Falsification

This paper deals with a relatively recent trend in the history of analytic philosophy, philosophical logic, and theory of science: the philosophical study of the role of inconsistency in empirical science. This paper is divided in three sections that correspond to the three types of inconsistencies identified: (i) factual, occurring between theory and observations, (ii) external, occurring between two mutually contradictory theories, and (iii) internal, characterising theories that entail mutually contradictory statements.

We information-theoretically reformulate two measures of capacity from statistical learning theory: empirical VC-entropy and empirical Rademacher complexity. We show these capacity measures count the number of hypotheses about a dataset that a learning algorithm falsifies when it finds the classifier in its repertoire minimizing empirical risk. It then follows from that the future performance of predictors on unseen data is controlled in part by how many hypotheses the learner falsifies. As a corollary we show that empirical VC-entropy quantifies the message (...) length of the true hypothesis in the optimal code of a particular probability distribution, the so-called actual repertoire. (shrink)

The paper demonstrates that falsifiability is fundamental to learning. We prove the following theorem for statistical learning and sequential prediction: If a theory is falsifiable then it is learnable -- i.e. admits a strategy that predicts optimally. An analogous result is shown for universal induction.

The possibility of testing contradictory statements about the factual world has been suggested but barely discussed in the relevant literature. Here I argue that if we assume that there are contradictory observation sentences, it would be logically impossible to falsify them. Accordingly, the extension of the dialetheist programme into empirical science would be non-advisable, for it would introduce logically unfalsifiable claims.

In this paper, I propose a formal framework for modelling the process of testing empirical statements, hypotheses, theories, and research programmes. Unlike the diverse forms of falsificationism, this framework does not require any commitment to classical logic or to any specific system of logic, as it aims to be useful regardless of the logic we presuppose. On this regard, the paper will focus on how this framework applies to two logical contexts: the classical and the paraconsistent contexts. I will show (...) that this framework converges with falsificationism for consistent classical theories, and that it has very interesting consequences for the variety of paraconsistent cases. Concerning the latter cases, what may be called "empirical dialetheism" will be severely undermined as I will show that not even in our quite liberal framework it is possible to reject an "observable contradiction.". (shrink)

This paper discusses the logical possibility of testing inconsistent empirical theories. The main challenge for answering this affirmatively is to avoid that the inconsistent consequences of a theory both corroborate it and falsify it. I answer affirmatively by showing that we can define a class of empirical sentences whose truth would force us to abandon such inconsistent theory: the class of its potential rejecters. Despite this, I show that the observational contradictions implied by a theory could only be verified (provided (...) we make some assumptions), but not rejected. From this, it follows that, although inconsistent theories are rejectable, they cannot be rejected qua inconsistent. (shrink)

In this paper, I draw attention to a revolution in the metaphysical commitments of Western astrology. Although I do not wish to promote astrology, I propose a rational route to this revolution. But there is a strong argument, from a Popperian perspective, that my proposal fails to establish rationality. I then consider whether we should say that astrology is either false or unfalsifiable, drawing attention to some surprising findings from schizophrenia research. Also, in a footnote I present “Tompkins’ paradox.”.

Susan Haack criticises the US courts' use of Karl Popper's epistemology in discriminating acceptable scientific testimony. She claims that acceptable testimony should be reliable and that Popper's epistemology is useless in discriminating reliability. She says that Popper's views have been found acceptable only because they have been misunderstood and she indicates an alternative epistemology which she says can discriminate reliable theories. However, her account of Popper's views is a gross and gratuitous misrepresentation. Her alternative epistemology cannot do what she claims (...) for it. The courts should not be concerned with reliability and, insofar as they use the term 'reliability,' it should be construed in a procedural rather than a substantive sense. Since Popper's epistemology gives something like a characterisation of science at its best, the courts should continue to invoke Popper's theories in their discrimination of acceptable testimony. (shrink)

The sheer multitude of criteria of empirical significance has been taken as evidence that the pre-analytic notion being explicated is too vague to be useful. I show instead that a significant number of these criteria—by Ayer, Popper, Przełęcki, Suppes, and David Lewis, among others—not only form a coherent whole, but also connect directly to the theory of definition, the notion of empirical content as explicated by Ramsey sentences, and the theory of measurement; two criteria by Carnap and Sober are trivial, (...) but can be saved and connected to the other criteria by slight modifications. A corollary is that the ordinary language defense of Lewis, the conceptual arguments by Ayer and Popper, the theoretical considerations by Przełęcki, and the practical considerations by Suppes all apply to the same criterion or closely related criteria. Furthermore, the equivalence of some criteria allows for their individual justifications to be taken cumulatively and, together with the entailment relations between nonequivalent criteria, suggest criteria for general auxiliary assumptions, comparative criteria, and more liberal conceptions of observation. (shrink)

Karl Popper rightly contests the possibility of a verification of basic statements. At the same time he strictly believes in the possibility of growth of empirical knowledge. Knowledge growth, however, is only possible if empirical theories can be falsified. This raises the question, how theories can be falsified, if a verification of those statements that falsify theories – i.e. basic statements – is not possible. This problem is often referred to as the “basic problem” or “problem of the empirical basis”. (...) In this paper I show that – from a logical point of view – a falsification of theories is possible without a verification of basic state-ments. Furthermore I show that knowledge growth in the empirical sciences will be possible if two assumptions are valid. These assumptions can neither be proven nor falsified. However, they have to be postulated by everybody in eve-ryday life. (shrink)

Preuves et Réfutations est écrit comme une série de dialogues socratiques entre un groupe d'étudiants discutant de la démonstration des caractéristiques d'Euler définies pour les polyèdres. Le livre explique de nombreuses idées logiques importantes, mettant l'accent sur l'idée d'heuristique positive. Le livre comprend deux annexes. Dans le premier, Lakatos donne des exemples du processus heuristique de la découverte mathématique en particulier et du processus scientifique en général. Deuxièmement, il oppose les approches déductives et heuristiques et propose des analyses heuristiques des (...) concepts « preuves ». DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.20798.31042. (shrink)

Karl Popper, ca raționalist critic, a fost un oponent al tuturor formelor de scepticism, convenționalism și relativism în știință. Multe dintre argumentele sale sunt îndreptate împotriva membrilor "Cercului Vienez". Popper este de acord cu aceștia cu privire la aspectele generale ale metodologiei științifice și neîncrederea lor în metodologia filosofică tradițională, dar soluțiile sale au fost semnificativ diferite. A contribuit semnificativ la dezbaterile privind metodologia științifică generală, demarcarea științei de pseudoștiință, natura probabilității și metodologia științelor sociale. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.27356.85127/1 .

În această lucrare argumentez faptul că, în ciuda criticilor teoriei falsificabilității propuse de Karl Popper pentru demarcarea între știință și ne-știință, în principal pseudoștiință, acest criteriu este încă foarte util, și perfect valabil după perfecționarea lui de către Popper și adepții lui. Mai mult, chiar și în versiunea sa inițială, considerată de Lakatos ca ”dogmatică”, Popper nu a afirmat că această metodologie este un criteriu absolut de demarcare: un singur contra-exemplu nu este suficient pentru a falsifica o teorie; mai mult, (...) o teorie poate fi salvată în mod legitim de falsificare prin introducerea unei ipoteze auxiliare. În comparație cu teoria lui Kuhn a revoluțiilor, de care el însuși s-a dezis ulterior transformând-o într-o teorie a ”micro-revoluțiilor”, consider că metodologia de demarcare a lui Popper, împreună cu dezvoltarea ulterioară propusă de acesta, inclusiv coroborarea și verosimilitudinea, deși imperfectă, nu numai că este valabilă și azi, dar este încă cea mai bună metodologie de demarcare. Pentru argumentare, m-am folosit de principalele lucrări ale lui Popper care tratează această problemă, și a principalilor săi critici și susținători. După o scurtă prezentare a lui Karl Popper, și o introducere în problema demarcației și metodologia falsificabilității, trec în revistă principalele critici aduse și argumentele susținătorilor săi, accentuând pe ideea că Popper nu a pus niciodată semnul egalității între falsificare și respingere. În final prezint propriile concluzii în această problemă. (shrink)

A scientific theory, according to Popper, can be legitimately saved from falsification by introducing an auxiliary hypothesis to generate new, falsifiable predictions. Also, if there are suspicions of bias or error, the researchers might introduce an auxiliary falsifiable hypothesis that would allow testing. But this technique can not solve the problem in general, because any auxiliary hypothesis can be challenged in the same way, ad infinitum. To solve this regression, Popper introduces the idea of ​​a basic statement, an empirical statement (...) that can be used both to determine whether a given theory is falsifiable and, if necessary, to corroborate falsification assumptions. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.22162.09923. (shrink)

There are (at least) three approaches to quantifying information. The first, algorithmic information or Kolmogorov complexity, takes events as strings and, given a universal Turing machine, quantifies the information content of a string as the length of the shortest program producing it [1]. The second, Shannon information, takes events as belonging to ensembles and quantifies the information resulting from observing the given event in terms of the number of alternate events that have been ruled out [2]. The third, statistical learning (...) theory, has introduced measures of capacity that control (in part) the expected risk of classifiers [3]. These capacities quantify the expectations regarding future data that learning algorithms embed into classifiers. Solomonoff and Hutter have applied algorithmic information to prove remarkable results on universal induction. Shannon information provides the mathematical foundation for communication and coding theory. However, both approaches have shortcomings. Algorithmic information is not computable, severely limiting its practical usefulness. Shannon information refers to ensembles rather than actual events: it makes no sense to compute the Shannon information of a single string – or rather, there are many answers to this question depending on how a related ensemble is constructed. Although there are asymptotic results linking algorithmic and Shannon information, it is unsatisfying that there is such a large gap – a difference in kind – between the two measures. This note describes a new method of quantifying information, effective information, that links algorithmic information to Shannon information, and also links both to capacities arising in statistical learning theory [4, 5]. After introducing the measure, we show that it provides a non-universal analog of Kolmogorov complexity. We then apply it to derive basic capacities in statistical learning theory: empirical VC-entropy and empirical Rademacher complexity. A nice byproduct of our approach is an interpretation of the explanatory power of a learning algorithm in terms of the number of hypotheses it falsifies [6], counted in two different ways for the two capacities. We also discuss how effective information relates to information gain, Shannon and mutual information. (shrink)

It is mostly agreed that Popper's criterion of falsifiability fails to provide a useful demarcation between science and pseudo-science, because ad-hoc assumptions are always able to save any theory that conflicts with the empirical data, and a characterization of ad-hoc assumptions is lacking. Moreover, adding some testable predictions is not very difficult. It should be emphasized that the Duhem-Quine argument does not simply make the demarcation approximate, but it makes it totally useless. Indeed, no philosophical criterion of demarcation is presently (...) able to rule out even some of the most blatant cases of pseudo-science, not even approximatively. This is in sharp contrast with our firm belief that some theories are clearly not scientific. Where does this belief come from? In this paper I argue that it is necessary and possible to recognize the notion of syntactic simplicity that is able to tell the difference between empirically equivalent scientific and non-scientific theories, with a precision that is adequate to many important practical purposes, and it fully agrees with the judgments generally held in the scientific community. (shrink)

What is science, and what is it not? Is falsifiability the key to drawing this line? How and why does science work? Should we worry whether science is talking about a "real" world? And should we stop thinking there is a single thing we can call "the scientific method"? With Deborah Mayo, Robert Rynasiewicz, and Drew Arrowood.

The predictive processing account of action, cognition, and perception is one of the most influential approaches to unifying research in cognitive science. However, its promises of grand unification will remain unfulfilled unless the account becomes theoretically robust. In this paper, we focus on empirical commitments of PP, since they are necessary both for its theoretical status to be established and for explanations of individual phenomena to be falsifiable. First, we argue that PP is a varied research tradition, which may employ (...) various kinds of scientific representations, differing in the scope of empirical commitments they entail. Two major perspectives on PP qua cognitive theory may then be distinguished: generalized vs. hierarchical. The first one fails to provide empirical detail, and the latter constrains possible physical implementations. However, we show that even hierarchical PP is insufficiently restrictive to disallow incorrect models and may be adjusted to explain any neurocognitive phenomenon–including non-existent or impossible ones–through flexible adjustments. This renders PP a universal modeling tool with an unrestricted number of degrees of freedom. Therefore, in contrast with declarations of its proponents, it should not be understood as a unifying theoretical perspective, but as a computational framework, possibly informing further theory development in cognitive science. (shrink)

In this paper I formalise the falsificationist proposal omitting Popper’s requirement of consistency. This omission results in (i) trivial theories being falsifiable in an inappropriate sense of the term, but also in (ii) some inconsistent non-trivial theories being so in an appropriate one. This justifies a slight alteration of the definition of falsifiability that excludes (i) but allows (ii). Instead of requiring that a falsifiable theory be consistent, my proposal only requires that the intersection of its classes of potential corroborators (...) and falsifiers be empty. (shrink)

Introduction: In the past, psychoanalysis was classified as a pseudoscience. Karl Popper was one of those who objected to the idea that psychoanalysis is a science, using falsifiability. However, falsifiability cannot be considered sufficient anymore, since it carries major weaknesses and better alternatives to address the issue are available. Objective: This article intends to evaluate the scientific status of psychoanalysis concerning the demarcation problem. Method: In order to do so, Sven Ove Hansson’s criteria were used. His proposal consists of a (...) set of sufficient and necessary conditions which is complemented by a multicriteria list that helps identifying pseudosciences. It was analyzed how much psychoanalysis fits each of Hansson's seven items, besides proposing the addition of an eighth. Results: The results showed that psychoanalysis was compatible with all eight demarcation of pseudoscience’s items. Conclusion: In the end, the conclusion was that even if falsifiability was to be dismissed, the evidence suggests that there are still enough reasons to affirm that psychoanalysis is a pseudoscience, since it significantly deviates from scientific quality standards. (shrink)

According to Karl Popper, science cannot verify its theories empirically, but it can falsify them, and that suffices to account for scientific progress. For Popper, a law or theory remains a pure conjecture, probability equal to zero, however massively corroborated empirically it may be. But it does just seem to be the case that science does verify empirically laws and theories. We trust our lives to such verifications when we fly in aeroplanes, cross bridges and take modern medicines. We can (...) do some justice to this apparent capacity of science to verify if we make a number of improvements to Popper’s philosophy of science. The key step is to recognize that physics, in accepting unified theories only, thereby makes a big metaphysical assumption about the nature of the universe. The outcome is a conception of scientific method which facilitates the criticism and improvement of metaphysical assumptions of physics. This view provides, not verification, but a perfect simulacrum of verification indistinguishable from the real thing. (shrink)

Bilim ve çarpık bilim arasına sınır çizebilmek için yapılan girişimler farklı teorilerin gelistirilmesini sağlamıştır. Henüz net bir sınır çizilememiştir ve tartışmalar devam etmektedir. İlk olarak doğrulama ve yanlışlama teorileri daha sonraları ise bilim çalışmalarını bir bütün olarak ele alan, araştırma programları olarak gören teoriler sunulmuştur. Bilimsel çalışmaların, yeni sorunlar üretmesi ve eleştirel bakış açısına sahip olması da bilim olanın sınırlarını çizebilmek için ölçütler arasında sayılmıştır. Bu çabalar ile bilim pratiklerinin irdelenmesi zamanla bilim insanına ve bilim kurumlarına yönelmiştir. Bu konunun önemli (...) bir sorunu bilim yolu ile ulaşabileceğimiz doğru bilginin ne olduğu ile neyin bilim olarak ele alınabileceğinin tek bir sorun gibi ele alınmasıdır. Bilimsel doğrunun ne olduğu ile bilimsel bilginin ne olduğu tartışması iç içe yürütülmektedir. Bir diğer sorun ise bilimin sınırlarını belirlerken bilim çalışmaları dışında etik ve sosyal ölçütler aranmasıdır. Bu yaklaşımlar konuyu çözümsüz bir noktaya götürmektedir. Diğer önemli nokta Astroloji örneğinin yanlış bilgilerle ele alınmasıdır. Bu çalışmada tartışmanın bilim pratiklerinde kalması gerektiği savunulmuştur. Çarpık bilimi ayırmak için sık kullanılan Astroloji örneği yeniden ele alınarak yanlış yargılara sebep olan bilgiler düzeltilmeye çalışılmıştır. Ayrıca önermelerin bilimsel doğruyu ayırma konusundaki önemi ve durumu tartışılmış böylece neyin bilim, neyin bilimsel doğru ve neyin bilim dışı olduğu netleştirilmeye çalışılmıştır. (shrink)

In this paper, we take a fresh look at three Popperian concepts: riskiness, falsifiability, and truthlikeness of scientific hypotheses or theories. First, we make explicit the dimensions that underlie the notion of riskiness. Secondly, we examine if and how degrees of falsifiability can be defined, and how they are related to various dimensions of the concept of riskiness as well as the experimental context. Thirdly, we consider the relation of riskiness to truthlikeness. Throughout, we pay special attention to probabilistic theories (...) and we offer a tentative, quantitative account of verisimilitude for probabilistic theories. (shrink)

Those who know the work of Karl Popper will have recognized in my title the transformation into interrogation of a formula repeated several times by this eminent philosopher of science, whom some consider as the greatest of the 20th century in his specific field - even if they do not share his theses. This Popperian formula, to which I wish to devote my analyzes here, has at least the merit of being clear and impactful. But as often, what is clear (...) and impactful can become too simple for what is to be thought, and perhaps even too simple to express faithfully the philosophy which one seeks to summarize there. Writing this, I am not claiming that Popper was not really a falsificationist. Far be it from me to dispute that the great thesis of his epistemology consists in making any scientific theory worthy of the name falsifiable or refutable. This is indisputable: for Popper, the dividing line between scientific theory and non-scientific theory lies precisely in this falsifiable character. (shrink)

This dissertation offers a proof of the logical possibility of testing empirical/factual theories that are inconsistent, but non-trivial. In particular, I discuss whether or not such theories can satisfy Popper's principle of falsifiablility. An inconsistent theory Ƭ closed under a classical consequence relation implies every statement of its language because in classical logic the inconsistency and triviality are coextensive. A theory Ƭ is consistent iff there is not a α such that Ƭ ⊢ α ∧ ¬α, otherwise it is inconsistent. (...) We say, instead, that Ƭ is non-trivial iff there is at least one α such that Ƭ ⊢ α, otherwise we say that it trivial. This happens because classical logic satisfies the principle of explosion, according ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet (from a contradiction anything follows). Under these conditions inconsistent classical theories would be compatible with any well-formed formula, which makes them useless for science. There are, however, so-called paraconsistent logics in which the principle of explosion does not generally hold and in which a theory can be (simply) inconsistent, but also absolutely consistent. It is in this logical framework that we can prove that some inconsistent theories can be falsifiable. (shrink)

Decision theorists have attempted to accommodate several violations of decision theory’s axiomatic requirements by modifying how agents’ choice options are individuated and formally represented. In recent years, prominent authors have worried that these modifications threaten to trivialize decision theory, make the theory unfalsifiable, impose overdemanding requirements on decision theorists, and hamper decision theory’s internal coherence. In this paper, I draw on leading descriptive and normative works in contemporary decision theory to address these prominent concerns. In doing so, I articulate and (...) assess several different criteria for individuating and formally representing agents’ choice options. (shrink)

Many researchers want to unify probability and logic by defining logical probability or probabilistic logic reasonably. This paper tries to unify statistics and logic so that we can use both statistical probability and logical probability at the same time. For this purpose, this paper proposes the P–T probability framework, which is assembled with Shannon’s statistical probability framework for communication, Kolmogorov’s probability axioms for logical probability, and Zadeh’s membership functions used as truth functions. Two kinds of probabilities are connected by an (...) extended Bayes’ theorem, with which we can convert a likelihood function and a truth function from one to another. Hence, we can train truth functions by sampling distributions. This probability framework was developed in the author’s long-term studies on semantic information, statistical learning, and color vision. This paper first proposes the P–T probability framework and explains different probabilities in it by its applications to semantic information theory. Then, this framework and the semantic information methods are applied to statistical learning, statistical mechanics, hypothesis evaluation, confirmation, and Bayesian reasoning. Theoretical applications illustrate the reasonability and practicability of this framework. This framework is helpful for interpretable AI. To interpret neural networks, we need further study. (shrink)

We live in an age alleged devoted to evidence-based medicine. Evidence-based medicine, however, depends on reliable data and if the data are largely, if not completely, manipulated by the manufacturer of pharmaceuticals, then the data are not reliable. Evidence-based medicine is an illusion. This book raises and attempts to answer the following questions: What are the ways in which the profit motive of industry undermines the integrity of science? How is science protected from corporate malfeasance in a capitalist economy? Our (...) particular focus is the relationship between the pharmaceutical industry and medicine. We argue that medicine desperately needs to re-evaluate its relationship with the pharmaceutical industry and re-affirm the ideal of evidence-based medicine. In our view, Karl Popper’s philosophy of science, Falsificationism and Critical Rationalism, provides a rigorous conception of science required to preserve the integrity of the scientific basis of medicine against the commercial influences. (shrink)

The multiple detections of gravitational waves by LIGO (the Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory), operated by Caltech and MIT, have been acclaimed as confirming Einstein's prediction, a century ago, that gravitational waves propagating as ripples in spacetime would be detected. Yunes and Pretorius (2009) investigate whether LIGO's template-based searches encode fundamental assumptions, especially the assumption that the background theory of general relativity is an accurate description of the phenomena detected in the search. They construct the parametrized post-Einsteinian (ppE) framework in response, (...) which broadens those assumptions and allows for wider testing under more flexible assumptions. Their methods are consistent with work on confirmation and testing found in Carnap (1936), Hempel (1969), and Stein (1992, 1994), with the following principles in common: that confirmation is distinct from testing, and that, counterintuitively, revising a theory's formal basis can make it more broadly empirically testable. These views encourage a method according to which theories can be made abstract, to define families of general structures for the purpose of testing. With the development of the ppE framework and related approaches, multi-messenger astronomy is a catalyst for deep reasoning about the limits and potential of the theoretical framework of general relativity. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The emerging consensus in the secondary literature on Duhem is that his notion of ‘good sense’ is a virtue of individual scientists that guides them choosie between empirically equal rival theories : 149–159; Ivanova 2010. “Pierre Duhem’s Good Sense as a Guide to Theory Choice.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 : 58–64; Fairweather 2011. “The Epistemic Value of Good Sense.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 : 139–146; Bhakthavatsalam. “Duhemian Good (...) Sense and Agent Reliabilism.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 64: 22–29). In this paper, I argue that good sense is irrelevant for theory choice within Duhem’s conception of scientific methodology. Theory choice, for Duhem, is either a pseudo-problem or addressed purely by empirical and formal desiderata depending on how it is understood. I go on to provide a positive interpretation of good sense as a feature of scientific communities that undergo particular forms of education that allow scientists to abandon theory pursuit. I conclude by suggesting that this interpretation entails that virtue epistemological readings of Duhem are insufficient for understanding good sense; we must employ a social epistemological perspective. (shrink)

Retractions play an important role in research communication by highlighting and explaining how research projects have failed and thereby preventing these mistakes from being repeated. However, the process of retraction and the data it produces is often sparse or incomplete. Drawing on evidence from 2046 retraction records, Quan-Hoang Vuong discusses the emerging trends this data highlights and argues for the need to enforce reporting standards for retractions, as a means of de-stigmatising retraction and rewarding practising integrity in the scholarly record.

Popper restricted his definition of falsifiability to consistent theories through what we may call his requirement of consistency. His main argument was that an inconsistent theory does not distinguish the sentences that corroborate it from those that contradict it, for all sentences follow from it. I propose to replace this requirement by the more basic requirement that the classes of potential corroborators and falsifiers of a theory do not overlap. This results not only in an unrestricted definition of falsifiability but (...) also in some inconsistent theories being falsifiable whenever that inconsistency is not located among its observational statements. Although this assumes a restriction of the principle of explosion or ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet (ECQ), it does not depend on any particular system or approach of paraconsistent logic. Finally, I propose to define the class of potential refuters of a theory, which is obtained by subtracting the class of potential corroborators from the class of potential falsifiers. Given that, by definition, the classes of potential refuters and corroborators of a theory do not overlap, it immediately follows that some observationally inconsistent theories are refutable in this sense. This establishes the bases for a new and more general formal theory of falsifiability of scientific factual/empirical theories. (shrink)

Since Popper and Lakatos, the demarcation line between science and non-science has been considered one of the fundamental issues of the philosophy of science. According to Lakatos, pseudoscience is a non-science, which appears as science, using science's public authority. Since then, mountains of texts have been published on how non-sciences, such as astrology, are not sciences. -/- But the enemy is not on the other side of the border. The enemy is in our midst. Science has been institutionalized. The best (...) way to do the pseudoscience is to fuss inside the big enterprise recognized as a science. (shrink)

In this article, I seek to improve upon a definition of pseudoscience put forward by Sven Ove Hansson. I argue that not only does its use of ‘pseudoscientific statement’ as definiendum inadequately address the theoretical issue of demarcation, it also makes the definition inapt for practical demarcation. Moreover, I argue that Hanson’s definition subsumes statements and associated practices that are forms of bad science, resulting in an unfavourably wide concept. I try to save the definition from the brunt of this (...) critique by arguing that some pseudoscientific statements are particularly significant when demarcating a discipline as a pseudoscience. (shrink)

Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) promises a relatively objective and tractable methodology for ranking the plausibility of competing hypotheses. Unlike Bayesianism, it is computationally modest. Unlike explanationism, it appeals to minimally subjective judgments about relations between hypotheses and evidence. Yet the canonical procedures for ACH allow a certain kind of instability in applications of the methodology, by virtue of supporting competing rankings despite common evidential bases and diagnosticity assessments. This instability should motivate advocates of ACH to focus their efforts toward (...) creating structured methods for individuating items of evidence. (shrink)

Philosophical treatments of scientific controversies usually focus on theory, excluding important practice related aspects. However, scientists in conflict often appeal to extra-theoretical and extra-empirical elements. To understand better the role that non-empirical elements play in scientific controversies, we introduce the notion of borrowed epistemic credibility, illustrating our proposal with a recent controversy in a field of evolutionary biology known as phylogeography. Our analysis shows how scientific controversies that spring from disagreements about methodological issues potentially involve deeper debates regarding what constitutes (...) good science, prompting the re-examination of more general issues, such as the nature of inference, rationality, and objectivity. (shrink)

Carnap’s search for a criterion of empirical significance is usually considered a failure. I argue that the results from two out of his three different approaches are at the very least problematic, but that one approach led to success. Carnap’s criterion of translatability into logical syntax is too vague to allow for definite results. His criteria for terms—introducibility by chains of reduction sentences and his criterion from “The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts”—are almost trivial and have no clear relation to (...) the empirical significance of sentences. However, his criteria for sentences—translatability, verifiability, falsifiability, confirmability—are usable, and under the assumptions needed for the Carnap sentence approach, verifiability, falsifiability, and translatability become equivalent. As a result of the Carnap sentence approach, metaphysics is rendered analytic. (shrink)

Chapter 3 surveys objectivity in the natural sciences. Thomas Kuhn problematized the logicist understanding of the objectivity or rationality of scientific change, providing a very different picture than that of the cumulative or step-wise progress of theoretical science. Theories often compete, and when consensus builds around one competitor it may be for a variety of reasons other than just the direct logical implications of experimental successes and failures. Kuhn pitted the study of the actual history of science against what Hans (...) Reichenbach referred to as the “logical substitutes” logicists used to reconstruct the rationality of theory change. Such substitutes were promoted to show that theory confirmation is a purely epistemic affair, where purely epistemic implies purely inferential. But where the positivists saw logical compulsion as the reason for theory change, Kuhn saw psychology in values as relevant to how theories are actually confirmed or accepted by the scientific community. (shrink)

In their critique of Klein (2014a), Trafimow and Earp present two theses. First, they argue that, contra Klein, a well-specified theory is not a necessary condition for successful replication. Second, they contend that even when there is a well-specified theory, replication depends more on auxiliary assumptions than on theory proper. I take issue with both claims, arguing that (a) their first thesis confuses a material conditional (what I said) with a modal claim (T&E’s misreading of what I said), and (b) (...) their second thesis has the unfortunate consequence of refuting their first thesis. (shrink)

Hempel, Popper, and Kuhn argue that to be scientific is to be testable, to be falsifiable, and most nearly to do normal science, respectively. I argue that to be scientific is largely to be interactive, offering some examples from science to show that the ideas from different fields of science interact with one another. The results of the interactions are that hypotheses become more plausible, new phenomena are explained and predicted, we understand phenomena from a new perspective, and our worldview (...) becomes simpler. I also argue that given that the interactions are impressive features of science, astrology and religion would be regarded as science, provided that there are similar interactions in those enterprises. (shrink)

This is a response to a claim by Sven Ove Hansson to the effect that Poppers dictum that falsification lies at the heart of all pursuit of science has once and for all been falsified by his study of articles published in Nature during the year 2000. We claim that this is based on a misunderstanding of Poppers philosophy of science interpreting it too literally, and that alternative readings of those papers are fully compliant with falsification. We scrutinize Hansson’s arguments (...) as well as giving an overview of Poppers falsification theory. (shrink)

Peer review is an opportunity to perform an unlawful censorship which ensures that no apostate notion ever get published in mainstream journals. Or such peer review censorship is an opportunity to steal any content and to claim afterward the priority of first publication. And last but not least, the peer review is an academic tool to promote the mainstream pseudoscience.

En el presente trabajo expongo la propuesta falsacionista de Karl Popper como resultado de su solución al problema de la inducción. En este sentido, la analizo bajo sus dos aspectos, el lógico y el metodológico. La idea detrás de ello es mostrar, en primer lugar, que su solución lógica al problema de la inducción es totalmente independiente de los criterios metodológicos que propone para la elección entre teorías rivales, y en segundo lugar, que estos últimos constituyen una transgresión a su (...) pretendida exclusión de la inducción en la práctica científica. (shrink)

From the early-1950s on, F.A. Hayek was concerned with the development of a methodology of sciences that study systems of complex phenomena. Hayek argued that the knowledge that can be acquired about such systems is, in virtue of their complexity (and the comparatively narrow boundaries of human cognitive faculties), relatively limited. The paper aims to elucidate the implications of Hayek’s methodology with respect to the specific dimensions along which the scientist’s knowledge of some complex phenomena may be limited. Hayek’s fallibilism (...) was an essential (if not always explicit) aspect of his arguments against the defenders of both socialism ([1935] 1948, [1940] 1948) and countercyclical monetary policy ([1975] 1978); yet, despite the fact that his conceptions of both complex phenomena and the methodology appropriate to their investigation imply that ignorance might beset the scientist in multiple respects, he never explicated all of these consequences. The specificity of a scientific prediction depends on the extent of the scientist’s knowledge concerning the phenomena under investigation. The paper offers an account of the considerations that determine the extent to which a theory’s implications prohibit the occurrence of particular events in the relevant domain. This theory of “predictive degree” both expresses and – as the phenomena of scientific prediction are themselves complex in Hayek’s sense – exemplifies the intuition that the specificity of a scientific prediction depends on the relevant knowledge available. (shrink)

Imre Lakatos' views on the philosophy of mathematics are important and they have often been underappreciated. The most obvious lacuna in this respect is the lack of detailed discussion and analysis of his 1976a paper and its implications for the methodology of mathematics, particularly its implications with respect to argumentation and the matter of how truths are established in mathematics. The most important themes that run through his work on the philosophy of mathematics and which culminate in the 1976a paper (...) are (1) the (quasi-)empirical character of mathematics and (2) the rejection of axiomatic deductivism as the basis of mathematical knowledge. In this paper Lakatos' later views on the quasi-empirical nature of mathematical theories and methodology are examined and specific attention is paid to what this view implies about the nature of mathematical argumentation and its relation to the empirical sciences. (shrink)

The principle of economy favours the theory which gives the most accurate predictions; of two equally accurate theories, economy favours the one which incorporates least metaphysics. The intention is to show that were metaphysical commitments of theories openly acknowledged and simplicity and other virtues generally accepted as judges in theory choice, the progress rate of science would likely become more optimal.

State of the art paper on the problem of induction: how to justify the conclusion that ‘all Fs are Gs’ from the premise that ‘all observed Fs are Gs’. The most prominent theories of contemporary philosophical literature are discussed and analysed, such as: inductivism, reliabilism, perspective of laws of nature, rationalism, falsificationism, the material theory of induction and probabilistic approaches, according to Carnap, Reichenbach and Bayesianism. In the end, we discuss the new problem of induction of Goodman, raised by the (...) grue predicate. (shrink)

Social science employs teleological explanations which depend upon the rationality principle, according to which people exhibit instrumental rationality. Popper points out that people also exhibit critical rationality, the tendency to stand back from, and to question or criticise, their views. I explain how our critical rationality impugns the explanatory value of the rationality principle and thereby threatens the very possibility of social science. I discuss the relationship between instrumental and critical rationality and show how we can reconcile our critical rationality (...) with the possibility of social science if we invoke Popper’s conception of limited rationality and his indeterminism. (shrink)