BackgroundClinical ethical practice (CEP) is required for healthcare workers (HCWs) to improve health-care delivery. However, there are gaps between accepted ethical standards and CEP in Ethiopia. There have been limited studies conducted on CEP in the country. Therefore, this study aimed to determine the magnitude and associated factors of CEP among healthcare workers in healthcare facilities in Ethiopia.MethodFrom February to April 2021, a mixed-method study was conducted in 24 health facilities, combining quantitative and qualitative methods. Quantitative (survey questionnaire) and qualitative (...) (semi-structured interviews) data were collected. For quantitative and qualitative data analysis, Stata version 14 and Atlas.ti version 7 were utilized. Multiple logistic regression and thematic analysis for quantative and qualitative respectively used.ResultsFrom a total of 432 study participants, 407 HCWs were involved in the quantitative analysis, 36 participants were involved in five focus group discussions (FGDs), and eleven key informant interviews (KIIs) were involved in the qualitative analysis. The score of good CEP was 32.68%. Similarly, the scores of good knowledge and attitude were 33.50% and 25.31%, respectively. In the multiple logistic regression models, satisfaction with the current profession, availability of functional CECs, compassionate leaders, previously thought clinical ethics in pre-service education and good attitude were significant factors associated with CEP. Among these significant factors, knowledge, compassionate leaders, poor infrastructure, a conducive environment and positive attitudes were also determinants of CEP according to qualitative findings.ConclusionsThe CEP in health care services in Ethiopia is low. Satisfaction with the current profession, functional CECs, positive attitude, compassionate leaders and previously thought clinical ethics were significant factors associated with CEP. The Ministry of Health (MoH) should integrate interventions by considering CECs, compassionate leadership, and positive attitudes and enhance the knowledge of health professionals. Additionally, digitalization, intersectoral collaboration and institutionalization are important for promoting CEP. (shrink)

In this article we examine four objections to the genetic modification of human beings: the freedom argument, the giftedness argument, the authenticity argument, and the uniqueness argument. We then demonstrate that each of these arguments against genetic modification assumes a strong version of genetic determinism. Since these strong deterministic assumptions are false, the arguments against genetic modification, which assume and depend upon these assumptions, are therefore unsound. Serious discussion of the morality of genetic modification, (...) and the development of sound science policy, should be driven by arguments that address the actual consequences of genetic modification for individuals and society, not by ones propped up by false or misleading biological assumptions. (shrink)

In the immediate future we are likely to witness significant developments in human genetic science. It is therefore of critical importance that Christian ethics engages with the genetics debate, since it affects not just the way we perceive ourselves and the natural world, but also has wider implications for our society. This book considers ethical issues arising out of specific practices in human genetics, including genetic screening, gene patenting, gene therapy, genetic counselling as well as feminist concerns. (...) Genetics and Christian Ethics argues for a particular theo-ethical approach that derives from a modified version of virtue ethics, drawing particularly on a Thomistic understanding of the virtues, especially prudence or practical wisdom and justice. The book demonstrates that a theological voice is highly relevant to contested ethical debates about genetics. (shrink)

-/- Policy regulations of ethically controversial genetic technologies should, on the one hand, be based on ethical principles. On the other hand, they should be socially acceptable to ensure implementation. In addition, they should align with ethical theory. Yet to date we lack a reliable and valid scale to measure the relevant ethical judgements in laypeople. We target this lacuna. -/- We developed a scale based on ethical principles to elicit lay judgments: the Genetic Technologies Questionnaire (GTQ). In (...) two pilot studies and a pre-registered main study, we validated the scale in a representative sample of the US population. -/- The final version of the scale contains 20 items but remains highly reliable even when reduced to five. It also predicts behaviour; for example, ethical judgments as measured by the GTQ predicted hypothetical donations and grocery shopping. In addition, the GTQ may be of interest to policymakers and ethicists because it reveals coherent and ethically justified judgments in laypeople. For instance, the GTQ indicates that ethical judgments are sensitive to possible benefits and harms (in line with utilitarian ethics), but also to ethical principles such as the value of consent-autonomy. -/- In conclusion, the GTQ can be recommended for research in both experimental psychology and applied ethics, as well as a tool for ethically and empirically informed policymaking. (shrink)

Feferman argues that category theory cannot stand on its own as a structuralist foundation for mathematics: he claims that, because the notions of operation and collection are both epistemically and logically prior, we require a background theory of operations and collections. Recently [2011], I have argued that in rationally reconstructing Hilbert’s organizational use of the axiomatic method, we can construct an algebraic version of category-theoretic structuralism. That is, in reply to Shapiro, we can be structuralists all the way down (...) ; we do not have to appeal to some background theory to guarantee the truth of our axioms. In this paper, I again turn to Hilbert; I borrow his distinction between the genetic method and the axiomatic method to argue that even if the genetic method requires the notions of operation and collection, the axiomatic method does not. Even if the genetic method is in some sense epistemically or logically prior, the axiomatic method stands alone. Thus, if the claim that category theory can act as a structuralist foundation for mathematics arises from the organizational use of the axiomatic method, then it does not depend on the prior notions of operation or collection, and so we can be structuralists all the way up. (shrink)

Ideas about heredity and evolution are undergoing a revolutionary change. New findings in molecular biology challenge the gene-centered version of Darwinian theory according to which adaptation occurs only through natural selection of chance DNA variations. In Evolution in Four Dimensions, Eva Jablonka and Marion Lamb argue that there is more to heredity than genes. They trace four "dimensions" in evolution -- four inheritance systems that play a role in evolution: genetic, epigenetic, behavioral, and symbolic. These systems, they argue, (...) can all provide variations on which natural selection can act. Evolution in Four Dimensions offers a richer, more complex view of evolution than the gene-based, one-dimensional view held by many today. The new synthesis advanced by Jablonka and Lamb makes clear that induced and acquired changes also play a role in evolution.After discussing each of the four inheritance systems in detail, Jablonka and Lamb "put Humpty Dumpty together again" by showing how all of these systems interact. They consider how each may have originated and guided evolutionary history and they discuss the social and philosophical implications of the four-dimensional view of evolution. Each chapter ends with a dialogue in which the authors engage the contrarieties of the fictional "I.M.," or Ifcha Mistabra -- Aramaic for "the opposite conjecture" -- refining their arguments against I.M.'s vigorous counterarguments. The lucid and accessible text is accompanied by artist-physician Anna Zeligowski's lively drawings, which humorously and effectively illustrate the authors' points. (shrink)

One of the most difficult issues to sort out morally is our obligation to future generations. Most individuals feel that they do indeed have some kind of obligation, but face difficulty in explaining the exact nature of the obligation. For one, it seems impossible to know the wants and desires of future generations, and furthermore the existence of the persons we are obligated to is entirely dependent upon the choices that we in fact make. In essence, we could shape future (...) generations so that they desire exactly what we provide for them. It seems that no matter what principle we adopt that is based upon these potential individuals we are led to absurd conclusions. Gregory Kavka calls this moral grappling the Paradox of Future Individuals. I believe that the ethical concerns surrounding genetic engineering should be seen as a specific instantiation of this Paradox and that by examining both we may be able to come up with some sort of working solution. Derek Parfit pleads ignorance as to a solution to this Paradox after an extensive exegesis on the issue, but as we may not be that far from shopping a genetic supermarket to determine the characteristics of our children I don’t believe we can settle for that conclusion. We will begin by examining the Paradox and suggested solutions to the Paradox. Next I will address how the Paradox relates directly to genetic engineering and discuss how rights-based arguments aimed against genetic engineering fail because of the nature of identity. Then I will consider how David Heyd’s Genero-centric principle applies to genetic engineering specifically and how a modified version of that principle may guide us out of the Paradox of Future Individuals in general. This solution may not be acceptable to utilitarian sensibilities, but it is because the numbers don’t add up that we may need to appeal to a different principle entirely. (shrink)

Several philosophers have questioned the possibility of a genetic epistemology, an epistemology concerned with the developmental transitions between successive states of knowledge in the individual person. Since most arguments against the possibility of a genetic epistemology crucially depend upon a sharp distinction between the genesis of an idea and its justification, I argue that current philosophy of science raises serious questions about the universal validity of this distinction. Then I discuss several senses of the genetic fallacy, indicating (...) which sense of ‘genesis’ is relevant to epistemology. Next I consider the objection that psychology is irrelevant to epistemology, and that since "genetic epistemology" is really psychology, "genetic epistemology" is irrelevant to a real epistemology. Finally, I take up the objection that nothing discovered in genetic psychology could be relevant to a genetic epistemology. These last two arguments are based upon what I claim to be a mistaken notion of the nature of psychology. Suitably interpreted, psychology can assist genetic epistemology precisely in the way that the history of science assists current philosonhv of science. *I owe considerable thanks to Jann Benson, Ken Freeman, Bernie Rollin and Ron Williams for their helpful discussions concerning many of the issues discussed in this paper. I also wish to thank David Hamlyn, John Heil, William Lycan, Harvey Siegel and an anonymous reviewer for their comments and suggestions. It goes without saying that none of these individuals (especially Hamlyn and Siegel) necessarily agree with me. An earlier version of this paper was read at Colorado State University where the audience's comments were beneficial. (shrink)

This article is about ‘genogeographic’ maps produced by late-Soviet geneticists and published during post-Soviet time. It focuses on the visual and numerical techniques scientists used to project genetic data onto geographic space. Rather than discussing their representational character, I follow these visuals as ‘folded objects’, describing the layering and realigning of measurements and temporalities as well as the shifts in the practices and meanings of genetics. In the 1970s Soviet biological anthropologists transformed scattered data points by means of spatial (...) statistics into visually coherent maps for a ‘genogeographical atlas’, by interpolating data for the entire USSR territory. Computer-aided modelling rendered ‘populations’ as systemic entities and enacted specific cybernetic versions of population, evolution and difference. Tracing the history of their making helps one in understanding what these folded objects hold in store, in terms of data ranging from Russian imperial and colonial anthropology, through early Soviet traditions, to cold war technologies. Folded into those maps in intricate ways, they have co-shaped post-Soviet human genetics as an ever-active site for possible reinscriptions of difference. (shrink)

The 1986 Cold Spring Harbor Symposium was on the subject of human genetics; it was the first symposium at Cold Spring Harbor on this topic since 1964. In the opening remarks for the conference, Walter F. Bodmer first summarized the progress in this field since 1964. He then described what is presently known about the functional complexity of the human genome and discussed the case for a definitive characterization and sequencing of the human genome. The following is an abridged and (...) slightly adapted version of this talk; it is reproduced courtesy of the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory © 1987. (shrink)

Neisseria gonorrhoeae, the bacterium that causes the sexually transmitted disease gonorrhea, demonstrates extensive antigenic heterogeneity in its surface components. The organism has the capacity to switch on and off the synthesis of different versions of components such as pili, outer membrane proteins, and lipopolysaccharide. Recent studies have shown that the gonococcus uses novel and complex mechanisms, of types not described previously, to store different versions of genetic information for surface proteins, and to regulate expression of those genes.

Modern medicine emphasizes treatment of the sick. It is often said that the widespread genetic testing soon to follow the completion of the Human Genome Project will usher in a new era of preventive medicine. Such changes require new ways of thinking, however. For example, there may be nothing clinically wrong with a healthy patient who requests genetic testing, even if the tests reveal disease genes. Since all individuals have genetic skeletons in their closets, it is important (...) to be careful not to confuse having disease genes with having the diseases that they cause. Unfortunately, many in the public have adopted a kind of genetic determinism that sees genes as destiny: for example, having the gene associated with colon cancer means they will develop colon cancer. Physicians tend to be more careful, yet even they are not immune to subtle versions of genetic determinism. One example of this is the uncritical categorization of certain diseases as “genetic”. In fact, an adequate concept of genetic disease is extremely difficult to come by. The simplest notion would require a 1:1 correspondence between a disease and its genes, but this is the exception rather than the rule. For example, cystic fibrosis (CF) is often put forward as a good example of a genetic disease, since it seems to result from mutations in a single gene, CFTR. Even in this case, however, the exact relationship between CFTR mutations and disease is not clear, as virtually every possible combination of sweat chloride test results, genetic test results, and symptoms has been observed.[1] If a patient presents with the classic symptoms of CF and is found to have a mutation in the CFTR gene, the physician might understandably infer that the mutation caused the disease. But if an asymptomatic patient is tested and it is discovered that he or she has a CFTR mutation, it is unclear what this means. The doctor might tell the patient the gene is abnormal and that he or she is likely to develop pulmonary problems, etc., but it’s not really known whether even this qualified prognosis is true.. (shrink)

This article is a revised version of a talk given in lieu of the Ph.D. dissertation: "Huntington´s Disease in Everyday Life. Knowledge, Ignorance and Genetic Risk". The dissertation evolves around the analysis of modern living with risk for a late onset genetic disorder. Here, three aspects of everyday lives faced with Huntington´s Disease (HD) are discussed. First, HD is one aspect of everyday living along with a variety of other aspects. The importance of risk is analysed as (...) personal and changing in changing circumstances. Second, genetic knowledge and technology are not solid universals, but situated and changing, and of varying importance in lives at risk. Last, the ethical rationalities of everyday living, research and clinical practice concerned with a hereditary condition are discussed as complex and contradictory in and across structures of social practice. (shrink)

This paper explores the implications of human reproductive cloning for our notions of parenthood. Cloning comes in numerous varieties, depending on the kind of cell to be cloned, the age of the source at the time the clone is created, the intended social relationship, if any, between source and clone, and whether the clone is to be one of one, or one of many, genetically identical individuals alive at a time. The moral and legal character of an act of cloning (...) may, moreover, differ in light of these distinctions. Surprisingly, however, reproductive cloning in all its variety seems to undermine the view of parenthood that is most popular among proponents of reproductive technology in the bioethics literature. This view, geneticism, has much to recommend it. I will show, however, that as commonly understood, geneticism is incompatible with the reproductive view of cloning. I then canvass alternative accounts of parenthood—namely, conventionalism, gestationalism, and intentionalism—but none succeeds in explaining reproductive cloning. I thus return to a reconstructed version of geneticism. I argue that the problem for geneticism rests not with the notion of genetic parenthood as such but with a particular, flawed, understanding of it, which I call informational geneticism. Informational geneticism should be rejected in favor of a “physicalistic” version of geneticism, which treats genes as particular objects, not abstract types, and takes seriously the essentially embodied character of reproduction. For these reasons, physicalistic geneticism survives the challenge represented by reproductive cloning. Additionally, physicalistic geneticism accommodates attractive aspects of competing views of parenthood, meeting some powerful objections in the process. (shrink)

An assessment is offered of the recent debate on information in the philosophy of biology, and an analysis is provided of the notion of information as applied in scientific practice in molecular genetics. In particular, this paper deals with the dependence of basic generalizations of molecular biology, above all the ‘central dogma’, on the so-called ‘informational talk’ (Maynard Smith [2000a]). It is argued that talk of information in the ‘central dogma’ can be reduced to causal claims. In that respect, the (...) primary aim of the paper is to consider a solution to the major difficulty of the causal interpretation of genetic information: how to distinguish the privileged causal role assigned to nucleic acids, DNA in particular, in the processes of replication and protein production. A close reading is proposed of Francis H. C. Crick's On Protein Synthesis (1958) and related works, to which we owe the first explicit definition of information within the scientific practice of molecular biology. Introduction 1.1 The basic questions of the information debate 1.2 The causal interpretation (CI) of biological information and Crick's ‘central dogma’ Crick's definitions of genetic information The main requirement for (CI) Types of causation in molecular biology 4.1 Structural causation in molecular biology 4.2 Nucleic acids as correlative causal factors The ‘central dogma’ without the notion of information Concluding remarks This is a new version of this article as there were errors in the abstract and full text in the previous version. (shrink)

Some authors have argued that the human use of reproductive cloning and genetic engineering should be prohibited because these biotechnologies would undermine the autonomy of the resulting child. In this paper, two versions of this view are discussed. According to the first version, the autonomy of cloned and genetically engineered people would be undermined because knowledge of the method by which these people have been conceived would make them unable to assume full responsibility for their actions. According to (...) the second version, these biotechnologies would undermine autonomy by violating these people’s right to an open future. There is no evidence to show that people conceived through cloning and genetic engineering would inevitably or even in general be unable to assume responsibility for their actions; there is also no evidence for the claim that cloning and genetic engineering would inevitably or even in general rob the child of the possibility to choose from a sufficiently large array of life plans. (shrink)

In a recent paper, William K. Goosens objects to the arguments I set out some time ago attacking the logical empiricist analysis of reduction as applied to genetics. In these works I did not argue against the claim that Mendelian genetics was being reduced to molecular biology. Nor did I conclude, as Goosens asserts, that in the case of genetics, “reduction is insignificant”. To the contrary, I repeatedly stated that, “given our pre-analytic intuitions about reduction,” the reduction of Mendelian to (...) molecular genetics “is a case of reduction, a paradigm case”. And in agreement with Kenneth Schaffner I argued that reduction “in some very important, pre-analytic sense has taken place and is taking place in genetics”. The target of my objections to reduction in genetics was not “reduction” in some pre-analytic sense. Nor was it the various explications which have appeared since. Rather it was the notion of theory reduction set out a generation ago by such logical empiricists as Ernest Nagel, The particular version of this analysis which I chose to attack was that presented by Schaffner ; for Schaffner's later views, see his. I chose Schaffner's explication to attack because I thought it was the best of its kind and because it was the only defense of the logical empiricist analysis at the time which used genetics as one of its chief examples. Contrary to Goosens' assumption, in criticizing Schaffner's explication, I did not thereby “endorse” it. (shrink)

In this paper, I wish to challenge theory-biased approaches to scientific knowledge, by arguing for a study of theorizing, as a cognitive activity, rather than of theories, as abstract structures independent from the agents’ understanding of them. Such a study implies taking into account scientists’ reasoning processes, and their representational practices. Here, I analyze the representational practices of geneticists in the 1910s, as a means of shedding light on the content of classical genetics. Most philosophical accounts of classical genetics fail (...) to distinguish between the purely genetic, or Mendelian level, and the cytological one. I distinguish between them by characterizing them in terms of their respective associated representational practices. I then present how the two levels were articulated within Morgan’s theory of crossing-over, and I describe the representational technique of linkage mapping, which embodies the “merging” of the Mendelian and cytological levels. I propose an analysis of the mapping scheme, as a means of enlightening the conceptual articulation of Mendelian and cytological hypotheses within classical genetics. Finally, I present the respective views of three opponents to Morgan in the 1910s, who had a different understanding of the articulation of cytology and Mendelism, and entertained different views concerning the role and proper interpretation of maps. I propose to consider these diverging perspectives as instantiating what I call different “versions” of classical genetics. (shrink)

The thrilling and terrifying history of genetic engineering. In 2018, scientists manipulated the DNA of human babies for the first time. As biologist and historian Matthew Cobb shows in As Gods, this achievement was one many scientists have feared from the start of the genetic age. Four times in the last fifty years, geneticists, frightened by their own technology, have called a temporary halt to their experiments. They ought to be frightened: Now we have powers that can target (...) the extinction of pests, change our own genes, or create dangerous new versions of diseases in an attempt to prevent future pandemics. Both awe-inspiring and chilling, As Gods traces the history of genetic engineering, showing that this revolutionary technology is far too important to be left to the scientists. They have the power to change life itself, but should we trust them to keep their ingenuity from producing a hellish reality? (shrink)

Background Generally, there is unanimity about the value of community engagement in health-related research. There is also a growing tendency to view genetics and genomics research (GGR) as a special category of research, the conduct of which including community engagement (CE) as needing additional caution. One of the motivations of this study was to establish how differently if at all, we should think about CE in GGR. Aim To assess the perspectives of genetics and genomics researchers in Uganda on CE (...) in GGR. Method A cross-sectional qualitative study was conducted at Makerere University and Uganda Virus Research Institute. Twenty-five individuals participated, the majority being male (sixteen). Participants included nineteen genetics and genomics researchers (researchers and research coordinators), two CE officers, three nurses and one nursing counsellor. Data were collected using in-depth interviews and analyzed in a thematic manner using NVivo version 12 Plus. Study findings Thirteen of the respondents had conducted CE in their GGR in either a geographical and disease-specific community. Some respondents said CE principles are the same and there is no need for special consideration for CE in GGR. Others gave ethical issues in GGR that require special consideration for CE in such research and these were categorized into six themes: GGR is new to communities, Difficulty in communicating GGR by the researchers, Genes are shared in communities, Cultural sensitivities against GGR, Community attitude toward GGR, Some GGR studies take long to end, and Negotiation of research benefits. Special considerations for CE when conducting GGR were suggested and categorized into seven themes: creating awareness of GGR in communities, obtaining both community acceptance and individual consent, CE team composition, involve communities in solving GGR challenges, prolong CE in some GGR, develop guidelines for CE in GGR, and legal considerations on GGR. Conclusion GGR was characterized by special issues that require special CE considerations for such research. (shrink)

In addressing the regulation of human genetic futures, scientific standards concerning human kinds are endorsed by philosophical approaches that tend to exclude many people with genetic conditions from the deliberative process. In broadening the axiological, ontological and epistemological framework to include disability perspectives, the focus is shifted from questions of regulation to practical matters of participation, invoking ideals of community equality and enabled choice. In developing practical community engagements to deliberate upon genetic futures, a process that allows (...) dialectical encounter between eugenic and non-eugenic approaches is envisioned so that strong versions of eugenics are avoided. (shrink)

Objective : Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) has been utilized by assisted reproductive technology (ART) to genetically screen embryos before placement in the uterus. However, many objections have been raised against the genetic screening of embryos, giving the practice an uncertain ethical, legal, and social status. Our aim was, therefore, to survey the possible presence and compliance to any legislation for PGD in the existing 60 in vitro fertilization (IVF) centres in the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) countries as well (...) as the availability of such a technological service. Methods : The study was performed in the department of biochemistry at King Faisal University between the periods Mar 2006 to Nov 2007. A questionnaire, in the form of a table, was sent to responsible persons of all 60 IVF centres and health authorities in the GCC countries. The collected data about the regulations and guidelines for the PGD program was analyzed using SPSS software package version 12.0 and the level of significance was set at P Results: 18 respondents, 16 IVF centres and 2 health authorities (26.87% of total) participated in the survey. The PGD techniques, mainly FISH analyses, were practiced in three centres in Saudi Arabia and one centre in the UAE. The major provider of PGD was King Faisal Specialist Hospital and Research Centre in Riyadh where more than 300 PGD tests had been performed. Whilst some regulations and guidelines have been introduced to IVF centres in all GCC countries, their implementations were left to the discretion of the treating centre. Conclusions : PGD services in the GCC countries were under-utilized due to the high cost of tests, the sophisticated technology involved and the poor returns of the investment. As a result of some deficiencies in the legislations which regulated PGD, the medical teams involved often faced difficulties on what rights to exercise in various PGD cases. (shrink)

In 1976, the Genetics Society of America published a document entitled “Resolution of Genetics, Race, and Intelligence.” This document laid out the Society’s position in the IQ controversy, particularly that on scientific and ethical questions involving the genetics of intellectual differences between human populations. Since the GSA was the largest scientific society of geneticists in the world, many expected the document to be of central importance in settling the controversy. Unfortunately, the Resolution had surprisingly little influence on the discussion. In (...) 1979, William Provine analyzed the possible factors that decreased the impact of the Resolution, among them scientists’ limited understanding of the relationship between science and ethics. Through the analysis of unpublished versions of the Resolution and exchanges between GSA members, I will suggest that the limited impact of the statement likely depended on a shift in the aims of the GSA due to the controversies that surrounded the preparation of the document. Indeed, the demands of the membership made it progressively more impartial in both scientific and political terms, decreasing its potential significance for a wider audience. Notably, the troubled history of the Resolution raises the question of what can make effective or ineffective the communication between scientists and the public—a question with resonance in past and present discussions on topics of social importance. (shrink)

My article is a rejoinder to Gert Biesta’s, ‘“This is My Truth, Tell Me Yours”. Deconstructive pragmatism as a philosophy of education.’ Biesta attempts to place Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction in ‘the very heart’ of John Dewey’s pragmatism. My article strives to impress Deweyan pragmatism in the heart of Derridian deconstruction. It does so by offering Dewey’s denotative, naturalistic, empirical perspectivalism as an alternative to Derrida’s anti-empirical quasi-transcendentalism for understanding otherness and difference. The first section of my article shows Biesta offers (...) a catastrophically mistaken and confused argument. The second section imprints Deweyan pragmatism in the heart of Derrida’s deconstruction. Dewey specifically makes philosophical use of a version of the genetic method he calls the ‘empirical denotative method’ to trace the exclusions as well as the inclusions of our perspectival selections driven by our finite embodied needs, interest, desires, and purposes. We may derive the trace of quasi-transcendental différance from the trace of empirically perspectival inclusions and exclusions. Specifically, différance is a reified hypostatic abstraction. Next, I respond to Biesta’s claim that since the metaphysics of presence still entangles Dewey, he cannot appreciate the fact that presence depends on absence. Actually, presence in Dewey always depends on absence. Finally, we will find that Biesta’s own deconstructive pragmatism flounders on his commitment to self-refuting relativism. (shrink)

I distinguish two versions of kin selection theory—a purely genetic version and a version that also appeals to cultural forms of cooperation —and present an argument in favor of using the former when it comes to accounting for the evolution of cooperation in non-human organisms. Specifically, I first show that both GKST and WKST are equally mathematically coherent—they can both be derived from the Price equation—but not necessarily equally empirically plausible, as they are based on different assumptions (...) about the inheritance system underlying the cooperative phenotype. Given this, I then, second, present a model selection theoretic argument in favor of GKST over WKST. This argument is based on the fact that, in non-human cases, the former theory is likely to be as empirically successful as WKST, while containing fewer degrees of freedom. I end by defending both the intrinsic importance of this argument and its relevance to the discussion surrounding the “gene’s eye view of evolution.”. (shrink)

Quantitative genetics (QG) analyses variation in traits of humans, other animals, or plants in ways that take account of the genealogical relatedness of the individuals whose traits are observed. “Classical” QG, where the analysis of variation does not involve data on measurable genetic or environmental entities or factors, is reformulated in this article using models that are free of hypothetical, idealized versions of such factors, while still allowing for defined degrees of relatedness among kinds of individuals or “varieties.” The (...) gene - free formulation encompasses situations encountered in human QG as well as in agricultural QG. This formulation is used to describe three standard assumptions involved in classical QG and provide plausible alternatives. Several concerns about the partitioning of trait variation into components and its interpretation, most of which have a long history of debate, are discussed in light of the gene-free formulation and alternative assumptions. That discussion is at a theoretical level, not dependent on empirical data in any particular situation. Additional lines of work to put the gene-free formulation and alternative assumptions into practice and to assess their empirical consequences are noted, but lie beyond the scope of this article. The three standard QG assumptions examined are: (1) partitioning of trait variation into components requires models of hypothetical, idealized genes with simple Mendelian inheritance and direct contributions to the trait; (2) all other things being equal, similarity in traits for relatives is proportional to the fraction shared by the relatives of all the genes that vary in the population (e.g., fraternal or dizygotic twins share half of the variable genes that identical or monozygotic twins share); (3) in analyses of human data, genotype-environment interaction variance (in the classical QG sense) can be discounted. The concerns about the partitioning of trait variation discussed include: the distinction between traits and underlying measurable factors; the possible heterogeneity in factors underlying the development of a trait; the kinds of data needed to estimate key empirical parameters; and interpretations based on contributions of hypothetical genes; as well as, in human studies, the labeling of residual variance as a non-shared environmental effect; and the importance of estimating interaction variance. (shrink)

In his left-libertarian theory of justice Hillel Steiner introduces the idea of conceiving our germ-line genetic information as a natural resource as a means to achieving luck-egalitarian equality. This idea is very interesting in and of itself. But it also has the potential of turning Steiner’s theory into a particularly powerful version of left-libertarianism, or so I argue in the first part of this paper. In the second part I critically examine this idea. I show why, in contrast (...) to what Steiner claims, this idea requires us to evaluate not only the pieces of GLGI that we have used, but rather all the pieces of GLGI that our bodies deliver throughout our lives. Then I argue that besides the immense technical difficulties involved in meeting this requirement, which we may overcome in the future, there is also a substantive reason why we cannot meet this requirement. The relevant value of any given piece of GLGI depends on the way it would interact with another piece of GLGI of the opposite sex in a reproductive process. But there is no way of determining which pieces of GLGI should be assigned to each other for the purpose of this evaluation. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to further develop van Fraassen’s diagnosis, expanding a previous analysis of the fundamental law of classical genetics and the status of the so-called ‘Mendel’s laws’.6 According to this diagnosis the Hardy-Weinberg law: 1) cannot be considered as axiom (or fundamental law) for classical population genetics, since it is a law that describes an equilibrium that 2) holds only under certain special conditions, and 3) only determines a subclass of models, 4) whose generalized form (and (...) fundamental law) being shading off into logical vacuity, and 5) more complex variants of the fundamental law (and of the Hardy-Weinberg law) can be “deduced” for more realistic assumptions. In order to achieve this, I will use notions of the structuralist view of theories, a version that is related to but different from that of van Fraassen’s. These are the notions of fundamental law, specialization, and special law. Having as a background a structuralist reconstruction of classical population genetics, I will show why the Hardy-Weinberg law should not be in fact considered the fundamental law of such a theory, but a special law (and not even a “terminal” specialization, i.e. a “non-terminal” specialization). (shrink)

The paper presents findings from an ethnography of dysmorphology, a specialism in genetic medicine, to explore genetic counselling as a process through which parents ‘become informed.’ Current professional and policy debate over the use of genetic technology in medicine emphasises the need for informed choice making, and for genetic services that provide parents with what is referred to as ‘non-directive genetic counselling.’ In the paper the process of becoming informed is shown to be very specific (...) and to have its own effects. Specifically, genetics is performed in dysmorphology as a space of ambiguity and uncertainty. In addition, parents are engaged by the clinic as participants in the very processes through which their child, and perhaps their family, are clinically classified. The paper examines the effects of parents’ immersion in this clinical space of deferral to suggest how the need for reproductive choice, and calculation, is predicated upon clinical processes that shift parents between the experience of definition and uncertainty. The paper thus troubles simple stories about autonomous and informed choice, particularly reproductive choice, as icons of contemporary versions of what it is to be fully human. (shrink)

The usual version of the genetic argument for panpsychism is not difficult to refute. The version is based on the principle of biological continuity according to which the various species differ in degree rather than in kind. It is then asserted that if there is some point in the evolution of life out of inanimate matter, or of higher out of lower life, such that before this point minds did not exist while thereafter they do exist, then (...) the principle of continuity is violated. The argument, as Paul Edwards points out, is based on the Scholastic principle that a cause must contain its effect in actuality, since otherwise it could not communicate the effect and thus could not operate as its cause. Just as what causes a body to heat up must itself be hot, so what causes human minds to come into existence must already possess mentality. Ultimately, the inanimate world of, say, six billion years ago caused human minds to come into existence. Therefore, the constituents of even the so-called “inanimate world” are psychic. Yet Edwards’ refutation of this particular argument is unassailable. The argument fails, first, because the Scholastic principle on which it is based is highly dubious. But it fails even granting this principle. The emergence of high-level minds from low-level minds would create just as great a problem as an original emergence of the mental from the nonmental. There would still be the problem of how an entity with given capacities and characteristics could be caused by entities without those capacities and characteristics. And, finally, if we grant the emergence of high-level from low-level minds, it is not clear why the mental itself may not emerge from the nonmental. (shrink)

In this retitled and revised version of Harris's original text Wonderwoman and Superman, the author discusses the ethics of human biotechnology and its implications relative to human evolution and destiny.

This paper examines several contemporary readings of Piaget's texts: M. Chapman's Constructive Evolution provides a wide-ranging exegesis of Piaget's entire body of work; F. Vidal's Piaget before Piaget focuses on Piaget's earliest writings; and H. Beilin's Piaget's New Theory concentrates on Piaget's very last projects. All three contend that in contrast to accepted versions of Piaget's theory, there is a relatively unknown Piaget and a markedly differently way to understand Genetic Epistemology. This brief review attempts to bracket such readings (...) within the purview of postmodern concerns with rationality. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

The Genetic Privacy Act is a comprehensive effort to protect individuals from unauthorized analysis of their DNA and from unauthorized disclosure of information resulting from genetic analysis. Irrespective of merit, every bill must survive legislative scrutiny. This is a considerable challenge, particularly for a bill as complex and far-reaching as the GPA. To illustrate my point, I describe the fate of two bills introduced into the Maryland Senate in 1995 by Senator Jennie Forehand. The first, also entitled the (...) Genetic Privacy Act, was a slightly modified version of the model legislation prepared by Annas, Glantz, and Roche. After a hearing, the bill received a 9-2 unfavorable vote from the Economic and Environmental Affairs Committee. The second was a much shorter bill, DNA Testing – Informed Consent and Confidentiality, which simply stated that “DNA analysis may only be performed with the informed consent of the person being analyzed” and that the results of such analysis “are the exclusive property of the person tested, are confidential, and may not be disclosed without the consent of the person being tested.” This bill had a hearing but was never put to a vote by the Judicial Proceedings Committee. My principal aim is to examine the testimony on these bills. I will conclude with some suggestions about accomplishing the goals of genetic privacy legislation. (shrink)

The following is dedicated to promoting a version of the disability critique of negative genetic selection while navigating claims that launching such a critique threatens reproductive liberty or is unavoidably antichoice. I highlight problematic conceptual assumptions regarding genetics and choice made by proponents and opponents of selection alike and bring out the underlying ableist values of the prevailing conversation. Ableism is discrimination against persons on the basis of perceived disability. I conclude that the existing social and institutional milieu (...) surrounding genetic selection threatens persons who experience difference with stigma and its accompanying political and social disadvantages. My .. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:GenetGerald PrinceGenet, by Edmund White (with a chronology by Albert Dichy); xliii & 820 pp. London: Picador, 1994, $29.95 paper.Abandoned to a foundling home in 1910 at the age of seven months, he started to steal before puberty, spent over two years as a teenager in the penal colony of Mettray, signed up with the French army for several tours of duty, and deserted. He traveled through Europe (...) and was arrested in Albania, Yugoslavia, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland. He was also repeatedly arrested and sent to jail in France—for embezzlement, for petty theft, for vagrancy—and his record of convictions made him liable for a life sentence until he was pardoned by the President of the Republic. He looked like a dandified tramp or a retired boxer. He frequented thugs and artists or philosophers, criminals and police chiefs, prostitutes as well as cabinet ministers. A book lover, he owned no books. A homosexual, he was rarely attracted to other homosexuals. A great champion of singularity, he came to feel that all human beings were equally valuable. Though he showed himself capable of impassioned friendship, he extolled and often practiced betrayal. He once boasted of being “strong from never having passed through a woman except at the moment of [his] birth” (p. 594). Yet he was a feminist. For a long time he could barely compose a standard letter in French but, when he died from throat cancer in 1985, he had written several masterpieces. He was Jean Genet.If, in his monumental Saint Genet, Sartre pays more attention to the configuration of the writer’s life than to the moments making up that life, Edmund White, in his admirable biography, patiently aligns the moments and waits for patterns to emerge. Genet is, first of all, a meticulous chronicle and can be savored for the details it provides about the protagonist’s daily life or its context, from gay bars in Pigalle to the 1968 Democratic convention in Chicago which Genet covered for Esquire. We learn many things. For example, that the FBI spelled his name as “John Genet” and Sartre’s as “Jean Paul Sat”; or that Leonard Nimoy (Mr. Spock) started his career by playing in movie versions of two Genet plays: The Balcony and Deathwatch.Through the accumulation of facts and anecdotes, great themes—homosexuality, death, abjection, gesture, power—slowly crystallize and White writes splendid pages on the quality of Genet’s texts (beyond their shock value: Genet said that “poetry is the art of using shit and making you eat it”). Written from 1942 to 1947, his five novels (Our Lady of the Flowers, The Miracle of the Rose, Funeral Rites, A Thief’s Journal, Querelle) treat homosexuality with unsurpassed candor, glorify evil, transvalue all values, and blend sociology and myth, slang and highly formal language, in a sumptuously lyrical prose. With The Balcony, The Blacks, and The Screens—composed between 1955 and 1957—Genet invents a stylized and ritualistic theater to explore the dynamics of power. Finally, in the striking mixture of memoir, pamphlet, and epic called The Prisoner of Love [End Page 146] (1985) Genet exalts two disinherited groups—the Black Panthers, the Palestinians—and suggests that love is the site where uniqueness and universality merge.More generally, certain constants in Genet’s life become evident: the loyalty to the abandoned child he was and the hatred for the bourgeois society that dispossessed him; the need to reject before being rejected; the fascination with power and the affirmation of otherness; the ability to mythify himself as an angel of rebellion. Genet was a sociopath of genius.Above all, by its scrupulous scholarship, its successful determination to remain impartial, and its capacity for authoritative prosaism, White’s biography encourages readers to take a (new) look at Genet’s flamboyantly unorthodox writing. It is a remarkable achievement.Gerald PrinceUniversity of PennsylvaniaCopyright © 1995 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

According to comic moralism, moral flaws make comic works less funny or not funny at all. In contrast, comic immoralism is the view that moral flaws make comic works funnier. In this article, I argue for a moderate version of comic immoralism. I claim that, sometimes, comic works are funny partly in virtue of their moral flaws. I argue for this claim—and artistic immoralism more generally—by identifying artistically valuable moral flaws in relevant actions undertaken in the creation of those (...) works. Underlying this argument is the idea that such generative actions are partly constitutive of a work's identity, and, therefore, they may affect the ethical value of an artwork either positively or negatively, and they are the proper objects of ethical appraisal. (shrink)

Argument“The problem of university courses on infinitesimal calculus and their demarcation from infinitesimal calculus in high schools” is the published version of an address Otto Toeplitz delivered at a meeting of the German Mathematical Society held in Düsseldorf in 1926. It contains the most detailed exposition of Toeplitz's ideas about mathematics education, particularly his thinking about the role of the history of mathematics in mathematics education, which he called the “genetic method” to teaching mathematics. The tensions and assumptions (...) about mathematics, history of mathematics, and historiography revealed in this piece dedicated to educational ideas are what make Toeplitz's text interesting in the study of historiography of mathematics. In general, the ways historiography of mathematics and teaching of mathematics, even without an immediate concern for history, are deeply entangled and, in our view, worth attention both in historical and educational research. (shrink)

Jonathan Haidt’s _Moral Foundation Theory _has been criticized on many fronts, mainly on account of its lack of evidence concerning the genetic and neurological bases of the evolved moral intuitions that the theory posits. Despite the fact that Haidt’s theory is probably the most promising framework from which to integrate the different lines of interdisciplinary research that deal with the evolutionary foundations of moral psychology, _i) _it also shows a critical underspecification concerning the precise mental processes that instantiate the (...) triggering of our evolved moral intuitions, and that _ii) _that underspecification coexists with and overspecification of the structure of human nature when it comes to exploring alternatives to capitalist societies. (shrink)

The role of fixed charges present at the surface of biological membranes is usually described by the Gouy-Chapman-Grahame theory of the electric double-layer where the Grahame equation is applied independently on each side of the membrane and where the capacitive charges are disregarded. In this article, we generalize the Gouy-Chapman-Grahame theory by taking into account both intrinsic charges and capacitive charges, in the density value of the membrane surface charges. In the first part, we show that capacitive charges couple electrostatic (...) potentials present on both sides of the membrane. The intensity of this coupling depends both on the value of the membrane specific capacitance and the transmembrane electric potential difference. In the second part, we suggest some physiological implications of membrane electric double-layers. (shrink)

The Epic of Evolution is a course taught at Northern Arizona University. It engages the task of formulating a new epic myth that is based on the physical, natural, social, and cultural sciences. It aims to serve the need of providing meaning for human living in the vast and complex universe that the sciences now depict for us. It is an interdisciplinary effort in an academic setting that is often divided by specializations; it focuses on values in a climate of (...) relativism; and it concentrates on an enterprise for which there are few textbooks at hand. The course is presented in three segments: the cosmos before humans appeared, the human phenomenon, and scenarios for the future of evolution. (shrink)