Reproductive cloning, genetic engineering and the autonomy of the child: the moral agent and the open future

Journal of Medical Ethics 33 (2):87-93 (2007)
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Abstract

Some authors have argued that the human use of reproductive cloning and genetic engineering should be prohibited because these biotechnologies would undermine the autonomy of the resulting child. In this paper, two versions of this view are discussed. According to the first version, the autonomy of cloned and genetically engineered people would be undermined because knowledge of the method by which these people have been conceived would make them unable to assume full responsibility for their actions. According to the second version, these biotechnologies would undermine autonomy by violating these people’s right to an open future. There is no evidence to show that people conceived through cloning and genetic engineering would inevitably or even in general be unable to assume responsibility for their actions; there is also no evidence for the claim that cloning and genetic engineering would inevitably or even in general rob the child of the possibility to choose from a sufficiently large array of life plans

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Matteo Mameli
King's College London

Citations of this work

The relative importance of undesirable truths.Lisa Bortolotti - 2013 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 16 (4):683-690.
The relative importance of undesirable truths.Lisa Bortolotti - 2012 - Medicine Healthcare and Philosophy (4):683-690.
Bioethics as Science Fiction.David Gurnham - 2012 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 21 (2):235-246.
Are All Rational Moralities Equivalent?Darryl Gunson - 2011 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 20 (2):238-247.

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References found in this work

A Life in the Shadow: One Reason Why We Should Not Clone Humans.Søren Holm - 1998 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 7 (2):160-162.
Freedom Evolves. [REVIEW]Jürgen Schröder - 2005 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 59 (2).

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