We live in times where it is possible to control our emotions using biomedical means – for example by taking pills that make us feel better. This chapter discusses one worry about the biomedical enhancement of mood. It is a worry that seems to play an important role in more familiar objections to biomedical enhancement of mood, such as the objection that it would lead to inauthenticity. The worry is that the use of positive mood enhancers will corrupt emotional lives. (...) Ethical questions about the biomedical enhancement of mood are often really questions about our affective reasons. Negative emotions typically feel bad, positive ones typically feel good. Here our hedonic reasons come into direct competition with affective reasons. Those who entirely dismiss affective reasons, or at least think that negative affective reasons are extremely weak, are likely to see little problem with positive mood enhancers. (shrink)

This paper examines implicaturist hybrid theories by examining how closely attitude expression by moral utterances fits with the varieties of implicature (conventional, particular conversational, generalized conversational) using five standard criteria for implicature: indeterminacy (§3), reinforceability (§4), non-detachability (§5), cancellability (§6), and calculability (§7). I argue (1) that conventional implicature is a clear non-starter as a model of attitude expression by moral utterances (2) that generalised conversational implicature yields the most plausible implicaturist hybrid but (3) that a non-implicaturist, and non-hybrid, alternative (...) might in fact be superior. (shrink)

In 1927 at the fifth Solvay Council, that reunited all the aristocracy of theoretical physics, Einstein, regarding with solicitude the new-born “quantum mechanics” of Louis de Broglie, Schrödinger, Heisenberg and Dirac, discerned with his usual sagacity an indelible mark that was destined to become, with time, a subject of passionate discussion among those whose vocation is to adulate this enigmatic and capricious personality.In 1926 Born had given the prophetic stroke to the portrait. Turning to probability as to the official factotum (...) of the reconciliation of the continuous and the discontinuous-here, the associated wave and particle-he transmuted the waves of de Broglie and Schr6dinger into an undulatory calculus o f probabilities, deducing, from a surprising principle, consequences that were even more surprising but always verified through experiment. Parting from the idea that the intensity of the wave is the probability of the detection of the particle at a given point and time, Born replaced the classic principle of addition of partial probabilities with his “principle of the addition of partial amplitudes” that are, as in classical optics, represented by “complex” dimensions, with one real part and one imaginary part. In general, the square of the module of the sum of amplitudes will be the probability. This expression contains, of course, the terms “square” and “rectangular.” The first, if they were alone, would give the former law; as for the second, they express the existence of phenomena of interference that are at the origin of the thousand and one well verified paradoxes of the “new mechanics “-the one thousand and first being the one under consideration here. (shrink)

In twelve new essays, contributors explore hybrid theories in metaethics and other normative domains.

The first part of this paper asks why we need, or what would motivate, ameaningful expansion of epistemology. It answers with three critical arguments found in the recent literature, which each purport to move us some distance beyond the preoccupations of ‘post-Gettier era’ analytic epistemology. These three—the ‘epistemic luck,’ ‘epistemic value’ and ‘epistemic reconciliation’ arguments associated with D. Pritchard, J. Kvanvig, and M. Williams, respectively—each carry this implication of needed expansion by functioning as forceful ‘internal critiques’ of the tradition. The (...) second part of the paper asks what specific directions an expanded field of epistemology should take. While this is taken as an open question for debate, the expansion suggested here remains continuous with the analytic tradition, while also underlining the centrality of the acquired or ‘reflective’ intellectual virtues in meeting the burdens of the three arguments. Responsibilism, as here understood, is not a philosophical thesis so much as an orientation of commitment to clearing away philosophical assumptions that systematically obstruct recognition of the importance of empirically-informed research programs into the reflective virtues. (shrink)

This book studies the occurrence (or not) of a case of circular reasoning in Kant's attempt to establish the foundation of knowledge. The response to this question instigates a commentary on the transcendental deduction of the categories, which lie at the heart of the Critique of Pure Reason, in both the 1781 and 1787 editions.

Protective measurements illustrate how Yakir Aharonov's fundamental insights into quantum theory yield new experimental paradigms that allow us to test quantum mechanics in ways that were not possible before. As for quantum theory itself, protective measurements demonstrate that a quantum state describes a single system, not only an ensemble of systems, and reveal a rich ontology in the quantum state of a single system. We discuss in what sense protective measurements anticipate the theorem of Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph (PBR), stating (...) that, if quantum predictions are correct, then two distinct quantum states cannot represent the same physical reality. (shrink)

So-called theories of well-being (prudential value, welfare) are under-represented in discussions of well-being. I do four things in this article to redress this. First, I develop a new taxonomy of theories of well-being, one that divides theories in a more subtle and illuminating way. Second, I use this taxonomy to undermine some misconceptions that have made people reluctant to hold objective-list theories. Third, I provide a new objective-list theory and show that it captures a powerful motivation for the main competitor (...) theory of well-being (the desire-fulfilment theory). Fourth, I try to defuse the worry that objective-list theories are problematically arbitrary and show how the theory can and should be developed. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to undermine a basic assumption of theories of well-being, one that I call well-being invariabilism. I argue that much of what makes existing theories of well-being inadequate stems from the invariabilist assumption. After distinguishing and explaining well-being invariabilism and well-being variabilism, I show that the most widely-held theories of well-being—hedonism, desire-satisfaction, and pluralist objective-list theories—presuppose invariabilism and that a large class of the objections to them arise because of it. My aim is to show that (...) abandoning invariabilism and adopting variabilism is a sensible first step for those aiming to formulate more plausible theories of well-being. After considering objections to my argument, I explain what a variabilist theory of well-being would be like and show that well-being variabilism need not be any threat to the project of formulating theories of well-being that deliver general principles concerning well-being enhancement. (shrink)

L'auteur de cet essai s'attache à montrer, par l'étude des grands penseurs du XVIe et du XVIIe siècle —- Ficin, Nicolas de Cues, Galilée, Pascal, Descartes, Luther, Calvin, Leibniz -—, que l'histoire n'est pas livrée au hasard mais obéit à des déterminismes complexes auxquels l'homme moderne peut d'autant moins échapper qu'il pense, contre maints bons esprits des siècles passés, être libre et voué au bonheur, alors que l'accomplissement sans fin de l'Occident ne peut avoir que des conséquences tragiques. Un livre (...) d'Estienne et Liébault —- L'Agriculture et Maison rustique -— qui parut pour la première fois en 1564 et dont la dernière édition date de 1689 est ici le contrepoint qui permet d'aborder, à travers science, religion, philosophie et hermétisme, les mondes —- Renaissance, Grand Siècle - qui tournent autour de la Maison rustique des mouches à miel dont les chapitres sont reproduits à la fin de l'ouvrage. Les idées de ces mondes, d'où sont-elles venues? D'ici et d'ailleurs? D'une procession allant des principes aux techniques, du nombre aux mathématiques utilitaires, du temps cyclique au temps de l'histoire, ce dont témoignerait l'hexagone de cire des abeilles que Kepler tenait pour un archétype? En recourant à la doctrine de la prédestination, version théologique du déterminisme scientifique, l'auteur entend mettre en évidence le caractère inéluctable du paradigme qui se cristallise à la Renaissance pour rendre manifeste aujourd'hui notre peu de possibles, sinon celui de nous regarder être agis. (shrink)

There are indications that simple reaction time might have slowed in Western countries, based on both cohort- and multi-study comparisons. A possible limitation of the latter method in particular is measurement error stemming from methods variance, which results from the fact that instruments and experimental conditions change over time and between studies. We therefore set out to measure the simple auditory reaction time (SRT) of 7,081 individuals (2,997 males and 4,084 females) born in Sweden 1959-1985 (subjects were aged between 27 (...) and 54 years at time of measurement). Depending on cut-offs and adjustment for ageing related slowing on SRT, the data suggest that SRT has increased between 3 and 16 ms in the 27 birth years covered in the present sample. The slowing is unlikely to be explained by attrition, as evaluated by comparing the general intelligence × birth-year interactions and standard deviations for both male participants and dropouts, utilizing military conscript cognitive ability data. The present result is consistent with previous studies employing alternative methods, and may result from several synergistic factors, such as possible recent micro-evolutionary trends favouring lower g in Sweden and the effects of industrially produced neurotoxic substances on peripheral nerve conduction velocity. (shrink)

This book explores international trends in naming and contributes to the growing field of critical onomastic enquiry. The contributors to this publication examine why names are not only symbols of a person or place, but also manifestations of cultural, linguistic and social heritage in their own right.

Leibniz comprenait la question pourquoi y a-t-il quelque chose plutot que rien? sur un mode ontologique; il l'interpretait dans le cadre d'une physique continue, lineaire et necessaire; et il y repondait en invoquant le principe de raison suffisante. Nous comprenons desormais cette question sur un mode non ontologique, en substituant une notion relativiste et pragmatiste de realite a la notion absolue d'etre; nous l'interpretons dans le cadre d'une physique discontinue, non lineaire et probabiliste; et nous y repondons en denoncant, sur (...) un mode non sceptique, le principe de raison suffisante. Operer un tel renversement de l'analyse leibnizienne ne suffit toutefois pas. Car nous restons dans le cadre de la logique binaire adoptee par Leibniz, a savoir l'opposition entre le quelque chose (1) et le rien (0)... (shrink)

Le Commentaire du Traité de l'âme d'Aristote par Thomas d'Aquin est le cinquième des commentaires fondamentaux des oeuvres d'Aristote traduits en langue française. Avec celui des Physiques, de la Métaphysique, de l'Interprétation et des Analytiques, il fonde l'édifice de la philosophie de Thomas d'Aquin et assure les contreforts de sa théologie. Ce traité se présente comme un vaste essai de définition de l'âme et principalement de l'âme humaine, avec en filigrane, une question lancinante : cette âme est-elle immortelle? Si ce (...) traité est l'un des plus courts d'Aristote, et selon ses propres termes, encore à l'état d'ébauche, il est construit avec une rigueur méthodologique qui en fait une sorte de modèle pour toute réflexion philosophique. Thomas propose une explication reconnue comme des plus limpides, et introduit à un livre encore loué deux millénaires plus tard par Hegel, Marx ou Darwin. Comme le reste de l'oeuvre d'Aristote, il connaît aujourd'hui un regain d'intérêt remarquable et le commentaire de Thomas offre un guide très sûr pour son intelligence. (shrink)

Well-being occupies a central role in ethics and political philosophy, including in major theories such as utilitarianism. It also extends far beyond philosophy: recent studies into the science and psychology of well-being have propelled the topic to centre stage, and governments spend millions on promoting it. We are encouraged to adopt modes of thinking and behaviour that support individual well-being or 'wellness'. What is well-being? Which theories of well-being are most plausible? In this rigorous and comprehensive introduction to the topic, (...) Guy Fletcher unpacks and assesses these questions and many more, including: Are pleasure and pain the only things that affect well-being? Is desire-fulfilment the only thing that makes our lives go well? Can something be good for someone who does not desire it? Is well-being fundamentally connected to a distinctive human nature? Is happiness all that makes our lives go well? Is death necessarily bad for us? How is the well-being of a whole life related to well-being at particular times? Also included is a glossary of key terms, and annotated further reading and study and comprehension questions follow each chapter, making _The Philosophy of Well-Being_ essential reading for students in ethics and political philosophy, and also suitable for those in related disciplines such as psychology, politics and sociology. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Main Approaches to Wittgenstein Interpretation Themes and Controversies Questions of Style and Method The Articles in This Volume.

Cet ouvrage propose d'unifier les sciences de l'homme entre elles et avec la philosophie en les articulant grâce à trois concepts fondamentaux: forme, sens et historicité.

Psychiatry presents a unique array of difficult ethical questions. However, a major challenge is to approach psychiatry in a way that does justice to the real ethical issues. Recently there has been a growing body of research in empirical psychiatric ethics, and an increased interest in how empirical and philosophical methods can be combined. Empirical Ethics in Psychiatry demonstrates how ethics can engage more closely with the reality of psychiatric practice and shows how empirical methodologies from the social sciences can (...) help foster this link. -/- The book is divided into two sections. In the first section there are discussions of the possibility of empirical ethics from a theoretical standpoint and an overview of the history of empirical medical ethics in general. The second, larger section is made up of chapters, discussing specific research projects in empirical psychiatric ethics. The contributors reflect on their choice of method: how and why they combine empirical and philosophical work, and how the two approaches relate to each other. The chapters in the second part thus have two purposes. The first is to present examples of empirical ethics in psychiatry; the second is to reflect on the way in which empirical research can support ethical analysis. -/- Empirical Ethics in Psychiatry is a unique contribution to bioethics and will be fascinating reading for all those working within the field, as well as mental health care professionals. (shrink)

This chapter is divided into three parts. First I outline what makes something an objective list theory of well-being. I then go on to look at the motivations for holding such a view before turning to objections to these theories of well-being.

The concept of well-being is one of the oldest and most important topics in philosophy and ethics, going back to ancient Greek philosophy and Aristotle. Following the boom in happiness studies in the last few years it has moved to centre stage, grabbing media headlines and the attention of scientists, psychologists and economists. Yet little is actually known about well-being and it is an idea often poorly articulated. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being provides a comprehensive, outstanding guide and (...) reference source to the key topics and debates in this exciting subject. Comprising over forty chapters by a team of international contributors, the Handbook is divided into six parts: well-being in the history of philosophy current theories of well-being, including hedonism, and perfectionism examples of well-being and its opposites, including friendship and virtue and pain and death theoretical issues such as well-being and value, harm, identity and well-being and children well-being in moral and political philosophy well-being and related subjects including law, economics, and medicine. Essential reading for students and researchers in ethics and political philosophy, it will also be an invaluable resource for those in related disciplines such as psychology, politics and sociology. (shrink)

La science ne se construit pas dans la solitude. La recherche s'inscrit dans les pratiques sociales d'un milieu et d'une époque. Mais, la croissance rapide de nos sociétés a créé une scission entre nos concitoyens et les "spécialistes", perçus comme perdus dans leurs savoirs et pratiquant des rites complexes et incompréhensibles. Le "peuple" et les "élites" ont cessé de se comprendre et une méfiance réciproque est née entre ces deux catégories qui fonctionnent pourtant selon les mêmes règles.

Charles Péguy (1873–1914) was a French religious poet, philosophical essayist, publisher, social activist, Dreyfusard, and Catholic convert. There has recently been a renewed recognition of Péguy in France as a thinker of unique significance, a reconsideration inspired in large part by Gilles Deleuze’s Différence et répétition, which ranked him with Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. In the English-speaking world, however, access to Péguy has been hindered by a scarcity of translations of his work. This first complete translation of one of his most (...) important prose works, with accompanying interpretive introduction and notes, will introduce English-speaking readers to a new voice, which speaks in a powerful and original way to a modern West in a condition of cultural and spiritual crisis. The immediate circumstance of the writing of this last prose essay, unfinished at the time of Péguy’s early death, was the placing of Henri Bergson’s philosophical works on the Catholic Index, and Péguy’s undertaking to defend his former teacher from his critics, both Catholic and secular. But the subject of Bergson is also a springboard for the exploration of the perennial themes—philosophical, theological, and literary—most central to Péguy’s thought. (shrink)

It is commonly claimed that reliance upon moral testimony is problematic in a way not common to reliance upon non-moral testimony. This chapter provides a new explanation of what the problem consists in—one that enjoys advantages over the most widely accepted explanation in the extant literature. The main theses of the chapter are as follows: that many forms of normative deference beyond the moral are problematic, that there is a common explanation of the problem with all of these forms of (...) deference—an explanation that is based on the connection between the relevant judgments and desire-like attitudes, and that this explanation is compatible with moral realism. (shrink)

Anselm's ontological argument is one of the most fascinating, most controversial, and most misunderstood arguments in the entire history of Western thought. By centring the argument firmly in the Neoplatonic tradition within which Anselm was writing, Understanding Anselm's Ontological Argument sheds fresh light and clarity on this enigmatic piece of philosophy. It argues that, far from resting upon a fallacy or illegitimately attempting to define God into existence, Anselm's argument is a powerful and plausible philosophical proof, and deserves to be (...) taken seriously as such. Written to be understandable for specialists and non-specialists alike, Understanding Anselm's Ontological Argument is ideal for scholars and researchers in philosophy of religion and philosophy in the Middle Ages (especially Neoplatonism) as well as for medievalists in general. (shrink)

Evolutionary debunking arguments are arguments that appeal to the evolutionary origins of evaluative beliefs to undermine their justification. This paper aims to clarify the premises and presuppositions of EDAs—a form of argument that is increasingly put to use in normative ethics. I argue that such arguments face serious obstacles. It is often overlooked, for example, that they presuppose the truth of metaethical objectivism. More importantly, even if objectivism is assumed, the use of EDAs in normative ethics is incompatible with a (...) parallel and more sweeping global evolutionary debunking argument that has been discussed in recent metaethics. After examining several ways of responding to this global debunking argument, I end by arguing that even if we could resist it, this would still not rehabilitate the current targeted use of EDAs in normative ethics given that, if EDAs work at all, they will in any case lead to a truly radical revision of our evaluative outlook. (shrink)

Philosophers have long theorized about what makes people's lives go well, and why, and the extent to which morality and self-interest can be reconciled. However, we have spent little time on meta-prudential questions, questions about prudential discourse—thought and talk about what is good and bad for us; what contributes to well-being; and what we have prudential reason, or prudentially ought, to do. This situation is surprising given that prudence is, prima facie, a normative form of discourse and cries out for (...) further investigation of what it is like and whether it has problematic commitments. It also marks a stark contrast from moral discourse, about which there has been extensive theorizing, in meta-ethics. -/- Dear Prudence: The Nature and Normativity of Prudential Discourse has three broad aims. Firstly, Guy Fletcher explores the nature of prudential discourse. Secondly, he argues that prudential discourse is normative and authoritative, like moral discourse. Thirdly, Fletcher aims to show that prudential discourse is worthy of further, explicit, attention both due to its intrinsic interest but also for the light it sheds on the meta-normative more broadly. (shrink)

Analyzes the relationship of power, bureaucracy, and change in modern society.

This article suggests a fresh look at gauge symmetries, with the aim of drawing a clear line between the a priori theoretical considerations involved, and some methodological and empirical non-deductive aspects that are often overlooked. The gauge argument is primarily based on a general symmetry principle expressing the idea that a change of mathematical representation should not change the form of the dynamical law. In addition, the ampliative part of the argument is based on the introduction of new degrees of (...) freedom into the theory according to a methodological principle that is formulated here in terms of correspondence between passive and active transformations. To demonstrate how the two kinds of considerations work together in a concrete context, I begin by considering spatial symmetries in mechanics. I suggest understanding Mach's principle as a similar combination of theoretical, methodological and empirical considerations, and demonstrate the claim with a simple toy model. I then examine gauge symmetries as a manifestation of the two principles in a quantum context. I further show that in all of these cases the relational nature of physically significant quantities can explain the relevance of the symmetry principle and the way the methodology is applied. In the quantum context, the relevant relational variables are quantum phases. (shrink)

Abstract Some philosophers find linguistic meaning mysterious. Two approaches suggest themselves for removing the felt mystery, or demystifying meaning. One involves providing a substantive account of meaning in meaning-free terms. Although this approach has come under serious attack in recent years, Paul Horwich has recently presented a version of the approach that might be thought impervious. A preliminary attempt is made to argue that Horwich's version is vulnerable to the considerations felt to undermine other versions of the substantive approach to (...) demystification. That leaves the second approach, quietism, which involves showing that although meaning is primitive it is un-mysterious. It is suggested that this approach is worthy of exploration. (shrink)