The role of fixed charges present at the surface of biological membranes is usually described by the Gouy-Chapman-Grahame theory of the electric double-layer where the Grahame equation is applied independently on each side of the membrane and where the capacitive charges are disregarded. In this article, we generalize the Gouy-Chapman-Grahame theory by taking into account both intrinsic charges and capacitive charges, in the density value of the membrane surface charges. In the first part, we show that capacitive charges couple electrostatic (...) potentials present on both sides of the membrane. The intensity of this coupling depends both on the value of the membrane specific capacitance and the transmembrane electric potential difference. In the second part, we suggest some physiological implications of membrane electric double-layers. (shrink)

Bescheiden im Umfang, revolutionär in der Wirkung, kontrovers in der Deutung: Rousseaus Schrift Vom Gesellschaftsvertrag oder die Prinzipien des Staatsrechts gehört bis heute zu den unangefochtenen Klassikern der Politischen Philosophie der Moderne. Der Gesellschaftsvertrag, der Umschlagort von Naturzustand und Staat, ist paradox; er soll die völlige Freiheit der Menschen gewährleisten und dennoch aus ihnen ein gemeinsames Ich schaffen, der Mensch soll vorbehaltlos zum Bürger dieses einen Staates werden.. Das moderne Freiheitsideal wird in eine antike Polisgemeinschaft transplantiert. Die Interpretation der Schrift (...) wird dadurch erschwert, dass sie einerseits ein an eine gelehrte Tradition anknüpfender rechtsphilosophischer Traktat ist, andererseits ein politisches Pamphlet mit rhetorischen Überhöhungen. Die Aufsatzsammlung sucht den Ambivalenzen des Buches gerecht zu werden, sie liefert einen kooperativen Kommentar zu den Hauptthemen des Gesellschaftsvertrages. (shrink)

Bescheiden im Umfang, revolutionär in der Wirkung, kontrovers in der Deutung: Rousseaus Schrift Vom Gesellschaftsvertrag oder die Prinzipien des Staatsrechts gehört bis heute zu den unangefochtenen Klassikern der Politischen Philosophie der Moderne. Der Gesellschaftsvertrag, der Umschlagort von Naturzustand und Staat, ist paradox; er soll die völlige Freiheit der Menschen gewährleisten und dennoch aus ihnen ein gemeinsames Ich schaffen, der Mensch soll vorbehaltlos zum Bürger dieses einen Staates werden.. Das moderne Freiheitsideal wird in eine antike Polisgemeinschaft transplantiert. Die Interpretation der Schrift (...) wird dadurch erschwert, dass sie einerseits ein an eine gelehrte Tradition anknüpfender rechtsphilosophischer Traktat ist, andererseits ein politisches Pamphlet mit rhetorischen Überhöhungen. Die Aufsatzsammlung sucht den Ambivalenzen des Buches gerecht zu werden, sie liefert einen kooperativen Kommentar zu den Hauptthemen des Gesellschaftsvertrages. (shrink)

Wegen seiner Theorie des Gesellschaftsvertrags gilt Rousseau als der Begründer der Volkssouveränität. Zweifellos hat er mit seinen Ideen die Französische Revolution und die Entwicklung der Demokratien stark beeinflussen können. Das Volk übernimmt nach ihm die Herrschaft, und zwar auf Grund eines Vertrags (,,contrat“), aus dem, als zentrale Instanz der politischen Gemeinschaft, der Gemeinwille (,,volonté générale“) hervorgeht. Dieser ist der Souverän. Alle Bürger nehmen gleicherweise daran teil. Doch sind sie ihm auch unterworfen, denn er ist der Gesetzgeber, und Freiheit kann der (...) Einzelne nur besitzen, wenn er dem Gesetz gehorcht. Der Einzelne ist somit Herrschender und Untertan zugleich. Erst wenn die Gesellschaft an die Stelle des ursprünglichen Naturzustandes gelangt, wenn also der natürliche Mensch (,,homme naturel“) zum bürgerlichen Menschen (,,homme civil“) wird, kann von Sittlichkeit die Rede sein. Das Zusammenbestehen in einer und derselben Person von Freiheit und Zwang bildet ein Paradox, das zu mancherlei Widersprüchlichkeiten Anlass gibt. Das ist der Grund, weshalb auch heute noch ganz unterschiedliche politische Systeme sich auf Rousseau berufen können. Um dieses Paradox dreht sich seine politische Philosophie, die im Contrat social (1762) ihre volle Entfaltung erreicht. Unser Text ist ein Beitrag zu folgendem Doppeljubiläum: Wir gedenken der Geburt Rousseaus vor 300 Jahren, am 28. Juni 1712, sowie des Contrat social , der also vor 250 Jahren erschienen ist. (shrink)

continent. 1.3 (2011): 149-155. The world is teeming. Anything can happen. John Cage, “Silence” 1 Autonomy means that although something is part of something else, or related to it in some way, it has its own “law” or “tendency” (Greek, nomos ). In their book on life sciences, Medawar and Medawar state, “Organs and tissues…are composed of cells which…have a high measure of autonomy.”2 Autonomy also has ethical and political valences. De Grazia writes, “In Kant's enormously influential moral philosophy, autonomy (...) , or freedom from the causal determinism of nature, became prominent in justifying the human use of animals.”3 One of the oldest uses of autonomy in English is a description of the French civil war from the late sixteenth century: “Others of the…rebellion entred in counsell, whether they ought to admit the King vpon reasonable conditions, specially hauing their autonomy.”4 Life, and in particular human life, and in particular human politics, is well served by the usages of autonomy . What about the rest of reality, however? Should it be thought of, if it's even considered real and mind-independent, as pure stuff for the manipulation or decorative tastes of truly autonomous beings? We tend to think of things such as paperweights and iPhones as mere tools of human design and human use. To use them is to cause them to exist as fully and properly as they can. But according to Martin Heidegger, when a tool such as a paperweight is used, it disappears, or withdraws ( Entzug ). We are preoccupied with copying the page that the paperweight is holding down. We are concerned with an essay deadline, and the paperweight simply disappears into this general project. If the paperweight slips, or if the iPhone freezes, we might notice it. All of a sudden it becomes vorhanden (present-at-hand) rather than zuhanden (ready-to-hand).5 Yet Heidegger is unable to draw a meaningful distinction between what happens to a paperweight when it slips from the book I'm copying from and what happens to the paperweight when it presses on the still resilient pages of the thick paperback itself. Further still and related to this point, even when I am using the paperweight as part of some general task, I am not using the entirety of the paperweight as such. My project itself selects a thin slice of paperweight-being for the purposes of holding down a book. Even when it is zuhanden the paperweight is withdrawn. Graham Harman is the architect of this way of thinking.6 Harman discovered a gigantic coral reef of withdrawn entities beneath the Heideggerian submarine of Da-sein, which itself is operating at an ontological depth way below the choppy surface of philosophy, beset by the winds of epistemology, and infested with the sharks of materialism, idealism, empiricism and most of the other isms that have defined what is and what isn't for the last several hundred years. At a moment when the term ontology was left alone like a piece of well chewed old chewing gum that no one wants to have anything to do with, object-oriented ontology (OOO) has put it back on the table. The coral reef isn't going anywhere and once you have discovered it, you can't un-discover it. And it seems to be teeming with strange facts. The first fact is that the entities in the reef—we call them “objects” somewhat provocatively—constitute all there is: from doughnuts to dogfish to the Dog Star to Dobermans to Snoop Dogg. People, plastic clothes pegs, piranhas and particles are all objects. And they are all pretty much the same, at this depth. There is not much of a distinction between life and non-life (as there isn't in contemporary life science). And there is not much of a distinction between intelligence and non-intelligence (as there is in contemporary artificial intelligence theory). A lot of these distinctions are made by humans, for humans (anthropocentrism). And the concept autonomy has come into play in policing such distinctions. In this essay I shall to try to liberate autonomy for the sake of nonhumans. I shall do so by parsing carefully the title, which is taken from Hakim Bey's work The Temporary Autonomous Zone .8 First we shall explore the term autonomous . Then we shall explore what the full meaning of zone is. Finally, we shall investigate what temporary means. Each of these terms is of great value. An object withdraws from access. This means that its very own parts can't access it. Since an object's parts can't fully express the object, the object is not reducible to its parts. OOO is anti-reductionist. But OOO is also anti-holist. An object can't be reduced to its “whole” either, “reduced upwards” as it were. The whole is not greater than the sum of its parts. So we have a strange irreductionist situation in which an object is reducible neither to its parts nor to its whole. A coral reef is made of coral, fish, seaweed, plankton and so on. But one of these things on its own doesn't embody part of a reef. Yet the reef just is an assemblage of these particular parts. You can't find a coral reef in a parking lot. In this way, the vibrant realness of a reef is kept safe both from its parts and from its whole. Moreover, the reef is safe from being mistaken for a parking lot. Objects can't be reduced to tiny Lego bricks such as atoms that can be reused in other things. Nor can be reduced upwards into instantiations of a global process. A coral reef is an expression of the biosphere or of evolution, yes; but so is this sentence, and we ought to be able to distinguish between coral reefs and sentences in English. The preceding facts go under the heading of undermining . Any attempt to undermine an object—in thought, or with a gun, or with heat, or with the ravages of time or global warming—will not get at the withdrawn essence of the object. By essence is meant something very different from essentialism . This is because essentialism depends upon some aspect of an object that OOO holds to be a mere appearance of that object, an appearance-for some object. This reduction to appearance holds even if that object for which the appearance occurs is the object itself! Even a coral reef can't grasp its essential coral reefness. In essentialism, a superficial appearance is taken for the essence of a thing, or of things in general. In thinking essentialism we may be able to discern another way of avoiding OOO. This is what Harman has christened overmining .? The overminer decides that some things are more real than others: say for example human perception. Then the overminer decides that other things are only granted realness status by somehow coming into the purview of the more real entity. When I measure a photon, when I see a coral reef, it becomes what it is. But when I measure a photon, I never measure the actual photon. Indeed, since at the quantum scale to measure means “to hit with a photon or an electron beam” (or whatever), measurement, perception ( aisthesis ), and doing become the same. What I “see” are deflections, tracks in a diffusion cloud chamber or interference patterns. Far from underwriting a world of pure illusion where the mind is king, quantum theory is one of the very first truly rigorous realisms, thinking its objects as irreducibly resistant to full comprehension, by anything.9 So far we have made objects safe from being swallowed up by larger objects and broken down into smaller objects—undermining. And so far we have made objects safe from being mere projections or reflections of some supervenient entity—overmining. That's quite a degree of autonomy. Everything in the coral reef, from the fish to a single coral lifeform to a tiny plankton, is autonomous. But so is the coral reef itself. So are the heads of the coral, a community of tiny polyps. So is each individual head. Each object is like one of Leibniz's monads, in that each one contains a potentially infinite regress of other objects; and around each object, there is a potentially infinite progress of objects, as numerous multiverse theories are now also arguing. But the infinity, the uncountability, is more radical than Leibniz, since there is nothing stopping a group of objects from being an object, just as a coral reef is something like a society of corals. Each object is “a little world made cunningly” (John Donne).10 We are indeed approaching something like the political valance of autonomy . The existence of an object is irreducibly a matter of coexistence. Objects contain other objects, and are contained “in” other objects. Let us, however, explore further the ramifications of the autonomy of objects. We will see that this mereological approach (based on the study of parts) only gets at part of the astonishing autonomy of things. Yet there are some more things to be said about mereology before we move on. Consider the fact that since objects can't be undermined or overmined, it means that there is strictly no bottom object . There is no object to which all other objects can be reduced, so that we can say everything we want to say about them, hypothetically at least, based on the behavior of the bottom object. The idea that we could is roughly E.O Wilson's theory of consilience .11 Likewise, there is no object from which all things can be produced, no top object . Objects are not emanations from some primordial One or from a prime mover. There might be a god, or gods. Suppose there were. In an OOO universe even a god would not know the essential ins and outs of a piece of coral. Unlike even some forms of atheism, the existence of god (or nonexistence) doesn't matter very much for OOO. If you really want to be an atheist, you might consider giving OOO a spin. If there is no top object and no bottom object, neither is there a middle object . That is, there is no such thing as a space, or time, “in” which objects float. There is no environment distinct from objects. There is no Nature (I capitalize the word to reinforce a sense of its deceptive artificiality). There is no world, if by world we mean a kind of “rope” that connects things together.12 All such connections must be emergent properties of objects themselves. And this of course is well in line with post-Einsteinian physics, in which spacetime just is the product of objects, and which may even be an emergent property of a certain scale of object larger than 10?¹?cm).13 Objects don't sit in a box of space or time. It's the other way around: space and time emanate from objects. How does this happen? OOO tries to produce an explanation from objects themselves. Indeed, the ideal situation would be to rely on just one single object. Otherwise we are stuck with a reality in which objects require other entities to function, which would result in some kind of undermining or overmining. We shall see that we have all the fuel we need “inside” one object to have time and space, and even causality. We shall discover that rather than being some kind of machinery or operating system that underlies objects, causality itself is a phenomenon that floats ontologically “in front of” them. In so doing, we will move from the notion of autonomy and begin approaching a full exploration of the notion of zone , which was promised at the outset of this essay. Since an object is withdrawn, even “from itself,” it is a self-contradictory being. It is itself and not-itself, or in a slightly more expanded version, there is a rift between essence and appearance within an object (as well as “between” them). This rift can't be the same as the clichéd split between substance and accidents , which is the default ontology. On this view, things are like somewhat boring cupcakes with somewhat less boring sugar sprinkles on them of different colors and shapes. But on the OOO view, what is called substance is just another limited slice of an object, a way of apprehending something that is ontologically fathoms deeper. What is called substance and what is called accidence are just on the side of what this essay calls appearance. The rift (Greek, chorismos ) between essence and appearance means that an object presents us with something like what in logic is known as the Liar: some version of the sentence “This sentence is false.” The sentence is true, which means that it is a lie, which means that it is false. Or the sentence is false, which means that it is telling the truth, which means that it is true. Now logic since Aristotle has tried desperately to quarantine such beasts in small backwaters and side streets so that they don't act too provocatively.14 But if OOO holds, then at least one very significant thing in the universe is both itself and not-itself: the object. An object is p ? ¬p. To cope with this fact, we shall need some kind of paraconsistent or even fully dialetheic logic, one that is not allergic to dialetheias (double-truthed things). Yet if we accept that objects are dialetheic, p ? ¬p, we can derive all kinds of things easily from objects. Consider the fact of motion. If objects only occupy one location “in” space at any “one” time, then Zeno's paradoxes will apply to trying to think how an object moves. Yet motion seems like a basic, simple fact of our world. Either everything is just an illusion and nothing really moves at all (Parmenides). Or objects are here and not-here “at the same time.”15 This latter possibility provides the basic setup for all the motion we could wish for. Objects are not “in” time and space. Rather, they “time” (a verb) and “space.” They produce time and space. It would be better to think these verbs as intransitive rather than transitive, in the manner of dance or revolt . They emanate from objects, yet they are not the object. “How can we know the dancer from the dance?” (Yeats).16 The point being, that for there to be a question, there must be a distinction—or there must not be (p ? ¬p).17 It becomes impossible to tell: “What constitutes pretense is that, in the end, you don't know whether it's pretense or not.”18 In this notion of the emergence of time and space from an object we can begin to understand the term zone . Zone can mean belt , something that winds around something else. We talk of temperate zones and war zones. A zone is a place where a certain action is taking place: the zone winds around, it radiates heat, bullets fly, armies are defeated. To speak of an autonomous zone is to speak of a place that a certain political act has carved out of some other entity. Cynically, Tibet is called TAR, the Tibetan Autonomous Region, for this very reason. In this phrase, Region tries to emulate zone : it sounds as if the place has its own rules, but of course, it is very much under the control of China. What action is taking place? “[N]ot something that just is what it is, here and now, without mystery, but something like a quest…a tone on its way calling forth echoes and responses…water seeking its liquidity in the sunlight rippling across the cypresses in the back of the garden.”19 If as suggested earlier there is no functional difference between substance and accidence; if there is no difference between perceiving and doing; if there is no real difference between sentience and non-sentience—then causality itself is a strange, ultimately nonlocal aesthetic phenomenon. A phenomenon, moreover, that emanates from objects themselves, wavering in front of them like the astonishingly beautiful real illusion conjured in this quotation of Alphonso Lingis. Lingis's sentence does what it says, casting a compelling, mysterious spell, the spell of causality, like a demonic force field. A real illusion: if we knew it was an illusion, if it were just an illusion, it would cease to waver. It would not be an illusion at all. We would be in the real of noncontradiction. Since it is like an illusion, we can never be sure: “What constitutes pretense…” A zone is what Lingis calls a level . A zone is not entirely a matter of “free will”: this concept has already beaten down most objects into abject submission. Objects are far more threateningly autonomous, and sensually autonomous, than the Kantian version of autonomy cited in the first paragraph of this essay. A zone is not studiously decided upon by an earnest committee before it goes into action. One of its predominant features is that it is already happening . We find ourselves in it, all of a sudden, in the late afternoon as the shadows lengthen around a city square, giving rise to an uncanny sensation of having been here before. Objects emit zones. Wherever I find myself a zone is already happening, an autonomous zone. It is the nonautonomous zones that are impositions on what is already the case. Or rather, these zones are autonomous zones that exclude and police. They are brittle. Every object is autonomous, but some objects try to maintain themselves through rigidity and brittleness, like (and such as) a police state. Paradoxically, the more rigidly one tries to exclude contradiction, the more virulent become the dialetheias that are possible. I can get around “This sentence is false” by imagining that there are metalanguages that explain what counts as a sentence. Then I can decide that this isn't a real sentence. This is basically Alfred Tarski's strategy, since he invented the notion of metalanguage specifically to cope with dialetheias.20 For example we might claim that sentences such as “This sentence is false” are neither true nor false. But then you can imagine a strengthened version of the Liar such as: “This sentence is not true”; or “This sentence is neither true nor false.” And we can go on adding to the strengthened Liar if the counter-attack tries to build immunity by specifying some fourth thing that a sentence can be besides true, false, and neither true nor false: “This sentence is false, or neither true nor false, or the fourth thing.” And so on.21 It seems as if language becomes more brittle the more it tries to police the Liars of this world. Why? I believe that this increasing brittleness is a symptom of a deep fact about reality. What is this deep fact? Simply that there are objects, that these objects are withdrawn, and that they are walking contradictions. This means indeed that (as Lacan put it) “there is no metalanguage,” since a metalanguage would function as a “middle object” that gave coherency and evenness to the others.22 Since there is no metalanguage, there is no rising above the disturbing illusory play of causality. This may even have political implications: no global critique is therefore possible, and attempts to smooth out or totalize are doomed to fail. To think the zone is to think the notion of temporary , which we shall now begin to discuss in greater detail. The zone is not in time: rather it “times.” But because a zone is an emanation of an object, it is based on a wavering fragility, since objects are p ? ¬p. When an object is born, that means that it has broken free of some other object. An object can be born because it and other objects are fragile. If not, no movement would be possible. Objects contain the seeds of their own destruction, a dialetheic sentence that says something like “This sentence cannot be proved.” Kurt Gödel argues that every true system of propositions contains at least one sentence that the system cannot prove. In order to be true, the system must have a minimum incoherence. To be real, it has to be fragile. Imagine a record player. Now imagine a record called I Cannot Be Played on This Record Player . When you play it on this record player, it produces sympathetic vibrations that cause the record player to shudder apart. No matter how many defense mechanisms you build in, there will always be the possibility of at least one record that destroys the record player.23 That is what being physical is. An object is inherently fragile because it is both itself and not-itself. When the rift between appearance and essence collapses, that is called destruction, ending, death. When an object breaks, several new objects are born. An opera singer sings a loud note in tune with the resonant frequency of a wine glass. (See the movie included below.) The singing is a zone, an autonomous level of intensity, opening a rift between appearance and essence. The glass ripples—for a moment it is nakedly a glass and a not-glass—almost as if it were having an orgasm, a little death. It is caught in the rift of the singing. Then its structure can't handle the coherence of the sound waves, and it breaks. It is incoherence and inconsistency that is the mark of existence, not consistency and noncontradiction. When things break or die, they become coherent. Essence disappears into appearance. I become the memories of friends. A glass becomes a dancing wave. Instantly, there are glass fragments, new temporary autonomous zones. The fragments have broken free from the glass. They are no longer its parts, but emanate their own time and space, becoming perhaps accidental weapons as they bury themselves in my flesh. Thus Hakim Bey's instructions on creating temporary autonomous zones oscillate disturbingly between performance art and politics, circus clowning and revolution. To play with the aesthetic is to play with causality, to rip from the sensual ether emanating from things new regions, new zones. Anarchist politics is the creation of fresh objects in a reality without a top or a bottom object, or for that matter a middle object: Everything in nature is perfectly real including consciousness, there's absolutely nothing to worry about. Not only have the chains of the Law been broken, they never existed; demons never guarded the stars, the Empire never got started, Eros never grew a beard. … There is no becoming, no revolution, no struggle, no path; already you're the monarch of your own skin—your inviolable freedom waits to be completed only by the love of other monarchs: a politics of dream, urgent as the blueness of sky.24 Bey imagines that this is because chaos is a primordial “undifferentiated oneness-of-being.” A Parmenides or a Spinoza or a Laruelle would read this a certain way. Individual objects, or decisions to talk about this rather than that, are just maggot-like things crawling around on the surface of the giant cheese of oneness.25 Yet he also describes chaos as “Primordial uncarved block, sole worshipful monster, inert & spontaneous, more ultraviolet than any mythology.” This image is of an inconsistent object, not of an undifferentiated field. An object, indeed, that can be distinguished from other things. If not, then the first part of The Temporary Autonomous Zone , subtitled “The Broadsheets of Ontological Anarchism,” is a kind of onto-theology. Onto-theology proclaims that some things are more real than others. Bey, however, is writing poetically, and thus ambiguously. We are at liberty to read “undifferentiated oneness-of-being” as something like the irreducibility of a thing to its parts and so forth (undermining and overmining). This certainly seems closer to the language in the following paragraph: “There is no becoming … already you're the monarch of your own skin.”26 On this view, there is no difference between art and politics: “When ugliness, poor design & stupid waste are forced upon you, turn Luddite, throw your shoe in the works, retaliate.” Since Romanticism this has been the war cry of the vanguard artist.27 To say to is to fall prey to the tired axioms of the avant-garde, and we think we know how the game goes. But OOO is not simply a way to advocate “new and improved” versions of this shock-the-bourgeoisie boredom. Bey's text is certainly full enough of that. Rather, since causality as such is aesthetic, and since nonhumans are not that different from humans, the new approach would be to form aesthetic–causal alliances with nonhumans. These alliances would have to resist becoming brittle, whether that brittleness is right wing (authoritarianism) or left wing (the endless maze of critique). No “ism,” especially not the ultimate forms, nihilism and cynicism, is in any sense effective at this point. All forms of brittleness are based on the mistaken assumption that there is a metalanguage and that therefore “Anything you can do, I can do meta.” I will not be listing any approaches here, as Bey does. Such lists and manifestos belong to the vanguardism that no longer works. Why? Not because of some marvelous revolution in human consciousness, but because nonhumans have so successfully impinged upon human social, psychic and aesthetic space. It is the time after the end of the world. That happened in 1945, when a thin layer of radioactive materials was deposited in Earth's crust. Geology now calls it this era the Anthropocene . Ironically, this period, named after humans, is the moment at which even the most thick headed of us make decisive contact with nonhumans, from mercury in our blood to manta rays to magnesium. Richard Dawkins, Pat Robertson and Lady Gaga all have to deal with global warming and mass extinction, somehow. We now live in an Age of Asymmetry marked by a skewed, spiraling relationship between vast knowledge and vast nonhuman things—both become vaster and vaster because of one another and for the same reasons.28 This means that coming up with the perfect attitude or the perfect aesthetic prescription just won't work any more. Even the most hardened anthropocentrist now has to pay through the nose for basic food supplies, and has to use more sunscreen. Whether he knows it or acknowledges it, he is already acting with regard towards nonhumans. There is nothing special to think, no special critique that will get rid of the stains of coexistence. The problem won't fit into the well-established modern boxes, which is why the “mystical,” “spiritual” quality of Bey's prose is welcome. Of course, when I put it this way, you may immediately close off and decide that I am talking about perfect attitudes after all, or something outside of politics, or other ways that the radical left marshals to police its thinking of the nonhuman. Because that is what is really at stake in all this: the nonhuman in its coexistence with the human—bosons, gods, clouds, spirits, lifeforms, experiences, the sunlight rippling across the cypresses. Bey begins to get at this in a Latour litany in the second part of The Temporary Autonomous Zone , “The Assassins”: Pomegranate, mulberry, persimmon, the erotic melancholy of cypresses, membrane-pink shirazi roses, braziers of meccan aloes & benzoin, stiff shafts of ottoman tulips, carpets spread like make-believe gardens on actual lawns—a pavilion set with a mosaic of calligrammes—a willow, a stream with watercress—a fountain crystalled underneath with geometry— the metaphysical scandal of bathing odalisques, of wet brown cupbearers hide-&-seeking in the foliage—“water, greenery, beautiful faces.”29 This will be conveniently dismissed as orientalism. If we're never allowed to escape the crumbling prison of modernity for fear of imperialism there is truly no hope. In a similar way, the fear of anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism is very often staged from a place that just is anthropocentrism .30 Critique turns into ressentiment . An object radiates a zone that is aesthetic and therefore causal. Because objects “time” they are temporary. Not because they exist “in” time that eventually gets the better of them. Their very existence implies the possibility of their non-existence. Since objects are not consistent, they can cease to exist. But nothing, no one, will ever be able to insert a blade between appearance and existence, even thought there is a rift there. Now that's what I call autonomy. NOTES 1. John Cage, Silence: Lectures and Writings (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1973), 96. 2. P. B. Medawar and J. S. Medawar, The Life Science: Current Ideas in Biology (London: Wildwood House, 1977), 8. 3. David DeGrazia, Animal Rights: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 5. 4. Antony Colynet, A True History of the Civil Warres in France (London, 1591), 480. 5. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time , tr. Joan Stambaugh (Albany, N.Y: State University of New York Press, 1996) 62–71. 6. Graham Harman, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects (Peru, IL: Open Court, 2002). 7. Hakim Bey, The Temporary Autonomous Zone (Brooklyn: Autonomedia, 1991). 8. Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object (Ripley: Zero Books, 2011), 7–18. 9. This is not the place to get into an argument about quantum theory, but I have argued that quanta also do not endorse a world that I can't speak about because it is only real when measured. This world is that of the reigning Standard Model proposed by Niels Bohr and challenged by De Broglie and Bohm (and now the cosmologist Valentini, among others). See Timothy Morton, “Here Comes Everything: The Promise of Object-Oriented Ontology,” Qui Parle 19.2 (Spring–Summer, 2011), 163–190. 10. John Donne, Holy Sonnets 15, in The Major Works: Including Songs and Sonnets and Sermons , ed. John Carey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 11. Edward O. Wilson, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (New York: Knopf, 1998). 12. Martin Heidegger, What Is a Thing? (Washington: Regnery, 1968), 243. 13. Albert Einstein, Relativity: The Special and the General Theory (London: Penguin, 2006); Petr Horava, “Quantum Gravity at a Lifshitz Point,” arXiv:0901.3775v2 [hep-th]. 14. Graham Priest, In Contradiction (Oxford University Press, 2006), passim: the most notable recent quarantine officers have been Tarski, Russell, and Frege. 15. Priest, In Contradiction , 172–181. 16. William Butler Yeats, “Among School Children,” Collected Poems , ed. Richard J. Finneran (New York: Scribner, 1996). 17. Paul de Man, “Semiology and Rhetoric,” Diacritics 3.3 (Autumn, 1973), 27–33 (30). 18. Jacques Lacan, Le seminaire, Livre III: Les psychoses (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1981), 48. See Slavoj Zizek, The Parallax View (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006), 206. 19. Alphonso Lingis, The Imperative (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 29. 20. Priest, In Contradiction , 9–27. 21. See Graham Priest and Francesco Berto, “ Dialetheism ,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2010 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. 22. Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection , tr. Alan Sheridan (London: Tavistock, 1977), 311. 23. The analogy can be found at length in Douglas Hofstadter, “Contracrostipunctus,” Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 75–81. 24. Bey, “ Chaos: The Broadsheets of Ontological Anarchism ,” Temporary Autonomous Zone . 25. This is closest to the language of François Laruelle in Philosophies of Difference: A Critical Introduction to Non-Philosophy (New York: Continuum, 2011) 179. 26. Bey, “ Chaos: The Broadsheets of Ontological Anarchism ,” Temporary Autonomous Zone . 27. Peter Bürger, Theory of the Avant Garde (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 28. For further discussion see Timothy Morton, “From Modernity to the Anthropocene: Ecology and Art in the Age of Asymmetry,” The International Social Science Journal 209 (forthcoming). 29. Bey, “ The Assassins ,” Temporary Autonomous Zone . 30. Timothy Morton, The Ecological Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010), 75–76. (shrink)

Modern aesthetic Minimalism is neither a flight to abstract spirituality, nor an extracting process of a primordial essence. It is concerned, rather, with the aesthetic object as pure refiguration and the production of “concrete universality”, of form as content and possibility of itself. This becomes especially apparent in the Minimalism of the 1960s. The main focus of this paper will be on Dan Flavin’s luminous minimalism. The latter is characterised by a style that, though simple in appearance, introduced a higher (...) level of complexity with regard to the relation between form and matter, concept and thing, in artistic production. Neither sculptures nor paintings, Flavin’s works fall right under Donald Judd’s category of “specific objects”. Nevertheless, his luminous creations are not particularly specific, just as they are not strictly speaking objects. Their main material – colour-light – is as intangible and diffuse, as its origin – the fluorescent lamp – is commonplace and artificial. Drawing on such influential theorists of art as Theodor W. Adorno, Peter Bürger, Clement Greenberg and Jacques Rancière, this paper studies the lessons that philosophy can learn from Flavin's light minimalism, most notably in relation to the notions of aesthetic materiality and sublimation. (shrink)

Since the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the validity of Marxism and Marxist theory has undergone intense scrutiny both within and outside the academy. In _Lukács After Communism_, Eva L. Corredor conducts ten lively and engaging interviews with a diverse group of international scholars to address the continued relevance of György Lukács’s theories to the post-communist era. Corredor challenges these theoreticians, who each have been influenced by the man once considered the foremost theoretician of Marxist aesthetics, to reconsider the (...) Lukácsean legacy and to speculate on Marxist theory’s prospects in the coming decades. The scholars featured in this collection—Etienne Balibar, Peter Bürger, Terry Eagleton, Fredric Jameson, Jacques Leenhardt, Michael Löwy, Roberto Schwarz, George Steiner, Susan Suleiman, and Cornel West—discuss a broad array of literary and political topics and present provocative views on gender, race, and economic relations. Corredor’s introduction provides a biographical synopsis of Lukács and discusses a number of his most important theoretical concepts. Maintaining the ongoing vitality of Lukács’s work, these interviews yield insights into Lukács as a philosopher and theorist, while offering anecdotes that capture him in his role as a teacher-mentor. (shrink)

At eighty-five, Jacques Maritain, the most distinguished Catholic philosopher of the twentieth century, has written what he offers as his last book, and it turns out to be a shocker. The peasant, as Maritain calls himself in the title, is a man who calls a spade a spade; and a storm of controversy descended immediately on the book's publication in France, as both Right and Left reeled from the force of Maritain's criticism.The Peasant of the Garonne is a sharp (...) attack on the new philosophy, hoping to cool off the fever for change that Maritain believes is imperiling the church's traditional spirituality and even the substance of doctrine. There is sardonic humor in his treatment of Teilhardians, phenomenologists, existentialists, new-style biblical critics, and clerical Freudians, but Maritain is deeply serious in warning that their capitulation to fashioniable trends represents a kind of kneeling before the world. (shrink)

Tout ce qui est dans l'oeuvre de Jacques, nous l'avons d'abord vécu à l'état de difficulté vitale et d'expérience, - les questions de l'art et de la morale, de la philosophie, de la foi, de la prière, de la contemplation. Cela nous a d'abord été donné à vivre, à chacun selon sa nature et la grâce de Dieu », notait Raïssa en 1934. Cette correspondance confirme le propos, qui nous fait pénétrer dans « l'amour fou » de deux vies (...) données l'une à l'autre, et la trame quotidienne de leur fécondité de pensée et de « grandes amitiés ».Leur conversion en 1906 scelle la vocation d'un couple venu déjà un peu d'ailleurs : lui, 18 ans, romantique, révolutionnaire et dreyfusard en diable, en rupture avec les élites républicaines laïques dont il est issu ; elle, 17 ans, comme sortie d'une peinture de Chagall, juive et slave en quête à la Sorbonne d'une nouvelle patrie spirituelle. Les premiers regards portés sur eux discernent déjà leur promesse : « Je les trouve absolument dignes l'un de l'autre ; ce sont même de si beaux types d'humanité qu'il faut se féliciter de les voir se rechercher. On ne trouve pas si souvent de couple bien assorti ; celui-là me paraît devoir donner un exemple lumineux. »Ils s'écrivent abondamment dès que les aléas de la vie les séparent et ce premier tome les suit dans la découverte d'eux-mêmes. Dans la discontinuité des circonstances, leur chemin métaphysique et mystique progresse, tandis que se révèle, derrière chaque ouvrage, chaque combat, chaque accompagnement spirituel, le secret de leur rayonnement : au fil de ces 712 lettres, c'est d'abord une histoire d'amour, dans un respect tendre et sacré de la singularité de l'autre. (shrink)

A prominent feature of American political consciousness is a desire to propagate democracy throughout the world. In our enthusiasm to share what we enjoy, Jacques Barzun sees that little attention is paid to exactly what we are trying to distribute. Through a brief historical survey of democracy, he shows that our popular conception of the term does not correspond with any particular definition. U.S. democracy has no central text and is distinctly different, in theory and in practice, from the (...) democracy of other states, both historical and contemporary. Democracy is an abstract ideal that is a function of time. Its present incarnation in the United States emphasizes freedom and equality through the means and language of specific personal rights. Barzun sees an internal tension in this formulation, one that ultimately threatens both freedom and equality if exported to the rest of the world. (shrink)

An accessible and thorough introduction to implicatures, a key topic in all frameworks of pragmatics. Starting with a definition of the various types of implicatures in Gricean, neo-Gricean and post-Gricean pragmatics, the book covers many important questions for current pragmatic theories, namely: the distinction between explicit and implicit forms of pragmatic enrichment, the criteria for drawing a line between semantic and pragmatic meaning, the relations between the structure of language and its use, the social and cognitive factors underlying the use (...) of implicatures by native speakers, and the factors influencing their acquisition for children and second language learners. Written in non-technical language, Implicatures will appeal to students and teachers in linguistics, applied linguistics, psychology and sociology, who are interested in how language is used for communication, and how children and learners develop pragmatic skills. (shrink)

" Je veus qu'on m'y voie en ma façon simple, naturelle et ordinaire, sans contention et artifice : car c'est moy que je peins. Mes defauts s'y liront au vif, mes imperfections et ma forme naïfve (native, naturelle), autant que la reverence publique (la décence) me l'a permis. " Les Essais, on le sait, ne sont pas une autobiographie, mais un autoportrait emboîté dans un ensemble de digressions, de citations, d'anecdotes, de réflexions morales, présentés avec humour, ironie, parfois avec fausse (...) modestie, en se jouant des temps, des lieux, des circonstances. Lire Montaigne, c'est donc certes découvrir ce portrait que Montaigne fait de lui-même, mais aussi éprouver les forces et les failles de cette introspection : à quelles conditions peut-on se regarder avec lucidité? La lecture des Essais incite ainsi à vouloir avoir une meilleure idée de soi-même, plus exacte, plus précise. Tel peut être l'usage de Montaigne. Du moins, tel est l'exercice auquel s'est complu l'auteur par un dialogue fécond avec le philosophe. (shrink)

Derrière toute affirmation, derrière toute déclaration, derrière toute doctrine, se trouve toujours un je, même s'il ne se présente pas comme tel : un je qui pense, qui croit, qui sait. Nous faisons sans cesse usage de nous-même - de nos perceptions, de nos sentiments, de nos idées, de nos savoirs, de nos croyances, pour penser, agir, ou communiquer. La réflexion philosophique ne fait pas exception : ce livre examine les diverses modalités de l'usage de soi en philosophie."--Page 4 of (...) cover. (shrink)

L’introspection peut être conçue comme une manière de s’observer pendant qu’on se livre à une activité mentale et comme une méthode de recherche dans les sciences du mental, dans l’intention de comprendre et de décrire aussi précisément que possible les événements mentaux d’ordre divers qui ont lieu en nous. Les critiques de l’introspection mettent en cause aussi bien la méthode et ses résultats que la possibilité même d’user d’une telle procédure. Les premières objections ont trait au caractère « objectif » (...) de l’introspection. L’autre catégorie d’objections porte sur la possibilité d’observer un événement mental pendant que celui-ci a lieu. Il n’en reste pas moins que nous nous regardons penser, sentir, agir. Puisque l’introspection au sens restreint n’est pas possible, à cause justement des problèmes que posent l’objectivité des résultats et la simultanéité de l’observation, je propose d’élargir la portée de l’introspection en la renforçant en arrière, par la rétrospection, considérée comme un regard jeté sur ce qui vient d’avoir lieu dans mon monde mental ; et en avant, par la prospection, considérée comme un regard jeté sur ce qui se passe en général dans mon monde mental. En partant de ce double point de vue, on constate que l’introspection est non seulement possible mais qu’elle est même intéressante et féconde. (shrink)

Poete pour les Juifs, qui ne se sont pas reconnus dans sa philosophie, Salomon Ibn Gabirol a ete pour les chretiens le philosophe Avencebrol ou Avicebron. Dans le Fons Vitae, Ibn Gabirol cherche a concilier deux evidences qui se contredisent et auxquelles il adhere neanmoins absolument: l'evidence monotheiste d'un Dieu createur ex nihilo, et l'evidence neoplatonicienne de l'emanation graduelle de l'etre. Le Fons Vitae a joue un role important pour la scolastique chretienne, surtout dans la problematique de l'origine et de (...) la composition des substances spirituelles, l'Un, l'intellect et l'ame. Cette reprise de La philosophie de Salomon Ibn Gabirol, revue et mise a jour, s'accompagne de la nouvelle parution de la traduction francaise du Fons Vitae, sous le titre Le Livre de la Source de Vie. (shrink)

Quelqu'un sait quelque chose, voila la situation de depart de toute problematique cognitive. Dans toute situation cognitive, un sujet connaissant se trouve en relation cognitive avec un objet connu. Contrairement a l'approche analytique suivie par les disciplines cognitives classiques - logique, epistemologie, psychologie cognitive, et aujourd'hui l'intelligence artificielle - qui detachent l'objet de leur recherche de son contexte d'origine, la demarche de ce livre est integrante. Elle entend ne pas couper la problematique cognitive des situations cognitives effectives dans lesquelles cette (...) problematique prend corps et se deploie. (shrink)

Pour Francis Jacques, Professeur émérite à l'Université Paris III-Sorbonne Nouvelle, l'âge de la modernité exténuée que nous vivons est celui des grands théorèmes de possibilité transcendantale. Il est peu de dire que l'homme ne possède pas la vérité : c'est désormais sur l'injonction radicale d'oser interroger qu'il convient d'instruire la question "Qu'est-ce que penser?". La philosophie commence au moment où la pensée se rend capable de mettre à jour la dimension de l'originaire, comme redoublement de l'origine. En quoi elle (...) se veut pensée de la constitution. La pensée religieuse commence l'acquiescement à ce qui pourrait achever l'interrogation radicale sur Dieu cherché, aimé comme l'infini d'un coeur. Elle se clôt avec la méditation du don. (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà paru sur RussEurope le 6 mars 2015. Nous remercions Jacques Sapir de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. L'analyse des formes économiques qui commencent à se coaguler en Russie depuis 2000 suggère le retour à un modèle de développement où le poids de l'État sera particulièrement important, que ce soit sous des formes directes ou indirectes. Dans le même temps, ces formes économiques ne sont pas sans rappeler celles que l'on trouvait dans le modèle (...) de développement russe des années - Économie et Marxisme. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage aurait pu s'intituler " matière et vie ". L'auteur nous guide sur le long chemin qui va des constituants élémentaires d'un jeune univers, dans lequel la vie est évidemment absente, jusqu'aux formes complexes de la matière. Il explique comment et pourquoi la matière se complexifie dans le coeur des étoiles de premières générations, dans la nébuleuse protosolaire, sur la jeune Terre envoie de différenciation, dans les premiers océans terrestres. Il décrit ce que l'on croit savoir, mais aussi passe (...) en revue tout ce que l'on ignore à propos de la génération spontanée des premières cellules vivantes. Lorsque la vie apparaît, l'histoire de la matière devient dépendante de l'évolution biologique. Après trois milliards d'années environ, celle-ci conduit à l'apparition de l'homme, seul être vivant capable de faire évoluer la matière. Ce livre propose ainsi une fresque d'une réelle ampleur, sans équivalent à ce jour, écrite pour être accessible à tous. Et pourtant, les questions abordées relèvent de nombreuses disciplines, comme l'astrophysique, la biologie, la chimie, le génie génétique et l'histoire des techniques. (shrink)

O presente Curso de Introdução ao Estudo do Direito se destaca como significativa contribição do Autor não apenas aos que estão ingressando no apaixonante cenário jurídico, como também a todos os profissionais e estudiosos que desejam aprofundar seus conhecimentos sobre a juridicidade, através de uma linguagem didática, precisa, simples, objetiva e direta, porém sem perder o necessário rigor científico. Com a publicação desta 6a edição, a obra de Paulino Jacques volta a ocupar o lugar que sempre lhe coube na (...) discussão dos principais problemas que envolvem o Direito. (shrink)

A la manière de Charles Taylor, dans les travaux qu'il a consacrés à la genèse du "moi" ou à l'évolution du sentiment religieux à travers les âges, Daniel Jacques trace un vaste panorama historique où il suit le développement de l'idée d'humanisme depuis l'Antiquité à nos jours. Il montre comment l'humanisme est posé à la Renaissance comme un retour à la sagesse des Anciens, puis comment il est, à l'époque des lumières, la mesure suprême de l'action et de la (...) pensée des forces progressistes. Il montre enfin comment, à partir du 19e siècle, des critiques perçoivent l'humanisme non plus comme l'heureuse manifestation d'une liberté conquise de haute lutte à l'encontre des traditions passées, mais comme la cause même de cette démesure et du déclin du sens moral qui l'accompagne. (shrink)