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  1. What is a Higher Level Set?Dimitris Tsementzis - 2016 - Philosophia Mathematica:nkw032.
    Structuralist foundations of mathematics aim for an ‘invariant’ conception of mathematics. But what should be their basic objects? Two leading answers emerge: higher groupoids or higher categories. I argue in favor of the former over the latter. First, I explain why to choose between them we need to ask the question of what is the correct ‘categorified’ version of a set. Second, I argue in favor of groupoids over categories as ‘categorified’ sets by introducing a pre-formal understanding of groupoids as (...)
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  • Mind the Gap: Steven French: The structure of the world: Metaphysics and representation. Oxford: OUP, 2014, 416pp, ISBN: 978-0-19-968484-7, ₤50.00 HB.Elaine Landry - 2015 - Metascience 25 (2):183-188.
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  • Mathematics: Method Without Metaphysics.Elaine Landry - 2023 - Philosophia Mathematica 31 (1):56-80.
    I use my reading of Plato to develop what I call as-ifism, the view that, in mathematics, we treat our hypotheses as if they were first principles and we do this with the purpose of solving mathematical problems. I then extend this view to modern mathematics showing that when we shift our focus from the method of philosophy to the method of mathematics, we see that an as-if methodological interpretation of mathematical structuralism can be used to provide an account of (...)
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  • Categorical Generalization and Physical Structuralism: Figure 1.Raymond Lal & Nicholas Teh - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (1).
    Category theory has become central to certain aspects of theoretical physics. Bain has recently argued that this has significance for ontic structural realism. We argue against this claim. In so doing, we uncover two pervasive forms of category-theoretic generalization. We call these ‘generalization by duality’ and ‘generalization by categorifying physical processes’. We describe in detail how these arise, and explain their significance using detailed examples. We show that their significance is two-fold: the articulation of high-level physical concepts, and the generation (...)
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