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  1. Segregated Specialists and Nuclear Culture.Sean F. Johnston - manuscript
    Communities of nuclear workers have evolved in distinctive contexts. During the Manhattan Project the UK, USA and Canada collectively developed the first reactors, isotope separation plants and atomic bombs and, in the process, nurtured distinct cadres of specialist workers. Their later workplaces were often inherited from wartime facilities, or built anew at isolated locations. For a decade, nuclear specialists were segregated and cossetted to gestate practical expertise. At Oak Ridge Tennessee, for example, the informal ‘Clinch College of Nuclear Knowledge’ aimed (...)
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  2. Believing is Said of Groups in Many Ways (and so It Should Be Said of Them in None).Richard Pettigrew -
    In the first half of this paper, I argue that group belief ascriptions are highly ambiguous. What's more, in many cases, neither the available contextual factors nor known pragmatic considerations are sufficient to allow the audience to identify which of the many possible meanings is intended. In the second half, I argue that this ambiguity often has bad consequences when a group belief ascription is heard and taken as testimony. And indeed it has these consequences even when the ascription is (...)
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  3. Testimonial Injustice: The Facts of the Matter.Migdalia Arcila-Valenzuela & Andrés Páez - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-18.
    To verify the occurrence of a singular instance of testimonial injustice three facts must be established. The first is whether the hearer in fact has an identity prejudice of which she may or may not be aware; the second is whether that prejudice was in fact the cause of the unjustified credibility deficit; and the third is whether there was in fact a credibility deficit in the testimonial exchange. These three elements constitute the facts of the matter of testimonial injustice. (...)
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  4. Experts, Public Policy and the Question of Trust.Maria Baghramian & Michel Croce - forthcoming - In Michael Hannon & Jeroen De Ridder (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. London, UK: Routledge.
    This chapter discusses the topics of trust and expertise from the perspective of political epistemology. In particular, it addresses four main questions: (§1) How should we characterise experts and their expertise? (§2) How can non-experts recognize a reliable expert? (§3) What does it take for non-experts to trust experts? (§4) What problems impede trust in experts?
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  5. The Problem of Unwelcome Epistemic Company.Joshua Blanchard - forthcoming - Episteme:1-13.
    Many of us are unmoved when it is objected that some morally or intellectually suspect source agrees with our belief. While we may tend to find this kind of guilt by epistemic association unproblematic, I argue that this tendency is a mistake. We sometimes face what I call the problem of unwelcome epistemic company. This is the problem of encountering agreement about the content your belief from a source whose faults give you reason to worry about the belief’s truth, normative (...)
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  6. The Epistemic Responsibilities of Citizens in a Democracy.Cameron Boult - forthcoming - In Jeroen De Ridder & Michael Hannon (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology.
    The chapter develops a taxonomy of views about the epistemic responsibilities of citizens in a democracy. Prominent approaches to epistemic democracy, epistocracy, epistemic libertarianism, and pure proceduralism are examined through the lens of this taxonomy. The primary aim is to explore options for developing an account of the epistemic responsibilities of citizens in a democracy. The chapter also argues that a number of recent attacks on democracy may not adequately register the availability of a minimal approach to the epistemic responsibilities (...)
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  7. The Significance of Epistemic Blame.Cameron Boult - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.
    One challenge in developing an account of the nature of epistemic blame is to explain what differentiates epistemic blame from mere negative epistemic evaluation. The challenge is to explain the difference, without invoking practices or behaviors that seem out of place in the epistemic domain. In this paper, I examine whether the most sophisticated recent account of the nature of epistemic blame—due to Jessica Brown—is up for the challenge. I argue that the account ultimately falls short, but does so in (...)
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  8. Towards a Eudaimonistic Virtue Epistemology.Berit Brogaard - forthcoming - In Abrol Fairweather (ed.), Naturalizing Virtue Epistemology. Synthese Library.
  9. Fortuitous Data and Conspiracy Theories.Joel Buenting & Jason Taylor - forthcoming - Journal of the Philosophy of Social Sciences.
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  10. Knowledge-First Approaches in Epistemology and Mind.E. And B. Carter, Gordon and Jarvis, A. (ed.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
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  11. Misinformation and Intentional Deception: A Novel Account of Fake News.Michel Croce & Tommaso Piazza - forthcoming - In Maria Silvia Vaccarezza & Nancy Snow (eds.), Virtues, Democracy, and Online Media: Ethical and Epistemic Issues. Routledge.
    This chapter introduces a novel account of fake news and explains how it differs from other definitions on the market. The account locates the fakeness of an alleged news report in two main aspects related to its production, namely that its creators do not think to have sufficient evidence in favor of what they divulge and they fail to display the appropriate attitude towards the truth of the information they share. A key feature of our analysis is that it does (...)
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  12. Consuming Fake News: Can We Do Any Better?Michel Croce & Tommaso Piazza - forthcoming - Social Epistemology.
    This paper focuses on extant approaches to counteract the consumption of fake news online. Proponents of structural approaches suggest that our proneness to consuming fake news could only be reduced by reshaping the architecture of online environments. Proponents of educational approaches suggest that fake news consumers should be empowered to improve their epistemic agency. In this paper, we address a question that is relevant to this debate: namely, whether fake news consumers commit mistakes for which they can be criticized and (...)
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  13. Intersubjective Propositional Justification.Silvia De Toffoli - forthcoming - In Luis R. G. Oliveira & Paul Silva Jr (eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification. Routledge.
    The distinction between propositional and doxastic justification is well-known among epistemologists. Propositional justification is often conceived as fundamental and characterized in an entirely apsychological way. In this chapter, I focus on beliefs based on deductive arguments. I argue that such an apsychological notion of propositional justification can hardly be reconciled with the idea that justification is a central component of knowledge. In order to propose an alternative notion, I start with the analysis of doxastic justification. I then offer a notion (...)
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  14. Responsibility for Collective Epistemic Harms.Will Fleisher & Dunja Šešelja - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science:1-41.
    Discussion of epistemic responsibility typically focuses on belief formation and actions leading to it. Similarly, accounts of collective epistemic responsibility have addressed the issue of collective belief formation and associated actions. However, there has been little discussion of collective responsibility for preventing epistemic harms, particularly those preventable only by the collective action of an unorganized group. We propose an account of collective epistemic responsibility which fills this gap. Building on Hindriks' (2019) account of collective moral responsibility, we introduce the Epistemic (...)
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  15. The ‘Ontological Complicity’ of Habitus and Field: Was Bourdieu an ‘Externalist’?Nikolaus Fogle & Georg Theiner - forthcoming - In Duncan Pritchard, Orestis Palermos & Adam Carter (eds.), Socially Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    Our aim in this chapter is to contribute to a greater appreciation of Bourdieu’s work within debates on embodied, extended and distributed cognition, grouped under the general heading of externalism (Rowlands 2003, Carter et al. 2014). We seek to draw out several pertinent elements of Bourdieu’s theory of social practice, and show how they variously resonate with, enrich, or problematize key externalist theses. We begin with an overview of the main elements of Bourdieu’s theoretical enterprise, in order to provide essential (...)
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  16. Education and Social Epistemology.Alvin Goldman - forthcoming - Philosophy of Education.
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  17. Experts: What Are They and How Can Laypeople Identify Them?Thomas Grundmann - forthcoming - In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    In this chapter, I survey and assess various answers to two basic questions concerning experts: (1) What is an expert?; (2) How can laypeople identify the relevant experts? These questions are not mutually independent, since the epistemology and the metaphysics of experts should go hand in hand. On the basis of our platitudes about experts, I will argue that the prevailing accounts of experts such as truth-linked, knowledge-linked, understanding-linked or service-oriented accounts are inadequate. In contrast, I will defend an evidence-linked (...)
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  18. Populism, Expertise, and Intellectual Autonomy.Allan Hazlett - forthcoming - In M. Berhow, G. Petersen & G. Tsakiridis (eds.), Engaging Populism: Democracy and the Intellectual Virtues. Palgrave.
    Populism, as I shall understand the term here, is a style of political rhetoric that posits a Manichean conflict between the people and corrupt elites. In the present decade, populism has played a particularly salient role in the politics of the United States and Europe. Moreover, populism is commonly associated with a kind of skepticism about expertise, on which the opinions of non- experts are to be preferred to any expert consensus. In light of all this, populist expertise skepticism appears (...)
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  19. Epistemic Contextualism and the Sociality of Knowledge.Jonathan Ichikawa - forthcoming - In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter has four central aims. First, in §1, I distinguish two ideas within epistemology that sometimes travel under the name ‘contextualism’ — the ‘situational contextualist’ idea that an individual’s context, especially their social context, can make for a difference in what they know, and the ‘linguistic contextualist’ idea that discourse using the word ‘knows’ and its cognates is context-sensitive, expressing dif- ferent contents in different conversational contexts. -/- Second, in §2, I situate contextualism with respect to several influential ideas (...)
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  20. Epistemology.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Paul Allen (ed.), The T&T Clark Encyclopedia of Christian Theology. New York: T&T Clark/Bloomsbury.
    Epistemology is the study of knowledge. This entry covers epistemology in two parts: one historical, one contemporary. The former provides a brief theological history of epistemology. The latter outlines three categories of contemporary epistemology: traditional epistemology, social epistemology, and formal epistemology, along with corresponding theological questions that arise in each.
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  21. Wenn Wahrheit wertlos wird: Demonstrativer Bullshit in der digitalisierten Öffentlichkeit.Romy Jaster & David Lanius - forthcoming - In Politische Bildung für die «neue» Öffentlichkeit? Springer.
    Das aktuelle politische Zeitgeschehen offenbart zunehmend ein Phänomen, das in der philosophischen Fachliteratur als „Bullshit“ bezeichnet wird. Im Unterschied zum Lügner, der über die Fakten täuschen will, stellt der Bullshitter seine Behauptungen ohne jedwede Orientierung an der Wahrheitsfindung auf. Wir unterscheiden verschiedene Arten von Bullshit und führen das Konzept des demonstrativen Bullshits ein. Wie wir zeigen, hat demonstrativer Bullshit im politischen Diskurs besondere Sprengkraft. Bullshitten politische Akteure demonstrativ, untergraben sie damit die Norm der Wahrheit im gesellschaftlichen Diskurs und tragen auf (...)
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  22. Epistemic Corruption and Social Oppression.Ian James Kidd - forthcoming - In Ian James Kidd, Quassim Cassam & Heather Battaly (eds.), Vice Epistemology. London: Routledge.
    I offer a working analysis of the concept of 'epistemic corruption', then explain how it can help us to understand the relations between epistemic vices and social oppression, and use this to motivate a style of vice epistemology, inspired by the work of Robin Dillon, that I call critical character epistemology.
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  23. Epistemic Paternalism Via Conceptual Engineering.Eve Kitsik - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association.
    The paper targets conceptual engineers who aim to improve other people’s patterns of inference and attention by shaping their concepts. Such conceptual engineers sometimes engage in a form of epistemic paternalism that I call “paternalistic cognitive engineering”: instead of explicitly persuading, informing and educating others, the engineers non-consultatively rely on assumptions about the target agents’ cognitive systems to improve their belief-forming. The target agents could reasonably regard such benevolent exercises of control as violating their sovereignty over their own belief-formation. This (...)
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  24. The Wisdom-of-Crowds: An Efficient, Philosophically-Validated, Social Epistemological Network Profiling Toolkit.Colin Klein, Marc Cheong, Marinus Ferreira, Emily Sullivan & Mark Alfano - forthcoming - In Hocine Cherifi, Rosario Nunzio Mantegna, Luis M. Rocha, Chantal Cherifi & Salvatore Micciche (eds.), Complex Networks & Their Applications XI: Proceedings of The Eleventh International Conference on Complex Networks and their Applications: COMPLEX NETWORKS 2022 - Volume 1. Springer.
    The epistemic position of an agent often depends on their position in a larger network of other agents who provide them with information. In general, agents are better off if they have diverse and independent sources. Sullivan et al. [19] developed a method for quantitatively characterizing the epistemic position of individuals in a network that takes into account both diversity and independence; and presented a proof-of-concept, closed-source implementation on a small graph derived from Twitter data [19]. This paper reports on (...)
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  25. The Genealogical Method in Epistemology.Martin Kusch & Robin McKenna - forthcoming - Synthese 197 (3):1057-1076.
    In 1990 Edward Craig published a book called Knowledge and the State of Nature in which he introduced and defended a genealogical approach to epistemology. In recent years Craig’s book has attracted a lot of attention, and his distinctive approach has been put to a wide range of uses including anti-realist metaepistemology, contextualism, relativism, anti-luck virtue epistemology, epistemic injustice, value of knowledge, pragmatism and virtue epistemology. While the number of objections to Craig’s approach has accumulated, there has been no sustained (...)
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  26. The Social Dimension of Open-Mindedness.Jack M. C. Kwong - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.
    This paper explores how open-mindedness and its exercise can be social in nature. In particular, it argues that an individual can be regarded as open-minded even though she does not conduct all of the intellectual tasks as required by open-mindedness by herself; that is, she delegates some of these tasks to her epistemic peers. Thinking about open-mindedness in such social terms not only opens up the possibility that there are different and surprising ways for an individual to be open-minded, but (...)
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  27. Epistemic Arrogance and Political Dissent.Michael Lynch - forthcoming - In Voicing Dissent. New York: Routledge.
    In this essay, I examine four different reasons for thinking that political dissent has epistemic value. The realization of this epistemic value hinges in part on what I’ll loosely call the epistemic environment, or the environment in which individuals come to believe, reason, inquire, and debate. In particular, to the degree that our social practices encourage and even embody an attitude of epistemic arrogance, the epistemic value of dissent will be difficult to realize. Ironically, it is precisely then that dissent (...)
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  28. Steve Fuller, Rhetoric and the End of Knowledge.J. Maffie - forthcoming - Radical Philosophy.
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  29. Mindscapes and Landscapes: Hayek and Simon on Cognitive Extension.Leslie Marsh - forthcoming - In Roger Frantz & Robert Leeson (eds.), Hayek and Behavioral Economics. Palgrave.
    Hayek’s and Simon’s social externalism runs on a shared presupposition: mind is constrained in its computational capacity to detect, harvest, and assimilate “data” generated by the infinitely fine-grained and perpetually dynamic characteristic of experience in complex social environments. For Hayek, mind and sociality are co-evolved spontaneous orders, allowing little or no prospect of comprehensive explanation, trapped in a hermeneutically sealed, i.e. inescapably context bound, eco-system. For Simon, it is the simplicity of mind that is the bottleneck, overwhelmed by the ambient (...)
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  30. Stigmergy 3.0: From Ants to Economies.Leslie Marsh & Margery Doyle - forthcoming - Cognitive Systems Research.
    The editors introduce the themed issue “stigmergy 3.0”.
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  31. Persuasion and Epistemic Paternalism.Robin McKenna - forthcoming - In Guy Axtell & Amiel Bernal (eds.), Epistemic Paternalism: Conceptions, Justifications, and Implications. Rowman & Littlefield.
    Many of us hold false beliefs about matters that are relevant to public policy such as climate change and the safety of vaccines. What can be done to rectify this situation? This question can be read in two ways. According to the descriptive reading, it concerns which methods will be effective in persuading people that their beliefs are false. According to the normative reading, it concerns which methods we are permitted to use in the service of persuading people. Some effective (...)
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  32. Persuasion and Intellectual Autonomy.Robin McKenna - forthcoming - In Kirk Lougheed & Jonathan Matheson (eds.), Epistemic Autonomy. Routledge.
    In her paper “Democracy, Public Policy, and Lay Assessments of Scientific Testimony” Elizabeth Anderson (2011) identifies a tension between the requirements of responsible public policy making and democratic legitimacy. The tension, put briefly, is that responsible public policy making should be based on the best available scientific research, but for it to be democratically legitimate there must also be broad public acceptance of whatever policies are put in place. In this chapter I discuss this tension, with a strong focus on (...)
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  33. Epistemic Shame as a First-Generation Scholar.Lucia Munguia - forthcoming - APA Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy.
    After a reflection on my personal experiences with shame for not having information about my family's struggles after I left for graduate studies, I argue that this experience of shame can be understood to be one of epistemic shame. I sketch a short rationale for this claim. I briefly summarize very recent work on epistemic shame careful to highlight two components of it: 1) this affective state relates to a belief that one holds and 2) the intensity of an experience (...)
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  34. Why We Should Keep Talking About Fake News.Jessica Pepp, Eliot Michaelson & Rachel Sterken - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (4):471-487.
    In response to Habgood-Coote (2019) and a growing number of scholars who argue that academics and journalists should stop talking about fake news and abandon the term, we argue that the reasons which have been offered for eschewing the term 'fake news' are not sufficient to justify such abandonment. Prima facie, then, we take ourselves and others to be justified in continuing to talk about fake news.
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  35. Conspiracy Theories and the Conventional Wisdom Revisited.Charles Pigden - forthcoming - In Olli Loukola (ed.), Secrets and Conspiracies. Rodopi.
    Conspiracy theories should be neither believed nor investigated - that is the conventional wisdom. I argue that it is sometimes permissible both to investigate and to believe. Hence this is a dispute in the ethics of belief. I defend epistemic ‘oughts’ that apply in the first instance to belief-forming strategies that are partly under our control. I argue that the policy of systematically doubting or disbelieving conspiracy theories would be both a political disaster and the epistemic equivalent of self-mutilation, since (...)
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  36. Umstrittene Wahrheit. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit in Philosophie und Religionen.R. Rothenbusch & Oliver Wiertz (eds.) - forthcoming
  37. The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge (1940).«.A. Salomon - forthcoming - Social Research: An International Quarterly.
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  38. Problems with Publishing Philosophical Claims We Don’T Believe.Işık Sarıhan - forthcoming - Episteme:1-10.
    Plakias has recently argued that there is nothing wrong with publishing defences of philosophical claims which we don’t believe and also nothing wrong with concealing our lack of belief, because an author’s lack of belief is irrelevant to the merit of a published work. Fleisher has refined this account by limiting the permissibility of publishing without belief to what he calls ‘advocacy role cases’. I argue that such lack of belief is irrelevant only if it is the result of an (...)
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  39. Knowing Disability, Differently.Shelley Tremain - forthcoming - In Ian James Kidd, Jose Medina & Pohlhaus Jr (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice. Routledge.
  40. Bots: Some Less-Considered Epistemic Problems.Benjamin Winokur - forthcoming - Social Epistemology:1-13.
    Posts on social media platforms like Twitter are sometimes the products of deceptively designed bots. These bots can cause obvious epistemic problems, such as tricking human users into believing the contents of misleading posts. However, less-considered epistemic problems involve false bot judgements where a human user mistakes another human user’s post for a bot-post, or where a human user mistakenly believes that bots are the primary vehicles for tokening certain content on social media. This paper takes up three questions concerning (...)
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  41. Trueing.Holly Andersen - 2023 - In The Pragmatist Challenge: Pragmatist Metaphysics for Philosophy of Science. Oxford University Press.
    Even in areas of philosophy of science that don’t involve formal treatments of truth, one’s background view of truth still centrally shapes views on other issues. I offer an informal way to think about truth as trueing, like trueing a bicycle wheel. This holist approach to truth provides a way to discuss knowledge products like models in terms of how well-trued they are to their target. Trueing emphasizes: the process by which models are brought into true; how the idealizations in (...)
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  42. Measuring Virtuous Responses to Peer Disagreement: The Intellectual Humility and Actively Open-Minded Thinking of Conciliationists.James R. Beebe & Jonathan Matheson - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-24.
    Some philosophers working on the epistemology of disagreement claim that conciliationist responses to peer disagreement embody a kind of intellectual humility. Others contend that standing firm or “sticking to one’s guns” in the face of peer disagreement may stem from an admirable kind of courage or internal fortitude. In this paper, we report the results of two empirical studies that examine the relationship between conciliationist and steadfast responses to peer disagreement, on the one hand, and virtues such as intellectual humility, (...)
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  43. On testimonial knowledge and its functions.Michel Croce - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-21.
    The problem of explaining how we acquire knowledge via testimony gives rise to a dilemma, according to which any theory must make testimonial knowledge either too hard or too easy, and therefore no adequate account of testimonial knowledge is possible. In recent work, John Greco offers a solution to the dilemma on behalf of anti-reductionism that appeals to Edward Craig’s functionalist epistemology. It is argued that Greco’s solution is flawed, in that his functionalist account provides wrong verdicts of ordinary cases (...)
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  44. Response to Commentaries by Alessandra Tanesini and Lani Watson.Michel Croce & Duncan Pritchard - 2022 - In Mark Alfano, Colin Klein & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), Social Virtue Epistemology. London: Routledge. pp. 609-612.
    The insightful commentaries to our contribution "Education as the Social Cultivation of Intellectual Virtue" (in 'Social Virtue Epistemology', (eds.) M. Alfano, C. Klein & J. de Ridder, Routledge 2022) offered by Alessandra Tanesini and Lani Watson highlight some important aspects of the work that philosophers, education theorists, and educators should carry out to strengthen the theoretical and practical advantages of the educational approach we have proposed. This commentary briefly addresses a few points that could set the grounds for future investigations (...)
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  45. Education as The Social Cultivation of Intellectual Virtue.Michel Croce & Duncan Pritchard - 2022 - In Mark Alfano, Colin Klein & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), Social Virtue Epistemology. London: Routledge. pp. 583-601.
    The recent literature has seen a burgeoning discussion of the idea that the overarching epistemic goal of education is the cultivation of the intellectual virtues. Moreover, there have been attempts to put this idea into practice, with virtue-led educational interventions in schools, universities, and even prisons. This paper explores the question of whether—and, if so, to what degree—such intellectual virtue-based approaches to education are essentially social. The focus in this regard is on the role of intellectual exemplars within this approach, (...)
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  46. Suspicious conspiracy theories.M. R. X. Dentith - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-14.
    Conspiracy theories and conspiracy theorists have been accused of a great many sins, but are the conspiracy theories conspiracy theorists believe epistemically problematic? Well, according to some recent work, yes, they are. Yet a number of other philosophers like Brian L. Keeley, Charles Pigden, Kurtis Hagen, Lee Basham, and the like have argued ‘No!’ I will argue that there are features of certain conspiracy theories which license suspicion of such theories. I will also argue that these features only license a (...)
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  47. Avoiding the Stereotyping of the Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories: A Reply to Hill.M. R. X. Dentith - 2022 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 11 (8):41-49.
    I’m to push back on Hill’s (2022) criticism in four ways. First: we need some context for the debate that occurred in the pages of the Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective that so concerns Hill. Second: getting precise with our terminology (and not working with stereotypes) is the only theoretically fruitful way to approach the problem of conspiracy theories. Third: I address Hill’s claim there is no evidence George W. Bush or Tony Blair accused their critics, during the build-up (...)
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  48. Science, Assertion, and the Common Ground.Corey Dethier - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-19.
    I argue that the appropriateness of an assertion is sensitive to context—or, really, the “common ground”—in a way that hasn’t previously been emphasized by philosophers. This kind of context-sensitivity explains why some scientific conclusions seem to be appropriately asserted even though they are not known, believed, or justified on the available evidence. I then consider other recent attempts to account for this phenomenon and argue that if they are to be successful, they need to recognize the kind of context-sensitivity that (...)
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  49. What’s Wrong with Epistemic Trespassing?Joshua DiPaolo - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):223-243.
    Epistemic trespassers are experts who pass judgment on questions in fields where they lack expertise. What’s wrong with epistemic trespassing? I identify several limitations with a seminal analysis to isolate three desiderata on an answer to this question and motivate my own answer. An answer should explain what’s wrong in the cases that motivate inquiry into epistemic trespassing, should explain what’s wrong with epistemic trespassing even if trespassers do not acknowledge their trespassing, and these explanations should not be independent of (...)
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  50. Gnostic Disagreement Norms.Domingos Faria - 2022 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 18 (1):(A2)5-22.
    Our main question in this paper is as follow: (Q) What are the epistemic norms governing our responses in the face of disagreement? In order to answer it, we begin with some clarification. First, following McHugh (2012), if we employ a useful distinction in normativity theory between evaluative and prescriptive norms, there are two readings of (Q)––we explore such distinction in section 2. And secondly, we accept gnosticism, that is, the account that the fundamental epistemic good is knowledge. It is (...)
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