El ensayo explora la relación que hay entre la educación para las ciencias y la educación para la democracia en el pensamiento de Max Weber, un problema no tratado por el sociólogo de Erfurt. Ello se realiza a partir del análisis del plano epistemológico y del análisis sobre la ética del científico de Weber. Al final, se elaboran dos interpretaciones razonables sobre el objeto del ensayo y se selecciona una de las mismas sobre la base de una apuesta pluralista.

Educar... ¿Cómo? ¿Qué implica hoy el mero hecho de que la ciudadanía pueda ser educada? Y, realmente, ¿podemos hoy educar a nadie? Éste es el lugar hacia el que se dirige la presente obra. El lugar de la discusión en filosofía moral y política se sitúa hoy en el ámbito de las virtudes cívicas y la educación de la ciudadanía. Pero aparte de dar cuenta de la necesidad de algún elenco de virtudes para sostener nuestro mundo y para poder vivir (...) en democracia, poco más allá se suele ir en la discusión. Por otro lado, ante el mundo de una ciudadanía que ha de ser enseñada para serlo, los pedagogos tampoco tienen muy claro cuál es su trabajo, qué deben enseñar ni cómo. El propósito de este libro es analizar qué supone apostar por ese ámbito de virtudes cívicas y cómo se puede educar en el mismo. (shrink)

Regla y tiempo real son las ineludibles entidades entre las que se genera la creación musical. En contra de ciertas idealizaciones que enturbian la comprensión de lo que hacemos cuando hacemos música, no hay --en un extremo del eje-- improvisación ni interpretación que no dependan en mayor o menor medida de un predeterminado marco normativo. Y, en el otro extremo, hasta el más exhaustivo conjunto de instrucciones se implementa siempre en un irrepetible tiempo real, lo que hace de la música (...) un fenómeno solo parcialmente predecible y, por lo tanto, abierto a la improvisación. En consecuencia, lejos de las inclinaciones excepcionalistas tanto de algunos discursos académicos como de ciertos valedores de lo que solemos llamar músicas improvisadas, esta obra señala una relevante continuidad entre distintos modos de hacer música, una continuidad a menudo oscurecida por la desatención o el humo ideológico. Toda interpretación es, pues, constitutivamente improvisativa y, a la vez, dependiente de un marco normativo. Si, finalmente, y en contra del hegemónico platonismo musical, admitimos que "una obra musical no existe sino en el momento de su interpretación", por decirlo en los términos de Vladimir Jankélévitch, parece que debiéramos contemplar sin reparos la posibilidad --por contraintuitiva que parezca-- de que toda obra musical sea forzosamente improvisativa. Estas páginas fascinantes pretenden, desde disciplinas complementarias como la estética, la musicología o la ontología del arte, esclarecer determinados aspectos básicos de nuestras prácticas musicales y responder a una serie de preguntas sobre la tradición, la naturaleza y la interpretación de la obra musical que no solemos hacernos"--Back cover. (shrink)

Este artículo tiene como objetivo desarrollar el pensamiento crítico y actitudes cívicas sobre los derechos humanos en la infancia con el álbum ilustrado. Para ello, se explica la conjunción entre lenguaje textual y visual del álbum y su aprovechamiento para desarrollar la educación literaria, plástica y en valores. Se analizan cuatro títulos con los que realizar mediación educativa en Educación Infantil relacionada con los derechos humanos. Finalmente, se concluye que el álbum es una herramienta pedagógica idónea para fomentar la lectura (...) literaria, la alfabetización visual y la creación de una futura ciudadanía crítica, empática y consciente de los derechos humanos. (shrink)

“Probably Peirce’s best-known works are the first two articles in a series of six that originally were collectively entitled Illustrations of the Logic of Science and published in Popular Science Monthly from November 1877 through August 1878. The first is entitled ‘The Fixation of Belief’ and the second is entitled ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear.’ In the first of these papers Peirce defended, in a manner consistent with not accepting naive realism, the superiority of the scientific method over other (...) methods of overcoming doubt and ‘fixing belief.’” — Robert Burch, “Charles Sanders Peirce,” entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2021 revision) -/- “Pragmatist epistemologies often explore how we can carry out inquiries in a self-controlled and fruitful way. (Where much analytic epistemology centres around the concept of knowledge, considered as an idealised end-point of human thought, pragmatist epistemology centres around the concept of inquiry, considered as the process of knowledge-seeking and how we can improve it.) So pragmatists often provide rich accounts of the capacities or virtues that we must possess in order to inquire well, and the rules or guiding principles that we should adopt. A canonical account is Peirce’s classic early paper ‘The Fixation of Belief‘. Here Peirce states that inquiry is a struggle to replace doubt with “settled belief“, and that the only method of inquiry that can make sense of the fact that at least some of us are disturbed by inconsistent beliefs, and will subsequently reflect upon which methods of fixing belief are correct is the Method of Science, which draws on the Pragmatic Maxim described above. This contrasts with three other methods of fixing belief: i) refusing to consider evidence contrary to one’s favored beliefs (the Method of Tenacity), ii) accepting an institution’s dictates (the Method of Authority), iii) developing the most rationally coherent or elegant-seeming belief-set (the A Priori Method).“ — Catherine Legg, “Pragmatism,” entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2021 revision). (shrink)

Recent conversation has blurred two very different social epistemic phenomena: echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Members of epistemic bubbles merely lack exposure to relevant information and arguments. Members of echo chambers, on the other hand, have been brought to systematically distrust all outside sources. In epistemic bubbles, other voices are not heard; in echo chambers, other voices are actively undermined. It is crucial to keep these phenomena distinct. First, echo chambers can explain the post-truth phenomena in a way that epistemic (...) bubbles cannot. Second, each type of structure requires a distinct intervention. Mere exposure to evidence can shatter an epistemic bubble, but may actually reinforce an echo chamber. Finally, echo chambers are much harder to escape. Once in their grip, an agent may act with epistemic virtue, but social context will pervert those actions. Escape from an echo chamber may require a radical rebooting of one's belief system. (shrink)

Value capture occurs when an agent’s values are rich and subtle; they enter a social environment that presents simplified — typically quantified — versions of those values; and those simplified articulations come to dominate their practical reasoning. Examples include becoming motivated by FitBit’s step counts, Twitter Likes and Re-tweets, citation rates, ranked lists of best schools, and Grade Point Averages. We are vulnerable to value capture because of the competitive advantage that such crisp and clear expressions of value have in (...) our private reasoning and our public justification. There is, however, a price. In value capture, we take a central component of our autonomy — our ongoing deliberation over the exact articulation of our values — and we outsource it. And the metrics to which we outsource usually engineered for the interests of some external force, like a large-scale institution’s interest in cross-contextual comprehensibility and quick aggregability. That outsourcing cuts off one of the key benefits to personal deliberation. In value capture, we no longer adjust our values and their articulations in light of own rich experience of the world. Our values should often be carefully tailored to our particular selves or our small-scale communities, but in value capture, we buy our values off the rack. In some cases – like decreasing CO2 emissions – the costs of non-tailored values are outweighed by the benefit of precise collective coordination. In other cases, like in our aesthetic lives, they are not. This suggests that we should want different values suited to different scales. We should want value federalism. Some values are perhaps best pursued at the largest-scale level, others at smaller scales. The problem occurs when we exhibit an excess preference for the largest-scale values – when we consistently let the universal metrics swamp our quieter interests. (shrink)

According to most accounts of trust, you can only trust other people (or groups of people). To trust is to think that another has goodwill, or something to that effect. I sketch a different form of trust: the unquestioning attitude. What it is to trust, in this sense, is to settle one’s mind about something, to stop questioning it. To trust is to rely on a resource while suspending deliberation over its reliability. Trust lowers the barrier of monitoring, challenging, checking, (...) and questioning. Trust sets up open pipelines between yourself and parts of the external world. Trust permits external resources to have a similar relationship to one as one’s internal cognitive faculties. This creates efficiency, but at the price of exquisite vulnerability. We must trust in this way because we are cognitively limited beings in a cognitively overwhelming world. Crucially, we can hold the unquestioning attitude towards objects and technologies. When I trust my climbing rope, I stop worrying about its reliability. When I trust my online calendaring system, I simply go to the events indicated, without question. But, one might worry, how could one ever hold such a normatively loaded attitude as trust towards mere objects? How could it ever make sense to feel betrayed by an object? Trust is our engine for expanding and outsourcing our agency — for binding external processes into our practical selves. Thus, we can be betrayed by our smartphones in the same way that we can be betrayed by our memory. When we trust, we try to make something a part of our agency, and we are betrayed when our part lets us down. To unquestioningly trust something is to let it in—to attempt to bring it inside one’s practical functioning. This suggests a new form of gullibility: agential gullibility, which occurs when agents too hastily and carelessly integrate external resources into their own agency. (shrink)

Uterus transplantation (UTx) research has been introduced in several countries, with trials in Sweden and the United States producing successful outcomes. The growing interest in developing UTx trials in other countries, such as Spain, the Netherlands, Japan, and Australia, raises important questions regarding the ethics of surgical innovation research in the field of UTx. This paper examines the current state of UTx in the context of the surgical innovation paradigm and IDEAL framework and discusses the ethical challenges faced by those (...) considering the introduction of new trials. We argue that UTx remains an experimental procedure at a relatively early stage of the IDEAL framework, especially in the context of de novo trials, where protocols are likely to deviate from those used previously and where researchers are likely to have limited experience of UTx. We conclude that countries considering the introduction of UTx trials should build on the strengths of the reported outcomes to consolidate the evidence base and shed light on the uncertainties of the procedure. Authorities responsible for the ethical governance of UTx trials are advised to draw on the ethical framework used in the oversight of surgical innovation. (shrink)

In his celebrated masterpiece, Symposium, Plato imagines a high-society dinner-party in Athens in 416 BC at which the guests - including the comic poet Aristophanes and, of course, Plato's mentor Socrates - each deliver a short speech in praise of love. The sequence of dazzling speeches culminates in Socrates' famous account of the views of Diotima, a prophetess who taught him that love is our means of trying to attain goodness. And then into the party bursts the drunken Alcibiades, the (...) most popular and notorious Athenian of the time, who insists on praising Socrates himself rather than love, and gives us a brilliant sketch of this enigmatic character. The power, humour, and pathos of Plato's creation engages the reader on every page. This new translation is complemented by full explanatory notes and an illuminating introduction. (shrink)

This article provides an overview of recent contributions to the debate on the ethical use of previously collected biobank samples, as well as a country report about how this issue has been regulated in Spain by means of the new Biomedical Research Act, enacted in the summer of 2007. By contrasting the Spanish legal situation with the wider discourse of international bioethics, we identify and discuss a general trend moving from the traditional requirements of informed consent towards new models more (...) favourable to research in a post‐genomic context. (shrink)

The abstract structure of inquiry - the process of acquiring and changing beliefs about the world - is the focus of this book which takes the position that the "pragmatic" rather than the "linguistic" approach better solves the philosophical problems about the nature of mental representation, and better accounts for the phenomena of thought and speech. It discusses propositions and propositional attitudes (the cluster of activities that constitute inquiry) in general and takes up the way beliefs change in response to (...) potential new information, suggesting that conditional propositions should be understood as projections of epistemic policies onto the world.Robert C. Stalnaker is a professor in the Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell University. A Bradford Book. (shrink)

En este trabajo pretendo mostrar el modo como la simpatía humeana sirve para convertir las pasiones barrocas en sentimientos morales con los que el interés puede establecerse como algo admisible en un comportamiento virtuoso. Ello supone la admisión de que no hay moralidad sino en un contexto social desde el cual se afinan los sentimientos de un modo reflexivo, aunque no únicamente racional siguiendo el mismo modelo que se usa para afinar el sentido del gusto.

This book clarifies the meaning of the most important and pervasive concepts and tools in bioethical argumentation and assesses the methodological suitability of the main methods for clinical decision-making and argumentation. The first part of the book is devoted to the most developed or promising approaches regarding bioethical argumentation, namely those based on principles, values and human rights. The authors then continue to deal with the contributions and shortcomings of these approaches and suggest further developments by means of substantive and (...) procedural elements and concepts from practical philosophy, normative systems theory, theory of action, human rights and legal argumentation. Furthermore, new models of biomedical and health care decision-making, which overcome the aforementioned criticism and stress the relevance of the argumentative responsibility, are included. (shrink)

La autonomía es parte esencial de la fundamentación moral de la sociedad contemporánea y ha dado lugar en el ámbito asistencial a un nuevo modelo de relación y de toma de decisiones clínicas. El objetivo de este artículo es exponer el significado de la autonomía del paciente a través de la distinción de tres dimensiones: autonomía decisoria, autonomía informativa y autonomía funcional o ejecutiva, la periodización de su evolución normativa a lo largo de tres etapas, y la propuesta de cuestiones (...) o desafíos que merecen ser objeto de estudio y aplicación en el futuro. (shrink)

"This edition, which replaces the original Loeb edition..., offers text, translation, and annotation that are fully current with modern scholarship"--Front flap of dust jacket, volume 1.

Metaphysicians speak of laws of nature in terms of necessity and universality; scientists, in terms of symmetry and invariance. In this book van Fraassen argues that no metaphysical account of laws can succeed. He analyzes and rejects the arguments that there are laws of nature, or that we must believe there are, and argues that we should disregard the idea of law as an adequate clue to science. After exploring what this means for general epistemology, the author develops the empiricist (...) view of science as a construction of models to represent the phenomena. (shrink)

A revolutionary new theory and call to action on animal rights, ethics, and law from the renowned philosopher Martha C. Nussbaum.

Philosophers of biology typically pose questions about individuation by asking “what is an individual?” For example, we ask, “what is an individual species”, “what is an individual organism”, and “what is an individual gene?” In the first part of this chapter, I present my account of the gene concept and how it is used in investigative practices in order to motivate a more pragmatic approach. Instead of asking “what is a gene?”, I ask: “how do biologists individuate genes?”, “for what (...) purposes?”, and “do their practices of individuating genes serve these purposes?" In the second part of this chapter, I propose that we use this approach when analyzing concepts of organisms and biological individuals. Following philosophical pragmatism, I argue that we should abstain from attempts to situate individuation of Darwinian individuals or of holobionts in a philosophy of nature. Instead, we should analyze practices of individuating organisms in terms of three-place relations between the world, ideas, and human purposes and actions. I conclude with three lessons: an ontological, an epistemological, and a meta-philosophical lesson, which I suggest, apply to philosophy of science generally and to philosophy and metaphysics at large. (shrink)

In this critique, Martha Nussbaum argues that our dominant theories of development have given us policies that ignore our most basic human needs for dignity and self-respect.

What is empiricism and what could it be? Bas . van Fraassen, one of the world’s foremost contributors to philosophical logic and the philosophy of science, here undertakes a fresh consideration of these questions and offers a program for renewal of the empiricist tradition. The empiricist tradition is not and could not be defined by common doctrines, but embodies a certain stance in philosophy, van Fraassen says. This stance is displayed first of all in a searing, recurrent critique of metaphysics, (...) and secondly in a focus on experience that requires a voluntarist view of belief and opinion. Van Fraassen focuses on the philosophical problems of scientific and conceptual revolutions and on the not unrelated ruptures between religious and secular ways of seeing or conceiving of ourselves. He explores what it is to be or not be secular and points the way toward a new relationship between secularism and science within philosophy. (shrink)

Bazzocchi disposes the text of the Tractatus in a user-friendly manner, exactly as Wittgenstein's decimals advise. This discloses the logical form of the book by distinct reading units, linked into a fashioned hierarchical tree. The text becomes much clearer and every reader can enjoy, finally, its formal and literary qualities.

This article provides an overview of recent contributions to the debate on the ethical use of previously collected biobank samples, as well as a country report about how this issue has been regulated in Spain by means of the new Biomedical Research Act, enacted in the summer of 2007. By contrasting the Spanish legal situation with the wider discourse of international bioethics, we identify and discuss a general trend moving from the traditional requirements of informed consent towards new models more (...) favourable to research in a post-genomic context. (shrink)

Part of The US Army Large-Scale Combat Operations Series, Maintaining the High Ground combines discussions and historical case studies from the past seventy-five years to address ethical challenges for the Army Profession. With today's all-volunteer Army, maintaining public trust is critical, and large-scale combat operations require a professional class of leaders and soldiers with strong ethics and the ability to adapt and even shape their own future.

This edition of Martin Ostwald's revised version of J. B. Skemp's 1952 translation of _Statesman_ includes a new selected bibliography, as well as Ostwald's interpretive introduction, which traces the evolution in Plato's political philosophy from _Republic_ to _Statesman to Laws_--from philosopher-king to royal statesman.

Lógica viva de Vaz Ferreira (1910) es considerada una original contribución a la reflexión lógica ---por ejemplo, recientemente, Vega Reñón (2013 y 2019) ha resaltado su relevancia---. Lógica viva puede interpretarse como la fundamentación, exposición e implementación parcial de un programa de indagación lógica, que anima una relectura de los contenidos tradicionales y una ampliación del elenco tradicional de paralogismos (Seoane 2019b). Al hacerlo entrelaza invención lógica y pedagógica. Desde esta óptica, resulta clave el contraste entre su estilo de (...) ejemplificar y el estilo usual de los manuales de lógica. Este trabajo propone una interpretación de la política de ejemplificación de Lógica viva. (shrink)

Résumé Nous posons dans cet article que l’humour dans le discours publicitaire est un mécanisme privilégié de la communication multicanale et plurisémiotique pour transformer le discours marchand en pratique communicationnelle agissante. Dans son rapport à une normativité donnée comme potentiellement divergente, il est mobilisé dans le double objectif de construire un ethos décalé, identifiable et mémorisable pour le locuteur-annonceur, et de produire du plaisir intellectuel pour susciter la connivence du récepteur, qui devient ainsi co-énonciateur. Est alors interrogée la sémiosis de (...) ce discours publicitaire dont chaque élément est porteur de signification aux yeux du récepteur lors de l’acte d’énonciation. Par la lecture connivente que le processus induit, l’acte humoristique comme acte de parole du côté de la production vise ensuite à s’actualiser en acte d’achat proprement dit du côté de la réception. (shrink)

This is an excellent translation. It achieves a very high standard of accuracy and readability, two goals very difficult to attain in combination when it comes to such a master of prose and philosophical argument as Plato. Because of this the book is suitable for courses at all levels in philosophy, from introductory courses on Plato, or problems in Philosophy, to graduate seminars. --Gerasimos Santas, Teaching Philosophy.

La afirmación “todos los triángulos son isósceles” es obviamente falsa; sin embargo, una supuesta “demostración” de tal aserto ha devenido muy popular. Al parecer, la autoría de dicha argumentación se debe a Rouse Ball (Rouse Ball, 1905, pp. 38-39). Diversos autores la han calificado como “falacia” o “sofisma”. Por ejemplo: Rouse Ball (1905, p. 38), E. A. Maxwell (1963, p. 13), Ya. S. Dubnov (2006, p. 2), Jesse Norman (2006, p. 2), Marvin J. Greenberg (2008, p. 25), K. Manders (2008, (...) p. 94). Hamblin enseña que un argumento falaz, desde el punto de vista de una larga tradición que se remonta a Aristóteles, es un argumento que no es válido, pero lo parece (Hamblin, 1970, p. 12). Así si se pretende afirmar que un argumento dado es una falacia, dos cuestiones resultan esenciales: ¿por qué el argumento es incorrecto?, ¿por qué luce como si fuera correcto? El objetivo aquí es, respondiendo ambas interrogantes, enriquecer la comprensión de este caso y, en general, algunos aspectos de la demostración geométrica heterogénea. (shrink)

Hoy vivimos en un mundo emocionalizado donde las discusiones éticas, políticas o culturales y estéticas se ofrecen siempre en forma de emociones (y se legitiman por ser sentimientos o afectos) y es difícil encontrar un espacio para la reflexión razonada. Creo que atender a la reflexión de Hume sobre la estética nos puede ayudar aquí, pues aunque comienza su conocido ensayo “Of the Standard of Taste” con la asunción de que sobre gustos nada hay escrito, Hume permite construir un espacio (...) de discusión (aunque no enteramente racional) acerca de cuestiones evidentemente sentimentales. Un espacio que se distingue por la conversación y la sociabilidad que supone esta: lo bello, como cualquier emoción, se educa en la charla que establecemos con quienes conversamos. No hay nada previo a la misma. (shrink)