American Pragmatism

Perplexity is an epistemic emotion with deep philosophical significance. In ancient Greek philosophy, it is identified as a catalyst for philosophical progress and personal philosophical transformation. In psychological terms, perplexity is the phenomenological sense of lacking immersion in the world, a state of puzzlement and alienation from one’s everyday surroundings. What could make such an emotion philosophically useful? To answer this question, I examine the role of perplexity in Jane Addams’s political theory and ethics. Addams, a social reformer and American (...) pragmatist philosopher, regarded perplexity as an emotion that arises out of specific situations, such as being part of a social settlement, union actions, or trying to surmount gender expectations. Perplexity allows us cognitive distance from our everyday customary morality and ordinary habits of thinking, and this pushes us to become creative in our philosophical reflection. I contextualize perplexity in Jane Addams’s social reforms, and examine the relevance of her ideas today. (shrink)

This paper aims to challenge the idea claimed by Putnam in his Dewey Lectures that internal realism presupposed sense data theory so that it would have been unable to account for the fundamental intuition of common sense realism that perception gives us cognitive access to reality. Rather, I argue that Putnam’s writings from the period of internal realism indicate that it (internal realism) already presupposed a form of direct realism of the kind he puts forth in the Dewey lectures. I (...) support my thesis with a demonstration of the implication of direct realism in the refutation of the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis that occurs in the first chapter of Reason, Truth and History, as well as with various passages from the philosopher’s writings of the time when he defended internal realism. I also argue, contrary to what the philosopher seems to assert in his Dewey Lectures, that his model-theoretic argument against metaphysical realism does not involve sense data theory. After noting the very strong resemblance between the theses of his common sense realism of the 1990s and those of his internal realism of the 1980s, I hypothesize that Putnam pretended to renounce internal realism in order to allow himself to rephrase his original position so as to avoid being misinterpreted as a form of idealism or fact constructivism, as was the case with his initial statement. (shrink)

While historians of pragmatism often present William James as the founder of the “subjectivist” wing of pragmatism that came back into prominence with the writings of Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam has argued that James’s views are actually much closer to Peirce’s (and Putnam’s own). Putnam does so by noting that James distinguishes two sorts of truth: “temporary truth,” which is closer to a subjective notion of warranted assertibility, and “absolute truth,” which is closer to Peirce’s own comparatively objective notion of (...) truth as what would be believed at some idealized end of inquiry. Putnam then argues that the temptation to read James as a precursor to Rorty requires privileging his talk of temporary truth, when, in fact, it was always absolute truth that was the primary sense of the term for James. This paper will argue that James’s views on truth are, in fact, much less tied to the absolute notion than Putnam suggests, and, indeed, that James’s account of the relations between our concepts and reality leave open the possibility that no claim of ours could ever be “absolutely” true, and thus that “temporary” truth would be all we could ever expect to have. (shrink)

While classical pragmatism quickly became identified with the theory of truth that dominated critical discussions of it, both of its founders, Charles Sanders Peirce and William James, understood pragmatism essentially as a method. The article compares Peirce’s conceptions of pragmatism with James’s view that the pragmatic method would allow us to resolve many disputes in philosophy, and argues that their differences undermine any purely ‘Peircian’ reading of James’s Pragmatic Maxim. It then examines the advantages and drawbacks of three other readings (...) of James’s maxim: the “activist” reading, the “subjectivist” reading, and the “practical” reading. (shrink)

Hilary Putnam spent much of his career criticizing the fact/value dichotomy, and this became apparent already during the phase when he defended internal realism. He later changed his epistemological and metaphysical view by endorsing natural realism, with the consequence of embracing alethic pluralism, the idea that truth works differently in various discourse domains. Despite these changes of mind in epistemology and in theory of truth, Putnam went on criticizing the fact/value dichotomy. However, alethic pluralism entails drawing distinctions among discourse domains, (...) especially between factual and nonfactual domains, and these distinctions are in tension with the rejection of the fact/value dichotomy, as this would in principle hinder factual domains as genuine. This issue raises, prima facie, some doubts about the effective compatibility of these views. (shrink)

This poised and articulate volume addresses an area of pragmatist philosophy as yet relatively unexplored in pragmatism's welcome revival. Neopragmatism's preoccupation with changing philosophers' view of the relation between language (or as Rorty puts it: "vocabularies") and reality, has largely focussed their discussions on the 'metaphysics & epistemology', rather than the 'value' side of philosophy, apart from Rorty's brief flirtations with edifying Western political discourse. Yet the nature of truth in ethics has been a topic of keen discussion in recent (...) mainstream philosophy, and it's widely acknowledged that pragmatism has original and interesting things to say about truth. This book seeks to contribute in particular to discussions of objectivity in ethics which are arguably somewhat bogged down in a wealth of finely divergent terminologies and positions: prescriptivism, fictionalism, intuitionism, quasi-realism and expressivism, to name just a few. Heney organises her own discussion around a distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism about moral claims. (shrink)

It is a philosophical adventure for me to write a paper on such a difficult topic. Part of the adventure lies in the fact that the problem of the Other1 is difficult in itself. It is even difficult to be brought up in a philosophically forceful way. This can explain the fact that the problem of the Other is still hardly a philosophical issue in the Anglo-Saxon tradition. In the continental tradition, the most prominent philosophers who have tackled this problem (...) are postmodernists. They are against traditional Western philosophy because they believe it regards the West, and Reason, Men, Mind, and so on, as the centers of philosophy, while marginalizing or even excluding non-Western, unreason, irrationality, madness... (shrink)

While both Isaiah Berlin and William James are widely seen as pluralists, this paper contends that neither is a pluralist tout court. Berlin certainly is a pluralist when it comes to morality and politics, but he is a monist when it comes to nature. And James is, paradoxically, both a pluralist and a monist as regards all of reality. These claims are advanced by showing how both thinkers’ approaches contrast with those of monists, not least Plato, Hegel, and Nietzsche. They (...) are also shown to be associated with different narrative genres: tragedy in Berlin’s case, and tragicomedy in James’. The paper then concludes with a brief discussion of an alternative approach, one that treads a path in between monism and pluralism and, because of this, favours a particular form of comedy. (shrink)

While Maurice Merleau-Ponty thought that the natural sciences could offer partial explanations of the world, he maintained that they were incomplete and further understanding required an existential analysis or a study of the pre-theoretical and pre-reflective structures that are the conditions of the possibility of experience. He offered a series of arguments against both the possibility of the sciences explaining the world in general and their ability to explain the phenomenon of perception in particular.In his paper, "Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenological Critique of (...) Natural Science," Thomas Baldwin pushes back on both of these positions, arguing that Merleau-Ponty offered insufficient proof of his... (shrink)

The noblest man living in a desert absorbs something of its harshness and sterility, while the nostalgia of the mountain-bred man when cut off from his surroundings is proof how deeply environment has become part of his being. Neither the savage nor the civilized man is what he is by native constitution but by the culture in which he participates.People wish to be settled; only as far as they are unsettled is there any hope for them.A prominent undercurrent in the (...) tradition of American philosophy concerns the endeavor to recover hope through a return to the ordinary and everyday. Ralph Waldo Emerson envisions and inaugurates such a path for the American scholar: I read with joy some of the auspicious signs of the... (shrink)

The gods were bored; therefore, they created human beings. Adam was bored because he was alone; therefore, Eve was created. Since that moment, boredom entered the world and grew in quantity in exact proportion to the growth of population. Adam was bored alone; then Adam and Eve were bored together; then Adam and Eve and Cain and Abel were bored en famille. After that, the population of the world increased and the nations were bored en masse.We hate boredom. We create; (...) we play in order to postpone boredom. We search for any possible capacity to play. We created language first and went further then, for literature, metaphor, symbol, and other possibilities in language to defer boredom. Interpretability of language... (shrink)

Rosa M. Calcaterra's new book is a critical interpretation of Richard Rorty's intellectual path as structured around the problem of normativity. How can we justify our normative claims in epistemology, morality, and politics, without lapsing into either ahistorical foundationalism or some form of skepticism? Calcaterra discusses the Rortyan answers to this question with a critical but sympathetic eye. In doing so, she stresses Rorty's relation to the broader pragmatist family even more than Rorty himself would have been willing to do. (...) Overall, three major strategies to bridge contingency and normativity emerge from the book. The first centers on meliorism as a powerful instrument to make sense of the idea of... (shrink)

Building upon her work in Livestock, Erin McKenna's Living with Animals delivers eight chapters about animals with which human beings share their lives: chimpanzees and other primates, horses and cattle, pigs and poultry, whales and fishes, pests, and cats and canines. This new work is carefully and beautifully constructed, consistent with her long effort of developing pragmatic ecofeminism. McKenna raises our attention to the use of pragmatism to name and address compelling problems of community—which, from this perspective, is construed in (...) its broadest sense to include non-human animals. The focus in this text is on animals with which humans have evolved and upon whose welfare we continue to depend for our... (shrink)

The texts gathered here were written to serve as an introduction to hermeneutical studies for a wide audience. The guiding idea was to present the concepts and theories that structure the paradigm of hermeneutic thinking from everyday and common experiences. Embedded in this strategy is the thesis that theoretical terms are abstractions from concrete practices and experiences of individuals and communities. In the case of basic hermeneutical terms such as "sense", "expression", "meaning", "interpretation" and "understanding" this is both evident and (...) problematic, as it is difficult to grasp the theoretical concepts that these words designate in each theory hermeneutics without confusing them with the non-theoretical notions associated with them in their daily and living use of language. In the following texts, I have attempted to clarify its use in hermeneutic theories, but always with the aim of presenting basic concepts on which the different hermeneutic theories will build their theses and intelligibility schemes. The strategy for this was to refer its use to practical contexts and basic actions, as this is where sense and meaning take place and acquire consistency. (shrink)

Gregory Pappas has observed that pragmatism did not “grow up” in the United States. As a coherent philosophy it originated there, and it is now growing up through critical and mutually transformative intra-cultural dialogue. As pragmatism continues growing up, we can bear Thoreau’s words in mind: “I know of few radicals as yet who are radical enough.” He was implying, in an implicit jab at Emerson, that the radicals of his day did not dig deep enough, down to the level (...) of their conceptual roots, to inspect them in order to transform their own lives (qtd Walls 168-169). Thoreau expressed this radicalism through “an iconic work of performance art” (Walls 194) in 1845-47, living on the shore of Walden Pond. Like Thoreau, in American Philosophy in Translation Naoko Saito digs deep, exposing the originating roots of pragmatism to criticism “with the result that its identity is translated” to meet contemporary conditions (Saito 72). (shrink)

Drawing on a rich pragmatist tradition, this book offers an account of the different kinds of ‘oughts’, or varieties of normativity, that we are subject to contends that there is no conflict between normativity and the world as science describes it. The authors argue that normative claims aim to evaluate, to urge us to do or not do something, and to tell us how a state of affairs ought to be. These claims articulate forms of action-guidance that are different in (...) kind from descriptive claims, with a wholly distinct practical and expressive character. This account suggests that there are no normative facts, and so nothing that needs any troublesome shoehorning into a scientific account of the world. This work explains that nevertheless, normative claims are constrained by the world, and answerable to reason and argumentation, in a way that makes them truth-apt and objective. (shrink)

This chapter examines and assesses the purported “neo-Hegelianism” of a version of pragmatism that developed within analytic philosophy, a context otherwise generally antipathetic to the philosophy of Hegel. In particular, it looks to the work of Robert Brandom and John McDowell who were influenced by the Pittsburgh philosopher Wilfrid Sellars and it examines the mediating role played by Richard Rorty in the development of this “Pittsburgh” neo-Hegelianism. In particular, Rorty believed that Sellars’s approach had to be freed from the scientific-realist (...) assumptions common to analytic philosophy that had limited the pragmatist and Hegelian dimensions of his work. (shrink)

This chapter highlights the need to respond to human limits of attention and perspective with sympathetic apprehension of the other points of view—especially those who are rendered opaque. McBride outlines a way that Seigfried’s notions of radical empiricism, experimental logic, and cooperative intelligence can hang together, suggesting that pragmatist feminism comes with an imperative to weave and reweave our social fabric, to broaden the range of our experiences, to incorporate the perspectives left unpictured. To this end, select insights drawn from (...) black feminist visionary pragmatism are expounded with the hopes of broadening and complicating the social fabric across lines of difference. (shrink)

A contemporary appraisal of the breadth, significance, and legacy of the work of Charlene Haddock Seigfried, this book brings together writings focused on pragmatist feminism/feminist pragmatism, contemporary pragmatism, William James and the reconstruction of philosophy, education and American philosophy in the 21st century. -/- Charlene Haddock Seigfried is a looming figure in American thought and feminist theory who coined the phrase 'pragmatist feminist' which has become an increasingly important concept in contemporary philosophy. Haddock Siegfried argues that pragmatism and its rich (...) history is a natural ally for feminism and that the creative combination of these two traditions can pave the way of a genuinely emancipatory feminist practice. Pragmatist Feminism and the Work of Charlene Haddock Seigfried explores and pushes this theory and brings it into conversation with some of the most vibrant strands of current philosophy. (shrink)

in peirce and religion: Knowledge, Transformation, and the Reality of God, Roger Ward argues that the founder of American pragmatism was a rather traditional Trinitarian Christian throughout his entire life. Such an argument is notable because scholarship on Peirce often underplays the philosopher’s comments about religion while emphasizing his work on logic, mathematics, and other non-religious philosophical topics. Those who take his views on religion seriously tend to interpret Peirce more radically than Ward, placing Peirce’s philosophy of religion and personal (...) theological beliefs in line with modern trends that are critical of traditional forms of Christianity. The argument in Ward’s book stands out against... (shrink)

i am deeply grateful to aaron and the three scholars who have taken upon themselves the task of reading and responding to my book Peirce and Religion. Their assessments, in a general way, are a variety of the same criticism concerning my argument about Peirce’s Christianity. My intention here is to address this general point, consider some particular comments from each of the respondents, and offer a re-direction at the end.I take it as success to have evoked the response from (...) each of these scholars. Tunstall brings forward the question of whether I have left philosophy altogether when presenting an apology of sorts for Trinitarian Christianity in the guise of assessing Peirce’s religion. The worry is that an... (shrink)

Over the last decade, my interest in Josiah Royce has been motivated by a question: What is the relationship between historical and verifiable facts and philosophical interpretation or theory? This question is of tremendous consequence in philosophy since the discipline requires no empirical or archival evidence to substantiate the arguments that are made for or against a “specific philosopher” or thinker beyond the impression the philosopher and other philosophers have made about the “specific philosopher under scrutiny.” When it comes to (...) the study of Black historical figures and the study of American racism, this question that motivated my interest in Josiah Royce and American Philosophy more generally became a... (shrink)

Although in recent years Christine Ladd-Franklin has received recognition for her contributions to logic and psychology, her role in late 19th and early 20th century philosophy, as well as her relationship with American pragmatism, has yet to be fully appreciated. My goal here is to attempt to better understand Ladd-Franklin’s place in the pragmatist tradition by drawing attention to her work on the nature and unity of the proposition. The question concerning the unity of the proposition – namely, the problem (...) of how to determine what differentiates a mere collection of terms from a unified and meaningful proposition – received substantial attention in Ladd-Franklin’s time, and would continue to interest analytic philosophers well into the 20th century. I argue that Ladd-Franklin had a distinct theory of the proposition and solution to the problem of the unity of the proposition that she developed over the course of her writings on logic and philosophy. In spelling out her views I will also show how her work interacted with that of the pragmatist who was her greatest influence, C.S. Peirce. (shrink)

This work argues that an opportunity is being missed by the philosophical tradition, especially within philosophy of culture: an opportunity not just to philosophize “about” culture, but to embody culture and put it into practice. It argues that philosophy itself is a powerful form of culture – one that needs to be better understood and more explicitly practiced. To highlight this blind spot, the work introduces a distinction between “philosophy of culture,” and “cultural philosophy.” Cultural philosophy should be better explored (...) by the discipline for two reasons: a clearer understanding of cultural philosophy would benefit all practitioners of philosophy; also, a philosopher of culture who engages cultural philosophy will be a more effective philosopher of culture. The goal of the project is to highlight the possibility of (and value in) a “cultural philosophy,” and to serve as something of a prolegomenon toward further work in that area. (shrink)

In this article, I critique two conceptions from the history of academic philosophy regarding academic philosophers as shamans, deriving more community-responsible criteria for any future versions. The first conception, drawing on Mircea Eliade’s Shamanism (1951), is a transcultural figure abstracted from concrete Siberian practitioners. The second, drawing on Chicana theorist Gloria Anzaldúa’s Borderlands/La Frontera (1987), balances Eliade’s excessive abstraction with Indigenous American philosophy’s emphasis on embodied materiality, but also overemphasizes genetic inheritance to the detriment of environmental embeddedness. I therefore conclude (...) that any aspiring philosophical shaman must ground their bodily-material transformative linguistic practices in the practices and environments of their own concrete communities, including the nonverbal languages of bodily comportment, fashion, and dance, in pursuit of social justice for all, including sovereignty, ecological justice, and well-being for Indigenous peoples worldwide. (shrink)

Willard V. Quine’s 1951 article, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (Two Dogmas) was taken to be revolutionary because it rejects the analytic-synthetic distinction and the thesis that empirical statements are confirmed individually rather than holistically. The present chapter, however, argues that the overcoming of modern philosophy already included the overcoming of these theses by Hegelians, pragmatists and two critics of Hegelianism and pragmatism, Grace and Theodore de Laguna. From this perspective, Two Dogmas offers a Hegelian epistemology that was already superseded in (...) 1910. The perspective is largely based on the de Lagunas’ 1910 book Dogmatism and Evolution: Studies in Modern Philosophy. The de Lagunas’ book also helps to make clear that the real revolution Two Dogmas participated in was the marginalisation of their work and that of other speculative philosophers. Grace de Laguna surely recognised much of this when she stood opposite Quine as he first presented Two Dogmas. (shrink)

This issue of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy's 2020 Proceedings includes papers given at the annual meeting in 2020 at the Hacienda Santa Clara in San Miguel de Allende, Guanajuato, Mexico. This was the first time that SAAP had ever held its annual meeting in Mexico, and it represents an important milestone for the Society. As immediate past president Gregory Pappas explains in his Address, "thanks to the efforts of many scholars and presidents, SAAP has come to (...) recognize the important philosophical contributions of female, African American, Indigenous, and Latinx philosophers … [and, also] a certain way of doing inter-American philosophy … contrapunteo." This contrapunteo... (shrink)

The book makes a new contribution to the contemporary debates on nihilism and the sacred. Drawing on an original interpretation of Richard Rorty’s writings, it challenges the orthodox treatment of nihilism as a malaise that human beings must overcome. Instead, nihilism should be framed as a problem for human culture to outgrow through pragmatism.

aída hernández castillo has given US a profound meditation on feminist dialogical activist inquiry as a pathway to knowledge. What strikes me most powerfully is Hernández Castillo's voice. The path she describes is one on which the methodological, the moral, and the existential merge into spiritual transformation.In this response, I will point out three characteristics of Hernández Castillo's path that leapt out at me: The experiences lead, the self is wrenched, and the self is quieted. Now, this is an odd (...) list. Pragmatists speak of experience as doing and undergoing, and these are all characteristics of undergoing. Scholars think of knowledge as the result of doing, of something constructed. Descartes... (shrink)