- Risk-Limited Indulgent Permissivism.Guy Axtell - manuscriptdetails
- Bodiless Affect.Ron C. de Weijze - manuscriptdetails
- Gradualism and the Gradualistic Account of Luck.Gregor Flock - manuscriptdetails
- A Gricean Approach to the Gettier Problem.Allan Hazlett - manuscriptdetails
- Quine’s Naturalized Epistemology, Epistemic Normativity and the Gettier Problem.Qilin Li - details
- “Absent Contrary Indication”: On a Pernicious Form of Epistemic Luck, and its Epistemic Agency Antidote.Alfonso Anaya - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-24.details
- Falibilidad y Normatividad.Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia (ed.) - forthcoming - Madrid, España: Cátedra.details
- Reassessing Lucky Understanding.Miloud Belkoniene - forthcoming - Episteme:1-15.details
- Social Epistemology and Knowing-How.Yuri Cath - forthcoming - In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.details
- Virtue Epistemology and the Analysis of Knowledge.Ian M. Church - forthcoming - New York: Bloomsbury Academic.details
- Legal Evidence and Knowledge.Georgi Gardiner - forthcoming - In Clayton Littlejohn & Maria Lasonen Aarnio (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence.details
- Is Justification Just in the Head?Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Blake Roeber, John Turri, Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell.details
- The Explanationist and the Modalist.Dario Mortini - forthcoming - Episteme:1-16.details
- On Mentioning Belief-Formation Methods in the Sensitivity Subjunctives.Bin Zhao - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.details
- On Translating the Sensitivity Condition to the Possible Worlds Idiom in Different Ways.Bin Zhao - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.details
- Deepfakes, Fake Barns, and Knowledge from Videos.Taylor Matthews - 2023 - Synthese 201 (2):1-18.details
- Collective Epistemic Luck.Moisés Barba & Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):99-119.details
- A Kierkegaardian Anti-Luck Epistemology.Tim Black - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):85-97.details
- Evidence, Epistemic Luck, Reliability, and Knowledge.Mylan Engel - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):33-56.details
- The Myth of Luck: Philosophy, Fate, and Fortune. [REVIEW]Jesse Hill - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (3):782-785.details
- Memory, Knowledge, and Epistemic Luck.Changsheng Lai - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):896-917.details
- A new solution to the safety dilemma.Dario Mortini - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-17.details
- Knowledge, individualised evidence and luck.Dario Mortini - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3791-3815.details
- Safety and Necessity.Niall J. Paterson - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1081-1097.details
- Correction to: Epistemic Luck and Knowledge.Michael J. Shaffer - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):7-8.details
- Epistemic Luck and Knowledge.Michael J. Shaffer - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):1-6.details
- Safety, Evidence, and Epistemic Luck.Michael J. Shaffer - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):121-134.details
- Epistemic Luck in Stoicism.Pavle Stojanović - 2022 - Ancient Philosophy 42 (1):273-289.details
- Saving Sensitivity.Brett Topey - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):177-196.details
- Sensitivity, Safety, and Epistemic Closure.Bin Zhao - 2022 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 30 (1):56-71.details
- Epistemic Closure, Necessary Truths, and Safety.Bin Zhao - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (4):391-401.details
- Close Error, Visual Perception, and Neural Phase: A Critique of the Modal Approach to Knowledge.Adam Michael Bricker - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1123-1152.details
- Modal Security.Justin Clarke-Doane & Dan Baras - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):162-183.details
- The Causal Theory of Knowledge Revisited: An Interventionist Approach.Job Grefte & Alexander Gebharter - 2021 - Ratio 34 (3):193-202.details
- Recent Work in the Epistemology of Understanding.Michael Hannon - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (3):269-290.details
- The Third Type of Epistemic Luck.Changsheng Lai - 2021 - Studies in Dialectics of Nature 7 (37):14-20.details
- Dispositional Evaluations and Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2021 - In Mona Jessica & Simion Brown (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 91–115.details
- Lucky Ignorance, Modality and Lack of Knowledge.Oscar A. Piedrahita - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (3).details
- Rehabilitating Statistical Evidence.Lewis Ross - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):3-23.details
- A Dilemma for Globalized Safety.Bin Zhao - 2021 - Acta Analytica 37 (2):249-261.details
- Knowledge from Falsehood, Ignorance of Necessary Truths, and Safety.Bin Zhao - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (2):833-845.details
- Non-Reductive Safety.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2020 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 33:25-38.details
- Environmental luck and the structure of understanding.Kenneth Boyd - 2020 - Episteme 17 (1):73-87.details
- Guy Axtell. Problems of Religious Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement.Sawyer Bullock - 2020 - Philosophia Christi 22 (1):172-175.details
- Set-theoretic pluralism and the Benacerraf problem.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):2013-2030.details
- Towards a Hybrid Account of Luck.Job de Grefte - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2):240-255.details
- Conversion, Causes, and Closed-Mindedness.Joshua Dipaolo - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (1):74-95.details
- Towards a Hybrid Account of Luck.Job Grefte - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2):240-255.details
- The Myth of Luck: Philosophy, Fate, and Fortune.Steven D. Hales - 2020 - London: Bloomsbury Academic.details
- Non‐Accidental Knowing.Niall J. Paterson - 2020 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 58 (2):302-326.details
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