Kant: Philosophy of History

It is commonly held that Kant, with his 1798 essay The Conflict of the Faculties, relinquishes some progressive stances and retreats to conservative positions. According to several interpreters, this is especially evident from Kant’s discussion of moral progress and public use of reason. Kant avers that moral progress can only occur through state-sanctioned education “from top to bottom” and entrusts the emergence of a state endowed with the relevant resolution and ability to “a wisdom from above” (7:92-93). According to numerous (...) interpreters, this call for state intervention and the accompanying surrender to a superhuman wisdom manifest Kant’s retreat from initially republican to later conservative positions. In Kant’s previous writings, the notion of public use of reason indicates the unrestricted freedom to communicate one’s thoughts, provided that the communication does not take place in the exercise of one’s function as a state official, and potentially encompasses all adult men. Instead, in The Conflict of the Faculties, Kant contrasts university professors’ freedom to make public use of their reason with the other public officials’ obligation “to uphold whatever […] the crown sanctions for them to expound publicly” (07:08). Thus, according to several scholars, Kant ends up disenfranchising the vast majority of people from the public use of reason and adjusting an emancipatory notion to the absolutist conception of speech and civil service. On my reading, with The Conflict of the Faculties, Kant neither retreats to conservative positions nor softens any progressive tenets of critical philosophy. On the contrary, I intend to show that a) the project of a state-sanctioned education constitutes Kant’s republican rebuttal of conservative positions on their ground, and is fully in keeping with critical philosophy; b) Kant sets forth a new notion of public use of reason that reverses the order of moral progress presented in his previous writings, but retains all its emancipatory character. I intend to support my interpretation by a) conducting a rhetorical analysis showing how Kant’s rhetoric aims to persuade the ruler that his interests are best served by fostering the regulative ideas of pure practical reason as discovered by critical philosophy; b) analysing Kant’s use of the term ‘public’ (both as the adjective ‘öffentlich’ and the noun ‘Publikum’) and showing how it retains its wide scope and emancipatory function and even expands them to areas previously subjected to legitimate censorship. (shrink)

Kant’s views on human history have been widely studied, but commentators have rarely discussed his speculative account of humanity’s origins, assuming that it does not neatly fit into his critical philosophy. This paper challenges this assumption by defending two claims. First, Kant’s major essay on this topic, “Conjectural Beginning of Human History,” is a key component of his teleological understanding of human history and should be incorporated into the study of his critical philosophy. Second, the story of humanity’s origins informs (...) Kant’s prescriptions for our moral education by better explaining individual development and providing guidelines for it. (shrink)

Kant scholars have paid relatively little attention to his raciology. They assume that his racism, as personal prejudice, can be disentangled from his core philosophy. They also assume that racism contradicts his moral theory. Lu-Adler challenges both assumptions. She shows how Kant’s raciology—divided into racialism and racism—is integral to his philosophical system as a whole. She also rejects the individualistic approach to Kant and racism. Instead, she uses the notion of racism as ideological formation to demonstrate how Kant, from his (...) social location both as a prominent scholar and as a lifelong educator, participated in the formation of modern racist ideology. -/- As a scholar, Kant developed a groundbreaking scientific theory of race from the standpoint of a philosophical investigator of nature or Naturforscher. As an educator, he transmitted denigrating depictions of the racialized others and imbued them with normative relevance. In both roles, he presented a worldview that excluded nonwhites from such goods as recognitional respect and candidacy for cultural and moral achievements. Some effects of this worldview are still palpable today. Scholars who research and teach Kant’s philosophy therefore have an unshakable burden to take part in the ongoing antiracist struggles, through their teaching practices as well as their scholarship. And they must do so in a color-conscious as opposed to colorblind way, with a pragmatic attention to nonideal social realities and a clear normative orientation toward substantial racial justice, equality, and inclusion. (shrink)

The chapter replies to Paul Guyer’s (2020) account of the debate between Mendelssohn and Kant about whether humankind makes continual moral progress. Mendelssohn maintained that progress can only be the remit of individuals, and that humankind only “continually fluctuates within fixed limits”. Kant dubs Mendelssohn’s position “abderitism” and explicitly rejects it. But Guyer contends that Kant’s own theory of freedom commits him, malgré lui, to abderitism. Guyer’s risky interpretive position is not supported by examination of the relevant texts in their (...) intellectual context. I first identify the historical origins of the term abderitism, which here signifies the independence of individual progress from social conditions. By contrast, Kant argues that individual progress cannot be independent of the progress of the species, acting as a corporate agent. This arresting position, I argue, must be understood in light of the Stoic ethical-teleological presuppositions generally accepted in eighteenth-century German discussion of human progress. (shrink)

According to an oft-repeated narrative, while Kant maintained racist views through the 1780s, he changed his mind in the 1790s. Pauline Kleingeld introduced this narrative based on passages from Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals and “Toward Perpetual Peace”. On her reading, Kant categorically condemned chattel slavery in those texts, which meant that he became more racially egalitarian. But the passages involving slavery, once contextualized, either do not concern modern, race-based chattel slavery or at best suggest that Kant mentioned it as a (...) cautionary tale for labor practices in Europe. Overall, Kant never explicitly considered chattel slavery as a moral problem to be addressed on its own. Rather, he treated it primarily in terms of its function in human history. If he ended up expressing some qualms about its practices, it was likely because they threatened to deepen intra-European conflicts and undermine the prospect of perpetual peace. The humanity of the enslaved “Negroes” was never part of the reasoning. This was not a casual oversight on Kant’s part. It reflects the complexity of his philosophical system: everything he did or did not say about chattel slavery begins to make sense once we connect his philosophy of history and his depiction of “Negroes” as natural slaves. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

This Element addresses three questions about Kant's guarantee thesis by examining the 'first addendum' of his Philosophical Sketch: how the guarantor powers interrelate, how there can be a guarantee without undermining freedom and why there is a guarantee in the first place. Kant's conception of an interplay of human and divine rational agency encompassing nature is crucial: on moral grounds, we are warranted to believe the 'world author' knew that if he were to bring about the world, the 'supreme' good (...) would come about too. Perpetual peace is the condition that enables the supreme good to be realized in history. (shrink)

My dissertation examines several proleptic bases running through Immanuel Kant’s philosophy of history. After setting preliminary ground to frame Kant’s hopeful historical viewpoint, I attempt to address and answer problems such as Yirmiyahu Yovel’s notion of “the historical antinomy” by trying to bridge the gap between reason and empirical history; to extricate Kant from Arthur Danto’s inclusion of him in a group of “substantive philosophers of history,” who all share the characteristic of presenting “prophetic” accounts of the future; as well (...) as to offer an original reading of Kant’s use of Seneca’s phrase, “Ducunt volentum fata, nolentem trahunt,” as it appears in two of the socio-political essays. Ultimately, I argue that it would be a betrayal of Kantian hope to forfeit the presumption, however unknowable, that there are teleological principles operating in history, thereby resigning ourselves to the “dismal reign of chance” (trostloses Ungefähr), a caveat that humanity cannot afford to dismiss. (shrink)

With this paper I analyze Kant’s account of the human vocation to cosmopolitanism discussed in the last section of the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View and show how Kant’s notion of cosmopolitanism requires the cooperation of pure reason and pragmatic anthropology. My main thesis is that pure reason provides regulative ideas, thereby maintaining a foundational role, and pragmatic anthropology provides empirical evidence, thereby reinforcing the theoretical and practical status of reason’s ideas. In developing my analysis, I argue that (...) Kant reframes the question ‘What is the human being?’ in a non-essential way, foregrounds a moral practical concern, and assigns freedom an unprecedented role. Finally, I relate my analysis to two questions frequently discussed in Kant scholarship, namely the problem of whether the Anthropology has only a pragmatic or also a moral scope and the problem of the relation between the Anthropology and Kant’s critical system. (shrink)

With this paper I analyze Kant’s account of the human vocation to cosmopolitanism discussed in the last section of the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (7:321-333) and show how Kant’s notion of cosmopolitanism requires the cooperation of pure reason and pragmatic anthropology. My main thesis is that pure reason provides regulative ideas, thereby maintaining a foundational role, and pragmatic anthropology provides empirical evidence, thereby reinforcing the theoretical and practical status of reason’s ideas. In developing my analysis, I argue (...) that Kant reframes the question ‘What is the human being?’ in a non-essential way, foregrounds a moral practical concern, and assigns freedom an unprecedented role. Finally, I relate my analysis to two questions frequently discussed in Kant scholarship, namely the problem of whether the Anthropology has only a pragmatic or also a moral scope and the problem of the relation between the Anthropology and Kant’s critical system. (shrink)

The ideal of the United Nations was first put forward by Immanuel Kant in his 1795 essay Perpetual Peace. Kant, in the tradition of Locke and Rousseau is a liberal who believes that relations between individuals can either be based upon law and consent or upon force and violence. One way that such the ideal of world peace could be achieved would be through the creation of a single world state, of which every human being was a citizen. Such an (...) ideal was advocated by a number of eighteenth century liberals. Kant, however, rejects this ideal and instead argues that the universal rule of law can be achieved through the establishment a federation of independent states. I examine the relevance of Kant’s arguments today, focusing on two questions: Firstly, as advocates of the rule of law, why advocate a federation of independent nations rather than a single world state. Secondly, is this ideal realizable? Is Kant right to think that republics are natural and are likely to live peacefully with one another? Kant’s arguments on this issue have been taken up again in recent decades by defenders of the theory of the “democratic peace”, the theory that democracies are more likely to live at peace with one another. (shrink)

The most apparent obstacles to a just, enlightened and peaceful social world are also, according to Kant, nature’s way of compelling us to realize those and other morally good ends. Echoing Adam Smith’s idea of the ‘invisible hand’, Kant thinks that selfishness, rivalry, quarrelsomeness, vanity, jealousy and self-conceit, along with the oppressive social inequalities they tend to produce, drive us to perfect our talents, develop culture, approach enlightenment and, through the strife and instability caused by our unsocial sociability, push us (...) towards justice, political equality and the highest good. What are we to make of these arguments, which seem to rely on questionable empirical assumptions, invoke dubious claims about natural teleology and sit uncomfortably with fundamental aspects of Kant’s ethical framework? I suggest that the arguments reveal one of Kant’s deep and important insights about the moral life by partially describing what a good and virtuous person reasonably hopes for. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall try to elucidate the relationship between nature and providence with regard to the function of guaranteeing perpetual peace in Kant's 1795 essay, an issue which, presumably for the very reason of providence being granted some role in the first place, has led to noticeable unease in Kant scholarship. Providence simply does not seem to fit in well into Kant’s philosophical account of history given the emphasis he puts on the notion of human freedom. The main (...) idea grounding my approach is that the notion of providence is not only not a threat to human freedom, but perhaps the most important ingredient in Kant’s solution of the compatibility problem with regard to human freedom and natural causal determinism. This solution of the compatibility problem, as I have argued elsewhere, must be understood along the lines of a so-called “altered law-compatibilism” which makes the special laws of nature dependent on human freedom. The role of providence then is to elucidate or explicate how such a dependency is possible. Moreover, Kant’s own definition of “providence”, which he develops as an alternative to Baumgarten’s, provides the resources of identifying it – in a sense to be qualified below – with nature and hence provides the means for solving a long-standing riddle in Kant’s account. Of course, the compatibility problem does not take centre stage in the guarantor section in any way. Rather, what Kant is doing there can best be understood as presupposing and being closely related to his compatibility argument: He can be read as spelling out the dependency of laws on nature with regard to the course of history. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Kant’s philosophy of history underwent a significant change between his 1784 Idea for a Universal History and his 1790 Third Critique. My proposal is that in between these two texts Kant decisively revised his conception of the sources of historical, i. e. cultural and political, progress: In 1784, he conceived of historical progress as primarily accomplished through social antagonism among human beings, whereas beginning in 1790, he elevates ethical cooperation into a second, significant source (...) of progress. Between 1784 and the 1790s, in other words, Kant re-conceived the collaboration between moral agents as a driving force of history and of the progressing cultivation of humankind. In this paper I offer evidence for this change and suggest reasons why it might have occurred. (shrink)

This report presents the features of the organisation and the main ideas of the international scientific conference “‘No Right of Sedition’. Kant and the Problem of Revolution in the 18th—21st Century Philosophy.” The conference was held at the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University (IKBFU) in Kaliningrad on November 9—10, 2017 and was dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the Russian Revolution. The event was organised by the Academia Kantiana — a research unit on comparative studies on Russian and Western philosophy (...) at the IKBFU’s Institute for the Humanities. The reports presented at the conference focused on the analysis of the phenomenon of revolution from Kant to the present day as well as the conceptions of revolution that appeared around the time of the Russian Revolution in 1917. The report summarises all the presentations and discussions that took place at the confe­rence in accordance with the thematic clusters. The conference confirmed that Kant’s ideas on the state and the revolution are still relevant today. (shrink)

Kant scholars have rarely addressed the notion of optimism as it was interpreted by the Königsbergian philosopher in the mid-18th century. The notion originates from Leibniz’s Theodi­cy and from debates over whether the actual world is the best of all possible worlds. The first of a two-part series, this article studies the historical context in which appeared Kant’s 1759 lecture advertisement leaflet entitled An Attempt at Some Reflections on Optimism. The study describes the requirements of the 1755 Berlin Academy of (...) Sciences’ competition for a comparison of G. W. Leibniz’s and A. Pope’s systems and an assessment of optimism. Another focus is the philological difficulties of translating Pope’s proposition “Whatever is, is right” into the French language — which was part of the competition task. The author considers the ways the proposition was translated into the Russian and German languages. The article shows the contribution of Voltaire and his Poem on the Lisbon Disaster and Candide: or, Optimism to the post factum changes in the perception of the competition results and to the emergence of new shades of meaning in the concept of optimism. The Lisbon earthquake of 1755 had a profound effect on Europe and on the perception of optimism and of the idea that the actual world is the best of all possible worlds. However, Kant’s epistolary legacy leads one to the conclusion that the philosopher examined the problem in the framework of a polemic on Crusian philosophy. This article presents Crusius’s arguments against the theory that this is the best of all possible worlds and in favour of the theory that there are several good worlds. God’s choice of the actual world owes therefore to the freedom of contradiction (libertas contradictionis) and to the freedom of contrariety (libertas contrarietatis), which are eliminated in the teaching of optimism. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 109 Heft: 3 Seiten: 504-509.

Many Kantians dismiss Kant’s claim that we have a duty to promote the highest good – an ideal world that combines complete virtue with complete happiness – as incompatible with the core of his moral philosophy. This dismissal, I argue, raises doubts about Kant’s ability to justify the moral law, yet it is a mistake. A duty to promote the highest good plays an important role in the justificatory strategy of the Critique of Practical Reason. Moreover, its analysis leads to (...) a new perspective on Kant’s conception of moral objectivity. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 109 Heft: 3 Seiten: 477-482.

History plays an important part internally to the Kantian architectonic. In what follows, I argue that Kant’s conception of history as a unified whole presents distinctive features that are illuminating about the critical and moral commitments of his philosophy, and also conversely, that his conception of philosophy makes specific demands that his philosophical history aims to fulfill. The argument is structured around four questions, each of which I take in turn: Why does Kant believe it important that history be seen (...) as forming a whole? How does he argue for the unity of the whole? What are the specific claims he makes about history? And why should anyone care for philosophical history? (shrink)

In his influential work on Kant and history, Yirmiyahu Yovel identifies a problem which he terms ‘the historical antinomy.’ The problem states that no possible mediation can take place between the atemporal realm of pure reason and the empirical realm of human history. In this paper, I aim to bridge this gap based on a two-aspect reading of the faculty of reason, and then proceed to show reason’s ability to apply transcendental ideas on empirical history for the sake of grasping (...) a rational idea of history in a single, mediated process. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 108 Heft: 2 Seiten: 288-295.

In this paper I examine Kant's conception of the history of pure reason and its relation to his metaphilosophy as it is presented in the Critique of Pure Reason [Kritik der reinen Vernunft] (KrV). In particular, I will attempt to answer the following question: why did Kant conclude the KrV with the history of pure reason and why did he insist that, without it, a gap would remain in his system? In the course of attempting to answer this question, I (...) will argue that Kant chose to conclude the KrV with a sketch of the history of pure reason because he took his ability to provide the history of pure reason to be a mark of the adequacy and success of his own philosophical system, in so far as it is the system which comprehends the nature of human reason, specifically the teleological nature of human reason (i.e., the system that recognizes that reason has intrinsic, self-imposed interests and goals) and insofar as it is the only system which, as the culmination of all the past systems of philosophy, is in a position to identify and satisfy all of the interests of human reason. (shrink)

Book Reviews Georg Cavallar, Kantian Review, FirstView Article.

The aim of this paper is to show how concern with agency, expressed in the idea that history is the doing of agents, shapes both Kant’s and Hegel’s conceptions of history and, by extension, the roles they accord philosophical historiography.

While Immanuel Kant is an epochal figure in a variety of fields, he has not figured prominently in the study of rhetoric and communication. This book represents the most detailed examination available into Kant's uneasy but often misunderstood relationship with rhetoric. By explicating Kant's complex understanding of rhetoric, this book advances the thesis that communicative practices play an important role in Kant's account of how we become better humans and how we create morally cultivating communities.

The review is available online on Estudos Kantianos.

Kant's Elliptical Path explores the main stages and key concepts in the development of Kant's Critical philosophy, from the early 1760s to the 1790s.

A review of Ulrich Lehner's recent book on Kant's philosophy of history. -/- .

Antagonism in human relations has been recognised since the beginning of Western history and has beenacknowledged as its driving and progressive force. But how exactly do contest, competition, and warcontribute to the historical progress of humankind? Coming from the position that there are timeless truthsin human history and that there is a human nature, in this paper I examine Kant’s notion of unsocialsociability from his Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose and how this notion relatesto human progress. (...) I explain the Kantian notion of the dynamics of history, his ‘unsocial sociability’, andcritique its problematic relation to his telos of nature: the formation of a universal civil union in perpetualpeace. In order to address this problem of dynamic-telos disparity I go back to the beginnings of Westernhistory, the ancient Greeks, with Nietzsche as a guiding mind. Focusing on his essay Homer onCompetition and also his book, The Birth of Tragedy I examine his uncovering of Greek ‘truth’ in relationto the division of Being in a primordial strife into beings of two opposing forms, the Apollonian andDionysian. I consider how these dual impulses were channelled, according to Nietzsche, into constructivesocial competitions and characterised the development and flourishing of Greek culture. I argue thatNietzsche’s view of human development and progress, via a republic of geniuses, overcomes the Kantiandisparity between the dynamic of history and nature’s end. (shrink)

This article provides an historical account of Kant's political, legal, and religious thought in the context of the Prussian Enlightenment.

This paper aims to understand Kant’s conception of Enlightenment and, in particular the idea of “Sapere Aude” (dare to think for yourself), described in his article published in 1784 An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment ? where he defines pre-enlightened people as living in a self-imposed “minority”. In the first part of the article, I will develop this notion, along with a process of domestication of human beings. In the second part, I will examine the solutions proposed to (...) overcome this situation, with particular emphasis on the development by the State, of the so-called “public use of reason”. (shrink)

This paper explores Michel Foucault’s contribution to rethinking the nature of the present through his examination of the ontology of contemporary reality he locates in Immanuel Kant’s “What Is Enlightenment?” By raising a series of critical questions concerning the epochal thinking that plagues Foucault’s various engagements with this text, the article goes on to argue that the attempt to find a single concept—or question—that appropriately summarizes a given era is an endeavor fraught with methodological problems. Highlighting the limitations of Foucault’s (...) approach in spite of his attempt to rethink modernity as an attitude, the paper concludes by advocating an alternative logic of history that definitively abandons epochal thinking in favor of a topological mapping of historical force fields in which it is recognized that there is no being behind time. (shrink)

A cursory overview of the most recent studies on Kant's philosophy of history might lead one to suspect that Kant was so confident of the moral potential of human reason that the future could only lead to human progress. But in fact Kant was very much conscious of the disheartening picture that human development presented. In the conclusion to his Conjectures on the Beginnings of Human History he writes: “The thinking person is assailed by a melancholy that can even lead (...) to moral corruption, something of which the unthinking person knows nothing: namely a dissatisfaction with that providence that rules the course of the world.” But Kant not wish to remain in a state of “melancholy”. He sees a possible connection between melancholy and the philosophy of history. In his relevant writings Kant addresses himself directly to the threat of this despair. The horrors of history can yield a philosophical meaning. Not history itself, but rather the philosophy of history has the capacity to console us. It can “heal” that which is lacking in wholeness through human progress. And because the history of philosophy contributes to the recovery of hope and conviction, it itself becomes an important movens of history. (shrink)

This article proposes a reading of the Kantian transcendental apperception that attempts both to reinforce the cognitive efficacy of its spontaneity and to determine the modus operandi of its unifying function . Thus, being irreducible to a pure logical form , the I think is meant to constitute the qualitative unity of all possible representational system, insofar as it performs an infinite process of semantic or narrative unification. From this standpoint, the I think denotes the key operation that produces meaning, (...) and thereby the very possibility of truth. It follows, from such a framework of a procedural and constructivist theory of truth, the absolute primacy of the establishment of a semantic community by and under the Self. This community lays the foundation of coherence or organic cohesion of contents, and coherence provides the ground where correspondence emerges, which, in the last analysis, expresses nothing but the ever unfinished agreement of donation and action, agreement of Self with Itself. (shrink)

There is a picture by Klee called Angelus Novus . It shows an angel who seems about to move away from something he stares at. His eyes are wide, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how the angel of history must look. His face is turned toward the past. Where a chain of events appears before us, he sees one single catastrophe, which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it at his feet. The angel would (...) like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise and has got caught in his wings; it is so strong that the angel can no longer close them. This storm drives him irresistibly into the future, to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows toward the sky. What we call progress is this storm. 1. (shrink)