Philosophy of Biology, Miscellaneous

This paper deals with the evolutionary origin and the adaptive function of emotion. I discuss the view that emotions have evolved as functional adaptations in both humans and non-human animals in order to cope with adaptive challenges and to promote fitness. I argue that there is evolutionary continuity between humans and animals in emotions and emotional expressions, and discuss behavioural argument for this thesis, specifically, Darwin’s and Ekman’s research on similarities in how humans and animals express their basic emotions. In (...) addition to this argument, I provide neuroscientific evidence that supports the claim that basic emotions are evolutionary old and shared among humans and many other animals. Finally, I conclude that animal emotions can be considered the bases and roots of our emotions that connect us to other sentient beings. (shrink)

Analytic metaphysics has become increasingly extended into the social domain. The aim of this article is critical self-reflection on the challenges of transferring the tools of analytic metaphysics from classical cases such as the very existence of abstract or composed objects to socially-contested phenomena such as gender and race. In reflecting on the status of metaphysics of race, I formulate a polemical hypothesis of misalignment according to which the tools of analytic metaphysics are not suitable for engaging with complex racial (...) phenomena and politics. In addressing this challenge of misalignment, the article sketches a perspective on critical metaphysics of race as interdisciplinary action research. (shrink)

This paper discusses the evolutionary origin and adaptive functions of emotions, in line with contemporary evolutionary psychology. Drawing upon Charles Darwin’s study of emotional expressions, it is argued that there is an evolutionary continuity among animals in emotional capacities, and that the differences between humans and animals are differences in degree and not in kind. The focus is on basic or primary emotions (joy, fear, sadness, anger), as it has been consistently shown that they are universal and shared among many (...) different species. Basis for this view is the neuroscientific research on brain mechanisms underlying the emotions, especially subcortical brain regions that are proven to be the evolutionary old loci of emotions, homologous across many species. These neuroscientific data provide convincing empirical evidence for the existence of emotional experiences in animals and the evolutionary continuity among species. (shrink)

A Correction to this paper has been published (changed to open access).

A mythopoetic paradigm or perspective sees the world primarily as a dramatic story of competing personal intentions, rather than a system of objective impersonal laws. Asma (2017) argued that our contemporary imaginative cognition is evolutionarily conserved—it has structural and functional similarities to premodern Homo sapiens’ cognition. This article will (i) outline the essential features of mythopoetic cognition or adaptive imagination, (ii) delineate the adaptive socio-cultural advantages of mythopoetic cognition, (iii) explain the phylogenetic and ontogenetic mechanisms that give rise to human (...) mythopoetic mind (i.e., genetically endowed simulation and associational systems that underwrite diverse symbolic systems); (iv) show how mythopoetic cognition challenges contemporary trends in cognitive science and philosophy, and (v) recognize and outline empirical approaches for a new cognitive science of the imagination. (shrink)

Modes of teaching and learning have had to rapidly shift amid the COVID-19 pandemic. As an emergency response, students from Philippine public schools were provided learning modules based on a minimized list of essential learning competencies in Biology. Using a cross-sectional survey method, we investigated students’ perceptions of the Biology self-learning modules (BSLM) that were designed in print and digitized formats according to a constructivist learning approach. Senior high school STEM students from grades 11 (n = 117) and 12 (n (...) = 104) participated in a survey using a 3-point Likert-scale questionnaire uploaded online through Google Forms. The survey results indicate that majority of the students perceived the modules positively, suggesting that aspects of the modules that were salient to students corresponded to essential elements of constructivist pedagogies. However, during interviews, students reported several difficulties in learning with BSLM as it was constrained by, to name a few, the use of unfamiliar words, lack of access to supporting resources, slow internet connection, and time constraints. To address these problems, teachers reported that they gave deadline extensions, complemented modules with other channels of support, and used online and offline platforms for reaching out to students to answer their queries and plan out their schedule for the week. The findings across the data sources point to the complex demands of emergency distance education that teachers, as curriculum designers and enactors, need to bear in mind in order to craft productive pedagogies, constructivist or otherwise, during this unprecedented time. (shrink)

Recently, psychological phenomena have been expanded to new domains, crisscrossing boundaries of organizational levels, with the emergence of areas such as social personality and ecosystem learning. In this contribution, we analyze the ascription of an individual-based concept to the social level. Although justified boundary crossings can boost new approaches and applications, the indiscriminate misuse of concepts refrains the growth of scientific areas. The concept of social personality is based mainly on the detection of repeated group differences across a population, in (...) a direct transposition of personality concepts from the individual to the social level. We show that this direct transposition is problematic for avowing the nonsensical ascription of personality even to simple electronic devices. To go beyond a metaphoric use of social personality, we apply the organizational approach to a review of social insect communication networks. Our conceptual analysis shows that socially self-organized systems, such as isolated ant trails and bee’s recruitment groups, are too simple to have social personality. The situation is more nuanced when measuring the collective choice between nest sites or foraging patches: some species show positive and negative feedbacks between two or more self-organized social structures so that these co-dependent structures are inter-related by second-order, social information systems, complying with a formal requirement for having social personality: the social closure of constraints. Other requirements include the decoupling between individual and social dynamics, and the self-regulation of collective decision processes. Social personality results to be sometimes a metaphorical transposition of a psychological concept to a social phenomenon. The application of this organizational approach to cases of learning ecosystems, or evolutionary learning, could help to ground theoretically the ascription of psychological properties to levels of analysis beyond the individual, up to meta-populations or ecological communities. (shrink)

In recent decades, several theories have claimed to explain the teleological causality of organisms as a function of self-organising and self-producing processes. The most widely cited theories of this sort are variations of autopoiesis, originally introduced by Maturana and Varela. More recent modifications of autopoietic theory have focused on system organisation, closure of constraints and autonomy to account for organism teleology. This article argues that the treatment of teleology in autopoiesis and other organisation theories is inconclusive for three reasons: First, (...) non-living self-organising processes like autocatalysis meet the defining features of autopoiesis without being teleological; second, organisational approaches, whether defined in terms of the closure of constraints, self-determination or autonomy, are unable to specify teleological normativity, that is, the individuation of an ultimate beneficiary; third, all self-organised systems produce local order by maximising the throughput of energy and/or material (obeying the maximum entropy production (MEP) principle) and thereby are specifically organised to undermine their own critical boundary conditions. Despite these inadequacies, an alternative approach called teleodynamics accounts for teleology. This theory shows how multiple self-organising processes can be collectively linked so that they counter each other’s MEP principle tendencies to become codependent. Teleodynamics embraces – not ignoring – the difficulties of self-organisation, but reinstates teleology as a radical phase transition distinguishing systems embodying an orientation towards their own beneficial ends from those that lack normative character. (shrink)

Une rétrospective des débats sur l'origine de la vie : le virus ou la cellule ? Le virus a besoin de la cellule pour se répliquer, mais la cellule est une forme plus évoluée à l'échelle évolutive de la vie. Les virus semblent avoir joué un rôle dans des événements tels que l'origine de la vie cellulaire et l'évolution des mammifères. Même la bactérie la plus simple est bien trop complexe pour être apparue spontanément au début de l'évolution. Par la (...) suite, l'évolution a pu produire des systèmes de plus en plus complexes. La première vraie cellule doit déjà avoir été un produit de l'évolution, résultant d'une communauté primordiale. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.27284.53122. (shrink)

This thought piece dealing with the Covid-19 ‘crisis’ was written – in the form of a diary that runs from February to July 2020 – for a special issue of Derrida Today entitled ‘Fire, Flood, Pestilence and Protest’, edited by Nicole Anderson, and published in November 2020. The piece deals with matters of biopolitics, telecommunication, death and mourning through Derrida and Agamben, and interrogates the eventness of what is called an ‘event’.

The study of viruses raises pressing conceptual and philosophical questions about their nature, their classification, and their place in the biological world. A major set of problems concerns the individuality and diachronic identity of a virus: what is the virus, the viral particle (virion) or the entire viral cycle? The correct identification of the virus has significant ontological consequences, also related to the place and time when biological entities begin and end. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.35874.66241.

Ecology is indispensable to understanding the biological world and addressing the environmental problems humanity faces. Its philosophy has never been more important. In this book, James Justus introduces readers to the philosophically rich issues ecology poses. Besides its crucial role in biological science generally, climate change, biodiversity loss, and other looming environmental challenges make ecology's role in understanding such threats and identifying solutions to them all the more critical. When ecology is applied and its insights marshalled to address these problems (...) and guide policy formation, interesting philosophical issues emerge. Justus sets them out in detail, and explores the often ethically charged dimensions of applied ecological science, using accessible language and a wealth of scientifically-informed examples. (shrink)

Some interpreters claim Kant distinguishes between organisms and living things. I argue that this claim is underdetermined by the textual evidence. Once this is recognized, it becomes a real possibility that Kant’s various remarks about the essential properties of living things generalize to organisms as such. This, in turn, generates a puzzle. Kant repeatedly claims that the capacity for representation is essential to the nature of a living thing. If he does not distinguish between living things and organisms, then how (...) might the capacity for representation be essential to the latter? Drawing on the writings of Kant and his contemporaries, I reconstruct a framework within which representational capacities might conceivably be thought to play this role. On this view, what distinguishes an organism from mechanically explicable products of nature is its capacity for endogenous behavior that is instinctual and representationally mediated. (shrink)

Purpose This paper aims to discuss ethical principles that are implicit in second-order cybernetics, with the aim of arriving at a better understanding of how second-order cybernetics frames living in a world with others. It further investigates implications for second-order cybernetics approaches to architectural design, i.e. the activity of designing frameworks for living. Design/methodology/approach The paper investigates the terminology in the second-order cybernetics literature with specific attention to terms that suggest that there are ethical principles at work. It further relates (...) second-order cybernetics to selected notions in phenomenology, pragmatism and transcendental idealism. The comparison allows for conclusions about the specificity of a second-order inquiry. In line with the thematic focus of this journal issue on the framing of shared worlds, the paper further elaborates on questions relating to the activity of designing “worlds” in which people live with others. Findings The paper highlights that a radical openness toward the future and toward the agency of others is inscribed in the conception of second-order cybernetics. It creates a frame of reference for conceiving social systems of all kinds, including environments that are designed to be inhabited. Originality/value The paper identifies an aesthetics grounded in the process of living-with-others as an ethical principle implicit in second-order cybernetics thought. It is an aesthetics that is radically open for the agency of others. Linking aesthetics and ethics, the paper’s contributions will be of specific value for practitioners and theoreticians of design. Considering second-order cybernetics as a practice generally dealing with designing, it also contributes to the wider second-order cybernetics discourse. (shrink)

There is a widespread belief that for their own safety and for the protection of wildlife, cats should be permanently kept indoors. Against this view, I argue that cat guardians have a duty to provide their feline companions with outdoor access. The argument is based on a sophisticated hedonistic account of animal well-being that acknowledges that the performance of species-normal ethological behavior is especially pleasurable. Territorial behavior, which requires outdoor access, is a feline-normal ethological behavior, so when a cat is (...) permanently confined to the indoors, her ability to flourish is impaired. Since cat guardians have a duty not to impair the well-being of their cats, the impairment of cat flourishing via confinement signifies a moral failing. Although some cats assume significant risks and sometimes kill wild animals when roaming outdoors, these important considerations do not imply that all cats should be deprived of the opportunity to access the outdoors. Indeed, they do not, by themselves, imply that any cat should be permanently kept indoors. (shrink)

The language parasite approach refers to the view that language, like a parasite, is an adaptive system that evolves to fit its human hosts. Supported by recent computer simulations, LPA proponents claim that the reason that humans can use languages with ease is not because we have evolved with genetically specified linguistic instincts but because languages have adapted to the preexisting brain structures of humans. This article examines the LPA. It argues that, while the LPA has advantages over its rival, (...) Chomskyan nativism, there are additional factors that may limit linguistic variety that have yet to be identified by its insightful proponents. This article suggests abandoning the search for a decisive cause of language capacity and argues that language evolution is more likely to arise from balancing multiple engineering constraints. (shrink)

本书共分九章内容：第一章论述了生命科学哲学兴起的背景，区分了生命科学哲学研究中的两种理论倾向，指出了生命科学哲学研究的主要问题，最后介绍了国内外生命科学哲学研究的进展；第二章分析了这种解释方式的合理性 及其与因果性解释方式的关系，并由此进一步讨论了生命科学的自主性问题；第三章从不同方面较详细地论述了正反两方面论证的依据，并对各种观点进行了比较，说明生物学理论缺少规律的原因；第四章讨论了还原概念和突现 概念的历史发展，分析了它们各自的认识论和本体论原因，指出了它们各自的优点和局限，最后指出了超越它们的途径；第五章着重讨论了进化论的统计特性与进化过程的决定论和非决定论问题；第六章讨论了生命难以定义的各 种原因，论述了定义生命的两种主要方法；第七章指出了人工生命提出的主要的哲学问题，从不同角度论证了强人工生命的可能性，分析了数字生命的实在论地位，揭示了人工生命所蕴含计算主义世界观；第八章分析了人类基因 组研究的价值及其所可能引起的伦理和法律问题；第九章总结了8年来关于人类克隆的主要争论和观点，并揭示了这些争论给我们的启示。.

The definition of life is a very important issue in the philosophy of biology, but this issue has unfortunately been neglected by the mainstream philosopher of biology for many years. In this paper, the difficulties with and the reasons for defining life are illustrated, the characteristics of life on Earth are explored, ways of defining life are examined, the main definitions of life are explained and evaluated, and finally, a new information definition of life is proposed.

The subject of this edited volume is the idea of levels of organization: roughly, the idea that the natural world is segregated into part-whole relationships of increasing spatiotemporal scale and complexity. The book comprises a collection of essays that raise the idea of levels into its own topic of analysis. Owing to the wide prominence of the idea of levels, the scope of the volume is aimed at theoreticians, philosophers, and practicing researchers of all stripes in the life sciences. The (...) volume’s contributions reflect this diversity, and draw from fields such as developmental biology, evolutionary biology, molecular biology, ecology, cell biology, and neuroscience. The book presents wide-ranging novel insights on causation and levels, the hierarchical structure of evolution, the role of levels in biological theory, and more. (shrink)

This article proposes an abstract mathematical frame for describing some features of cognitive and biological time. We focus here on the so called “extended present” as a result of protentional and retentional activities (memory and anticipation). Memory, as retention, is treated in some physical theories (relaxation phenomena, which will inspire our approach), while protention (or anticipation) seems outside the scope of physics. We then suggest a simple functional representation of biological protention. This allows us to introduce the abstract notion of (...) “biological inertia”. (shrink)

The notion of habit used in neuroscience is an inheritance from a particular theoretical origin, whose main source is William James. Thus, habits have been characterized as rigid, automatic, unconscious, and opposed to goal-directed actions. This analysis leaves unexplained several aspects of human behavior and cognition where habits are of great importance. We intend to demonstrate the utility that another philosophical conception of habit, the Aristotelian, may have for neuroscientific research. We first summarize the current notion of habit in neuroscience, (...) its philosophical inspiration and the problems that arise from it, mostly centered on the sharp distinction between goal-directed actions and habitual behavior. We then introduce the Aristotelian view and we compare it with that of William James. For Aristotle, a habit is an acquired disposition to perform certain types of action. If this disposition involves an enhanced cognitive control of actions, it can be considered a “habit-as-learning”. The current view of habit in neuroscience, which lacks cognitive control and we term “habit-as-routine”, is also covered by the Aristotelian conception. He classifies habits into three categories: (1) theoretical, or the retention of learning understood as “knowing that x is so”; (2) behavioral, through which the agent achieves a rational control of emotion-permeated behavior (“knowing how to behave”); and (3) technical or learned skills (“knowing how to make or to do”). Finally, we propose new areas of research where this “novel” conception of habit could serve as a framework concept, from the cognitive enrichment of actions to the role of habits in pathological conditions. In all, this contribution may shed light on the understanding of habits as an important feature of human action. Habits, viewed as a cognitive enrichment of behavior, are a crucial resource for understanding human learning and behavioral plasticity. (shrink)

A ubiquitous feature of active sleep in mammals and birds is its relative abundance in early development. In rat pups across the first two postnatal weeks, active sleep promotes the expression of synchronized oscillatory activity within and between cortical and subcortical sensorimotor structures. Sensory feedback from self-generated myoclonic twitches – which are produced exclusively during active sleep – also triggers neural oscillations in those structures. We have proposed that one of the functions of active sleep in early infancy is to (...) provide a context for synchronizing developing structures. Specifically, neural oscillations contribute to a variety of neurodevelopmental processes, including synapse formation, neuronal differentiation and migration, apoptosis, and the refinement of topographic maps. In addition, synchronized oscillations promote functional connectivity between distant brain areas. Consequently, any condition or manipulation that restricts active sleep can, in turn, deprive the infant animal of substantial sensory experience, resulting in atypical developmental trajectories. The synchronization of rhythmic neural activity across brain structures provides evidence of communication. In developing sensorimotor networks, such oscillations are triggered most clearly and prominently during REM sleep. We propose that REM sleep provides a context for the emergence and expression of functional connectivity in the developing sensorimotor system. (shrink)

Margulis’ evolutionary theory entails a revision of certain core concepts of traditional biology. One of these changes is related to the hot debate about units of selection. This paper considers Margulis’ proposal as a new research tradition (RT) and evaluates its consequences to the mentioned issue. Three ideas are suggested here: firstly, that her theory represents the revision of many classical biological concepts; secondly, that her position implies a reappraisal of many traditional issues in philosophy of biology; and thirdly, that (...) studying it from Lakatos and Laudan’s ideas about RT allows us to enlighten the richness of her theory. (shrink)

Despite remarkable empirical and methodological advances, our theoretical understanding of the evolutionary processes that made us human remains fragmented and contentious. Here, we make the radical proposition that the cultural communities within which Homo emerged may be understood as a novel exotic form of organism. The argument begins from a deep congruence between robust features of Pan community life cycles and protocell models of the origins of life. We argue that if a cultural tradition, meeting certain requirements, arises in the (...) context of such a “social protocell,” the outcome will be an evolutionary transition in individuality whereby traditions and hominins coalesce into a macroscopic bio-socio-technical system, with an organismal organization that is culturally inherited through irreversible fission events on the community level. We refer to the resulting hypothetical evolutionary individual as a “sociont.” The social protocell provides a preadapted source of alignment of fitness interests that addresses a number of open questions about the origins of shared adaptive cultural organization, and the derived genetic adaptations that support them. Also, social cooperation between hominins is no longer in exclusive focus since cooperation among traditions becomes salient in this model. This provides novel avenues for explanation. We go on to hypothesize that the fate of the hominin in such a setting would be mutualistic coadaptation into a part-whole relation with the sociont, and we propose that the unusual suite of derived features in Homo is consistent with this hypothesis. (shrink)

According to the dual inheritance theory, cultural learning in our species is a biased and highly efficient process of transmitting cultural traits. Here we define a model of cultural learning where social learning is integrated as a complementary element that facilitates the discovery of a specific behavior by an apprentice, and not as a mechanism that works in opposition to individual learning. In that context, we propose that the emergence of the ability to approve or disapprove of offspring behavior, orienting (...) their learning, transformed primate social learning into a cultural transmission system, like that which characterizes our species. Assessor teaching facilitates the replication and/or reconstruction of behaviors that are difficult to imitate and helps to determine which behaviors should be imitated. We also explore the form in which assessor teaching has conditioned the evolution of our abilities to develop cultures in the hominin line, converting us into individuals equipped with what we call a suadens psychology. Our main point is to defend the hypothesis that suadens psychology determines the stability and dynamics that affect the trajectories of many cultural characters. We compare our proposal with other theories about cultural evolution, specifically with dual inheritance theory and cultural attraction theory. (shrink)

With the advent of powerful parallel computers, efforts have commenced to simulate complete mammalian brains. However, so far none of these efforts has produced outcomes close to explaining even the behavioral complexities of animals. In this article, we suggest four challenges that ground this shortcoming. First, we discuss the connection between hypothesis testing and simulations. Typically, efforts to simulate complete mammalian brains lack a clear hypothesis. Second, we treat complications related to a lack of parameter constraints for large-scale simulations. To (...) demonstrate the severity of this issue, we review work on two small-scale neural systems, the crustacean stomatogastric ganglion and the Caenorhabditis elegans nervous system. Both of these small nervous systems are very thoroughly, but not completely understood, mainly due to issues with variable and plastic parameters. Third, we discuss the hierarchical structure of neural systems as a principled obstacle to whole-brain simulations. Different organizational levels imply qualitative differences not only in structure, but in choice and appropriateness of investigative technique and perspective. The challenge of reconciling different levels also undergirds the challenge of simulating and hypothesis testing, as modeling a system is not the same thing as simulating it. Fourth, we point out that animal brains are information processing systems tailored very specifically for the ecological niches the respective animals live in. (shrink)

Holobionts are symbiotic assemblages composed by a host plus its microbiome. The status of holobionts as individuals has recently been a subject of continuous controversy, which has given rise to two main positions: on the one hand, holobiont advocates argue that holobionts are biological individuals; on the other, holobiont detractors argue that they are just mere chimeras or ecological communities, but not individuals. Both parties in the dispute develop their arguments from the framework of the philosophy of biology, in terms (...) of what it takes for a “conglomerate” to be considered an interesting individual from a biological point of view. However, the debates about holobiont individuality have important ontological implications that have remained vaguely explored from a metaphysical framework. The purpose of this paper is to cover that gap by presenting a metaphysical approach to holobionts individuality. Drawing upon a conception of natural selection that puts the focus on the transgenerational recurrence of the traits and that supports the thesis that holobionts are units of selection, we argue that holobionts bear emergent traits and exert downward powers over the entities that compose them. In this vein, we argue, a reasonable argument can be made for conceiving holobionts as emergent biological individuals. (shrink)

I offer a novel view of the mechanisms underlying the spontaneous facial expression of emotion. According to my Social Amplification View, facial expressions result from the interplay of two processes: an emotional process that activates specific facial muscles, though not always to the point of visible contraction, followed by a social cognitive process that amplifies these activations so that they may function more effectively as social signals. I argue that SAV outperforms both the Neurocultural View and the Behavioral Ecology View, (...) as well as previously proposed syntheses of these views, in accounting for various empirical findings. (shrink)

In questo lavoro si dimostra che l'opinione comune, secondo cui è Heidegger a introdurre Jacob von Uexküll nel dibattito filosofico è scorretta, in quanto è Scheler, due decenni prima, a scoprire e valorizzare la portata filosofica di Uexküll. -/- Pure la distinzione fra mondo (Welt) e ambiente (Umwelt), come quella fra apertura al mondo e chiusura ambientale, non è introdotta da Heidegger nel 1929 (cfr. l'Introduzione di Marco Mazzeo al testo di Uexküll, Ambienti animali e ambienti umani, p.18 e seg.) (...) ma è già presente in Scheler negli scritti del periodo 1909-1913. (shrink)

I offer four ways of distinguishing paleobiology from neontology, and from this develop a sketch of the philosophy of paleobiology. I then situate and describe the papers in the special issue Paleobiology and Philosophy, and reflect on the value and prospects of paleontology-focused philosophy.

The classical theories of the genetic code claimed that its coding rules were determined by chemistry—either by stereochemical affinities or by metabolic reactions—but the experimental evidence has revealed a totally different reality: it has shown that any codon can be associated with any amino acid, thus proving that there is no necessary link between them. The rules of the genetic code, in other words, obey the laws of physics and chemistry but are not determined by them. They are arbitrary, or (...) conventional, rules. The result is that the genetic code is not a metaphorical entity, as implied by the classical theories, but a real code, because it is precisely the presence of arbitrary rules that divides a code from all other natural processes. In the past 20 years, furthermore, various independent discoveries have shown that many other organic codes exist in living systems, which means that the genetic code has not been an isolated case in the history of life. These experimental facts have one outstanding theoretical implication: they imply that in addition to the concept of information we must introduce in biology the concept of meaning, because we cannot have codes without meaning or meaning without codes. The problem is that at present we have two different theoretical frameworks for that purpose: one is Code Biology, where meaning is the result of coding, and the other is Peircean biosemiotics, where meaning is the result of interpretation. Recently, however, a third party has entered the scene, and it has been proposed that Robert Rosen’s relational biology can provide a bridge between Code Biology and Peircean biosemiotics. (shrink)

In multicellular organisms, cells are frequently programmed to die. This makes good sense: cells that fail to, or are no longer playing important roles are eliminated. From the cell’s perspective, this also makes sense, since somatic cells in multicellular organisms require the cooperation of clonal relatives. In unicellular organisms, however, programmed cell death poses a difficult and unresolved evolutionary problem. The empirical evidence for PCD in diverse microbial taxa has spurred debates about what precisely PCD means in the case of (...) unicellular organisms. In this article, we survey the concepts of PCD in the literature and the selective pressures associated with its evolution. We show that definitions of PCD have been almost entirely mechanistic and fail to separate questions concerning what PCD fundamentally is from questions about the kinds of mechanisms that realize PCD. We conclude that an evolutionary definition is best able to distinguish PCD from closely related phenomena. Specifically, we define “true” PCD as an adaptation for death triggered by abiotic or biotic environmental stresses. True PCD is thus not only an evolutionary product but must also have been a target of selection. Apparent PCD resulting from pleiotropy, genetic drift, or trade-offs is not true PCD. We call this “ersatz PCD.”. (shrink)

After biologist Deborah Gordon made a series of experimental discoveries in the 1980s, she argued that a change in terminology regarding the division of labor among castes of specialists was needed. Gordon’s investigations of the interactive effects of ants in colonies led her to believe that the established approach Edward O. Wilson had pioneered was biased in a way that made some alternative candidate adaptive explanations invisible. Gordon argued that this was because the term “division of labor” implied a division (...) among specialists that was unwarranted, and proposed “task allocation” as a better description that did not bias research against the alternative causes she had discovered. Gordon’s empirical findings and theoretical proposals also vindicate the initial critics of Wilson’s human sociobiology who have been dismissed as political radicals, but her proposals have been widely misunderstood by many contemporary behavioral ecologists. The terminological and methodological confusions rampant in contemporary discourse can be clarified by applying a framework developed by Elisabeth Lloyd involving an analysis of the constraints imposed by different research questions. Applying this framework will show how the methodological problems involving description raised by the initial critics of Wilson’s human sociobiology extended to his analysis of ants, indicating that they were not challenging Wilson’s naturalistic approach to the study of human evolution, but rather his methods. It will also show how confusion over how Gordon’s proposed research questions have been conflated with the possible answers she has argued ought to be investigated. This in turn will clarify contemporary disputes over her proposal to abandon the term “division of labor.”. (shrink)

The leading hypothesis concerning the “reuse” or “recycling” of neural circuits builds on the assumption that evolution might prefer the redeployment of established circuits over the development of new ones. What conception of cognitive architecture can survive the evidence for this hypothesis? In particular, what sorts of “modules” are compatible with this evidence? I argue that the only likely candidates will, in effect, be the columns which Vernon Mountcastle originally hypothesized some 60 years ago, and which form part of the (...) well-known columnar hypothesis in neuroscience—systems that cannot handle gross cognitive functions as distinct from strictly exiguous subfunctions. This is in stark contrast to the modules postulated by much of cognitive psychology, cognitive neuropsychology, and evolutionary psychology. And yet the fate of this revised notion is unclear. The main issue confronting it is the effect of the neural network context on local function. At some point the effects of context are so strong that the degree of specialization required for modularity is not able to be met. Still, despite indications from neuroimaging that peripheral and central systems deploy shared circuitry, some skills clearly do seem to display modularization and autonomy. This article: provides an in-depth analytical and historical review of the fortunes of modular thinking in cognitive science; offers a systematic calibration of brain regions in terms of degrees of functional specificity and robustness; and suggests another way of accounting for the partially encapsulated character of expertise and other highly practiced skills without having to resort to domain-specific modules. (shrink)

Communication is inherent to social relationships. Previous papers addressed the correlation between social and communicative complexity, and the origin of sociality in rodents. In subterranean social species, as the number of animals in the same burrow increases, so do interindividual contact rates. This is because of limitations in actually used tunnel length and diameter, leading to an increasing number of agonistic situations probably resulting in time loss, threatening, and fighting with danger of injuries. To avoid this, social species are expected (...) to have an increase in the number of particular vocalizations. Comparison of the adult vocal repertoire of 12 species through regression and phylogenetically independent contrasts suggests three main conclusions: social species increase their repertoire both in number and categories of vocal signals in relation to solitary species, although the coefficient was smaller in the PIC model; the number of agonistic vocalizations was also different between solitary and social species, with the latter displaying higher numbers of these calls; the percentage of agonistic vocalizations in relation to total repertoire was similar between social and solitary species, with no significant relationship between this parameter and the social structure. These results imply that agonistic vocalizations have also increased in number in social species, indicating the importance of these calls in the establishment of new relationships. As repertoire changes are essential to cope with new and frequent kinds of interactions sociality originates, these results suggest that at least for these organisms, communicative changes, especially at the level of agonistic signals, could be a necessary condition to fulfill in the path to the possibility of group living. (shrink)

How comes that two organisms can interact with each other or that we can comprehend what the other experiences? The theories of embodiment, intersubjectivity or empathy have repeatedly taken as their starting point an individualistic assumption (the comprehension of the other comes after the self-comprehension) or a cognitivist one (the affective dimension follows the cognitive process). The thesis of this book is that there are no two isolated entities at the origin which successively interact with each other. There is, rather, (...) an impersonal stratum – the original affectivity (Gefühlsdrang) – which lets the living organisms be constitutively attuned with the expressive dimension of the life from the very beginning. The book aims to rethink the issue of corporality on the basis of a biosemiotics of the interaction between lived body (Leib) and environment (Umwelt). The human emotions reveals themselves as devices that experiment further attunement levels and expose the human being – because of her ex-centricity – to the alienation in various forms of the psychopathological existence. This is an unprecedented perspective that turns to psychopathology to reread against the light the watermark weaving the structure of personal singularity. What emerges is an intermediate territory confining both with philosophy and psychiatry: the psychopathology of ordo amoris. The author advances the project of a new psychopathology of ordo amoris, not only tackling with the 19th-century tradition of psychiatry and phenomenological psychopathology, but also with the contemporary disputes on intersubjectivity in phenomenology and with those on schizophrenia as disruption of aida or as disembodiment process in psychiatry. What results from his project is the first systematic study on the international level showing the relevance of Schelerian concepts of body schema (Leibschema) and order of feeling (ordo amoris) to understand the disruptions of emotional regulation on the psychopathological dimension as well as on the formation process of the singularity. (shrink)

The applications of machine learning and deep learning to the natural sciences has fostered the idea that the automated nature of algorithmic analysis will gradually dispense human beings from scientific work. In this paper, I will show that this view is problematic, at least when ML is applied to biology. In particular, I will claim that ML is not independent of human beings and cannot form the basis of automated science. Computer scientists conceive their work as being a case of (...) Aristotle’s poiesis perfected by techne, which can be reduced to a number of straightforward rules and technical knowledge. I will show a number of concrete cases where at each level of computational analysis, more is required to ML than just poiesis and techne, and that the work of ML practitioners in biology needs also the cultivation of something analogous to phronesis, which cannot be automated. But even if we knew how to frame phronesis into rules, still this virtue is deeply entrenched in our biological constitution, which computers lack. Whether computers can fully perform scientific practice independently of humans is an ill-posed question. (shrink)

Timers and sensors are common devices that make our daily life safer, more convenient, and more efficient. In a cellular context, they arguably play an even more crucial role as they ensure the survival of cells in the presence of various extrinsic and intrinsic stresses. Biological timers and sensors generate distinct signaling profiles, enabling them to produce different types of cellular responses. Recent data suggest that they can work together to guarantee correct timing and responsiveness. By exploring examples of cellular (...) stress signaling from mitosis, DNA damage, and hypoxia, the authors discuss the common architecture of timer‐sensor integration, and how its added features contribute to the generation of desired signaling profiles when dealing with stresses of variable duration and strength. The authors propose timer‐sensor integration as a widespread mechanism with profound biological implications and therapeutic potential. -/- . (shrink)

A reductionistic, bottom‐up, cellular‐based concept of the origins of sentience and consciousness has been put forward. Because all life is based on cells, any evolutionary theory of the emergence of sentience and consciousness must be grounded in mechanisms that take place in prokaryotes, the simplest unicellular species. It has been posited that subjective awareness is a fundamental property of cellular life. It emerges as an inherent feature of, and contemporaneously with, the very first life‐forms. All other varieties of mentation are (...) the result of evolutionary mechanisms based on this singular event. Therefore, all forms of sentience and consciousness evolve from this original instantiation in prokaryotes. It has also been identified that three cellular structures and mechanisms that likely play critical roles here are excitable membranes, oscillating cytoskeletal polymers, and structurally flexible proteins. Finally, basic biophysical principles are proposed to guide those processes that underly the emergence of supracellular sentience from cellular sentience in multicellular organisms. (shrink)