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  1. Problems of Religious Luck, Chapter 2: The New Problem of Religious Luck.Guy Axtell - manuscript
    One main kind of etiological challenge to the well-foundedness of someone’s belief is the consideration that if you had a different education/upbringing, you would very likely accept different beliefs than you actually do. Although a person’s religious identity and attendant religious beliefs are usually the ones singled out as targets of such “contingency” or “epistemic location” arguments, it is clear that a person’s place and time has a conditioning effect in all domains of controversial views, and over all of what (...)
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  2. Problems of Religious Luck, Chapter 6: The Pattern Stops Here?Guy Axtell - forthcoming - In Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement.
    This book has argued that problems of religious luck, especially when operationalized into concerns about doxastic risk and responsibility, can be of shared interest to theologians, philosophers, and psychologists. We have pointed out counter-inductive thinking as a key feature of fideistic models of faith, and examined the implications of this point both for the social scientific study of fundamentalism, and for philosophers’ and theologians’ normative concerns with the reasonableness of a) exclusivist attitudes to religious multiplicity, and b) theologically-cast but bias-mirroring (...)
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  3. Problems of Religious Luck, Chapter 3: "Enemy in the Mirror: The Need for Comparative Fundamentalism".Guy Axtell - forthcoming - In Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement.
    Measures of inductive risk and of safety-principle violation help us to operationalize concerns about theological assertions or a sort which, as we saw in Part I, aggravate or intensify problems of religious luck. Our overall focus in Part II will remain on a) responses to religious multiplicity, and b) sharply asymmetrical religious trait-ascriptions to religious insiders and outsiders. But in Part II formal markers of inductive norm violation will supply an empirically-based manner of distinguishing strong from moderate fideism. As we (...)
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  4. Problems of Religious Luck, Ch. 4: "We Are All of the Common Herd: Montaigne and the Psychology of Our 'Importunate Presumptions'".Guy Axtell - forthcoming - In Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement.
    As we have seen in the transition form Part I to Part II of this book, the inductive riskiness of doxastic methods applied in testimonial uptake or prescribed as exemplary of religious faith, helpfully operationalizes the broader social scientific, philosophical, moral, and theological interest that people may have with problems of religious luck. Accordingly, we will now speak less about luck, but more about the manner in which highly risky cognitive strategies are correlated with psychological studies of bias studies and (...)
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  5. Problems of Religious Luck, Ch. 5: "Scaling the ‘Brick Wall’: Measuring and Censuring Strongly Fideistic Religious Orientation".Guy Axtell - forthcoming - In Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement.
    This chapter sharpens the book’s criticism of exclusivist responsible to religious multiplicity, firstly through close critical attention to arguments which religious exclusivists provide, and secondly through the introduction of several new, formal arguments / dilemmas. Self-described ‘post-liberals’ like Paul Griffiths bid philosophers to accept exclusivist attitudes and beliefs as just one among other aspects of religious identity. They bid us to normalize the discourse Griffiths refers to as “polemical apologetics,” and to view its acceptance as the only viable form of (...)
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  6. On Predicting Recidivism: Epistemic Risk, Tradeoffs, and Values in Machine Learning.Justin B. Biddle - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-21.
    Recent scholarship in philosophy of science and technology has shown that scientific and technological decision making are laden with values, including values of a social, political, and/or ethical character. This paper examines the role of value judgments in the design of machine-learning systems generally and in recidivism-prediction algorithms specifically. Drawing on work on inductive and epistemic risk, the paper argues that ML systems are value laden in ways similar to human decision making, because the development and design of ML systems (...)
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  7. Inductive Risk in Macroeconomics: Natural Rate Theory, Monetary Policy, and the Great Canadian Slump.Gabriele Contessa - forthcoming - Economics and Philosophy.
    This paper has two goals. The first is to fill a gap in the literature on inductive risk by exploring the relevance of the notion of inductive risk to macroeconomics and monetary policy. The second goal is to draw some general lessons about inductive risk from the case discussed. The most important of these lessons is that the notion of inductive risk is no less relevant to the relationship between the proximate and distal goals of policy than it is to (...)
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  8. Risk and Precaution.Stephen John - forthcoming - Public Health Ethics: Key Concepts and Issues in Policy and Practice:67--84.
  9. Are Algorithms Value-Free? Feminist Theoretical Virtues in Machine Learning.Gabbrielle Johnson - forthcoming - Journal Moral Philosophy.
    As inductive decision-making procedures, the inferences made by machine learning programs are subject to underdetermination by evidence and bear inductive risk. One strategy for overcoming these challenges is guided by a presumption in philosophy of science that inductive inferences can and should be value-free. Applied to machine learning programs, the strategy assumes that the influence of values is restricted to data and decision outcomes, thereby omitting internal value-laden design choice points. In this paper, I apply arguments from feminist philosophy of (...)
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  10. William James on Risk, Efficacy, and Evidentialism.P. D. Magnus - forthcoming - Episteme:1-13.
    William James’ argument against William Clifford in The Will to Believe is often understood in terms of doxastic efficacy, the power of belief to influence an outcome. Although that is one strand of James’ argument, there is another which is driven by ampliative risk. The second strand of James’ argument, when applied to scientific cases, is tantamount to what is now called the Argument from Inductive Risk. Either strand of James’ argument is sufficient to rebut Clifford's strong evidentialism and show (...)
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  11. Kevin C. Elliott. A Tapestry of Values: An Introduction to Values in Science. [REVIEW]David Montminy & François Papale - forthcoming - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science.
  12. Kevin C. Elliott and Ted Richards , Exploring Inductive Risk. Case Studies of Values in Science.Federica Russo - forthcoming - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science.
  13. Thinking About Values in Science: Ethical Versus Political Approaches.S. Andrew Schroeder - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-10.
    Philosophers of science now broadly agree that doing good science involves making non-epistemic value judgments. I call attention to two very different normative standards which can be used to evaluate such judgments: standards grounded in ethics and standards grounded in political philosophy. Though this distinction has not previously been highlighted, I show that the values in science literature contain arguments of each type. I conclude by explaining why this distinction is important. Seeking to determine whether some value-laden determination meets substantive (...)
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  14. Inductive Risk and Values in Composite Outcome Measures.Roger Stanev - forthcoming - In Kevin Elliot & Ted Richards (eds.), Exploring Inductive Risk. Oxford University Press.
    The use of composite outcomes is becoming widespread in clinical trials. By combining individual outcome measures into a composite, researchers claim a composite can increase statistical precision and trial efficiency, expediting the trial by reducing sample size and cost, and consequently enabling researchers to answer questions that could not otherwise be answered. Another rationale given for using a composite is that it provides a measure of the net effect of the intervention that is more patient-relevant than any single outcome measure. (...)
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  15. Public Trust in Science: Exploring the Idiosyncrasy-Free Ideal.Marion Boulicault & S. Andrew Schroeder - 2021 - In Kevin Vallier & Michael Weber (eds.), Social Trust. Routledge.
    What makes science trustworthy to the public? This chapter examines one proposed answer: the trustworthiness of science is based at least in part on its independence from the idiosyncratic values, interests, and ideas of individual scientists. That is, science is trustworthy to the extent that following the scientific process would result in the same conclusions, regardless of the particular scientists involved. We analyze this "idiosyncrasy-free ideal" for science by looking at philosophical debates about inductive risk, focusing on two recent proposals (...)
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  16. On the mitigation of inductive risk.Gabriele Contessa - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (3):1-14.
    The last couple of decades have witnessed a renewed interest in the notion of inductive risk among philosophers of science. However, while it is possible to find a number of suggestions about the mitigation of inductive risk in the literature, so far these suggestions have been mostly relegated to vague marginal remarks. This paper aims to lay the groundwork for a more systematic discussion of the mitigation of inductive risk. In particular, I consider two approaches to the mitigation of inductive (...)
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  17. Teorias da conspiração: por que algumas não valem um caracol.Carvalho Eros - 2021 - Perspectiva Filosófica 48 (2):340-357.
    Neste artigo, mapeio o terreno da discussão em torno das teorias da conspiração, destacando o problema de como defini-las, os fatores que levam à crença nas teorias da conspiração, os seus potenciais prejuízos e como devemos reagir a elas. Defendo que devemos avaliar as consequências da crença em uma teoria da conspiração para determinar se ela deve ser levada a serio ou não. Em bloco, as teorias da conspiração ameaçam a capacidade coletiva de produção de conhecimento e devemos nos preocupar (...)
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  18. Well-Ordered Science and Public Trust in Science.Gürol Irzik & Faik Kurtulmus - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 19):4731-4748.
    Building, restoring and maintaining well-placed trust between scientists and the public is a difficult yet crucial social task requiring the successful cooperation of various social actors and institutions. Kitcher’s takes up this challenge in the context of liberal democratic societies by extending his ideal model of “well-ordered science” that he had originally formulated in his. However, Kitcher nowhere offers an explicit account of what it means for the public to invest epistemic trust in science. Yet in order to understand how (...)
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  19. Pandemia COVID-19 z perspektywy teorii ryzyka.Andrzej Klimczuk - 2021 - In Andrzej Zybała, Artur Bartoszewicz & Krzysztof Księżopolski (eds.), Polska... Unia Europejska... Świat... w pandemii COVID-19 - wybrane zagadnienia. Wnioski dla kształtowania i prowadzenia polityki publicznej. Warszawa: Elipsa. pp. 34-56.
    Artykuł zawiera przegląd wybranych powiązań pandemii COVID-19 z teoriami ryzyka. W pierwszej kolejności przedstawiono podstawowe pojęcia dotyczące przygotowania i mobilizowania sieci podmiotów polityki publicznej do wspólnych działań w warunkach niepewności. W dalszej części omówiono zagadnienie gotowości na ryzyko wystąpienia pandemii i jej zwalczania. Następnie przedstawiono wybrane możliwe efekty społeczne, gospodarcze i polityczne pandemii COVID-19. W podsumowaniu wskazane zostały rekomendacje dotyczące zarządzania podmiotami publicznymi na dalszych etapach rozwoju pandemii i w okresie po pandemii oraz propozycje dalszych kierunków badań. // The article (...)
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  20. The epistemic consequences of pragmatic value-laden scientific inference.Adam P. Kubiak & Paweł Kawalec - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (2):1-26.
    In this work, we explore the epistemic import of the value-ladenness of Neyman-Pearson’s Theory of Testing Hypotheses by reconstructing and extending Daniel Steel’s argument for the legitimate influence of pragmatic values on scientific inference. We focus on how to properly understand N-P’s pragmatic value-ladenness and the epistemic reliability of N-P. We develop an account of the twofold influence of pragmatic values on N-P’s epistemic reliability and replicability. We refer to these two distinguished aspects as “direct” and “indirect”. We discuss the (...)
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  21. Well-Founded Belief and the Contingencies of Epistemic Location.Guy Axtell - 2020 - In Patrick Bondy & J. Adam Carter (eds.), Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. London: Routledge. pp. 275-304.
    A growing number of philosophers are concerned with the epistemic status of culturally nurtured beliefs, beliefs found especially in domains of morals, politics, philosophy, and religion. Plausibly, worries about the deep impact of cultural contingencies on beliefs in these domains of controversial views is a question about well-foundedness: Does it defeat well-foundedness if the agent is rationally convinced that she would take her own reasons for belief as insufficiently well-founded, or would take her own belief as biased, had she been (...)
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  22. Science and Moral Imagination: A New Ideal for Values in Science.Matthew Brown - 2020 - Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
    The idea that science is or should be value-free, and that values are or should be formed independently of science, has been under fire by philosophers of science for decades. Science and Moral Imagination directly challenges the idea that science and values cannot and should not influence each other. Matthew J. Brown argues that science and values mutually influence and implicate one another, that the influence of values on science is pervasive and must be responsibly managed, and that science can (...)
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  23. Enzyme Classification and the Entanglement of Values and Epistemic Standards.Stijn Conix - 2020 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 84:37-45.
    This paper investigates the case of enzyme classification to evaluate different ideals for regulating values in science. I show that epistemic and non-epistemic considerations are inevitably and untraceably entangled in enzyme classification, and argue that this has significant implications for the two main kinds of views on values in science, namely, Epistemic Priority Views and Joint Satisfaction Views. More precisely, I argue that the case of enzyme classification poses a problem for the usability and descriptive accuracy of these two views. (...)
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  24. Integrating Heather Douglas’ Inductive Risk Framework with an Account of Scientific Evidence: Why and How?O. Çağlar Dede - 2020 - Perspectives on Science 28 (6):737-763.
    I examine how Heather Douglas’ account of values in science applies to the assessment of actual cases of scientific practice. I focus on the case of applied toxicologists’ acceptance of molecular evidence-gathering methods and evidential sources. I demonstrate that a set of social and institutional processes plays a philosophically significant role in changing toxicologists’ inductive risk judgments about different kinds of evidence. I suggest that Douglas’ inductive risk framework can be integrated with a suitable account of evidence, such as Helen (...)
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  25. Are Experts Representative of Non-Experts? Elective Modernism, Aspects of Representation, and the Argument From Inductive Risk.Jaana Eigi - 2020 - Perspectives on Science 28 (4):459-481.
    The approach to expert communities and political representation of non-experts in Harry Collins and Robert Evans’ elective modernism reflects the conviction that experts are not representative of ordinary citizens. I use an analysis of aspects of representation and the argument from inductive risk to argue that experts can be seen as representative of non-experts, when we understand representation as resemblance based on shared social perspectives and acknowledge the inevitable involvement of such perspectives in decisions under inductive risk. This, in turn, (...)
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  26. Relevance and Risk: How the Relevant Alternatives Framework Models the Epistemology of Risk.Georgi Gardiner - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):481-511.
    The epistemology of risk examines how risks bear on epistemic properties. A common framework for examining the epistemology of risk holds that strength of evidential support is best modelled as numerical probability given the available evidence. In this essay I develop and motivate a rival ‘relevant alternatives’ framework for theorising about the epistemology of risk. I describe three loci for thinking about the epistemology of risk. The first locus concerns consequences of relying on a belief for action, where those consequences (...)
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  27. Defending a Risk Account of Scientific Objectivity.Inkeri Koskinen - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (4):1187-1207.
    When discussing scientific objectivity, many philosophers of science have recently focused on accounts that can be applied in practice when assessing the objectivity of something. It has become clear that in different contexts, objectivity is realized in different ways, and the many senses of objectivity recognized in the recent literature seem to be conceptually distinct. I argue that these diverse ‘applicable’ senses of scientific objectivity have more in common than has thus far been recognized. I combine arguments from philosophical discussions (...)
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  28. Trust and Distributed Epistemic Labor‎.Boaz Miller & Ori Freiman - 2020 - In Judith Simon (ed.), The Routledge Handbook on Trust and Philosophy. New York: Routledge. pp. ‎341-353‎.
    This chapter explores properties that bind individuals, knowledge, and communities, together. Section ‎‎1 introduces Hardwig’s argument from trust in others’ testimonies as entailing that trust is the glue ‎that binds individuals into communities. Section 2 asks “what grounds trust?” by exploring assessment ‎of collaborators’ explanatory responsiveness, formal indicators such as affiliation and credibility, ‎appreciation of peers’ tacit knowledge, game-theoretical considerations, and the role moral character ‎of peers, social biases, and social values play in grounding trust. Section 3 deals with establishing (...)
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  29. Catastrophic Risk.H. Orri Stefánsson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (11):1-11.
    Catastrophic risk raises questions that are not only of practical importance, but also of great philosophical interest, such as how to define catastrophe and what distinguishes catastrophic outcomes from non-catastrophic ones. Catastrophic risk also raises questions about how to rationally respond to such risks. How to rationally respond arguably partly depends on the severity of the uncertainty, for instance, whether quantitative probabilistic information is available, or whether only comparative likelihood information is available, or neither type of information. Finally, catastrophic risk (...)
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  30. An Inductive Risk Account of the Ethics of Belief.Guy Axtell - 2019 - Philosophy. The Journal of the Higher School of Economic 3 (3):146-171.
    From what norms does the ethics of belief derive its oughts, its attributions of virtues and vices, responsibilities and irresponsibilities, its permissioning and censuring? Since my inductive risk account is inspired by pragmatism, and this method understands epistemology as the theory of inquiry, the paper will try to explain what the aims and tasks are for an ethics of belief, or project of guidance, which best fits with this understanding of epistemology. More specifically, this chapter approaches the ethics of belief (...)
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  31. Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement.Guy Axtell - 2019 - Lanham, MD, USA & London, UK: Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefield.
    To speak of being religious lucky certainly sounds odd. But then, so does “My faith holds value in God’s plan, while yours does not.” This book argues that these two concerns — with the concept of religious luck and with asymmetric or sharply differential ascriptions of religious value — are inextricably connected. It argues that religious luck attributions can profitably be studied from a number of directions, not just theological, but also social scientific and philosophical. There is a strong tendency (...)
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  32. Book ReviewsKevin C. Elliott and Ted Richards , Exploring Inductive Risk: Case Studies of Values in Science , 312 Pages. Isbn: 9780190467715/9780190467722. Hardback/Paperback: $99.00/$39.95. [REVIEW]Zina B. Ward - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (6):769-772.
  33. Risk and Values in Science: A Peircean View.Daniele Chiffi & Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen - 2019 - Axiomathes 29 (4):329-346.
    Scientific evidence and scientific values under risk and uncertainty are strictly connected from the point of view of Peirce’s pragmaticism. In addition, economy and statistics play a key role in both choosing and testing hypotheses. Hence we may show also the connection between the methodology of the economy of research and statistical frequentism, both originating from pragmaticism. The connection is drawn by the regulative principles of synechism, tychism and uberty. These principles are values that have both epistemic and non-epistemic dimension. (...)
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  34. Ethics of the Scientist Qua Policy Advisor: Inductive Risk, Uncertainty, and Catastrophe in Climate Economics.David Frank - 2019 - Synthese:3123-3138.
    This paper discusses ethical issues surrounding Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) of the economic effects of climate change, and how climate economists acting as policy advisors ought to represent the uncertain possibility of catastrophe. Some climate economists, especially Martin Weitzman, have argued for a precautionary approach where avoiding catastrophe should structure climate economists’ welfare analysis. This paper details ethical arguments that justify this approach, showing how Weitzman’s “fat tail” probabilities of climate catastrophe pose ethical problems for widely used IAMs. The main (...)
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  35. What Is Epistemic Public Trust in Science?Gürol Irzik & Faik Kurtulmus - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (4):1145-1166.
    We provide an analysis of the public's having warranted epistemic trust in science, that is, the conditions under which the public may be said to have well-placed trust in the scientists as providers of information. We distinguish between basic and enhanced epistemic trust in science and provide necessary conditions for both. We then present the controversy regarding the connection between autism and measles–mumps–rubella vaccination as a case study to illustrate our analysis. The realization of warranted epistemic public trust in science (...)
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  36. The Politics of Certainty: The Precautionary Principle, Inductive Risk and Procedural Fairness.Stephen John - 2019 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 22 (1):21-33.
    ABSTRACTThis paper re-interprets the precautionary principle as a ‘social epistemic rule’. First, it argues that sometimes policy-makers should act on claims which have not been scientifically established. Second, it argues that, given how scientists ought to solve ‘inductive risk’ problems, such guidance is required not only under actual conditions, but under any plausible conditions. Third, it suggests that procedural fairness may provide policy-makers with reasons to be very reluctant to act on claims which are not scientifically established. The restriction of (...)
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  37. Uncertainty: How It Makes Science Advance.Kostas Kampourakis & Kevin McCain - 2019 - Oxford University Press.
    Scientific knowledge is the most solid and robust kind of knowledge that humans have because of its inherent self-correcting character. Nevertheless, anti-evolutionists, climate denialists, and anti-vaxxers, among others, question some of the best-established scientific findings, making claims unsupported by empirical evidence. A common aspect of these claims is reference to the uncertainties of science concerning evolution, climate change, vaccination, and so on. This is inaccurate: whereas the broad picture is clear, there will always exist uncertainties about the details of the (...)
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  38. Infertility, Epistemic Risk, and Disease Definitions.Rebecca Kukla - 2019 - Synthese 196 (11):4409-4428.
    I explore the role that values and interests, especially ideological interests, play in managing and balancing epistemic risks in medicine. I will focus in particular on how diseases are identified and operationalized. Before we can do biomedical research on a condition, it needs to be identified as a medical condition, and it needs to be operationalized in a way that lets us identify sufferers, measure progress, and so forth. I will argue that each time we do this, we engage in (...)
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  39. Measuring Belief and Risk Attitude.Sven Neth - 2019 - Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 297:354–364.
    Ramsey (1926) sketches a proposal for measuring the subjective probabilities of an agent by their observable preferences, assuming that the agent is an expected utility maximizer. I show how to extend the spirit of Ramsey's method to a strictly wider class of agents: risk-weighted expected utility maximizers (Buchak 2013). In particular, I show how we can measure the risk attitudes of an agent by their observable preferences, assuming that the agent is a risk-weighted expected utility maximizer. Further, we can leverage (...)
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  40. Incorporating User Values Into Climate Services.Wendy Parker & Greg Lusk - 2019 - Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 100 (9):1643-1650.
    Increasingly there are calls for climate services to be “co-produced” with users, taking into account not only the basic information needs of users but also their value systems and decision contexts. What does this mean in practice? One way that user values can be incorporated into climate services is in the management of inductive risk. This involves understanding which errors in climate service products would have particularly negative consequences from the users’ perspective (e.g., underestimating rather than overestimating the change in (...)
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  41. Value-Entanglement and the Integrity of Scientific Research.David B. Resnik & Kevin C. Elliott - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 75:1-11.
  42. Kevin C. Elliott and Ted Richards, Eds. Exploring Inductive Risk: Case Studies of Values in Science. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. Xiv+277. $99.00 ; $40.00. [REVIEW]Federica Russo - 2019 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 9 (1):179-182.
  43. What is Inductive Risk?: Kevin C. Elliott and Ted Richards : Exploring Inductive Risk: Case Studies of Values in Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, 312pp, $39.95 PB. [REVIEW]S. Schroeder - 2019 - Metascience 28 (1):29-32.
  44. “Antiscience Zealotry”? Values, Epistemic Risk, and the GMO Debate.Justin B. Biddle - 2018 - Philosophy of Science 85 (3):360-379.
    This article argues that the controversy over genetically modified crops is best understood not in terms of the supposed bias, dishonesty, irrationality, or ignorance on the part of proponents or critics, but rather in terms of differences in values. To do this, the article draws on and extends recent work of the role of values and interests in science, focusing particularly on inductive risk and epistemic risk, and it shows how the GMO debate can help to further our understanding of (...)
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  45. Animal Cognition and Human Values.Jonathan Birch - 2018 - Philosophy of Science 85 (5):1026-1037.
    Animal welfare scientists face an acute version of the problem of inductive risk, since they must choose whether to affirm attributions of mental states to animals in advisory contexts, knowing their decisions hold consequences for animal welfare. In such contexts, the burden of proof should be sensitive to the consequences of error, but a framework for setting appropriate burdens of proof is lacking. Through reflection on two cases—pain and cognitive enrichment—I arrive at a tentative framework based on the principle of (...)
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  46. Weaving Value Judgment Into the Tapestry of Science.Matthew J. Brown - 2018 - Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 10 (10).
    I critically analyze Kevin Elliott’s A Tapestry of Values in order to tease out his views on the nature and status of values or value judgments in the text. I show there is a tension in Elliott’s view that is closely connected to a major lacuna in the philosophical literature on values in science: the need for a better theory of values.
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  47. From Tapestry to Loom: Broadening the Perspective on Values in Science.Heather Douglas - 2018 - Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 10 (8).
    After raising some minor philosophical points about Kevin Elliott’s A Tapestry of Values (2017), I argue that we should expand on the themes raised in the book and that philosophers of science need to pay as much attention to the loom of science (i.e., the institutional structures which guide the pursuit of science) as the tapestry of science. The loom of science includes such institutional aspects as patents, funding sources, and evaluation regimes that shape how science gets pursued, and that (...)
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  48. Risque et expertise.Alexandre Guay (ed.) - 2018 - Besançon, France: Presses universitaires de Franche-Comté.
    Le risque comme l’expertise sont des sujets d’une rare richesse, comme le confirme la vaste littérature sur ces questions. Lorsqu’ils sont croisés, les difficultés que chacun d’entre eux soulève s’en trouvent renforcées. Le présent ouvrage est le produit des sixièmes conférences Pierre Duhem qui avaient pour thème : risque et expertise. Il rassemble les textes originaux de l’économiste Marc Fleurbaey et du philosophe Sven Ove Hansson, ainsi que les échanges qu’ils ont eu avec les commentateurs Mikaël Cozic, Minh Ha-Duong et (...)
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  49. Inductive Risk and Regulatory Toxicology: A Comment on de Melo-Martín and Intemann.Daniel Hicks - 2018 - Philosophy of Science 85 (1):164-174.
    Inmaculada de Melo-Martín and Kristen Intemann consider whether, from the perspective of the argument from inductive risk, ethical and political values might be logically, epistemically, pragmatically, or ethically necessary in the “core” of scientific reasoning. In each case, they argue that there are significant conceptual problems. In this comment, employing regulatory uses of high-throughput toxicology at the US Environmental Protection Agency as a case study, I respond to some of their claims about the notion of “pragmatic necessity.” I conclude that, (...)
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  50. The Promise and Perils of Industry‐Funded Science.Bennett Holman & Kevin C. Elliott - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (11).
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