- Belief is weak.John Hawthorne, Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1393-1404.details
- Regularity and Hyperreal Credences.Kenny Easwaran - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (1):1-41.details
- Knowledge in Action.Jonathan Weisberg - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13.details
- Two-Context Probabilism and the Dissolution of the 'Lottery' Problem.Gregor Flock - manuscriptdetails
- How Low Can You Go? A Defense of Believing Philosophical Theories.Elizabeth Jackson - manuscriptdetails
- Rationalizing the Principal Principle for Non-Humean Chance.J. Khawaja - manuscriptdetails
- Self-locating belief and the goal of accuracy.Richard Pettigrew - manuscriptdetails
- Wittgenstein and Contemporary Belief-Credence Dualism.Guy Axtell - forthcoming - In Wittgenstein and the Epistemology of Religion. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
- That Does Not Compute: David Lewis on Credence and Chance.Gordon Belot - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.details
- How to believe long conjunctions of beliefs: probability, quasi-dogmatism and contextualism.Stefano Bonzio, Gustavo Cevolani & Tommaso Flaminio - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-26.details
- Epistemic Probabilities are Degrees of Support, not Degrees of (Rational) Belief.Nevin Climenhaga - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
- Absence of evidence against belief as credence 1.Andrew del Rio - forthcoming - Analysis.details
- Committed Neutrality in the Rational Mind.Jane Friedman - forthcoming - Analysis.details
- Should credence be sensitive to practical factors? A cost-benefit analysis.Jie Gao - forthcoming - Mind and Language.details
- Subjective Probability and its Dynamics.Alan Hajek & Julia Staffel - forthcoming - In Markus Knauff & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), MIT Handbook of Rationality. MIT Press.details
- On Accuracy and Coherence with Infinite Opinion Sets.Mikayla Kelley - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.details
- How should your beliefs change when your awareness grows?Richard Pettigrew - forthcoming - Episteme:1-25.details
- Decision theory and degree of belief.Piers Rawling - forthcoming - Philosophy of the Social Sciences.details
- Aptness and means-end coherence: a dominance argument for causal decision theory.J. Robert G. Williams - forthcoming - Sythese.details
- Accuracy and Infinity: A Dilemma for Subjective Bayesians.Mikayla Kelley & Sven Neth - 2023 - Synthese 201 (12):1-14.details
- Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality. [REVIEW]Bob Beddor - 2022 - Philosophical Review 131 (3):394-398.details
- I Hear You Feel Confident.Adam Michael Bricker - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (1):24-43.details
- Suspicious conspiracy theories.M. R. X. Dentith - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-14.details
- Categorical versus graded beliefs.Franz Dietrich - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 18.details
- Degrees of Acceptance.Alexander Dinges - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly (3):578-594.details
- What Is ‘Real’ in Interpersonal Comparisons of Confidence.Edward Elliott - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (1):102-116.details
- Comparativism and the Measurement of Partial Belief.Edward Elliott - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2843-2870.details
- Thinking, Guessing, and Believing.Ben Holguin - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1):1-34.details
- A normative comparison of threshold views through computer simulations.Alice C. W. Huang - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-23.details
- Faith and Reason.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - In Mark A. Lamport (ed.), The Handbook of Philosophy and Religion. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 167-177.details
- On the Independence of Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):9-31.details
- Why Credences Are Not Beliefs.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):360-370.details
- Probing the Mind of God: Divine Beliefs and Credences.Elizabeth Jackson & Justin Mooney - 2022 - Religious Studies 58 (1):S61–S75.details
- Epistemic Akrasia and Belief‐Credence Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson & Peter Tan - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):717–727.details
- Imprecise Credences and Acceptance.Benjamin Lennertz - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.details
- Immoral lies and partial beliefs.Neri Marsili - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (1):117-127.details
- Aggregating agents with opinions about different propositions.Richard Pettigrew - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-25.details
- Uncertainty Phobia and Epistemic Forbearance in a Pandemic.Nicholas Shackel - 2022 - In Anneli Jefferson, Orestis S. Palermos, Panos Paris & Jonathan Webber (eds.), Values and Virtues for a Challenging World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 271-291.details
- Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):201-217.details
- Two Concepts of Belief Strength: Epistemic Confidence and Identity Centrality.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13:1-4.details
- The Limits of Partial Doxasticism.Facundo M. Alonso - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly (2):326-345.details
- Moral Hazard, the Savage Framework, and State-Dependent Utility.Jean Baccelli - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (2):367-387.details
- The Problem of State-Dependent Utility: A Reappraisal.Jean Baccelli - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (2):617-634.details
- Machine-Believers Learning Faiths & Knowledges: The New Gospel of Artificial Intelligence.Virgil W. Brower - 2021 - Internationales Jahrbuch Für Medienphilosophie 7 (1):97-121.details
- A Faithful Response to Disagreement.Lara Buchak - 2021 - The Philosophical Review 130 (2):191-226.details
- Perception and probability.Alex Byrne - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:1-21.details
- Probability Filters as a Model of Belief.Catrin Campbell-Moore - 2021 - Proceedings of Machine Learning Research 147:42-50.details
- Why undermining evolutionary debunkers is not enough.Andrew del Rio - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7437-7452.details
- The relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs: A general impossibility theorem.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2021 - In Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief. Essays on the Lottery Paradox. Cambridge University Press. pp. 223-54.details
- Beliefs don’t simplify our reasoning, credences do.Alexander Dinges - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):199-207.details
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