Hume: Sympathy

This essay examines the relation between philosophical questions concerning personal identity and character development in Shaftesbury’s and Hume’s philosophy. Shaftesbury combines a metaphysical account of personal identity with a normative approach to character development. By contrasting Shaftesbury’s and Hume’s views on these issues, I examine whether character development presupposes specific metaphysical views about personal identity, and in particular whether it presupposes the continued existence of a substance, as Shaftesbury assumes. I show that Hume’s philosophy offers at least two alternatives. Moreover, (...) I consider whether and how Hume’s philosophy leaves scope for character development and how he departs from Shaftesbury’s normative project of self-formation. (shrink)

In this paper, we develop a neo-Humean response to the problem of moral inclusion by bringing Humean moral philosophy into deep and serious dialogue with Latin American philosophy. Our argument for achieving this two-fold aim unfolds as follows. In section one, we elucidate Mia Sosa-Provencio’s conception of a mestiza ethics of care. We begin by highlighting its fundamental elements, especially its concern with what we refer to as the cultural embeddedness both of moral agents and of moral patients. We then (...) explain how this aspect of the mestiza ethic poses a distinctive challenge for Humean moral philosophy. In section two, we develop a neo-Humean response to this challenge. We begin by highlighting the strengths and limits of trying to develop a response by appealing to Hume’s conceptions of sympathy and humanity. We then present what we take to be the most plausible way for a neo-Humean conception of moral philosophy to offer a satisfactory reply to the challenge posed by the mestiza ethics of care, by appealing to two key concepts from outside the system of Hume’s moral philosophy: namely, sympathetic understanding and relational humility. (shrink)

Here is an appealing position: one reason to pursue interaction with people from backgrounds that differ from our own is that doing so can improve our moral judgment. As some scholars have noticed, this position seems pedigreed by support from the famed philosophers of human sociability, David Hume and Adam Smith. But regardless of whether Hume or Smith personally held anything like the appealing position, neither might have had theoretically grounded reason to do so. In fact, both philosophers explain moral (...) judgment in ways that seem to present obstacles to the acceptance of the appealing position. This paper entertains the possibility that either of their moral theories contains resources to overcome these obstacles and implies the appealing position. I argue that Smith's theory does so more straightforwardly than Hume's does. This difference, I also argue, reveals something important about the Hume-Smith philosophical relationship. I close by sketching a way to fit the source of the appealing position in Smith's moral psychology with his focus on the desire for mutual sympathy. (shrink)

Hume’s Treatise, Enquiries and Essays contain plentiful material for an investigation into the moral nature of other animals and our moral relations to them. In particular, Hume pays considerable attention to animal minds. He also argues that moral judgment is grounded in sympathy. As sympathy is shared by humans and some other animals, this already hints at the possibility that some animals are morally considerable, even if they are not moral agents. Most contributions to the literature on animal ethics assume (...) one of the big three normative theories as their starting point; consequentialism, deontology or neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. However, as several philosophers have argued, Hume’s discussion of animals suggests a distinctive, alternative approach. I defend and develop this sort of view, building from the ground up via a careful study of Hume’s texts. In particular, I pay close attention to the operations of sympathy and the correctness conditions for moral judgments based on our sympathetic responsiveness to animal minds, addressing a number of interpretative puzzles and difficulties along the way. The result is an outline of an approach to animal ethics that is grounded in a general philosophy of nature, a naturalistic methodology and broadly plausible psychological assumptions. (shrink)

Sympathy is a powerful principle in human nature, which can change our passions, sentiments and ways of thinking. For the 18th century Scottish philosopher David Hume, sympathy is a working mechanism accountable for a wide range of communication: the ways of interacting with the others’ affections, emotions, sentiments, inclinations, ways of thinking and even opinions. The present paper intends to find a systematic reading of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature from the point of view of what the mechanism of sympathetic (...) communication implies in terms of strengthening our action of understanding, of being sensitive to, and vicariously experiencing the feelings, thoughts, and experience of others. Hume’s description of the sympathetic mechanism appears to suggest that sympathetic passions come upon us purely by natural means in a passive manner, without the active use of any of our faculties. Consequently, scholarly attention is drawn to the mechanistic character of the sympathetic process; its automatic nature is emphasized to such an extent that some experts even find it to be completely void of any reflective process. The current study investigates to what extent the sympathetic process can actively be modified and in what manner sympathetic feelings can be generated as described in Hume’s system of emotions. The paper identifies at which points the otherwise mechanically and passively operating process of sympathetic feelings is open to be modified by actively altering or strengthening certain skeletal points of the mechanism. I argue that the alterations can be initiated by the person who receives the sympathetic feelings and also by the person whose passions are transmitted, moreover even by a third party. In a seemingly mechanic model, there is room for altering or at least amplifying one’s sympathetic feelings. (shrink)

In this essay, I examine the role played by sympathy in preserving the practical dimension of Hume’s ethics. I reconstruct how sympathy works for Hume by differentiating it from the contemporary understanding of empathy, and I counter some of the objections that have been moved against Humean sympathy. I argue that Humean sympathy is instrumental in bringing about a common point of view of morality, and capable of vindicating both how we form moral judgments, and how we are moved by (...) them. I maintain that this is due to the fact that the process of the determination of the point of view of morality via sympathy is reflective in a way that makes it overlap with the perspective of the agent who acts morally. This bears consequences for the Humean notion of ethical objectivity. I conclude by indicating that such an understanding of sympathy in Hume favors an internalist reading regarding the normative status he recognizes moral reasons as having. (shrink)

En este trabajo pretendo mostrar el modo como la simpatía humeana sirve para convertir las pasiones barrocas en sentimientos morales con los que el interés puede establecerse como algo admisible en un comportamiento virtuoso. Ello supone la admisión de que no hay moralidad sino en un contexto social desde el cual se afinan los sentimientos de un modo reflexivo, aunque no únicamente racional siguiendo el mismo modelo que se usa para afinar el sentido del gusto.

In this concluding chapter to Hume’s Moral Philosophy and Contemporary Psychology, I identify and briefly discuss a series of questions that are particularly suggestive for promising avenues of future research. These questions concern six topics: (1) the nature of virtue, (2) the nature and role of sympathy, (3) the nature of moral development and moral education, (4) the nature and role of various passions, (5) the nature of moral motivation, and (6) the relationship between Hume’s ‘science of man’ and contemporary (...) cognitive science. (shrink)

Hume’s view that the object of moral feeling is a natural passion, motivating action, causes problems for justice. There is apparently no appropriate natural motive, whilst, if there were, its “partiality” would unfit it to ground the requisite impartial approval. We offer a critique of such solutions as that the missing non-moral motive is enlightened self-interest, or that it is feigned, or that it consists in a just disposition. We reject Cohon’s postulation of a moral motive for just acts, and (...) also Harris’s attempt to dispense with motive as the source of their merit, by invoking extensive sympathy, and citing their beneficial societal consequences. These solutions assume that, if Hume remains a virtue ethicist, the natural virtues supply the paradigm. Taylor claims that a revolution in motivational psychology follows the inauguration of the artificial convention of justice, remoulding the natural virtues. This solution founders, we argue, upon unresolved contradictions besetting even these virtues. (shrink)

If Hume is considered cosmopolitan in his ethics at all, he is said to be so through his anti-mercantilist approach to commerce. Prevailing commercial interpretations attribute to Hume a cosmopolitanism that is best described as instrumental and supervenient. I argue that Hume’s principles lead to a cosmopolitan ethic that is more demanding than commercial interpretations recognize. Hume’s cosmopolitanism is more than merely supervenient and its instrumentality is such that cosmopolitan regard becomes inseparable from healthy patriotic concern. I show sympathy and (...) duty, not merely justice, central to Hume’s cosmopolitanism and address how Hume’s moderate cosmopolitanism might be enacted in society. I suggest Hume’s view can contribute to contemporary cosmopolitan discourse, aiding both those forms with which it is consonant and the practical ends of otherwise opposed, Kantian forms. (shrink)

Our modern-day word for sympathy is derived from the classical Greek word for fellow-feeling. Both in the vernacular as well as in the various specialist literatures within philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, economics, and history, "sympathy" and "empathy" are routinely conflated. In practice, they are also used to refer to a large variety of complex, all-too-familiar social phenomena: for example, simultaneous yawning or the giggles. Moreover, sympathy is invoked to address problems associated with social dislocation and political conflict. It is, then, turned (...) into a vehicle toward generating harmony among otherwise isolated individuals and a way for them to fit into a larger whole, be it society and the universe.This volume offers a historical overview of some of the most significant attempts to come to grips with sympathy in Western thought from Plato to experimental economics. The contributors are leading scholars in philosophy, classics, history, economics, comparative literature, and political science. Sympathy is originally developed in Stoic thought. It was also taken up by Plotinus and Galen. There are original contributed chapters on each of these historical moments. Use for the concept was re-discovered in the Renaissance. And the volume has original chapters not just on medical and philosophical Renaissance interest in sympathy, but also on the role of antipathy in Shakespeare and the significance of sympathy in music theory. Inspired by the influence of Spinoza, sympathy plays a central role in the great moral psychologies of, say, Anne Conway, Leibniz, Hume, Adam Smith, and Sophie De Grouchy during the eighteenth century. The volume should offers an introduction to key background concept that is often overlooked in many of the most important philosophies of the early modern period.About a century ago the idea of Einfühlung was developed in theoretical philosophy, then applied in practical philosophy and the newly emerging scientific disciplines of psychology. Moreover, recent economists have rediscovered sympathy in part experimentally and, in part by careful re-reading of the classics of the field. (shrink)

I have shown here the different roles that sympathy plays in the accounts of justice in the Treatise and Enquiry. In the former work, a redirected sympathy naturally extends our concern, and subsequently our moral approval or blame, to all those included within the scope of the rules of justice. In the Enquiry, we find this same progress of sentiments, but Hume’s introduction of the sentiment of humanity allows him to make a stronger case for the importance of those virtues (...) that are useful, particularly the virtues of justice. The command of our esteem and our moral approval of justice secure a place for justice at the heart of Hume’s ethics. This does not entail, however, that other useful virtues are not also essential. Benevolence and the care of children, friendship, and gratitude not only help to sustain sociability, but they are essential for living a properly human life. (shrink)

Over the past years the relevance of compassion for society and specific practices such as in healthcare is becoming a focus of attention. Philosophers and scientists discuss theoretical descriptions and defining characteristics of the phenomenon and its benefits and pitfalls. However, there are hardly any empirical studies which substantiate these writings in specific societal areas. Besides, compassion may be in the eye of attention today but has always been of interest for many contemporary philosophers as well as philosophers in the (...) past, David Hume amongst them. Three themes related to Hume’s hypotheses on compassion are discussed and compared to outcomes of an empirical study amongst nurses and patients with a chronic disease. This comparison gives insights into the perception of those for whom compassion is of specific importance in their daily lives and into the usefulness of Hume’s notions on compassion. (shrink)

This paper starts from the premise that Spinoza and Hume share a realisticnaturalistic approach to human nature. Human beings are finite parts of nature, and as such strongly interdependent creatures. This interdependence is reflected in the central social-psychological principles that Hume and Spinoza employ, respectively sympathy and affectuum imitatio. Both principles show the immediacy of the communication of passions, and the strong influence that other people’s passions exert over our own affective lives. Central to this paper are an analysis and (...) comparison of the working of sympathy and imitation of affects. As it turns out, both philosophers consider humans to be limitedly social beings. Social, because we tend to be moved by the pains and pleasures of our fellows. Limitedly social, because our egoistic side limits the scope of our fellow-feeling, and may turn the other’s pain into our pleasure and vice versa. This puts a pressure on groups; their living together can never be truly harmonious without external interference. Spinoza and Hume, therefore, regard a further stabilisation and harmonisation of collective affective life as a key political concern. As will finally be argued, the precise way in which this concern is fleshed out in their political theories makes them occupy a shared, distinctive position in early modern political thought. (shrink)

David Hume and Adam Smith are usually, and understandably, seen as developing very similar sentimentalist accounts of moral thought and practice. As similar as Hume's and Smith's accounts of moral thought are, they differ in telling ways. This essay is an attempt primarily to get clear on the important differences. They are worth identifying and exploring, in part, because of the great extent to which Hume and Smith share not just an overall approach to moral theory but also a conception (...) of what the key components of an adequate account of moral thought will be. In the process, I hope to bring out the extent to which they both worked to make sense of the fact that we do not merely have affective reactions but also, importantly, make moral judgments. (shrink)

Hume?s account of sympathy has often been taken to describe what the discovery of so-called mirror neurons has suggested, namely, that we are able to understand one another?s emotions and beliefs through experiences that require no mediating thoughts and exactly resemble the experiences of the observed person. I will oppose this interpretation by arguing that, on Hume?s standard account, sympathy is a mechanism that produces ideas and beliefs prior to the emergence of shared feelings. To stress this aspect of Humean (...) sympathy is to show that the experiences, which mirror neurons apparently cause us to have, may well count as inferentially derived emotion-laden beliefs, thus undermining the opposition between experience-grounded and inference-based accounts of mind-reading. (shrink)

Le présent article a pour objectif de mettre en évidence un aspect de l’influence de Francis Hutcheson sur la troisième partie du Traité de la Nature Humaine de David Hume, consacrée à la morale : Hume écrit, en effet, que l’être humain est doté d’un sens moral. Cependant, la distinction qu’il opère entre la philosophie de l’anatomiste et celle du peintre, dans cette œuvre, montre qu’il se refuse à suivre totalement l’exemple de Hutcheson. Hume compte bien, au contraire, approfondir et (...) compléter une philosophie morale qu’il trouve encore superficielle chez son contemporain et même si cela implique de devoir toucher et réinterpréter les concepts clés de ce dernier. Pourtant, à y regarder de près, la notion de sympathie contribue, d’un certain point de vue, à rapprocher les deux philosophies. Le sens moral de Hume, dans le Traité, ne serait-il pas bien plus qu’une simple expression vide de contenu, comme on l’a trop souvent supposé ? Et que serait-il alors ? (shrink)

David Hume endorses three claims that are difficult to reconcile: (1) sympathy with those in distress is sufficient to produce compassion towards their plight, (2) adopting the general point of view often requires us to sympathize with the pain and suffering of distant strangers, but (3) our care and concern is limited to those in our close circle. Hume manages to resolve this tension, however, by distinguishing two types of sympathy. We feel compassion towards those around us because associative sympathy (...) causes us to mirror their pain and suffering, but our ability to enter into the afflictions of those remote from us involves cognitive sympathy and merely requires us to reflect upon how we would feel in their shoes. This hybrid theory of sympathy receives support from recent work on affective mirroring and cognitive pretense. Hume’s account should appeal to contemporary researchers, therefore, who are interested in the nature of moral imagination. (shrink)

Many prominent scholars of Hume's philosophy have suggested that Hume eventually abandoned his associationist account of sympathy, which he made so much of in the Treatise, by the time he came to write the second Enquiry. In this paper I reconsider the seeming disappearance of the associationist account of sympathy, but with the ultimate aim of defending a no-change hypothesis. That is, I’ll argue that careful analysis reveals that Hume not only retained the associationist theory of sympathy in his later (...) work, he made no substantive changes to this theory, including in particular, in EPM. (shrink)

The moral psychology of sympathy is the linchpin of the sentimentalist moral theories of both David Hume and Adam Smith. In this paper, I attempt to diagnose the critical differences between Hume's and Smith's respective accounts of sympathy in order to argue that Smithian sympathy is more properly suited to serve as a basis for impartial moral evaluations and judgments than is Humean sympathy. By way of arguing this claim, I take up the problem of overcoming sympathetic partiality in the (...) construction of a moral point of view, acknowledged by both writers, as my primary platform. My contention is that Humean sympathy is too mechanistic to actually deliver an impartial adjudicatory perspective, and that Smithian sympathy, with its evaluative, imaginative components, succeeds where Hume's account falls short. The paper is comprised of six sections: (i) introductory remarks, (ii) a discussion of Humean sympathy, (iii) a discussion of Smithian sympathy and its distinctness, (iv) a critical analysis of Hume's attempt to correct for sympathetic partiality in the construction of the judicial spectator's general point of view, (v) a critical discussion of sympathetic partiality in Smithian sympathy & (vi) a critical analysis of Smith's construction of the impartial spectator perspective as a moral point of view. (shrink)

Although empathy is arguably an important factor to consider in moral education, the concept itself has consistently stood on tenuous ground. In this essay, I claim that our adherence to ontological dualism and discrete subjectivity have problematized our comprehension of empathy. I propose that our understanding is limited by our understanding of selfhood. If the self were defined as intersubjective, along the lines of Merleau-Ponty, then empathy’s ambiguities would dissipate. After reconceptualizing empathy in light of intersubjectivity, I call for pedagogical (...) relations that are aligned with developmental research, which provides further support for adhering to an alternative conception of the phenomenon. (shrink)

Resumen: La esquematización que de Hume realiza Jhon Bricke, me condujo a plantear ciertas preguntas que encuentran un terreno fértil en el análisis que sobre la simpatía realiza Hume. Esta propuesta plantea como hipótesis fundamental que el deseo de ser apreciado es el rasgo fundamental del ser apa..

In this essay, I want to reconsider sympathy as a “natural” emotion or sentiment. Adam Smith famously defended it as such (as did his friend David Hume) but both used the term ambiguously and in a different sense than we use it today. Nevertheless, it seems to me that Smith got it quite right, that the basis of morality and justice is to be found in the realm of affect rather than in theory and principles alone, and that sympathy is (...) a “natural” or should we say a “basic” emotion. But that means that morality may not be an exclusively human characteristic, as many philosophers (including Smith and Hume) have assumed. But some contemporary thinking in psychology and philosophy makes that extension plausible. (shrink)

More than two hundred years after its publication, David Hume's Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals is still widely regarded as either a footnote to the more philosophically interesting third book of the Treatise, or an abbreviated, more stylish, version of that earlier work. These standard interpretations are rather difficult to square with Hume's own assessment of the second Enquiry. Are we to think that Hume called the EPM “incomparably the best” of all his writings only because he preferred that (...) later style of exposition? Or worse, should we take his preference for the second Enquiry as a sign of aging literary vanity? Does Hume's stated preference for the EPM in no way speak to its philosophical content? (shrink)

This dissertation examines the evolution of David Hume's ethics, focusing on moral judgment, moral motivation and ethical normativity. In chapter one, I argue that previous scholars have missed a crucial distinction between two different sympathetic processes at work in the Treatise. The first sympathetic process, "particular sympathy" is analogous to ordinary empathy and variable in just the way empathy is, but a second, non-variable process, "extensive sympathy" is the source of our moral sentiments. In chapter two, I give an account (...) of Hume's understanding of ethical normativity in the Treatise, arguing that he holds that society, our intimate relationships, and even our ability to be actively concerned with our long-term interests all depend on our adopting extensive sympathy as a standard by which to regulate our character and our passions. The view of moral motivation which then emerges is one on which our moral sentiments play the role of redirecting our natural passions and desires. ;In chapters three and four, I consider the second Enquiry, arguing that what had changed by the time of that work was not primarily the doctrine of Hume's ethics, but his view of the project of writing moral philosophy. In the Treatise, Hume seeks to explain and justify moral standards and judgments, while in the second Enquiry Hume also seeks to inspire people to regulate their lives by those standards and judgments. Only if we are alert to Hume's project in the second Enquiry will we at last resolve debates over whether Hume abandoned the doctrine of sympathy by the time of that work. Similarly, we need to understand the project of that work if we are to understand the section therein on our "interested obligation to virtue," and the appendix to that work called, "A Dialogue." ;In concluding, I place Hume against the map of contemporary ethics, arguing that philosophers with a broad variety of non-Humean and Humean committments have reason to take Hume's ethics seriously, in part because the account of Hume's ethics for which I have argued changes the map of contemporary ethics. (shrink)

David Hume's sentimentalist moral theory, especially as it appears in the Treatise, is often dismissed as a failure. First, his explanation of sympathy, the central principle of the theory, seems to be inconsistent. Second, his assumption that our moral assessments will coincide once the effects of bias are removed seems unsupported. My dissertation shows that these criticisms are unfounded. The Treatise should be read as Hume's attempt to give an explanation of human phenomena, especially morality, without appealing to theistic premises. (...) I argue that the radical re-thinking of the self at the centre of this secularizing project allows Hume to avoid the standard criticisms. ;Hume divides his treatment of the self into two parts. In Chapter 1, I consider Hume's account of personal identity, focussing on his eventual rejection of this account in the "Appendix" to the Treatise; I argue that this rejection springs from his recognition that he has failed to account for the mental activity involved in introspective examination of the mind. In Chapter 2, I examine the second part of the Hume's treatment of the self, his account of the self of the passions. I argue that Hume views the "indirect" passions of pride, humility, love, and hatred, as mechanisms by which we conceive of ourselves as inhabiting distinctive places in the social world. Chapter 3 shows how Hume's two treatments of the self come together in his explanation of sympathy in such a way that the standard criticisms of this explanation no longer apply. ;Noting Hume's repeated claim that the indirect passions accompany the moral sentiments, I argue in Chapter 4 that agreement in our moral responses is presupposed in our ability to identify character traits. They are one of the kinds of features that, by means of the passions, we recognize as making a difference to who someone is. Moral agreement follows from Hume's building the social co-ordination of attitudes into his analysis of the passions. Chapter 5 examines the role of the passions in explaining the national sense that, I argue, is presupposed in Hume's treatment of "artificial" virtues such as justice. (shrink)

La investigación humeana acerca de los principios de la moral parte de la pasión como motivo de la acción y al mismo tiempo pretende que su valoración ha de guiarse por la utilidad. Si bien son dos afirmaciones difíciles de combinar, la tesis del presente estudio es que la posibilidad de tender un puente entre la aspiración a la felicidad privada y el interés por el bienestar público está anclada, en su origen, en el sentimiento de benevolencia que el autor (...) descubre como principio original de la mente, pero logra sus efectos solamente en virtud de la fuerza de la simpatía y del espectáculo de la vida social y la conversación. Así, la moralidad -como posibilidad de realización de distinciones morales, de aprobar o censurar desde el punto devista del espectador- se articula y afina en el flujo incesante decontaminación y contagio de afecciones. (shrink)

This paper deals with Hume's criticism to Cartesian self and his account of a social self discovered through emotions, pride and sympathy. It wants to give possible solutions to Hume's contradictions on personal identity.

In his earliest work, *A Treatise of Human Nature,* Hume attempts an analysis of the forms of social cooperation and the necessity of the establishment of "rules of justice," concluding that the possibility of establishing a basic normative system requires the previous "artificial" production of reasons for acting. Among human beings, there is no natural reason to carry out acts of justice beyond benevolence, altruism and selfishness. In order to defend this thesis Hume develops an interesting syllogism, a model of (...) analysis, by means of which he refutes contemporary theories. As a result of his treatment, rights, society and the basic schemes of justice necessary for cooperation are the offsprings of the peculiarities of human mind and the species specific necessities in what he, happily for philosophy, called "circumstances of justice," and the interest and principle of sympathy. The author of this paper goes over each of the aspects of his argumentation and makes a brief commentary. (shrink)

While Hume insists that "sympathy," or fellow feeling, is the primary source of moral evaluation, he recognizes that sympathetically acquired feelings vary in emotional intensity according to a number of factors he regards as morally irrelevant. The question arises as to how the changeableness of sympathy can be reconciled with the "stable" moral judgment. It emerges that the sympathetic judgment becomes corrected by adopting, what Hume calls, a "general point of view." Specifically, the theory of belief and "general rules" in (...) Bk.I of the Treatise accounts for both the prejudice which besets the moralist and the method which corrects such prejudice. In Bk.III, Hume only makes implicit references to the place of general rules in moral judgment. It is urged that without a full appreciation of the theory of belief and general rules in Bk.I, Hume's ideas about moral judgment are far too brief to be understood and are therefore subject to a number of misconceptions. Part One examines Hume's ideas about human reason and Part Two aims to clarify Hume's notion of sympathy. Both parts seek to explain how the "trivial properties" of the imagination are responsible for the "unreasonable" judgment of fact and the "partial" judgment of merit. These properties, or over-generalizing propensities, generate the general rules of the imagination. It is by means of the general rules of the understanding, the rules which regulate initial judgments by an act of reflection, that factual judgments become reasonable and moral judgments impartial. What is of interest is the ongoing dialectic of the two sorts of general rules, the "combat" of reason and imagination, which, it is maintained, Hume never resolves. Although it is concluded that Hume's theory of moral judgment ends with the same skepticism as does his theory of belief and general rules at the close of Bk.I, the positive role that both reason and imagination play in the development of science and morality is also stressed. (shrink)

David Hume argues that the prevalence of human sympathizing justifies our attributing to humans a certain degree of benevolence. This move from sympathy to having a concern for others has been challenged by recent critics. A more fine-grained look at Hume’s concept of sympathy may reveal the reasons why he thought that experiencing sympathy implied having a benevolent attitude. Two arguments from the Treatise are analyzed and found wanting. It is suggested that Hume’s confusion may derive from ambiguities surrounding the (...) term “sympathy” and a lack of attention given to the intentional aspects of sympathizing. (shrink)

The standard interpretation of hume's ethical theory maintains that sympathy is merely an empirical feature of motivation and ethics. This article argues for an alternative interpretation according to which sympathy is a necessary feature of practical reasoning. Hence, It is impossible to deny that we have altruistic reasons, Because such a denial requires adopting a particular perspective which reveals inexorably the existence of such reasons. What this entails is that hume's ethical theory includes an argument rendering skepticism about altruism unintelligible.

Though Hume is often considered the hero of analytic philosophy in its positivistic phase, his concept of sympathy can be understood as an eighteenth- century prototype of Verstehen. Sympathy is central to Hume's moral philosophy, as he considered it the source of human motivation, social interaction, evaluation, and understanding. It has been acknowledged that sympathy, for Hume, was the human ability to associate with the sensations and passions of others. However, he also stated that this association was neither feeling nor (...) passion, but a species of communication. This sympathetic communication included not only passions and feelings, but ideas, opinions, and reason. Though somewhat inconsistently, Hume argued that the process of sympathy was hermeneutic rather than causal. Like the concept of Verstehen, sympathy requires a contextual understanding of human relations. (shrink)

The starting point of this study is the concept of the “world-opening instance” one of the most carefully created concepts in philosophical reflection, from the predominance of the being, via consciousness, to a singular mode of experience which finds its support in finiteness and dispossession . The main points of the article are the analysis of the fragile itinerary of subjectivity, the study of Da-seinas the limit of the substantialist ontology, and the experience of negativity as an appropriate form for (...) illuminating the manifestation of the self. The article highlights the contrast between this and the experience of the “you”, proposed by Gadamer and by Habermas theory of communicative action. (shrink)

The author develops an historical thesis about Hume’s moral theory in the Treatise and advances his own estimate, which goes well beyond Hume’s, of the connection between sympathy and morality. In a masterly analysis of the Treatise doctrines of sympathy and the indirect passions, Mercer reveals insurmountable difficulties in Hume’s endeavor to give morality a basis in the passions. He characterizes the technical notion of sympathy operating in the Treatise as narrow, egocentric, and amoral; and singles out both a natural (...) proclivity to prejudice and a blindness to value as its inherent limitations. (shrink)