Classical Confucianism, Misc

Fallibilism is a precondition for the conversation between culturally distinct philosophies that comparative philosophy tries to bring about. Without an acknowledgement that our own tradition’s claims may be incomplete or mistaken, we would have no reason to engage members of other communities. Were the early Confucians fallibilists? While some contemporary commentators have seen fallibilism as an essential characteristic of the Confucian tradition, others have argued that the tradition is characterized instead by an “epistemological optimism,” and must be substantially revised if (...) it is to meet the challenges of the modern world. What both sets of commentators have in common is that they see fallibilism as a kind of intellectual virtue. If, to adapt a statement from Peirce, fallibilism’s consequences are antagonistic to Confucianism, then so much the worse for Confucianism. In this paper, I want to look at the issue of fallibilism in the central text of Confucianism, the Analects. At the heart of this text I find a puzzle that complicates both of the above-mentioned views. Confucius’ teachings advocate personal humility, flexibility, and listening to others, on the one hand, while at the same time considering the central teachings themselves to be infallible. In the first half of the paper I look at some textual evidence that shows that Confucius advocates a fallibility of persons but not a full-fledged epistemic one, and in the second half I give an explanation of why this is the case. (shrink)

Confucius is considered to be a great philosopher and educator in Chinese society and one of the greatest scholars ever in world history. He was the founder of Confucianism, which constitutes a major part of traditional Chinese culture and made tremendous contribution to the unfolding of Chinese civilization over the centuries. In this study, the authors have presented a comprehensive outline of Confucianism and have attempted to gauge the attitude of contemporary Chinese people towards Confucian concepts, values and attributes as (...) well as their influences on the social lives of present-day Chinese population. The Likert Scale was applied in the study to assess the attitude of the Chinese educated class belonging to the educational institutions like the universities in Beijing towards Confucianism. It was found from the survey that the Confucian concepts still wield substantial influence on the social outlook of the modern-day Chinese people and these attributes are still relevant in the day to day lives of the Chinese society. Philosophy and Progress, Vol#61-62; No#1-2; Jan-Dec 2017 P 109-132. (shrink)

Confucian writings on ritual from the classical period (ca 8th-3rd centuries BCE), including instruction manuals, codes of conduct, and treatises on the origins and function of ritual in human life, are impressive in scope and repay careful engagement. These texts maintain that ritual participation fosters social and emotional development, helps persons deal with significant life events such as marriages and deaths, and helps resolve political disagreements. These early sources are of interest not only to historians and Sinologists, but also to (...) philosophers and social scientists; they contain enduring insights into the nature and status of rituals more generally. This chapter surveys classical Confucian theories of the origins and functions of ritual, and summarizes some strident critiques of them from contemporary thinkers in the Mohist, Daoist, and Legalist schools of thought. The aim is to indicate key issues as well as promising strategies for analyzing ritual in Confucian thought and action. (shrink)

Han Feizi’s criticisms of Confucian and Mohist political recommendations are often thought to involve materialist or historicist arguments, independently of their epistemological features. Drawing largely on Amia Srinivasan’s recent taxonomy of genealogical arguments, this paper proposes a genealogical reading of passages in “The Five Vermin [五蠹 wudu]” and “Eminence in Learning [顯學 xianxue].” This reveals Han Feizi’s arguments to be more comprehensively appreciated as problematizing Confucian and Mohist political judgments as arising from undermining contingencies, rendering them irrelevant, if not detrimental, (...) to any lasting excellence of a state. In doing this, it is also suggested that there is a ‘master argument’ underlying Han Feizi’s criticisms, according to which the epistemology of the Confucians and Mohists are fundamentally unreliable. (shrink)

Recent debates on Confucian meritocracy largely center around outright normative critiques rather than its textual basis. The unflattering upshot is the lack of attention to a mode of critique that scrutinizes Confucian meritocracy by questioning the way meritocrats invoke Confucian concepts and values. Focusing on three meritocrats—Bai Tongdong 白彤東, Daniel A. Bell, and Kang Xiaoguang 康曉光, this article ventures a text-based normative approach by examining continuities and ruptures between core meritocratic arguments they make, and the messages conveyed by Confucian masters. (...) The core argument that I advance is that the meritocratic thesis about the political division of labor does not mesh with the classic Confucian understandings of voluntariness and political authority, which generates uneasy normative consequences for Confucian meritocracy. Ultimately, classic Confucianism does not provide a conceptually secure platform for the meritocratic part of Confucian meritocracy as its ardent advocates claim. (shrink)

Tongdong Bai’s ambitious book, Against Political Equality: The Confucian Case, aims to not only draw on classic Confucianism to shed light on contemporary issues but also make Confucianism universally applicable to the human conditions widely shared around the globe. Bai’s Confucian political theory carries distinctive merits in both its innovative approach and comprehensive scope, but there are still ambiguities of which he owes us more explanation. In this review article, I offer a brief summary of Bai’s book and critically engage (...) with three aspects of his account: the acceptability of the Confucian hybrid regime, its relationship with Confucian compassion, and hierarchical international order. First, Bai’s pursuit of service to the people as an end result makes it difficult to apply to societies that champion political equality and participation. Second, neither the supremacy of the Confucian value of compassion nor the hybrid regime’s ability to carry it through is self-evidently clear. Third, the Confucian idea of unity among all-under-heaven undermines Bai’s advocacy of patriotic allegiance to a particular state and hierarchical inter-state order where the multiplicity of states, albeit unequal, is preserved. (shrink)

The rise of populism and the decline of western liberal democracies in the recent decade have pushed many contemporary Confucian political theorists to re-examine the relationship between Confucianism and liberal democracy. On the one hand, whether or not Confucianism and liberal democracy are strictly compatible with each other is no longer important to many. Instead, it is theoretically more interesting and practically more urgent to try and explore the best of both worlds. On the other hand, if the relationship can (...) be understood in such a way as to pivot the question from what liberal democracy can do for Confucianism to what Confucianism can do for liberal democracy, then it seems that political Confucianism... (shrink)

What is the relationship between moral virtue and happiness? Does having moral virtues make their possessors happy? Can one be happy without them? Philosophers provide diverging answers to these questions due to their different understandings of the concept of happiness which has multifarious meanings and senses. In this essay, I compare the representative Western theories of happiness with what may be called “a classical Confucian view” informed by recent scholarship on classical Confucianism. I argue that for classical Confucian philosophers, especially (...) Confucius and Mencius, there are two kinds of happiness: exclusive and inclusive happiness. I conclude that moral virtue is necessary for inclusive happiness shared by the virtuous and the recipients of their virtuous actions and/or policies. (shrink)

This paper explores the meaning of Confucian de 德 in the Book of Rites 《禮記》. Using intertextual discussions with texts supplemented by the Analects《論語》, the Mengzi 《孟子》, and the Xunzi《荀子》, I argue that ritual and virtue are closely interrelated. Without ritual, virtue is raw. Without virtue, ritual is barren. De’s interrelationship with ritual is central to Confucian ethics. Ritual is constitutive for all Confucian virtues. This central thesis coupled with subsequent features such as de’s aesthetic dimension and thick interpersonal relationships (...) demonstrate that the Confucian de has multilayered meanings that cannot be fully captured by either the contemporary concept of virtue or the Aristotelian idea of arête. (shrink)

This article argues for the necessity of a social group ontology in Confucian ethics. The heart of Confucian ethics is self-cultivation begun in familial relations. Social group categories can disrupt family structures in ways that can only be ignored at a high cost to the well-being of biological family members who do not share the dominant group identities. To make this disruption clear, I will articulate the challenge queer lives pose for classical Confucian self-cultivation. This discussion will give rise to (...) an account of queer chosen kin and its compatibility with the existing Confucian role-relational ontology. The incorporation of social group identities and an account of the sociopolitical constitution of persons is necessary not only for the development of Confucian social and political philosophy, but also for illustrating the significant ways in which Confucianism can shape cross-cultural discussions of ethical self-cultivation. (shrink)

In 2016, Colin Kaepernick, a quarterback for the San Francisco 49ers, remained seated during the national anthem in order to protest racial injustice and police brutality against African-Americans. After consulting with National Football League and military veteran Nate Boyer, Kaepernick switched to taking a knee during the anthem for the remainder of the season. Several NFL players and other professional athletes subsequently adopted this gesture. This article brings together complementary Confucian and phenomenological analyses to elucidate the significance of Kaepernick’s gesture, (...) and in the process provide a phenomenological characterization of the connection between the Confucian notions of sagehood and ritual. Kaepernick’s gesture subverts the anthem ritual from within while simultaneously remaining faithful to the ideals it is meant to express. Furthermore, it institutes a new bodily form of patriotic self-expression compatible with both American and Confucian ideals. (shrink)

Totalitarianism is perhaps unanimously regarded as one of the greatest political evils of the last century and has been the grounds for much of Anglo-American political theory since. Confucianism, meanwhile, has been gaining credibility in the past decades among sympathizers of democratic theory in spite of criticisms of it being anti-democratic or authoritarian. I consider how certain key concepts in the classical Confucian texts of the Mencius and the Xunzi might or might not be appropriated for ‘legitimising’ totalitarian regimes. Under (...) an Arendtian approach to understanding totalitarianism, it is precisely an unproblematised relation to a normative History and Nature that underlies the potential compatibility or incompatibility. I argue against a longstanding prejudice that if any form of Confucianism would be totalitarian, it would have to be Xunzian. Against this, I hope to show that if any form of Confucianism would be totalitarian, it might well be a naturalistic Mencian Confucianism instead of a constructivist Xunzian one. (shrink)

The proposed paper presents an argument in favor of a Rawlsian approach to ethics for Internet technology companies (den Hoven & Rooksby, 2008; Hoffman, 2017). Ethics statements from such companies are analyzed and shown to be utilitarian and teleological in nature, and therefore in opposition to Rawls’ theories of justice and fairness. The statements are also shown to have traits in common with Confucian virtue ethics (Ames, 2011; Nylan, 2008).

This book explores the significance of archery as ritual practice and literary metaphor in classical Confucian texts. Archery passages in the Analects, Mencius, and Xunzi are discussed in the light of Zhou culture and the troubled historical circumstances of early followers of the ruist master Confucius.

In this article we examine Classical Confucian political thinking through the lens of paternalism. We situate Confucianism amid contemporary models of paternalism to show that Confucianism can be understood as a soft form of paternalism regarding its method. Confucianism stresses cultivation of the people by moral exemplars to guide the people to act in ways that are in their own best interests. This is in contrast to use of law and punishment as a deterrent of unwanted behaviours of the people. (...) We demonstrate that Confucian paternalism does not advocate for a static top-down structure of governance that is incapable of reform, underscoring its non-authoritarian ideal. We do this by stressing the vital upward momentum constituted in general cultivation of the wider population utilizing li. The picture that emerges from an examination of Confucian political thought through the lens of paternalism is what we name “exemplary paternalism.”. (shrink)

Confucianism is potentially relevant to business ethics and business practice in many ways. Although some scholars have seen Confucian thought as applicable to corporate social responsibility :433–451, 2009) and to corporate governance :30–43, 2013), only a few business ethicists :415–431, 2001b; Journal of Business Ethics 116:703–715, 2013; Romar in Journal of Business Ethics 38:119–131, 2002; Lam in The Analects, Penguin Classics, London, 2003; Chan in Journal of Business Ethics 77:347–360, 2008; Woods and Lamond in Journal of Business Ethics 102:669–683, 2011) (...) have taken seriously the possibility that Confucius may have important insights to offer regarding virtue ethics, which has now become the most popular normative theory as evidenced by the number of recent articles published in business ethics journals :287–318, 2017). This paper aims to help rectify this oversight. The paper focuses on several distinctive aspects of Confucian ethics, discussing both how Confucius’ approach differs from Aristotelian virtue ethics in significant ways and how these key differences suggest numerous directions for future research. (shrink)

The question of possible moral conflict between commitment to family and to impartiality is particularly relevant to traditional Confucian thought, given the importance of familial bonds in that tradition. Classical Confucian ethics also appears to lack any developed theoretical commitment to impartiality as a regulative ideal and a standpoint for ethical judgment, or to universal equality. The Confucian prioritizing of family has prompted criticism of Confucian ethics, and doubts about its continuing relevance in China and beyond. This chapter assesses how (...) those sympathetic to the Confucian vision of the good life might respond. It first explores Confucian conceptions of love and the importance of familial love. Next, problems arising from this commitment to partiality are discussed, and how a modern Confucian ethics might respond. I explore what notions of impartiality—understood largely pragmatically, as a value that functions in everyday social life rather than as an explicit moral principle that guides deliberation or judgment—can be derived from an ethics that focuses on family commitments. (shrink)

There have been questions that are directed toward the outcome of using an exemplar in moral and character education. Meanwhile, the role of the narrative in the context of moral and character education has often been viewed as being didactic and being used to indoctrinate moral lessons only. On the other hand, some scholars have also attempted to explore the significances of the exemplar and the narrative for moral and character education. In classical Confucianism, the exemplar refers to the Junzi. (...) Moreover, there were many narratives concerning the lives of the exemplars mentioned by Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi for their students to emulate and aspire to. This paper argues that the utilization of the exemplar and the narrative in classical Confucianism can offer us another perspective for conducting moral and character education. This paper firstly illustrates the notion of the Junzi as an exemplar in classical Confucianism. Then, it explores the role of the narrative of the Junzi as an exemplar in classical Confucianism. Lastly, it discusses its four implications for moral and character education, comprising: assisting students to discover the commonality of their exemplars and themselves as the starting point to emulate their exemplars; helping students to build their morality and character through their interaction with ‘many others;’ guiding students to create a proper narrative of themselves to form an integrative view of their lives; and emphasizing the exemplary function of the teacher in moral and character education. (shrink)

This thesis is about the creativity in the East and the West, but I will mainly focus on the view of creativity in ancient Greek philosophy and Chinese philosophy. In the first chapter, I will explore the concept of creativity, the history of creativity, and the research on creativity, including the creativity research in psychology and philosophy, which will set the stage for further disscusion. Then in the second chapter, I will start from Plato’s dialogue, Ion, and explore the traditional (...) theory of creativity in ancient Greek philosophy, and claim that their creative ability is inspired by divine being. After this, I will show people’s view on creativity has undergone a process of demystification. During this process, people gradually began to resist the divine source and explore the world individually and independently. Meanwhile, the meaning of the concept of creativity has become broader, since it is not limited to poem any more, but it can be applied to other fields, such as art, science, and education. In the third chapter, I will turn to the modern creativity theory, including the lateral thinking and emotional creativity, and explore how to be creative with lateral thinking techniques and how to improve creativity through emotion regulation. After the examination in the West, I will turn to the theory of creativity in Chinese philosophy, by focusing on classical works in Daoism and Confucianism. In the fourth chapter, I will explore the view of creativity in philosophy of Daoism. I will claim that the creativity in Daoism is natural and cosmological, and there is no external creative source, so I will claim it is self- creativity, which is distinct from the ancient Western creativity pushed by external divine power. In the fifth chapter, I will argue that the creativity in Confucianism is evolutionary, which is unlike the revolutionary creativity in the West, and I will propose the way to become creative in Confucianism based on its classics, Analects, and then will explore the creativity principle and how the agent cultivate their creative ability in Confucianism. In the conclusion, I will summarize the difference between the creativity in East and West, from the perspective of the source of creativity, nature of creativity. I will claim that the source of creativity in ancient Greek philosophy is divine being, whereas there is no divine source for creativity in Chinese philosophy, therefore, the creativity in the West traditionally is inspired creativity, while the creativity in the East traditionally is natural and cosmological creativity. In addition, the concept of creativity in the West is revolutionary, whereas the concept of creativity in the East is evolutionary and the moral function of creativity is also addressed in Chinese philosophy. (shrink)

The classical Chinese philosophical tradition (ca. 6th to 3rd centuries BCE) contains rich discussion of skill and expertise. Various texts exalt skilled exemplars (whether historical persons or fictional figures) who guide and inspire those seeking virtuosity within a particular dao (guiding teaching or way of life). These texts share a preoccupation with flourishing, or uncovering and articulating the constituents of an exemplary life. Some core features thought requisite to leading such a life included spontaneity, naturalness, and effortless ease. However, there (...) was also significant disagreement during this ‘Warring States’ or ‘Hundred Schools’ period on which skills were valuable, how one should cultivate them, and who exactly ought to serve as exemplars. In this chapter, I discuss two prominent types of expertise and their attendant skills. The first is expertise at a particular craft, occupation, or dao, which finds its most poignant celebration in the early Daoist anthology Zhuangzi. Interest in crafts or skilled occupations was likely motivated by a perceived (or implied) analogy with living a good life more generally. The second concerns ethical expertise, a prominent and widely held ideal within the Ruist (Confucian) and Mohist schools. Both maintain that ethical expertise consists of an ability to apply past models or precedents to current cases, though they diverge on what those models are and how to properly apply them. The aim is to provide non-specialists an overview of this literature in Daoism, Confucianism, and Mohism, while also providing suggestions about further research. (shrink)

This paper discusses commerce in Early Confucianism. It argues that the virtuous Confucian agent engages with the world in different ways, including in commerce – it is another way of acting with virtue. This conception is compared with two roughly contemporary approaches in economics, the thought of Wilhelm Röpke and the Humanomics project by Vernon Smith. In both, virtue is constitutive to commerce. However, they differ substantially in the exact relationship between virtue and commerce. While in Early Confucianism commerce is (...) a way for the agent to unfold and cultivate virtues, in Röpke, virtues are a corrective to the utilitarianism in commerce. In Humanomics, agents engaging in commercial relations find shared virtues. (shrink)

There are a number of recent attempts to introduce Confucian values to the ethical analysis of technology. These works, however, have not attended sufficiently to one central aspect of Confucianism, namely Ritual (‘Li’). Li is central to Confucian ethics, and it has been suggested that the emphasis on Li in Confucian ethics is what distinguishes it from other ethical traditions. Any discussion of Confucian ethics for technology, therefore, remains incomplete without accounting for Li. This chapter aims to elaborate on the (...) concept of Confucian Li and discuss its relevance to ethics of technology. Particularly, by referring to Li’s communicative, formative, and aesthetic function, I formulate an approach to ethics of technology with an emphasis on community, performance, and the aesthetic and demonstrate how this approach proceeds with the ethical analysis of technology. In doing so, I attempt to answer the question: why Confucianism matters in ethics of technology. (shrink)

This essay examines the role that the the ethical plays in early Confucian political philosophy. By focusing primarily on the political thought of Xunzi, I argue that there is a necessary relationship between ethical ideas and political ideas in texts such as the Analects, Mengzi, and Xunzi. In particular, I argue against a more ‘realist’ reading of the tradition which argues that for early Confucians political order was not only a goal independent of ethical goals but also one in which (...) morality had no role to play. In doing so, I show that interpreting the early Confucians constructing their political thought on top of the scaffolding of their ethical views allows us to make more sense of the broader array of ideas on the political realm appearing throughout these texts. (shrink)

A substantial reason behind the Confucian canonization of the Yijing can be located in some underlying patterns of thinking common to both the Yijing and The Analects; especially relevant here is the doctrine of rectification of names. In particular, I analyze the fundamental structure of the Yijing by means of the names and symbols standing in unique semantic/semiotic relations to the world, and I go on to suggest that this is what is importantly entailed by the doctrine of the rectification (...) of names when the latter is understood by means of the perlocutionary function of the prescriptive language. (shrink)

Mengzi maintained that both benevolence (ren 仁) and rightness (yi 義) are naturally-given in human nature. This view has occupied a dominant place in Confucian intellectual history. In Mencius 6A, Mengzi's interlocutor, Gaozi, contests this view, arguing that rightness is determined by (doing what is fitting, in line with) external circumstances. I discuss here some passages from the excavated Guodian texts, which lend weight to Gaozi's view. The texts reveal nuanced considerations of relational proximity and its limits, setting up requirements (...) for moral action in scenarios where relational ties do not play a motivational role. I set out yi's complexity in these discussions, highlighting its implications for (i) the nei-wai debate; (ii) the notion of yi as "rightness," or doing the right thing; and (iii) how we can understand the connection between virtue and right action in these early Confucian debates. This material from the excavated texts not only provides new perspectives on a longstanding investigation of human nature and morality, it also challenges prevailing views on Warring States Confucian intellectual history. In the well-known debate between Mengzi and Gaozi in Mencius 6A, Mengzi maintained that both ren and yi are naturally-given 1 in human nature. The figure 1 To say that ren and yi are naturally-given is not to say that they are fully-developed from the start. I use the phrase "naturally-given" throughout the paper to indicate where a particular capacity or resource (ren or yi) may be found, rather than its final polished state. (shrink)

This essay examines the role of virtue and the status of non-moral goods in conceptions of the good human life through an exploration of the thought of Confucius and Mencius. Both Confucius and Mencius lived in quite similar worlds, but their conceptualizations of the world differed from each another. This difference led them to hold different views on the role of virtue and the status of non-moral goods. On the one hand, Confucius highlighted the self-sufficiency of virtue, but he acknowledged (...) and appreciated the intrinsic and instrumental value of non-moral goods. On the other hand, while Mencius underscored the role of virtue as the best means to the best ends, he tried to depreciate the value of non-moral goods. As a consequence, even though their conceptions of the good life were essentially predicated on virtue, they parted company concerning the status of non-moral goods in human life. (shrink)

The notion of benevolence-righteousness un-doubtedly constitutes the core of Mencius’s theory concerning the goodness of human nature, it also holds the key to the entire Confucian ethics. Despite the fact that we normally give Confucius credit for his discussion over the concept of benevolence, it is Mencius who creates the conjoint of benevolence-righteousness.But as a category benevolence-righteous-ness does not represent a sheer combination of benevolence and righteousness, but suggests a new or reformative version of this line of thought in the (...) intellectual development within Confucian tradition. Mencius’s unique contribution by no means lies in an effort of simply forming a linkage between the two terms, but in the fact that he gives this concept a deeper connotation so as to transform it into an intrinsic-meaning-structure. Mencius’s thinking on this regard is mainly expressed through his theory of human nature, which forms the relation of benevolence and righteous-ness, the two most important among the four starting point. This paper aims to seek a comprehension of the Confucian stance towards evil or the negative phenomena in morality. According to Mencius’s under-standing, the meaning of righteousness is twofold, namely the sense of shame and the hatred of evil. Insofar as consciousness-structure is concerned, both pertain to the compassion for the innocent victims. The former refers to sort of reflection and repentance due to one’s sense of compassion; the latter to one’s coming forward against evil driven by the sense of compassion. Together they depict the whole picture of the Confucian treatment of the evil or immoral phenomena. Thus the sense of shame and that of the hatred of evil become an essential resource for the study of the sense of justice in Confucianism. In a word, the notion of benevolence-righteousness indicates the combination of promoting the good and prohibiting the evil, whose function can be taken in both ethical and political terms. (shrink)

An examination of the tensions between different conceptions of objectivity and subjectivity, and impartiality and partiality, as they arise in epistemology, ethical theory, and metaethics. Resources from classical Chinese philosophy are leveraged throughout the work to showcase new alternative ways of resolving these tensions.

ABSTRACTIn Sinicized Asia, justice, conceptualized and institutionalized in its current form on a Western mold is part of a singular and ancient Confucian legal tradition.In this paper, it will be argued that Confucians initially articulated the concept of justice in relation to their own explanation of the world and their ideal, which distinguishes and rewards men’s actions according to their merits and social condition.It will be shown that Confucius’s thinking is primarily political and suggests ways of harmoniously organizing and reforming (...) society in which justice is conceived both as a principle of government, a principle of social conduct and one of the essential virtues, or a ‘moral sense’ that everyone must possess, while, in practice, Confucian justice will put forward the imperatives of retributive justice. This, despite its philosophical aversion for sanctions and for what upsets harmony. (shrink)

This paper attempts to derive an ethics of interdependence in the Chung Yung, the Doctrine of the Mean. The Doctrine of the Mean, one of the Four Books of Confucianism often paired with the Great Learning, Ta Hsueh, is considered a patchwork of at least two separate writings. While the title indicates the topic to be the Doctrine of the Mean, analogous to the Aristotelian Mean, the latter half of the treatise discusses another topic, Cheng, translated often as sincerity, truth, (...) or reality. On closer reading, however, and emphasizing the second character Yung, meaning “practice” or “common,” one can discover the ethical implications of the treatise. The first part presents the main ideas of the treatise, and the second shows the logical movement of these ideas to come up with an ethics of interdependence: interdependence of self and others, of self and things, and of self and Heaven and Earth. (shrink)

There is no notion of postmortem Heaven and Hell in both ancient Israeli and Confucian traditions, and the two traditions also share quite a number of similarities about the idea of immortal life after death. Therefore, a comparison of the commonness in this field, e.g. the Jewish Levirate Marriage custom and the Confucian custom of adopting one’s son as heir; the idea of name surviving death in Biblical Judaism and that of glorifying one’s parents by making one’s name famous in (...) future ages in Confucianism, can help us reveal the common pursuit in the two traditions: the postmortem fulfillment of an individual is realized in the form of the continuation of one’s family/ tribe/ nation of which they were, and forever remain, a generational link. In addition, this can help clarify a long faulted Confucian dogma of “Having no male heir being the gravest of the three cardinal offences against filial piety”. (shrink)

I propose that Confucianism incorporates a latent commitment to the closely related epistemic virtues of curiosity and inquisitiveness. Confucian praise of certain people, practices, and dispositions is only fully intelligible if these are seen as exercises and expressions of epistemic virtues, of which curiosity and inquisitiveness are the obvious candidates. My strategy is to take two core components of Confucian ethical and educational practice and argue that each presupposes a specific virtue. To have and to express a ‘love of learning’ (...) requires the virtue of curiosity, while the normative practice of good questioning requires exercise of the virtue of inquisitiveness. Taken together, people engaging in the foundational Confucian project of moral self-cultivation must desire and acquire a range of epistemic goods, a set of dispositions that manifest in the virtues of curiosity and inquisitiveness, possession of which is admirable and excellent. Such, at least, is the claim defend in this chapter, which is an exercise in cross-cultural virtue epistemology. (shrink)

The Confucian theory of kingcraft represented a spirit of “moral supremacy”. Confucius and Mencius distinguished “kingcraft” from “rule by force”, which not only emphasized their essential difference at the level of value, but also paid great attention to their relevancy and overlapping of the meaning of existence at the level of being beneficial to society and achievements. The Confucian put emphasis on “justice and humanity” as the highest principle in ethical community, instead of “profit”. Only with morality and justice as (...) the ultimate purpose and the highest principle, can utilitarian successes be purified and can the value as a human being be realized, therefore, constituted the true connotation and internal elements of “kingcraft”. Confucian kingcraft theory can be summarized as: a kind of morality-based principle of the unity of morality-utility. With regard to the principles of international relations, the Confucian kingcraft theory put particular emphasis on the internal unity of the way of heaven, god’s will, benevolent heart, the public opinion, people’s emotions and feelings, and highlighted the transcendental meaning of the principle of moral supremacy. Nowadays, the kingcraft spirit is still of great significance theoretically and practically. (shrink)

Confucian scholars should satisfy two conditions insofar as they think their theories enable Confucianism to make contributions to liberal politics and social policy. The liberal accommodation condition stipulates that the theory in question should accommodate as many reasonable conceptions of the good and religious doctrines as possible while the intelligibility condition stipulates that the theory must have a recognizable Confucian character. By and large, Joseph Chan’s Confucian perfectionism is able to satisfy the above two conditions. However, contrary to Chan and (...) many other Confucian scholars, I argue that any active promotion of Confucianism will violate the liberal accommodation condition. I propose the “wide view of moderate perfectionism,” which enables Confucianism to shed light on a wide range of political and social issues without promoting Confucianism actively. Thus, I present a new approach to the long-standing question of how Confucianism may improve political and social development in a liberal society. (shrink)

In paradigmatic Confucian (Ruist) discourses, emotion (qing) has been depicted as co-arising with human nature (xing) and an irreducible constitutive source of human practices and their interpretation. The affects are concurrently naturally arising and alterable through how individuals react and respond to them and how they are or are not cultivated. That is, emotions are relationally mediated realities given in and transformed through how they are felt, understood, interpreted, and acted upon. Confucian discourses have elucidated the ethical character of the (...) emotions and sought to understand and cultivate emotional life as a hermeneutical and ethical task in establishing expectable patterns of human flourishing that orient virtues, roles, and relations. In this chapter, I explore the extent to which classical Ruist and Neo-Confucian discourses offer hermeneutical models for interpreting the complex interconnections between moral psychology and their mediations in the ethical life world. By examining a range of Confucian sources, the author argues that Confucian “moral psychologies” clarify affective dimensions of human existence within the interpersonal nexus of ethical life and indicate ways of cultivating affective awareness for relationally understanding and interpreting others, one’s world, and oneself. (shrink)

The so-called daxue zhi dao 大學之道, though a Confucian way of self-cultivation, can inspire contemporary universities through a process of creative interpretation. Having examined the ethos of modern university in its four historical stages, I come up with its last stage of reaching out in the era of globalization and dialogue among civilizations, in which we have to rethink the idea of university from the fuller development of human reason. This can be achieved only through increasingly reaching out toward many (...) others by means of mutual waitui 外推 and self-reflection, which presuppose and announce an ethics of generosity in priority over and implementable by reciprocity. Universities today should learn from classical Confucianism, and we should keep in mind their initial generous spirit as exemplified by Confucius himself. Strangification and self-reflection, being moved by original generosity and implemented by reciprocity, will eventually bring us the hope of reason. (shrink)

据报道，越南人每年焚烧大约5 万吨香纸，不仅是纸纸形式， 还有iPhone、汽车、衣服， 甚至是管家形，希望取悦死者。 这这做法被错错地归因于传传的佛教教义，但大多数越南人都不知道它的起源來自于中国。 在生活的其他方面，越南也有许多类似的例子， 他们们于對自己的文化增添新的规范、价值和信仰，甚至相互矛盾的東西。 这这被称为“文化可加性”的现象促使我们研究越南民间故事所显示的三教（儒教、佛教和道教）的核心价值值和规范之间的共存、相互作用和影响。通过过用贝叶斯逻逻回归，我们们估了一个故事的关关信息是否受宗教（因变 量）支配的可能性，還是受到三个教义有关的价值和反价值在表面的影响（自变量）。 我们的主要发现包括儒教和道教价值在文化上可加性的存在。更具体地说，实实实果表明，道教和儒教的价值值在民间故事中的相互作用或相加， 有助于预预故事的关关信息是否与儒教思想有关，β_{VT⋅VC} = 0.86。 同时，佛教却没有这这的传统统统。 这些实果有一些重要意义。 首先，这表明了儒教思想的综治地位，因为儒教和道教的价值在一个故事中一起出现，导致了这个故事有儒学主导的关关信息。因此，它表明了儒学支配地位的实据，并反对对三大宗教的共同根源，或是“三教同源”（“tam giáo đồng nguyên”） 概念的自由解释，认为宗教有传一性或唯一性。 其次，“文化可加性”概念有助于解释许多有趣的社会文化现象，就是越南社会没有不容忍和极端主义的宗教， 在教育里离谱谱谱的现象，科学技术的努力创造的效果低下， 商业中的错导品牌战略。我们知道我们的实果只是初步的， 并且必须进行更多的理论研究和实实研究， 以对 “文化可加性”有充分的解释。.

Yuejiao was the primary form of education ever since the time of Emperors Yao and Shun. This tradition of valuing Yue over Li lasted till the Three Dynasties period. After the Spring and Autumn Period, Lijiao became the dominant form, but it still consisted of a lot of yue. Seeing the declining of this tradition, Confucius claimed to “follow upon Zhou”. That is, he wanted to recover and inherit this ideology that engages primarily in music cultivation supplemented by ritual normalization. (...) His statement: “Let a man be first incited by the Songs, then given a firm footing by the study of ritual, and finally perfected by music,” also shows his emphasis on Yue. More proofs can be found in Confucian classics such as Analects and the Record of Rites, in which discourses on/ about beauty and goodness are characterized by the juxtaposition of Li and Yue to serve a higher purpose for the pre-Qin Confucians. However, this ideology was not inherited by later Confucians. And the consequence is with the increasing status and impact of Confucianism in China in the past 2500 years, such a tradition of valuing Yue over Li gradually turned into a tradition of valuing Li over Yue. This, however, is inconsistent with both Confucius’ ideology of Li and Yue and the real characteristic of Chinese cultural tradition. (shrink)

This paper addresses the issue of ecological sustainability and the dilemma between instrumental rationality and protection of the environment through a discussion of food production. In Confucianism, all human activities, including consumption of food, are seen as inseparable from problems of value. While Confucianism stresses the importance of healthy food, it rejects viewing nature as only having instrumental value. The Confucian view of sustainability can be seen from three parts: Humans should follow the murmuring of their 'heart/mind' and seek to (...) restrict the use of natural resources as much as possible to ‘let every being manifest its mandate to the full’; Harmony with nature is a premise for sustaining humanity; and Finally, taking care of the fundamental needs of the people is a premise for ecological sustainability. (shrink)

In his most recent book, Against Individualism: A Confucian Rethinking of the Foundations of Morality, Politics, Family, and Religion, Henry Rosemont defends against those who would call his reading of Confucianism—he sees it as a type of Role Ethics—a misinterpretation. Rosemont contends that Confucian Role Ethics is important for challenging individualism, even if it is somehow unfaithful to pre-Qin texts. He writes that he could "simply re-title" his book "Role Ethics: A Different Approach to Moral Philosophy Based on a Creative (...) Misreading of Early Confucian Writings". In Confucian Propriety and Ritual Learning: A Philosophical Interpretation, Geir Sigurðsson... (shrink)

In this highly original work, Mathew A. Foust breaks new ground in comparative studies through his exploration of the connections between Confucianism and the American Transcendentalist and Pragmatist movements. In his examination of a broad range of philosophers, including Confucius, Mencius, Xunzi, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, Charles Peirce, William James, and Josiah Royce, Foust traces direct lines of influence from early translations of Confucian texts and brings to light conceptual affinities that have been previously overlooked. Combining resources from (...) both traditions, Confucianism and American Philosophy offers fresh insights into contemporary problems and exemplifies the potential of cross-cultural dialogue in an increasingly pluralistic world. (shrink)

The present study examines the four core concepts that underpin the various theories of cultivation of East Asian Confucian philosophy: self, cultivation, transformation, and nurture. The discussion is divided into six sections. The first section, the introduction, explains the significance of the issue in question. The second section examines the substantial notion of “self” as expounded in the Confucian intellectual tradition and the corresponding concept of selfhood or personhood. Confucianism stresses that personal selfhood is based on the freedom of subjectivity, (...) and society’s values and norms originate in this freedom of subjectivity. The third section discusses the functional concept of cultivation, focusing on the fact that in Confucian theories the terms “cultivation” and “body” are always combined to form the concept of “self-cultivation.” Moreover, Confucian thinkers tend to discuss the effort of self-cultivation in the context of a body-mind continuum. Indeed, they often use orientational metaphors in order to describe the efforts entailed by cultivation. The fourth section analyzes the linguistic setting and context of the functional concept of transformation within Confucian philosophy of the concrete self. The term “transformation” indicates clearly that Confucian philosophy is a transformative philosophy. The fifth section analyzes the functional concept of nurture, stressing that Confucius’ two greatest followers, Mencius and Xunzi, represent two opposed approaches to nurturing. Mencius stresses that one should undertake the effort of “nurturing qi,” that is, produce culture through natural cultivation, while Xunzi advocates artificially instilling culture in order to discipline, tame, and order nature. Mencius and Xunzi both turn to the container metaphor in their discussions of self-cultivation. The article concludes that the various cultivation activities advocated by these two disparate Confucians are based on two assumptions: the self coincides with the physical body, and the physical self is steeped in and interactive with the cultural values of society. In sum, the functional concept of self-cultivation is an important pillar of Confucian theories of self-cultivation. (shrink)

Whose Tradition? Which Dao? Confucius and Wittgenstein on Moral Learning and Reflection by James F. Peterman addresses the valuable position that Confucius’ dao can and has to be understood within the useful framework of Wittgensteinian forms of life, their concrete language games, and the mastery of techniques and rule- following, and that Wittgenstein’s forms of life embody critical therapeutic interventions that can be better understood through Confucian ideas of moral practice and reflection, most significantly as the practice of ritual. Placing (...) Confucianism in a global philosophical context is necessary, since the self-sufficiency of Confucianism demands that it should be possible to... (shrink)

The aim of the article is to demonstrate that the contact between European philosophy and Chinese culture in the 17 th and 18 th centuries had an influence on the emergence and development of secularism, which became a distinctive feature of the Western Enlightenment. In the first part, I examine in what way knowledge of the history of China and the Confucian ethics contested the Biblical chronology and undermined faith as a prerequisite for morality. Subsequently, I analyze the attempts to (...) refute these allegations, reinterpreting Confucianism as crypto-monotheism. In the third part, I will show how the debate on Chinese culture has contributed to the birth of the secular philosophy of history, which put an end to the Enlightenment Sinophilia. In conclusion, I will present the main limitations of the thesis about the influence of Chinese thought on the birth of secularism. (shrink)

One’s translating, reading, and understanding of texts from other eras and traditions are conditioned by tacit assumptions built into one’s own vocabulary and psycho-cultural understanding of self—of which one tends to be only intuitively aware. Thus, for example, when encountering the vocabulary in Classical Chinese for “I,” “me,” “mine,” “self,” et cetera, modern readers are inclined to import their own linguistic, cognitive, and cultural intuitions about these terms, unconsciously and without second thought. This has been particularly problematic for modern Western (...) readers of the Confucian classics, who tend to take self as ontologically and ethically individual. However, recent psychological accounts of self... (shrink)

The problem of free will as it is know in Western philosophical traditions is hardly known in China. Considering how central the problem is in the West, this is a remarkable fact. We try to explain this, and we offer insights into discussions within Chinese traditions that we think are related, not historically but regarding the issues discussed. Thus we introduce four central Chinese concepts, namely: (1) xīn 心 (heart, heart-mind), (2) xìng 性 (human nature, characteristic tendencies, inborn capacity), (3) (...) mìng 命 (lifespan, fate, command, allotment, endowment), and (4) zìrán 自然 (self-so, so of itself, nature, spontaneity), and we indicate how these concepts and their discussions can be related to discussions on free will. (shrink)

This is an intellectual autobiography that aims to explain how I am both an analytic philosopher who writes on questions of moral relativism and pluralism and also on classical Confucianism and Daoism. I have written on the subjects of moral psychology and moral epistemology, articulating what I see to be a fruitful consilience between insights of both Confucian and Daoist thinkers and some of the latest findings in psychology and neuroscience. I regard as synergistic and completely logical this combination of (...) interests, but many find it surprising, so I identify the experiences and influences that brought me to where I am now. (shrink)