has failed to yield general, reliable, (...) componential accounts. (shrink)

The empirical study of belief is emerging at a rapid clip, uniting work from all corners of cognitive science. Reliance on belief in understanding and predicting behavior is widespread. Examples can be found, inter alia, in the placebo, attribution theory, theory of mind, and comparative psychological literatures. Research on belief also provides evidence for robust generalizations, including about how we fix, store, and change our beliefs. Evidence supports the existence of a Spinozan system of belief fixation: one that is automatic (...) and independent of belief rejection. Independent research supports the existence of a system of fragmented belief storage: one that relies on large numbers of causally isolated, context-sensitive stores of belief in memory. Finally, empirical and observational data support at least two systems of belief change. One system adheres, mostly, to epistemological norms of updating; the other, the psychological immune system, functions to guard our most centrally held beliefs from potential inconsistency with newly formed beliefs. Refining our under- standing of these systems can shed light on pressing real-world issues, such as how fake news, propaganda, and brainwashing exploit our psychology of belief, and how best to construct our modern informational world. (shrink)

What makes humans moral beings? This question can be understood either as a proximate question or as an ultimate question. The question is about the mental and social mechanisms that produce moral judgments and interactions, and has been investigated by psychologists and social scientists. The question is about the fitness consequences that explain why humans have morality, and has been discussed by evolutionary biologists in the context of the evolution of cooperation. Our goal here is to contribute to a fruitful (...) articulation of such proximate and ultimate explanations of human morality. We develop an approach to morality as an adaptation to an environment in which individuals were in competition to be chosen and recruited in mutually advantageous cooperative interactions. In this environment, the best strategy is to treat others with impartiality and to share the costs and benefits of cooperation equally. Those who offer less than others will be left out of cooperation; conversely, those who offer more will be exploited by their partners. In line with this mutualistic approach, the study of a range of economic games involving property rights, collective actions, mutual help and punishment shows that participants' distributions aim at sharing the costs and benefits of interactions in an impartial way. In particular, the distribution of resources is influenced by effort and talent, and the perception of each participant's rights on the resources to be distributed. (shrink)

In recent years much research has been undertaken regarding the feasibility of the human uterine transplant as a treatment for absolute uterine factor infertility. Should it reach clinical application this procedure would allow such individuals what is often a much-desired opportunity to become not only social mothers, or genetic and social mothers but mothers in a social, genetic and gestational sense. Like many experimental transplantation procedures such as face, hand, corneal and larynx transplants, UTx as a therapeutic option falls firmly (...) into the camp of the quality of life transplant, undertaken with the aim, not to save a life, but to enrich one. However, unlike most of these novel procedures – where one would be unlikely to find a willing living donor or an ethics committee that would sanction such a donation – the organs to be transplanted in UTx are potentially available from both living and deceased donors. In this article, in the light of the recent nine-case research trial in Sweden which used uteri obtained from living donors, and the assertions on the part of a number of other research teams currently preparing trials that they will only be using deceased donors, I explore the question of whether, in the case of UTx, there exist compelling moral reasons to prefer the use of deceased donors despite the benefits that may be associated with the use of organs obtained from the living. (shrink)

Brain damage may doubly dissociate cognitive modules, but the practice of revealing dissociations is predicated on modularity being true (T. Shallice, 1988). This article questions the utility of assuming modularity, as it examines a paradigmatic double dissociation of reading modules. Reading modules illustrate two general problems. First, modularity fails to converge on a fixed set of exclusionary criteria that define pure cases. As a consequence, competing modular theories force perennial quests for purer cases, which simply perpetuates growth in the list (...) of exclusionary criteria. The first problem leads, in part, to the second problem. Modularity fails to converge on a fixed set of pure cases. The second failure perpetuates unending fractionation into more modules. (shrink)

Cet article est consacré au problème du rapport entre l’entrelacement des genres (συμπλοκὴ τῶν εἰδῶν) et le logos dans le Sophiste. Après avoir brièvement présenté le problème, je discute, dans la première partie, différentes solutions proposées par les commentateurs. Je cherche à montrer qu’aucune de ces solutions n’est pleinement satisfaisante. Dans la deuxième partie, je propose une nouvelle solution au problème de la συμπλοκὴ τῶν εἰδῶν fondée sur une distinction entre deux types de logos, le logos dialectique et le logos (...) doxique. Dans la troisième partie, je cherche à justifier textuellement cette solution en recourant à la fois au texte du Sophiste lui-même et à la dernière partie du Théétète. Dans ma conclusion, je suggère que la distinction entre logos dialectique et logos doxique correspond à une différence qui traverse toute l’œuvre de Platon, à savoir la différence entre connaissance et opinion. / This paper deals with the problem of the συμπλοκὴ τῶν εἰδῶν in the Sophist. In the first part, after a brief presentation of this problem, I discuss different solutions which have been proposed in the recent literature. I try to show that none of them is entirely satisfying. In the second part, I propose and explain a new solution based on a distinction between two types of logos : dialectical logos and doxastic logos. In the third part, I try to justify this solution on the basis of some passages of the Sophist and of the final part of the Theaetetus. To conclude, I suggest that the distinction between dialectical logos and doxasticlogos matches the difference between knowledge and belief made by Plato in his dialogues. (shrink)

Has the time come to put to bed the concept of a harm threshold when discussing the ethics of reproductive decision making and the legal limits that should be placed upon it? In this commentary, we defend the claim that there exist good moral reasons, despite the conclusions of the non-identity problem, based on the interests of those we might create, to refrain from bringing to birth individuals whose lives are often described in the philosophical literature as ‘less than worth (...) living’. (shrink)